Malcolm K Smith

The UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board adopts an approach to information disclosure in connection with clinical treatment that moves away from medical paternalism towards a more patient-centred approach. In doing so, it reinforces the protection afforded to informed consent and autonomous patient decision making under the law of negligence. However, some commentators have expressed a concern that the widening of the healthcare providers’ duty of disclosure may provide impetus, in future cases, for courts to adopt a more rigorous approach to the application of causation principles. The aim would be to limit liability but, in turn, it would also limit autonomy protection. Such a restrictive approach has recently been adopted in Australia as a result of the High Court decision in Wallace v Kam. This paper considers whether such an approach is likely under English negligence law and discusses case law from both jurisdictions in order to provide a point of comparison from which to scope the post-Montgomery future.

Summary
- Gender dysphoria is a condition in which a child's subjectively felt identity and gender are not congruent with her or his biological sex. Because of this, the child suffers clinically significant distress or impairment in social functioning.
- The Family Court of Australia has recently received an increasing number of applications seeking authorisation for the provision of hormones to treat gender dysphoria in children.
- Some medical procedures and interventions performed on children are of such a grave nature that court authorisation must be obtained to render them lawful. These procedures are referred to as special medical procedures.
- Hormonal therapy for the treatment of gender dysphoria in children is provided in two stages occurring years apart. Until recently, both stages of treatment were regarded by courts as special medical treatments, meaning court authorisation had to be provided for both stages.
- In a significant recent development, courts have drawn a distinction between the two stages of treatment, permitting parents to consent to the first stage. In addition, it has been held that a child who is determined by a court to be Gillick competent can consent to stage 2 treatment.
- The new legal developments concerning treatment for gender dysphoria are of ethical, clinical and practical importance to children and their families, and to medical practitioners treating children with gender dysphoria. Medical practitioners should benefit from an understanding of the recent developments in legal principles. This will ensure that they have up-to-date information about the circumstances under which treatment may be conducted with parental consent, and those in which they must seek court authorisation.

Through an examination of Wallace v Kam, this article considers and evaluates the law of causation in the specific context of a medical practitioner’s duty to provide information to patients concerning material risks of treatment. To supply a contextual background for the analysis which follows, Part II summarises the basic principles of causation law, while Part III provides an overview of the case and the reasoning adopted in the decisions at first instance and on appeal. With particular emphasis upon the reasoning in the courts of appeal, Part IV then examines the implications of the case in the context of other jurisprudence in this field and, in so doing, provides a framework for a structured consideration of causation issues in future non-disclosure cases under the Australian civil liability legislation. As will become clear, Wallace was fundamentally decided on the basis of policy reasoning centred upon the purpose behind the legal duty violated. Although the plurality in Rogers v Whitaker rejected the utility of expressions such as ‘the patient’s right of self-determination’ in this context, some Australian jurisprudence may be thought to frame the practitioner’s duty to warn in terms of promoting a patient’s autonomy, or right to decide whether to submit to treatment proposed. Accordingly, the impact of Wallace upon the protection of this right, and the interrelation between it and the duty to warn’s purpose, is investigated. The analysis in Part IV also evaluates the courts’ reasoning in Wallace by questioning the extent to which Wallace’s approach to liability and causal connection in non-disclosure of risk cases: depends upon the nature and classification of the risk(s) in question; and can be reconciled with the way in which patients make decisions. Finally, Part V adopts a comparative approach by considering whether the same decision might be reached if Wallace was determined according to English law.

Disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment are increasingly coming before Australian Supreme Courts. Such cases are generally heard in the parens patriae jurisdiction where the test applied is what is in the patient’s “best interests”. However, the application of the “best interests” test, and its meaning, remains unclear in this context. To shed light on this emerging body of jurisprudence, this article analyses the Australian superior court decisions that consider an adult’s best interests in the context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment. We identify a number of themes from the current body of cases and consider how these themes may guide future decision-making. After then considering the law in the United Kingdom, we suggest an approach for assessing best interests that could be adopted by Australian Supreme Courts. We argue that the suggested approach will lead to a more structured and systematic decision-making process that better promotes the best interests of the patient.

Medical research represents a substantial departure from conventional medical care. Medical care is patient-orientated, with decisions based on the best interests and/or wishes of the person receiving the care. In contrast, medical research is future-directed. Primarily it aims to contribute new knowledge about illness or disease, or new knowledge about interventions, such as drugs, that impact upon some human condition. Current State and Territory laws and research ethics guidelines in Australia relating to the review of medical research appropriately acknowledge that the functions of medical care and medical research differ. Prior to a medical research project commencing, the study must be reviewed and approved by a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). For medical research involving incompetent adults, some jurisdictions require an additional, independent safeguard by way of tribunal or court approval of medical research protocols. This extra review process reflects the uncertainty of medical research involvement, and the difficulties surrogate decision-makers of incompetent adults face in making decisions about others, and deliberating about the risks and benefits of research involvement. Parents of children also face the same difficulties when making decisions about their child’s research involvement. However, unlike the position concerning incompetent adults, there are no similar safeguards under Australian law in relation to the approval of medical research involving children. This column questions why this discrepancy exists with a view to generating further dialogue on the topic.

Section 14(4) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 imposes – within the general licensing conditions listed in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 – a prohibition to prevent the selection and implantation of embryos for the purpose of creating a child who will be born with a “serious disability.” This article offers a perspective that demonstrates the problematic nature of the consultation, review, and legislative reform process surrounding s 14(4). The term “serious disability” is not defined within the legislation, but we highlight the fact that s 14(4) was passed with the case of selecting deaf children in mind. We consider some of the literature on the topic of disability and deafness, which, we think, casts some doubt on the view that deafness is a “serious disability.” The main position we advance is that the lack of serious engagement with alternative viewpoints during the legislative process was unsatisfactory. We argue that the contested nature of deafness necessitates a more robust consultation process and a clearer explanation and defence of the normative position that underpins s 14(4).

This paper provides an overview of the regulatory developments in the UK which impact on the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo screening techniques for the creation of “saviour siblings.” Prior to the changes implemented under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, this specific use of IVF was not addressed by the legislative framework and regulated only by way of policy issued by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). Following the implementation of the statutory reforms, a number of restrictive conditions are now imposed on the face of the legislation. This paper considers whether there is any justification for restricting access to IVF and pre-implantation tissue typing for the creation of “saviour siblings.” The analysis is undertaken by examining the normative factors that have guided the development of the UK regulatory approach prior to the 2008 legislative reforms. The approach adopted in relation to the “saviour sibling” issue is compared to more general HFEA policy, which has prioritized the notion of reproductive choice and determined that restrictions on access are only justified on the basis of harm considerations.

This editorial first describes the workshop out of which the present special issue arose. The editors then identify the need for a multidisciplinary collection examining the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 from both legal and political perspectives, including the consultation process, campaigning and parliamentary debates leading to its passage, and the concluded legislation and its effects. The editorial provides an overview of the legislative reform process, key legislative changes, and the various contributions to the special issue. Cross-cutting themes include the value of a qualitative, discourse-based approach to research in this area; the need to understand the 2008 Act in historical context; unforeseen practical implications of the legislative provisions; and silences and missed opportunities in the legislation. Finally, a postscript covers the changing landscape of hybrid embryo research since the passage of the Act, and the uncertain future of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority at the time of writing.

This article considers the regulatory position concerning altruistic surrogacy in Queensland, focusing on the intended changes to the current legal framework announced by the government in June 2012. The previous government had made significant progress by reforming surrogacy laws in 2010. However, that progress is at risk of being reversed. The proposed changes to the law would make it a criminal offence to enter into an altruistic surrogacy arrangement for certain individuals or couples. If enacted, the offence would only apply in altruistic surrogacy cases where the intended parent or parents are either single, in a same-sex relationship, or are in a heterosexual relationship of less than two years. Moreover, if enacted, the offence would apply extra-territorially. The authors argue that these changes represent a retrograde step for the law and urge the government to reconsider. This is based on the fact that they are out of step with current social attitudes, are contrary to the spirit of anti-discrimination laws, and that they are unjustified in terms of child welfare concerns.

On 1 January 2010, the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) came into force. The legislation was the outcome of a detailed review and consultation process undertaken by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. Arguably, the change to the regulatory framework represents a significant shift in policy compared to previous regulatory approaches on this topic in Victoria. This article considers the impact of the new legislation on eligibility for reproductive treatments, focusing on the accessibility of such services for the purpose of creating a “saviour sibling”. It also highlights the impact of the Victorian regulatory body’s decision to abolish its regulatory policies on preimplantation genetic diagnosis and preimplantation tissue-typing, concluding that the regulatory approach in relation to these latter issues is similar to other Australian jurisdictions where such practices are not addressed by a statutory framework.

Scientific discoveries, developments in medicine and health issues are the constant focus of media attention and the principles surrounding the creation of so called ‘saviour siblings’ are of no exception. The development in the field of reproductive techniques has provided the ability to genetically analyse embryos created in the laboratory to enable parents to implant selected embryos to create a tissue-matched child who may be able to cure an existing sick child.

The research undertaken in this thesis examines the regulatory frameworks overseeing the delivery of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in Australia and the United Kingdom and considers how those frameworks impact on the accessibility of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) procedures for the creation of ‘saviour siblings’. In some jurisdictions, the accessibility of such techniques is limited by statutory requirements. The limitations and restrictions imposed by the state in relation to the technology are analysed in order to establish whether such restrictions are justified.

The analysis is conducted on the basis of a harm framework. The framework seeks to establish whether those affected by the use of the technology (including the child who will be created) are harmed. In order to undertake such evaluation, the concept of harm is considered under the scope of John Stuart Mill’s liberal theory and the Harm Principle is used as a normative tool to judge whether the level of harm that may result, justifies state intervention or restriction with the reproductive decision-making of parents in this context.

The harm analysis conducted in this thesis seeks to determine an appropriate regulatory response in relation to the use of pre-implantation tissue-typing for the creation of ‘saviour siblings’. The proposals outlined in the last part of this thesis seek to address the concern that harm may result from the practice of pre-implantation tissue-typing. The current regulatory frameworks in place are also analysed on the basis of the harm framework established in this thesis.

The material referred to in this thesis reflects the law and policy in place in Australia and the UK at the time the thesis was submitted for examination (December 2009).

This paper provides an overview of the regulatory aspects of assisted reproductive technologies in Australia. The paper focuses on the regulatory issues specific to the State of Queensland and considers how the law impacts on the accessibility of reproductive services.

The regulation of assisted reproductive technology (ART) in Australia is a complicated mix of legislation, professional standards and guidelines. The legislation in Victoria, South Australia, and Western Australia, place limits on access to fertility services that do not exist in the non-statutory jurisdictions. Those who are clinically infertile or at risk of passing on a genetic disease or disorder if they were to naturally conceive are able to access services. However, it is arguable that the statutory eligibility criteria remain discriminatory in two ways despite the impact of previous court challenges. Firstly, it remains discriminatory to deny access to single and lesbian women unless they have been unable to conceive after having heterosexual intercourse over a required time frame. The main focus of the paper however, relates to the second aspect of the statutory eligibility criteria, particularly in relation to the creation of saviour siblings. Some couples seek access to IVF services on the basis that they wish to have another child who would also be a tissue type match for an existing ill child. The use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis offers assistance in establishing tissue type prior to implantation of an embryo in the IVF cycle. However, under the current statutory eligibility criteria, a couple will only be granted access if they are themselves at risk of passing on a genetic disease or disorder. This means a couple who wish to use PGD solely to detect tissue type would not fall within the eligibility criteria. The lack of eligibility criteria in the non-statutory jurisdictions means that the technology is potentially available for detecting tissue compatibility regardless of whether the parents are themselves at risk of passing on a genetic disease. A distinction that is arguably irrelevant.

Advances in the field of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) have been revolutionary. This book focuses on the use of ARTs in the context of families who seek to conceive a matching sibling donor as a source of tissue to treat an existing sick child. Such children have been referred to as 'saviour siblings'. Considering the legal and regulatory frameworks that impact on the accessibility of this technology in Australia and the UK, the work analyses the ethical and moral issues that arise from the use of the technology for this specific purpose. The author claims the only justification for limiting a family's reproductive liberty in this context is where the exercise of reproductive decision-making results in harm to others. It is argued that the harm principle is the underlying feature of legislative action in Western democratic society, and as such, this principle provides the grounds upon which a strong and persuasive argument is made for a less-restrictive regulatory approach in the context of 'saviour siblings'. The book will be of great relevance and interest to academics, researchers, practitioners and policy makers in the fields of law, ethics, philosophy, science and medicine.