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Speakers:Jules Coleman (Yale)Jeff McMahan (Rutgers)Jeremy Waldron (NYU) Moderator:Robin Kar (LLS) Video of Panel One
... Coleman claims that corrective justice stands (metaphorically) between our practices of tort law and abstract principles of fairness ... defending conceptual analysis, Coleman is committed to the project of identifying apriori the... more
... Coleman claims that corrective justice stands (metaphorically) between our practices of tort law and abstract principles of fairness ... defending conceptual analysis, Coleman is committed to the project of identifying apriori the "thinnest" conceptions of our concepts that answer ...
This article argues that the problems of corrective and distributive justice are, at bottom, the same. The authors argue that both can be understood as responses to the question: who owns which of life's misfortunes? Two extreme but... more
This article argues that the problems of corrective and distributive justice are, at bottom, the same. The authors argue that both can be understood as responses to the question: who owns which of life's misfortunes? Two extreme but unattractive positions set the range of possibilities. All misfortunes could be left where they fall, or all could be held in common. Neither extreme is attractive, because neither has room for the intuitive idea of responsibility, that is, that people should bear the costs of their activities. Libertarians try to incorporate that idea by adding a rule of strict liability for injuries as an exception to a general rule that injuries should lie where they fall. Liberal egalitarians seek to make room for responsibility by supposing that all misfortunes should be held in common except those to which people willingly expose themselves. The authors argue that the libertarian and the egalitarian employ parallel strategies, neither of which can succeed, beca...
Since the 1970s, analytic jurisprudence has been under attack from what has come to be known as the Critical Legal Studies (" CLS") movement. CLS has been joined in this attack by proponents of FeministJurisprudence, and, most... more
Since the 1970s, analytic jurisprudence has been under attack from what has come to be known as the Critical Legal Studies (" CLS") movement. CLS has been joined in this attack by proponents of FeministJurisprudence, and, most recently, by proponents of Critical Race Theory. When the battle lines are drawn in this way, the importance of the distinctions between the Natural Law and Positivist traditions are easily missed. Whatever distinguishes Hart from Dworkin, and both from Lon Fuller, matters very little from this point of view, as ...
... moral action (as part of which Kavka's famous “toxin puzzle” is a focus of discussion), the nature of deterrence, the rationality of ... Skyrms, Daniel M. Farrell, David Gauthier, Michael E. Bratman, Gilbert Harman, Edwin... more
... moral action (as part of which Kavka's famous “toxin puzzle” is a focus of discussion), the nature of deterrence, the rationality of ... Skyrms, Daniel M. Farrell, David Gauthier, Michael E. Bratman, Gilbert Harman, Edwin Curley, SA Lloyd, Jean Hampton, Gary Watson, Jeff McMahan. ...
... The support staff at Yale has been wonderful. I am especially grateful to Carmelita Morales for her help in preparing the manu-script for publication, and to Dean StephenYandle for making other Yale resources available to me. ...
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1736577 1 NOT FOR QUOTATION JANUARY 7, 2011 BLAMEWORTHINESS AND THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES JULES COLEMAN AND ALEX SARCH, YALE UNIVERSITY AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN ...
The oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of law COLEMAN Jules, SHAPIRO Scott.
... One argument might be that rational bargains struck from fair initial conditions produce constraints that are fair ... Why not, in other words, just preclude bargaining from unfair starting points? ... Our objection is not that it is... more
... One argument might be that rational bargains struck from fair initial conditions produce constraints that are fair ... Why not, in other words, just preclude bargaining from unfair starting points? ... Our objection is not that it is inappropriate in general to confine the choice problem or to ...

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