Alexander Kostyuk

The challenging issues in corporate governance and company performance were explored in the international conference that took place in Lisbon on October 26th, 2017, entitled “Corporate governance and company performance: Exploring the challenging issues” (the joint organization was composed by ISEG Lisbon, publishing house “Virtus Interpress”, ADVANCE/CSG Research Center and Virtus Global Center for Corporate Governance). The main purpose of the conference was to provide the platform at international level for academics to analyse recent trends and upcoming challenges in corporate governance and company performance, major challenges and new horizons in further research. Keynote speakers addressed valuable suggestions and examples of how researchers focused on the board of directors can learn from research approaches of behavioural scientists regarding individual and group behaviour. Scholars participated in the conference concluded that insights from various disciplines should be combined for performing more precise and accurate research on corporate boards. Moreover, scholars identified main challenges currently facing the boards, namely the exponential rise in the number of risks and the difficulties of developing relevant strategies. A relevant discussion was raised concerning as to whether discretionary accruals fit methodological needs of researchers focused on corporate governance and on the financial information disclosed. In the line with recent practices in corporate governance in Europe, scholars suggested that female directors were associated with fewer income-increasing discretionary accruals.

This manuscript is aimed at highlighting the most recent trends in corporate governance, ownership and control based on the manuscripts presented at the international conference “Corporate Governance, Ownership and Control” that took place in Rome on February 27, 2017. We have also used reputable papers published in the relevant academic journals in the past to support the arguments stated by the authors of the papers, presented at the conference. This paper covers a wide range of corporate governance topics in corporate ownership and control toward corporate governance mechanisms, such as board of directors, the board diversity, directors’ remuneration, firm performance, auditing and accounting, etc. We saw a growing interest of researchers to widen the scope of their major research to link it to corporate ownership and control issues. Currently, corporate governance research follows two major routs: classical empirical corporate governance research and multidisciplinary research aimed at findings non-conventional methods to solution of existing problems.

The article explores the structure of corporate ownership in banking sector in Ukraine during anafter-privatization period of time from 1998 to 2003. It was concluded that the share of insiders1inthe structure of corporate ownership in banking sector in Ukraine remarkably increased. The shareof outsiders almost did not change. Thus, privatization has led to transferring the corporate ownershipfrom the State to insiders. Development of the process of concentration of corporate ownershipstructure in banks in Ukraine is controlled by two groups of investors. These are management(executives) of the banks and institutional investors. Major objective of purchasing shares bymanagement is obtaining a total control over the compensation policy. Role of minority shareholdersis very weak and there rights are not protected enough to let them participate actively in corporategovernance. Keywords : corporate ownership, executives, institutional investors, privatization

... Alexander N. Kostyuk, Konstantin Tchernyshov, Helen Kostyuk Abstract ... The virtual owners of the group are the residents of Ukraine Konstantin Zhevago and Aleksey Kucherenko. The operational governance is carried out by Sergey Veselov and Igor Frunze. ...

The article explores the structure of corporate ownership in Ukraine during an after-privatization period of time from 1998 to 2001. It was concluded that the share of insiders1 in the structure of corporate ownership in Ukraine remarkably increased. The share of outsiders almost did not change. Thus, "industrial" privatization has led to transferring the corporate ownership from the State to

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... Alexander Kostyuk, Candidate in Sciences (Finance) and Assistant Professor in Corporate Governance, Department of Management and Foreign ... Igor Goumeniuk: Sergey and Andrew Momots, Danko Company directors; Sergey Tarouta, director of ISD Company; Raouvil ...

The main research question of this research is: "Does an ownership structure influence performance of executive compensation in Ukraine?". A very detailed investigation of the most active Ukrainian joint stock companies has been undertaken. Total number of the companies under research is 50. Period of investigation is from 1998 to 2003. Fixed-based compensation is still the major form to reward executives at Ukrainian companies. From this perspective, Ukrainian practices for rewarding executives belongs to Continental model, developed in Germany. It can be explained by lack of: appropriate legislation, allowing stock based compensation; liquid stock market; lack of knowledge of directors (members of supervisory boards) on incentive based compensation; lack of control and executive monitoring functions by supervisory board.

The author reports on the corporate board practices in Ukraine. The roles of board of directors are mainly about control. The strategic and advisory roles are not developed. The mode of strategic involvement of the members of supervisory boards in Ukraine is mainly about reviewing and approving. Thus, the board of directors in Ukraine is "a rubber stamp". The degree of independence of directors is very low. Major board practices in Ukraine are: small number of independent directors on the board; low frequency of meeting of the board; small number of committees on the board; the management board influences the supervisory board. Board practices in Ukraine need a sort of recommendations, similar to those, made in UK at the end of 1990s, and at the start of the third millennium.

The paper considers board practices in the Ukraine and developed countries such as the USA, the UK, Germany and Japan. Investigation on the board practices in the Ukraine is the first ever has been conducted. As a result of investigation undertaken, major conclusions have been made. The most important of them is that the German model is getting spread in the Ukraine from year to year. Major evidences are small number of independent directors on the board, low frequency of meeting of the board, small number of committees on the board, the management board influences the supervisory board. The main reason of closing the board practices in the Ukraine to those in Germany is increase in concentration of ownership that is following with increase in corporate control, violation of the minority shareholders' rights, increase in number of conflicts of interests and decrease in transparency of the Ukrainian joint stock companies.

We examine the economic reasons underlying the behavior of some senior managers to inflate their firms' reported earnings. While the extant literature cites accounting and corporate governance structure as potential reasons that facilitate the inflating tendency, we conjecture that opportunism at different hierarchical levels within firms do not leave much scope for some senior managers to improve firms' fundamental performance. To protect their personal utility, they resort to inflating tendency, but only if the firms' corporate governance has loopholes. A major solution offered here is to improve firms' internal management control system which could reduce within-firm opportunism. However, this solution must accompany improvements to corporate governance.