Ownership Structure

Neither the existence of a global tendency toward the centralization of capital as theorized by Marx
nor the possible links between economic crisis and capital centralization have been verified by empirical
studies. Using techniques of complex network analysis applied to the Thomson Reuters Eikon database we
introduce a definition of centralization as network control and present a first study of its global evolution
from 2001 to 2016. We find that the global network control is highly centralized: the fraction of the
top holders cumulatively holding the 80% of the global economic value of the companies examined does
never exceed 2%. Furthermore, by inspecting the temporal dynamics of the phenomenon we observe a
relevant increase in the centralization of capital: this trend assumes a more regular and general character
since the financial crisis started in 2007, with a growth of more than 20%.

This paper examines the impact of intellectual capital and corporate governance on company's performance in the world on the basis of previous studies. The study particularly focuses on how intellectual capital and its components such as human capital, structural capital and corporate governance variables such as board structure, ownership structure influence company's performance. The review paper comprises of seven important parts. The first part of the paper reviews the literature on financial performance of companies. Second section reviews the literature on intellectual capital. Third part summarizes the literature on components of intellectual capital. Fourth section reviews the literature on corporate governance. Fifth section studies the literature on components of corporate governance. Sixth and seventh section studies the influence of intellectual capital and corporate governance variables on company's performance. The study reveals that intellectual capital has significant relation with company's performance and is an efficient indicator of long run performance of companies. Evidence also proves that corporate governance variables such as board size, number of committees, board meetings and ownership structure influence the performance of company's both positively and negatively.

Purpose: This paper investigates the effect of corporate board attributes, ownership structure and firm-level characteristics on both corporate mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviour in annual reports of Libyan firms.
Design/methodology/approach:  Multivariate regression techniques are used to estimate the effect of corporate board and ownership structures on mandatory and voluntary disclosures of a sample of Libyan firms between 2006 and 2010.
Findings: Our results are as follows. First, we find that board size, board composition, the frequency of board meetings and the presence of an audit committee have an impact on the level of corporate disclosure. Second, this study finds an evidence that director ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership and institutional ownership have a non-linear effect on the level of corporate disclosure. Finally, we find that firm age, liquidity, listing status, industry type and auditor type are positively associated with the level of corporate disclosure. Limitation: Future research could investigate disclosure practices using other channels of corporate disclosure, such as corporate websites. Useful insights may be offered also by future studies by conducting in-depth interviews with corporate managers, directors and owners regarding these issues.
Implication: Investors may also rely on such corporate governance characteristics to shape expectations about voluntary and/or mandatory information disclosure. Originality/value: Existing disclosure studies have mainly examined governance and voluntary disclosure relationship in non-listed firms. Our study, therefore, extends, as well as contributes to the existing literature by the examining the governance-disclosure nexus relating to both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in both listed and non-listed firms.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Board and ownership structures; Corporate disclosure behaviour; Multi-theoretical perspective.