- Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden
Isaac Taylor
Stockholm University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
Many governmental policies are justified by the need to protect national security. But the concept of security is often underspecified in this context. If nothing else, security involves freedom from (significant) risks of harm. But... more
Many governmental policies are justified by the need to protect national security. But the concept of security is often underspecified in this context. If nothing else, security involves freedom from (significant) risks of harm. But should we expand our conception of security to include other elements? This paper argues that, in answering this question, we need to consider the role that security plays in politics. It defends a conception of security that locates its value primarily in the protection of the autonomy of individuals. While this explains why various risks of harm should be viewed as set-backs to security, other sorts of threats will also be included. Finally, it considers the implications of this account for questions of security policy. It is claimed that international cooperation on security matters, far from the optional policies they are often viewed as, may in fact be necessary for states to be legitimate.
Research Interests:
When artificial intelligence (AI) is used to make high-stakes decisions, some worry that this will create a morally troubling responsibility gap-that is, a situation in which nobody is morally responsible for the actions and outcomes that... more
When artificial intelligence (AI) is used to make high-stakes decisions, some worry that this will create a morally troubling responsibility gap-that is, a situation in which nobody is morally responsible for the actions and outcomes that result. Since the responsibility gap might be thought to result from individuals lacking knowledge of the future behavior of AI systems, it can be and has been suggested that deploying explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) techniques will help us to avoid it. These techniques provide humans with certain forms of understanding of the systems in question. In this paper, I consider whether existing XAI techniques can indeed close the responsibility gap. I identify a number of significant limits to their ability to do so. Ensuring that responsibility for AI-assisted outcomes is maintained may require using different techniques in different circumstances, and potentially also developing new techniques that can avoid each of the issues identified.
Research Interests:
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) to make high-stakes decisions is sometimes thought to create a troubling responsibility gap-that is, a situation where nobody can be held morally responsible for the outcomes that are brought about.... more
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) to make high-stakes decisions is sometimes thought to create a troubling responsibility gap-that is, a situation where nobody can be held morally responsible for the outcomes that are brought about. However, philosophers and practitioners have recently claimed that, even though no individual can be held morally responsible, groups of individuals might be. Consequently, they think, we have less to fear from the use of AI than might appear to be the case. This paper assesses this claim. Drawing on existing philosophical models of collective responsibility, I consider whether changing focus from the individual to the collective level can help us identify a locus of responsibility in a greater range of cases of AI deployment. I find that appeal to collective responsibility will be of limited use in filling the responsibility gap: the models considered either do not apply to the case at hand or else the relevant sort of collective responsibility, even if present, will not be sufficient to remove the costs that are often associated with an absence of responsibility.
Research Interests:
Criminal justice systems have traditionally relied heavily on human decision-making, but new technologies are increasingly supplementing the human role in this sector. This paper considers what general limits need to be placed on the use... more
Criminal justice systems have traditionally relied heavily on human decision-making, but new technologies are increasingly supplementing the human role in this sector. This paper considers what general limits need to be placed on the use of algorithms in sentencing decisions. It argues that, even once we can build algorithms that equal human decision-making capacities, strict constraints need to be placed on how they are designed and developed. The act of condemnation is a valuable element of criminal sentencing, and using algorithms in sentencingeven in an advisory role threatens to undermine this value. The paper argues that a principle of "meaningful public control" should be met in all sentencing decisions if they are to retain their condemnatory status. This principle requires that agents who have standing to act on behalf of the wider political community retain moral responsibility for all sentencing decisions. While this principle does not rule out the use of algorithms, it does require limits on how they are constructed.
Research Interests:
In this paper, we draw attention to an unintended but severe side effect of just war thinking: the fact that it can impose barriers to making peace. Investigating historical material concerning a series of conflicts in China during the... more
In this paper, we draw attention to an unintended but severe side effect of just war thinking: the fact that it can impose barriers to making peace. Investigating historical material concerning a series of conflicts in China during the early twentieth century, we suggest that operating in a just war framework might change actors' identities and interests in a way that makes peacemaking an unavailable action. But since just war theory places significant normative constraints on how long wars can be continued, it might thus be selfdefeating, in the sense that those who adopt it may undermine the very goals which it is supposed to serve. Whether this finding calls for a revision of existing ethical frameworks governing warfare will depend on whether there are possible alternatives to just war theory that perform better at reining in unjust violence.
Research Interests:
The use of military force abroad is a significant part of some states’ counterterrorist efforts. Can these operations be ethically justified? This paper considers whether the underlying principles that philosophers have put forward to... more
The use of military force abroad is a significant part of some states’ counterterrorist efforts. Can these operations be ethically justified? This paper considers whether the underlying principles that philosophers have put forward to justify humanitarian interventions (which may underlie the international norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P)) can also give support for foreign counterterrorist interventions of this sort. While it finds that the limits to international action that are imposed by the need to respect state sovereignty do not rule out counterterrorist interventions, it urges caution in supporting an international norm permitting them. Because such a norm would be open to manipulation and abuse, it may be preferable to discourage appealing to it in order to justify military counterterrorism.
Research Interests:
The principle of fairness is a moral principle which states that individuals are under an obligation to contribute towards beneficial cooperative projects. It has been appealed to in arguing that citizens are obligated to pay for public... more
The principle of fairness is a moral principle which states that individuals are under an obligation to contribute towards beneficial cooperative projects. It has been appealed to in arguing that citizens are obligated to pay for public goods that their government supplies. Yet the principle has faced a number of powerful objections, most notably those of Robert Nozick. In responding to some of these objections, proponents of the principle have placed a number of conditions on its application. However, by doing so, they have reduced the number of public goods that the principle can explain obligations to contribute towards, and consequently limited its relevance to questions of political obligation. I argue here that a more permissive version of the principle, with fewer conditions on its application, will perform equally well in responding to Nozick's objections. This opens up the possibility of a theory of political obligation that relies more heavily on the principle of fairness than has previously been thought possible.
Research Interests:
Dominant normative theories of armed conflict orientate themselves around the ultimate goal of peace. Yet the deployment of these theories in the international sphere appears to have failed in advancing toward this goal. In this paper, we... more
Dominant normative theories of armed conflict orientate themselves around the ultimate goal of peace. Yet the deployment of these theories in the international sphere appears to have failed in advancing toward this goal. In this paper, we argue that one major reason for this failure is these theories' use of essentially contested concepts-that is, concepts whose internally complex character results in no principled way of adjudicating between rival interpretations of them. This renders the theories susceptible to manipulation by international actors who are able to pursue bellicose policies under the cover of nominally pacific frameworks, and we show how this happened historically in a case study of the Korean War of 1950-1953. In order to better serve the goals of peace, we suggest, the rules of war should be reframed to simpler, but more restrictive, normative principles.
Research Interests:
There has recently been increasing interest in the possibility and ethics of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), which would combine sophisticated AI with machinery capable of enacting deadly force. One objection to LAWS is that... more
There has recently been increasing interest in the possibility and ethics of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), which would combine sophisticated AI with machinery capable of enacting deadly force. One objection to LAWS is that their use will create a troubling responsibility gap, where no human agent can properly be held accountable for the outcomes they create. While some authors have attempted to show that individual agents can, in fact, be responsible for the behaviour of LAWS in various circumstances, this will not be possible in all cases. This paper argues, however, that by assigning responsibilities to group agents operating within the military-industrial complex, as well as the military-industrial complex as a whole, we may be able to close the responsibility gap, or at least reduce its costs. Insofar as the potential for responsibility gaps poses an ethical barrier to the development and deployment of LAWS, this argument, if sound, may show their use to be morally permissible in a greater range of cases.
Research Interests:
There has been a huge growth in the size and number of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in the last decade or so. In this context, the question of when, if ever, states should hire PMSCs to carry out military operations has... more
There has been a huge growth in the size and number of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in the last decade or so. In this context, the question of when, if ever, states should hire PMSCs to carry out military operations has gained particular urgency. In this paper, I defend the answer that states should do so whenever PMSCs will be the most effective agents available against a number of recent objections. All of these objections claim that considerations aside from the relative effectiveness of PMSCs should bear on the question. Some argue that there is something inherently morally problematic with hiring PMSCs, and thus infer that they should sometimes not be hired even when they are the most effective agents available. Others point to undesirable side-effects that hiring PMSCs is thought to cause, and claim that these should be taken into account when deciding whether to hire them. I argue, however, that all of these further considerations are either irrelevant to the decision or reducible to effectiveness.
Research Interests:
Philip Pettit has argued that more robust harms are worse than less robust ones, other things equal, and thinks that appealing to this presumption can help us rationalise the appeal of a number of widely-held moral principles. In this... more
Philip Pettit has argued that more robust harms are worse than less robust ones, other things equal, and thinks that appealing to this presumption can help us rationalise the appeal of a number of widely-held moral principles. In this paper, I challenge this view. I argue against the presumption and suggest that, even if it were correct, it could not give much support to the moral principles that Pettit discusses. I also claim, however, that Pettit has the resources at his disposal to explain the attraction of the principles in another way, and lay out how such an explanation would proceed. As moral heuristics, at least, these principles can be grounded on the need to maintain social norms necessary to guarantee individuals' security.
Research Interests:
Governments around the world collect huge amounts of personal data from their citizens (as well as foreigners) for counterterrorist purposes. While mining this data has arguably increased the security of populations, the practices through... more
Governments around the world collect huge amounts of personal data from their citizens (as well as foreigners) for counterterrorist purposes. While mining this data has arguably increased the security of populations, the practices through which this data is currently collected in many countries have been criticised for violating individuals' rights to privacy. Yet it is not clear what a permissible data-collection regime (if one is possible) would look like, and thus also how we could reform existing regimes to make them morally acceptable. This paper explores a number of ways in which we might justify a data-collection regime to those affected in spite of the set-backs to their privacy. In contrast to existing justifications, I argue that individuals can be asked to surrender their personal data as a requirement of reciprocity in a cooperative system in which they gain security from others doing likewise. Relying on this justification, though, has significant implications for how we should reform existing data-collection regimes. In particular, more stringent limits will need to be placed on the forms which these regimes can legitimately take.
Research Interests:
This paper considers whether just war theory needs to be modified to assess the use of military force against terrorist groups. It rejects two existing arguments for doing this ("the contractualist justification" and "the policing... more
This paper considers whether just war theory needs to be modified to assess the use of military force against terrorist groups. It rejects two existing arguments for doing this ("the contractualist justification" and "the policing model"), and outlines and defends a third ("the consequentialist justification"). Just war theory, it is claimed, is partially designed to bring about certain desirable consequences, and when empirical circumstances change in ways that mean following its principles is less likely to result in those consequences-as when terrorist groups are involved in conflicts-they need to be adjusted.
Research Interests:
It is widely thought that the international community, taken as a whole, is required to take action to prevent terrorism. Yet what each state is required to do in this project is unclear and contested. This paper examines a number of... more
It is widely thought that the international community, taken as a whole, is required to take action to prevent terrorism. Yet what each state is required to do in this project is unclear and contested. This paper examines a number of bases on which we might assign responsibilities to conduct counter-terrorist operations to states. I argue that the ways in which other sorts of responsibilities have been assigned to states by political philosophers will face significant limitations when used to assign the necessary costs of preventing terrorism. I go on to suggest that appealing to the principle of fairness -- which assigns obligations on the basis of benefits received from cooperative endeavours -- may be used to make up the shortfall, despite this principle having received relatively little attention in existing normative accounts of states’ responsibilities.
Research Interests:
Political integration in the European Union creates the need for a common means of communication among the various linguistic communities in Europe. One way of meeting this need is unilingualism: the use of a single language as a "lingua... more
Political integration in the European Union creates the need for a common means of communication among the various linguistic communities in Europe. One way of meeting this need is unilingualism: the use of a single language as a "lingua franca". While this option has been thought to be efficient, this does not mean that we should necessarily choose it. This paper argues that a unilinual Europe will inevitably be unfair despite recent attempts to show otherwise, since non-native speakers of the lingua franca will pick up the costs of learning it while native speakers can free-ride on their efforts. This unfairness provides a reason for preferring alternative means of facilitating communication. In particular, multilingualism - communication through translators and interpreters - may be preferable.
Research Interests:
Language use is a public good. Those using a common language receive benefits that are non-excludable and non-rival. And as more people speak the same language, the greater these benefits are. Sometimes individuals make a conscious... more
Language use is a public good. Those using a common language receive benefits that are non-excludable and non-rival. And as more people speak the same language, the greater these benefits are. Sometimes individuals make a conscious decision to learn a language other than their native language in order to receive these benefits, and thereby incur costs. This paper is an attempt to determine how we should share the costs among all beneficiaries. I argue against Van Parijs’s proposal for this, and instead argue that an approach found in the work of Gauthier is preferable. A general lesson to be drawn from this paper is that the correct principle for distributing the costs of (global) public goods will depend on whether we think the good in question is required by justice or not. Where Van Parijs went wrong, I claim, was in thinking that a cross-border common language is required by justice.
Research Interests:
A practice-dependent theory of justice holds that principles of justice depend, in their content, on the nature of the practice that they are intended to regulate. Institutionalism, one variety of practice-dependent theory, claims that it... more
A practice-dependent theory of justice holds that principles of justice depend, in their content, on the nature of the practice that they are intended to regulate. Institutionalism, one variety of practice-dependent theory, claims that it is institutional form which determines principles of justice. Specifically, principles of justice should enable the effective pursuit of the point and purpose of the institution they regulate. One consequence of this view is that it cannot be a duty of justice to set up new institutions when none already exist, as there are no principles of justice in the absence of institutions – call this the “conservative institutionalist claim”. In this paper, I argue against this claim, and use the case of global public goods as an example of when there can be duties of justice to set up new institutions.