Marko Savic

In the wake of the Cold War, Yugoslavia and its successor states were engulfed in a series of conflicts, including armed ones. In all of the republics - the newly independent states of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia’s then-province of Kosovo, but with the exception of Slovenia - these conflicts were primarily ethnically driven. The only former Yugoslav republic to avert armed conflict in the 1990s was Montenegro, which regained its independence peacefully in 2006. In this article, the authors respond to the research question of why, out of all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, was it only in Montenegro in which there was no ethnic conflict during the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation? The authors apply the Randall Collins theory of social conflicts to the case study of Montenegro. This theory combines geopolitical and ethnic factors for the absence or outbreak of conflicts, something which has a strong explanatory potential for this case stud...

In the wake of the Cold War, Yugoslavia and its successor states were engulfed in a series of conflicts, including armed ones. In all of the republics - the newly independent states of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia’s then-province of Kosovo, but with the exception of Slovenia - these conflicts were primarily ethnically driven. The only former Yugoslav republic to avert armed conflict in the 1990s was Montenegro, which regained its independence peacefully in 2006. In this article, the authors respond to the research question of why, out of all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, was it only in Montenegro in which there was no ethnic conflict during the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation? The authors apply the Randall Collins theory of social conflicts to the case study of Montenegro. This theory combines geopolitical and ethnic factors for the absence or outbreak of conflicts, something which has a strong explanatory potential for this case stud...

In the wake of the Cold War, Yugoslavia and its successor states were engulfed in a series of conflicts, including armed ones. In all of the republics - the newly independent states of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia’s then-province of Kosovo, but with the exception of Slovenia - these conflicts were primarily ethnically driven. The only former Yugoslav republic to avert armed conflict in the 1990s was Montenegro, which regained its independence peacefully in 2006. In this article, the authors respond to the research question of why, out of all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, was it only in Montenegro in which there was no ethnic conflict during the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation? The authors apply the Randall Collins theory of social conflicts to the case study of Montenegro. This theory combines geopolitical and ethnic factors for the absence or outbreak of conflicts, something which has a strong explanatory potential for this case stud...

In the wake of the Cold War, Yugoslavia and its successor states were engulfed in a series of conflicts, including armed ones. In all of the republics - the newly independent states of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia’s then-province of Kosovo, but with the exception of Slovenia - these conflicts were primarily ethnically driven. The only former Yugoslav republic to avert armed conflict in the 1990s was Montenegro, which regained its independence peacefully in 2006. In this article, the authors respond to the research question of why, out of all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, was it only in Montenegro in which there was no ethnic conflict during the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation? The authors apply the Randall Collins theory of social conflicts to the case study of Montenegro. This theory combines geopolitical and ethnic factors for the absence or outbreak of conflicts, something which has a strong explanatory potential for this case stud...

In the wake of the Cold War, Yugoslavia and its successor states were engulfed in a series of conflicts, including armed ones. In all of the republics-the newly independent states of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia's then-province of Kosovo, but with the exception of Slovenia-these conflicts were primarily ethnically driven. The only former Yugoslav republic to avert armed conflict in the 1990s was Montenegro, which regained its independence peacefully in 2006. In this article, the authors respond to the research question of why, out of all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, was it only in Montenegro in which there was no ethnic conflict during the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation? The authors apply the Randall Collins theory of social conflicts to the case study of Montenegro. This theory combines geopolitical and ethnic factors for the absence or outbreak of conflicts, something which has a strong explanatory potential for this case study. Through a multidisciplinary approach, based on a case study as a qualitative method, the authors analyse various factors so that they are able to reach concrete conclusions in a comprehensive manner. The analysis covers historical, demographic, political, and special ethical aspects in Montenegro. Our explanation of the most important causes which ensured the absence of ethnic conflict in Montenegro is based on perspectives of what can be referred to as the neo-Weberian and anti-foundationalism approaches which emphasise the behaviour of the state, as well as geopolitical circumstances, as prime examples for the emergence or absence of ethnic-based conflict.

Analiza fenomena prezidencijalizacije u Crnoj Gori jedan je od proizvoda objavljenih u posljednjoj fazi projekta „Balkanska komparativna studija izbora: prezidencijalizacija političkih partija kao ograničenje unutarpartijske demokratije“, koji je Centar za monitoring i istraživanje CeMI sproveo u partnerstvu sa Fakultetom političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, NVO „Demokratija za razvoj“ sa Kosova, Albanskim institutom za političke studije, te grupama ekperata iz Bosne i Hercegovine i Makedonije, a uz podršku Regionalnog programa za promociju istraživanja na Zapadnom Balkanu (RRPP).

The wave of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa left thousands of people within Europe's borders, causing a variety of consequences for intra-European migration. In this paper, the author analyzes the causes and consequences of the unwillingness of the European Union (EU) to provide a unique response to the migrant crisis. The aim of this paper is to examine the cracks in the "common voice" of the EU on the occasion of this crisis and their impact on the behavior of the 'transit' countries. Based on the content analysis, comparative-historical analysis and using available statistical data, author researches the impact of the migrant crisis on different responses of the " transit " countries caused by weakness of the EU to respond to this crisis with common solutions. On the theoretical level, the author deals with the implications of this crisis on the emergence of " democracy of the wall " , the crisis of common values of the EU and almost only the " financial model" of the response to the crisis. Based on historical analysis, the author argues the EU's failure in a way that its members (Hungary, Croatia and the Czech Republic) respond to the migration crisis by raising the walls and refusing to accept a part of the refugees within the quotas proposed by the EU. These are the same countries that experienced massive emigration during the 20th century (eg migrations caused by the crisis in relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union in 1956). Furthermore, the author uses the available data on the EU's extensive financial support and concludes that such a policy has attempted to replace the vacuum in non-unification within the EU itself. The EU has set up an 'only' financial model as a response to the migration crisis, and only in 2015 resources have risen to 9.5 billion euros for this purpose. In that year, 'transit' countries outside the EU, Serbia, and Macedonia received 17 million euros from EU, but this amount allocated for Serbia increase to 50 million by 2017. On the other hand, little has been done to encourage sustainable legal solutions in these countries, which would protect human rights of migrants. In this paper, the author also analyzes public policies and available reports in Serbia and concludes that out of the currently 4100 migrants, only 427 have sought asylum in Serbia. Due to the lack of legal solutions and insufficient pressure for their improvement from the EU, thousands of migrants live in Serbia in the status of illegal immigrants and without any legal rights. In addition, the author argues the consequences of the crisis for common European values, such as solidarity, its impact on the free movement of people and ideas, the rise of xenophobia and the failure to respect the human rights of migrants. Based on analysis of public policy discourse and on the basis of relevant policy analysis, the author proposes certain solutions for the EU response in order to provide clear, sustainable and high-quality assistance to 'transit' countries.

Osnovni cilj izrade ove studije je da kroz analizu postojećeg stanja ukažemo na probleme zdravstvenog sistema Crne Gore, i uz to da kroz analizu zakonodavstva zemalja u okruženju (Hrvatske kao članice EU, i Srbije kao kandidata za članstvo) pružimo jasne preporuke za njegovo poboljšanje. Posebnu pažnju posvetili smo analizi rada zaštitinika prava pacijenata, i percepciji građana o kvalitetu zdravstvenog sistema na osnovu podataka koje smo dobili kroz istraživanje i sprovođenje ispitivanja javnog mnjenja, pružanja besplatne pravne pomoći, anonimnih prijava kršenja prava pacijenata putem prve web i mobilne aplikacije, ali i kroz stalnu komunikaciju sa relevantnim institucijama.

U ovom radu pokušaćemo da dokučimo najbitnije značajke i specifičnosti demokratske konsolidacije u Brazilu. Takođe, pokušaćemo da damo analitički pregled glavnih izazova koji stoje pred punom demokratskom konsolidacijom u Brazilu.
U prvim godinama dvadesetog vijeka Brazil je bio pretežno agrarna zemlja. Koncept agrarne proizvodnje bio je većinski zasnovan na proizvodnji kafe. “Egzogeno usmjerena ekonomija”  značajno je narušena krizom koja je zahvatila oblast izvoza kafe. Dodatnom pogoršanju ovakvog stanja doprinijela je i Velika depresija, a kasnije i Drugi svjetski rat. Uslijedila je industrijalizacija, kao logičan odgovor.

Pitanje finansiranja političkih subjekata i izbornih kampanja i kontrola tog procesa, jedna su od najznačajnijih pitanja za održavanje slobodnih, demokratskih i fer izbora u Crnoj Gori. U proteklih nekoliko godina ovo pitanje i zakonska regulativa u ovoj oblasti su bili predmet žive debate između svih političkih aktera, koja je rezultirala brojnim izmjenama zakonskog, ali i institucionalnog okvira. Komparativnom analizom koju je uradio CeMI obuhvaćeno je pet zemalja Srbija, Hrvatska, Slovenija, Austrija i Finska. Analiza je pokazala kako je pitanje finansiranja političkih partija izuzetno kompleksno, i kako sve promjene i pojave korupcije u tom procesu, u velikoj mjeri utiču na povjerenje građana u izborni proces. Analiza je pokazala da Crna Gora obezbjeđuje daleko najviši procenat budžetskih sredstava za finansiranje političkih subjekata. Dodatno, samo u Crnoj Gori su sredstva za finansiranje zakupa prostorija političkih subjekata izdvojena iz sredstava za redovno finansiranje, pa se pored, i ovako velikih budžetskih izdvajanja, u Budžetu skupštine izdvajaju sredstva za potrebe svake parlamentarne političke partije. Komparativna analiza je pokazala koji god od analiziranih modela da se primjeni na Crnu Goru, ona bi izdvajala mnogo manje novca za finansiranje političkih partija (tabela 1.). Ono što je važno istaknuti je da se od svih posmatranih modela jedino u Srbiji, kao i u Crnoj Gori, dio budžetskih sredstava dodjeljuje prije izbornog procesa i to u istom procentu od 20%. Međutim, značajna je razlika da se u Crnoj Gori mora ispuniti jednostavan zahtjev dovoljnog broja potpisa podrške, što za posljedicu ima da novac iz budžeta dobiju i političke partije koje na izborima nijesu osvojile ni 1% glasova. U Srbiji koja ima sličan model raspodjele budžetskih sredstava mehanizam je složeniji i može poslužiti kao primjer dobre prakse. Naime, institut izbornog jemstva, je u Srbiji uveden kako bi osigurao povraćaj izbornih sredstava od onih partija koje nisu dobile dovoljnu podršku na izborima. Politički subjekti koji su dali izjavu da namjeravaju da koriste sredstva iz javnih izvora za pokriće troškova izborne kampanje, dužni su da polože izborno jemstvo, u visini sredstava koje dobijaju prije izbora. Izborno jemstvo može biti novac, hartije od vrijednosti ili nekretnine u vrijednosti jednakoj sredstvima koja su raspodijeljena prije izbora. U slučaju da ne ostvari rezultat od 1% važećih glasova birača, (ili 0,2% važećih glasova u slučaju političkih subjekata koji predstavljaju manjine), politički subjekat vrši povraćaj ovih sredstava u budžet Republike Srbije. Ukoliko se ne izvrši povraćaj sredstava, država zadržava izborno jemstvo, tj. novac ili nekretninu koja je založena. Tabela 1. Sredstva koja se izdvajaju iz državnog budžeta za redovan rad političkih partija i za izborne kampanje 1

Temu ovog kratkog osvrta na problem korupcije u zdravstvu nametnule su pojedine odredbe novog Zakona o zdravstvenoj zaštiti, donešenog 28. decembra 2015. godine. Naime, u članu 98 novog Zakona se daje mogućnost da " zdravstveni radnik i zdravstveni saradnik, zaposlen sa punim radnim vremenom u zdravstvenoj ustanovi čiji je osnivač država može, uz mišljenje direktora i uz saglasnost ministra, da zaključi ugovor za obavljanje dopunskog rada u toj zdravstvenoj ustanovi ili sa drugom zdravstvenom ustanovom čiji je osnivač država ili drugo pravno lice " 1. Ovim je zapravo ljekarima ponovo data mogućnost, kroz proizvoljno ograničenje dobijanja prethodne saglasnosti, da dio svog rada obavljaju i u privatnoj praksi. Naime, na osnovu pomenutog Zakona, bliže uslove za dopunski rad propisuje Ministartsvo zdravlja. Podzakonski akt koji bi odredio bliže uslove, poslije gotovo dva mjeseca od stupanja Zakona na snagu, nije usvojen i nije dostupan na sajtu Ministarstva. Ova situacija ostavlja prostor za nedoslednosti u postupanju na osnovu zahtjeva za dopunski rad koji su eventualno pristigli u ovom periodu. U konačnom, nepostajanje bližih uslova zajedno sa šturim rješenjem " mišljenja direktora i saglasnosti ministra " ostavljaju mogućnost izdavanja dozvole za dopunski rad politički podobnim zdravstvenim radnicima. Podsjećamo, uz značajan doprinos CeMI-ja, u Akcionom planu (za period 2013-2014) za sprovođenje Strategije za borbu protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala 2010-2014, uvedena je mjera kontrolnog nadzora (cilj broj 62, mjera 131) 2 za praćenje primjene Pravilnika o dopunskom radu 3 , koji je ograničavao rad zdravstvenih radnika istovremeno u privatnom i javnom sektoru, tačnije predviđao dopunski rad samo u okviru Mreže zdravstvenih ustanova 4 , a sve u cilju suzbijanja nelegalnih plaćanja za zdravstvene usluge. Iako su ovakva mjera i postavljeni cilj predstavljali iskorak u borbi protiv korupcije u oblasti zdravstva, realizacija plana pokazala je značajne nedostatke. Realizacijom pomenute mjere 131 Akcionog plana, zdravstvena inspekcija je u periodu 01. jul – 31. decembar 2014. godine izvršila 401 inspekcijski pregled u zdravstvenim

Our scientific research includes three side, a threefold relationship of Russia and the Balkans, the one established in the geopolitical thought of important writers, one historical, factual, and modern one, more economic "only" relationship. Although Russia was addressed to the Balkans, according to the creators of the its foreign policy with more or less intensity, and opposite pressure to resolve the issue of leaving the warm sea and control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which Russia has initiated to almost all gatherings of the great powers, the biggest part of the work will be devoted to the period after the Second World War up to Putin's rule.
Balkans as a haven for Russian presence, is especially challenging for research, both because of its geographical position and historical fraught of relationships of nearly all Balkan countries and Russia, with the aim of laying the foundations for the creation of the modern geopolitical mosaic of Russia and its presence in the Balkans, in the light of current developments in international relations.
The essence is to break the myth of the Balkans as a traditional Russian stronghold, to observe it as a field of collision of East and West, where both sides have conflicting interests and conflicting goals. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Balkans was the line of the meeting of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, through the special status of the non-aligned Yugoslavia, developments after the Cold War, to the various roles in the time of Yugoslavia's dissolution and the wars in this area. For understanding Russian presence in the Balkans today, it is especially important to emphasize the period of Vladimir Putin's rule, his personality that never ceases to intrigue, and who wants to maintain Russia's importance on the scene where pressing issues in the world are being solved and to regain its status of "great power“, in accordance to his clear realistic views on international relations.
Key words: geopolitics, geopolitics of gas, foreign policy, Russia, the Balkans, energy projects, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Putin.