We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be
enjoyable in itself. This possibili... more We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced emotion.
The striatum (caudate nucleus, putamen and nucleus accumbens) is the main input structure of the ... more The striatum (caudate nucleus, putamen and nucleus accumbens) is the main input structure of the basal ganglia. It receives cortical projections from the vast majority of the cortex, as well as from other subcortical structures such as the thalamus and amygdala. Its role in planning, preparation and execution of voluntary movements is known to be fine-tuned by the interaction between projection neurons and interneurons. Since the 1990s, it has been accepted that the proportion of interneurons increases phylogenetically, being about 5% in rodents and 26% in humans. However, these data have not been confirmed with unbiased techniques, such as stereology. In the present report, we have divided the human striatum into functional territories (associative, sensorimotor and limbic) and we have quantified the numerical density of all striatal neurons (using Nissl staining) in each area. Taking into account our past research on the estimation of striatal interneurons, we have calculated the proportion of interneurons in each territory. This value was on average 17.1% for the whole striatum, although interneurons were more abundant in the associative (21.9%) than in the sensorimotor (12.8%) and limbic (11.1%) aspects. Therefore, we demonstrate with unbiased stereology that the overall proportion of striatal interneurons is slightly lower than that reported in previous studies, and that it varies in the functional territories of this structure.
One key aspect of motivation is the ability of agents to overcome excessive weighting of intrinsi... more One key aspect of motivation is the ability of agents to overcome excessive weighting of intrinsic subjective costs. This contribution aims to analyze the subjective cost of effort and assess its neural correlates in sedentary volunteers. We recruited a sample of 57 subjects who underwent a decision-making task using a prospective, moderate, and sustained physical effort as devaluating factor. Effort discounting followed a hyperbolic function, and individual discounting constants correlated with an indicator of sedentary lifestyle (global physical activity questionnaire; R = − 0.302, P = 0.033). A subsample of 24 sedentary volunteers received a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan while performing a similar effort-discounting task. BOLD signal of a cluster located in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with the subjective value of the pair of options under consideration (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; cluster corrected for multiple comparisons for the whole brain). Furthermore, effort-related discounting of reward correlated with the signal of a cluster in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; small volume cluster corrected for a region of interest including the ventral prefrontal cortex and striatum). This study offers empirical data about the intrinsic subjective cost of effort and its neural correlates in sedentary individuals.
In psychiatry, as in any other medical specialty, the clinician collects information from the pat... more In psychiatry, as in any other medical specialty, the clinician collects information from the patient’s anamnesis, clinical observation and diagnostic tests, evaluates these data and makes a diagnosis. The most common manuals to assess a patient’s mental disease according to his or her symptoms are the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). This chapter aims to explain the dialogue that philosophy and psychiatry have held for decades to achieve a better understanding of dissociative identity disorder (DID). The outcome of this dialogue is the expression of the diagnostic criteria for DID, as well as other dissociative disorders, in the medical manuals. Thus, we first analyze the evolution of DID across the different versions of ICD and DSM. We then show that the characterization of DID and other dissociative disorders is a lively debate far from being settled. We demonstrate that the core of this debate is the understanding of person after John Locke’s philosophy: a person is defined by the apparent expression of consciousness and memories. This leads to what we have termed a primary conceptual dissociation: the mental qualities of the person are dissociated from the body. We propose an alternative account based on the dynamic nature of identity, and the understanding of person as a mind-body unity. We hope that our contribution, which comes up from the interdisciplinary dialogue between psychiatry and philosophy, contributes to a better understanding of this disorder and its underlying concepts.
In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions t... more In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions that empirical sciences, and in particular neuroscience, ultimately encounter. The last decades have witnessed an enormous progress in brain research, mainly because of the improvement of neuroimaging techniques and neurogenetics, and the development of optogenetics. Furthermore, the US Government and European Union have launched the BRAIN Initiative and Human Brain Project, respectively, to promote a better understanding of brain functioning and its disorders. Unfortunately, their gates appear sealed for disciplines that pursue a deep knowledge of the mind, such as philosophy or psychology. The most probable outcome of this situation is “promissory materialism”, as Sir John Eccles warned several decades ago. I review the multidisciplinary approach of Eccles to the study of the brain and mind, especially through his relationship with Mariano Artigas. Finally, I propose that interdisciplinary research may be improved by a more solid understanding of the discipline one wants to dialogue with, and a multidisciplinary training from the beginning of the research career.
In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent maturation, and in... more In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent maturation, and in particular emotional management, may have opposing explanations depending on the interpretation of the assumed brain architecture, that is, whether a componential computational account (CCA) or a dynamic systems perspective (DSP) is used. According to CCA, cognitive functions are associated with the action of restricted brain regions, and this association is temporally stable; by contrast, DSP argues that cognitive functions are better explained by interactions between several brain areas, whose engagement in specific functions is temporal and context-dependent and based on neural reuse. We outline the main neurobiological facts about adolescent maturation, focusing on the neuroanatomical and neurofunctional processes associated with adolescence. We then explain the importance of emotional management in adolescent maturation. We explain the interplay between emotion and cognition under the scope of CCA and DSP, both at neural and behavioral levels. Finally, we justify why, according to CCA, emotional management is understood as regulation, specifically because the cognitive aspects of the brain are in charge of regulating emotion-related modules. However, the key word in DSP is integration, since neural information from different brain areas is integrated from the beginning of the process. Consequently, although the terms should not be conceptually confused, there is no cognition without emotion, and vice versa. Thus, emotional integration is not an independent process that just happens to the subject, but a crucial part of personal growth. Considering the importance of neuropsychological research in the development of educational and legal policies concerning adolescents, we intend to expose that the holistic view of adolescents is dependent on whether one holds the implicit or explicit interpretation of brain functioning.
A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs abo... more A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs about the severity of their disease or the nature of its treatment, considering therapy as curative rather than palliative. We propose that this attitude may be understood as self-deception, following the current psychological theories about this topic. In this article we suggest that the reason these patients deceive themselves is to preserve their belief systems. According to some philosophical accounts, the human belief system (HBS) is constituted as a web with a few stable central nodes – deep-seated beliefs – intimately related with the self. We hypothesize that the mind may possess defensive mechanisms, mostly non-conscious, that reject certain sensory inputs (e.g., a fatal diagnosis) that may undermine deep-seated beliefs. This interpretation is in line with the theory of cognitive dissonance. Following this reasoning, we also propose that HBS-related self-deception would entail a lower cognitive load than that associated with confronting the truth: whereas the latter would engage a myriad of high cognitive functions to re-configure crucial aspects of the self, including the setting of plans, goals, or even a behavioral output, the former would be mostly non-conscious. Overall, we believe that our research supports the hypothesis that in cases of terminal illness, (self-)deceiving requires less effort than accepting the truth.
In present times, certain fields of science are becoming aware of the necessity to go beyond a
re... more In present times, certain fields of science are becoming aware of the necessity to go beyond a restrictive specialization, and establish an open dialogue with other disciplines. Such is the case of the approach that neuroscience and philosophy are performing in the last decade. However, this increasing interest in a multidisciplinary perspective should not be understood, in our opinion, as a new phenomenon, but rather as a return to a classical standpoint: a proper understanding of human features –organic, cognitive, volitional, motor or behavioral, for example– requires a context that includes the global dimension of the human being. We believe that grand neuroscientific conclusions about the mind should take into account what philosophical reflection has said about it; likewise, philosophers should consider the organic constitution of the brain to draw inferences about the mind. Thus, both neuroscience and philosophy would benefit from each other’s achievements through a fruitful dialogue. One of the main problems a multidisciplinary group encounters is terminology: the same term has a different scope in various fields, sometimes even contradictory. Such is the case of habits: from a neuroscientific perspective, a habit is a mere automation of an action. It is, therefore, linked to rigidity and limitation. However, from a classical philosophical account, a habit is an enabling capacity acquired through practice, which facilitates, improves and reinforces the performance of certain kind of actions. From neuroscience, habit acquisition restricts a subject’s action to the learnt habit; from philosophy, habit acquisition allows the subject to set a distance from the simple motor performance to cognitively enrich the action. For example, playing piano is a technical habit; considering the neuroscientific account, a pianist would just play those sequences of keystrokes that had been repeatedly practiced in the past. However, according to the philosophical perspective, it would allow the pianist to improvise and, moreover, go beyond the movements of their hands to concentrate in other features of musical interpretation. In other words, a holistic view of habits focuses on the subject’s disposition when facing both known and novel situations. We believe neuroscience could contribute to achieve a deeper understanding of the neural bases of habits, whose complexity could be deciphered by a philosophical reflection. Thus, we propose this Research Topic to increase our understanding on habits from a wide point of view. This collection of new experimental research, empirical and theoretical reviews, general commentaries and opinion articles covers the following subjects: habit learning; implicit memory; computational and complex dynamical accounts of habit formation; practical, cognitive, perceptual and motor habits; early learning; intentionality; consciousness in habits performance; neurological and psychiatric disorders related to habits, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, stereotypies or addiction; habits as enabling or limiting capacities for the agent.
Background / Purpose: The terms “identity” and “personality” are frequently used in medical liter... more Background / Purpose: The terms “identity” and “personality” are frequently used in medical literature in the attempt to classify certain dissociative disorders. The main diagnostic manuals used in psychiatry, the DSM-5 and the ICD-10, use the term “dissociative identity disorder” (DID) and “multiple personality disorder” (MPD) respectively, to define a disruption of identity characterized by two or more distinct personality states, or an experience of possession, as evidenced by discontinuities in sense of self, cognition, behavior, affect, perceptions, and/or memories. In scientific reports, identity and personality are apparently interchangeable terms. In our opinion, this poses an important conceptual problem that could lead to a misinterpretation of the patient condition. Main conclusion: Given this framework, we discuss the use of the terms “personality” and “identity” that underlies the DSM-5 and ICD-10 manuals, as well as the scientific literature regarding DID and MPD. In a...
Tesis doctoral inédita leída en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Medicina. Fecha de... more Tesis doctoral inédita leída en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Medicina. Fecha de lectura: 21 de Junio de 2006.
Striatal nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide phosphate reduced-diaphorase (NADPH-d)-positive (+) ce... more Striatal nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide phosphate reduced-diaphorase (NADPH-d)-positive (+) cells are one of the major classes of striatal interneurons. The present study analyzes their somatodendritic morphology, distribution pattern, and compartmental organization in the caudate nucleus (CN) and putamen (Put) of nine normal human brains. The following striatal territories are examined: 1) the precommissural head of the CN; 2) the postcommissural head of the CN; 3) the body of the CN; 4) the gyrus of the CN; 5) the tail of the CN; 6) the precommissural Put; and 7) the postcommissural Put. Three morphologically distinct types of NADPH-d+ neurons were found in each of these territories. The two most common NADPH-d+ neurons displayed an ovoid or triangular perikaryon from which several thick primary dendrites emerged, although much less numerous, bipolar-shaped NADPH-d+ cells were also observed. The highest density of NADPH-d+ neurons was found in the gyrus of the CN, followed by the body of the CN, tail of the CN, postcommissural head of the CN, postcommissural Put, precommissural head of the CN, and precommissural Put. The matrix was the striatal compartment with the densest NADPH-d+ neuronal population. Some of these cells also occurred in the center and peripheral regions of the striosomes located in the head of the CN and in the Put. In the body and gyrus of the CN, the striosomes were largely devoid of these striatal interneurons. Knowledge of the density and distribution of these interneurons should advance our understanding of the organization of the normal human striatum and help to evaluate the effects of neurodegenerative processes on cell density.
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 2011
Ventricular enlargement is one of the most consistent abnormal structural brain findings in schiz... more Ventricular enlargement is one of the most consistent abnormal structural brain findings in schizophrenia and has been used to infer brain shrinkage. However, whether ventricular enlargement is related to local overlying cortex and/or adjacent subcortical structures or whether it is related to brain volume change globally has not been assessed. We systematically assessed interrelations of ventricular volumes with gray and white matter volumes of 40 Brodmann areas (BAs), the thalamus and its medial dorsal nucleus and pulvinar, the internal capsule, caudate and putamen. We acquired structural MRI ( patients with schizophrenia (n = 64) and healthy controls (n = 56)) and diffusion tensor fractional anisotropy (FA) (untreated schizophrenia n = 19, controls n = 32). Volumes were assessed by manual tracing of central structures and a semi-automated parcellation of BAs. Patients with schizophrenia had increased ventricular size associated with decreased cortical gray matter volumes widely across the brain; a similar but less pronounced pattern was seen in normal controls; local correlations (e.g. temporal horn with temporal lobe volume) were not appreciably higher than non-local correlations (e.g. temporal horn with prefrontal volume). White matter regions adjacent to the ventricles similarly did not reveal strong regional relationships. FA and center of mass of the anterior limb of the internal capsule also appeared differentially influenced by ventricular volume but findings were similarly not regional. Taken together, these findings indicate that ventricular enlargement is globally interrelated with gray matter volume diminution but not directly correlated with volume loss in the immediately adjacent caudate, putamen, or internal capsule.
The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, ... more The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: 1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; 2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”); and 3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as cognitively controlled behaviors that in turn improve cognitive control of behavior, are a crucial resource for enhancing human learning and behavioral plasticity.
We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be
enjoyable in itself. This possibili... more We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced emotion.
The striatum (caudate nucleus, putamen and nucleus accumbens) is the main input structure of the ... more The striatum (caudate nucleus, putamen and nucleus accumbens) is the main input structure of the basal ganglia. It receives cortical projections from the vast majority of the cortex, as well as from other subcortical structures such as the thalamus and amygdala. Its role in planning, preparation and execution of voluntary movements is known to be fine-tuned by the interaction between projection neurons and interneurons. Since the 1990s, it has been accepted that the proportion of interneurons increases phylogenetically, being about 5% in rodents and 26% in humans. However, these data have not been confirmed with unbiased techniques, such as stereology. In the present report, we have divided the human striatum into functional territories (associative, sensorimotor and limbic) and we have quantified the numerical density of all striatal neurons (using Nissl staining) in each area. Taking into account our past research on the estimation of striatal interneurons, we have calculated the proportion of interneurons in each territory. This value was on average 17.1% for the whole striatum, although interneurons were more abundant in the associative (21.9%) than in the sensorimotor (12.8%) and limbic (11.1%) aspects. Therefore, we demonstrate with unbiased stereology that the overall proportion of striatal interneurons is slightly lower than that reported in previous studies, and that it varies in the functional territories of this structure.
One key aspect of motivation is the ability of agents to overcome excessive weighting of intrinsi... more One key aspect of motivation is the ability of agents to overcome excessive weighting of intrinsic subjective costs. This contribution aims to analyze the subjective cost of effort and assess its neural correlates in sedentary volunteers. We recruited a sample of 57 subjects who underwent a decision-making task using a prospective, moderate, and sustained physical effort as devaluating factor. Effort discounting followed a hyperbolic function, and individual discounting constants correlated with an indicator of sedentary lifestyle (global physical activity questionnaire; R = − 0.302, P = 0.033). A subsample of 24 sedentary volunteers received a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan while performing a similar effort-discounting task. BOLD signal of a cluster located in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with the subjective value of the pair of options under consideration (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; cluster corrected for multiple comparisons for the whole brain). Furthermore, effort-related discounting of reward correlated with the signal of a cluster in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; small volume cluster corrected for a region of interest including the ventral prefrontal cortex and striatum). This study offers empirical data about the intrinsic subjective cost of effort and its neural correlates in sedentary individuals.
In psychiatry, as in any other medical specialty, the clinician collects information from the pat... more In psychiatry, as in any other medical specialty, the clinician collects information from the patient’s anamnesis, clinical observation and diagnostic tests, evaluates these data and makes a diagnosis. The most common manuals to assess a patient’s mental disease according to his or her symptoms are the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). This chapter aims to explain the dialogue that philosophy and psychiatry have held for decades to achieve a better understanding of dissociative identity disorder (DID). The outcome of this dialogue is the expression of the diagnostic criteria for DID, as well as other dissociative disorders, in the medical manuals. Thus, we first analyze the evolution of DID across the different versions of ICD and DSM. We then show that the characterization of DID and other dissociative disorders is a lively debate far from being settled. We demonstrate that the core of this debate is the understanding of person after John Locke’s philosophy: a person is defined by the apparent expression of consciousness and memories. This leads to what we have termed a primary conceptual dissociation: the mental qualities of the person are dissociated from the body. We propose an alternative account based on the dynamic nature of identity, and the understanding of person as a mind-body unity. We hope that our contribution, which comes up from the interdisciplinary dialogue between psychiatry and philosophy, contributes to a better understanding of this disorder and its underlying concepts.
In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions t... more In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions that empirical sciences, and in particular neuroscience, ultimately encounter. The last decades have witnessed an enormous progress in brain research, mainly because of the improvement of neuroimaging techniques and neurogenetics, and the development of optogenetics. Furthermore, the US Government and European Union have launched the BRAIN Initiative and Human Brain Project, respectively, to promote a better understanding of brain functioning and its disorders. Unfortunately, their gates appear sealed for disciplines that pursue a deep knowledge of the mind, such as philosophy or psychology. The most probable outcome of this situation is “promissory materialism”, as Sir John Eccles warned several decades ago. I review the multidisciplinary approach of Eccles to the study of the brain and mind, especially through his relationship with Mariano Artigas. Finally, I propose that interdisciplinary research may be improved by a more solid understanding of the discipline one wants to dialogue with, and a multidisciplinary training from the beginning of the research career.
In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent maturation, and in... more In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent maturation, and in particular emotional management, may have opposing explanations depending on the interpretation of the assumed brain architecture, that is, whether a componential computational account (CCA) or a dynamic systems perspective (DSP) is used. According to CCA, cognitive functions are associated with the action of restricted brain regions, and this association is temporally stable; by contrast, DSP argues that cognitive functions are better explained by interactions between several brain areas, whose engagement in specific functions is temporal and context-dependent and based on neural reuse. We outline the main neurobiological facts about adolescent maturation, focusing on the neuroanatomical and neurofunctional processes associated with adolescence. We then explain the importance of emotional management in adolescent maturation. We explain the interplay between emotion and cognition under the scope of CCA and DSP, both at neural and behavioral levels. Finally, we justify why, according to CCA, emotional management is understood as regulation, specifically because the cognitive aspects of the brain are in charge of regulating emotion-related modules. However, the key word in DSP is integration, since neural information from different brain areas is integrated from the beginning of the process. Consequently, although the terms should not be conceptually confused, there is no cognition without emotion, and vice versa. Thus, emotional integration is not an independent process that just happens to the subject, but a crucial part of personal growth. Considering the importance of neuropsychological research in the development of educational and legal policies concerning adolescents, we intend to expose that the holistic view of adolescents is dependent on whether one holds the implicit or explicit interpretation of brain functioning.
A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs abo... more A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs about the severity of their disease or the nature of its treatment, considering therapy as curative rather than palliative. We propose that this attitude may be understood as self-deception, following the current psychological theories about this topic. In this article we suggest that the reason these patients deceive themselves is to preserve their belief systems. According to some philosophical accounts, the human belief system (HBS) is constituted as a web with a few stable central nodes – deep-seated beliefs – intimately related with the self. We hypothesize that the mind may possess defensive mechanisms, mostly non-conscious, that reject certain sensory inputs (e.g., a fatal diagnosis) that may undermine deep-seated beliefs. This interpretation is in line with the theory of cognitive dissonance. Following this reasoning, we also propose that HBS-related self-deception would entail a lower cognitive load than that associated with confronting the truth: whereas the latter would engage a myriad of high cognitive functions to re-configure crucial aspects of the self, including the setting of plans, goals, or even a behavioral output, the former would be mostly non-conscious. Overall, we believe that our research supports the hypothesis that in cases of terminal illness, (self-)deceiving requires less effort than accepting the truth.
In present times, certain fields of science are becoming aware of the necessity to go beyond a
re... more In present times, certain fields of science are becoming aware of the necessity to go beyond a restrictive specialization, and establish an open dialogue with other disciplines. Such is the case of the approach that neuroscience and philosophy are performing in the last decade. However, this increasing interest in a multidisciplinary perspective should not be understood, in our opinion, as a new phenomenon, but rather as a return to a classical standpoint: a proper understanding of human features –organic, cognitive, volitional, motor or behavioral, for example– requires a context that includes the global dimension of the human being. We believe that grand neuroscientific conclusions about the mind should take into account what philosophical reflection has said about it; likewise, philosophers should consider the organic constitution of the brain to draw inferences about the mind. Thus, both neuroscience and philosophy would benefit from each other’s achievements through a fruitful dialogue. One of the main problems a multidisciplinary group encounters is terminology: the same term has a different scope in various fields, sometimes even contradictory. Such is the case of habits: from a neuroscientific perspective, a habit is a mere automation of an action. It is, therefore, linked to rigidity and limitation. However, from a classical philosophical account, a habit is an enabling capacity acquired through practice, which facilitates, improves and reinforces the performance of certain kind of actions. From neuroscience, habit acquisition restricts a subject’s action to the learnt habit; from philosophy, habit acquisition allows the subject to set a distance from the simple motor performance to cognitively enrich the action. For example, playing piano is a technical habit; considering the neuroscientific account, a pianist would just play those sequences of keystrokes that had been repeatedly practiced in the past. However, according to the philosophical perspective, it would allow the pianist to improvise and, moreover, go beyond the movements of their hands to concentrate in other features of musical interpretation. In other words, a holistic view of habits focuses on the subject’s disposition when facing both known and novel situations. We believe neuroscience could contribute to achieve a deeper understanding of the neural bases of habits, whose complexity could be deciphered by a philosophical reflection. Thus, we propose this Research Topic to increase our understanding on habits from a wide point of view. This collection of new experimental research, empirical and theoretical reviews, general commentaries and opinion articles covers the following subjects: habit learning; implicit memory; computational and complex dynamical accounts of habit formation; practical, cognitive, perceptual and motor habits; early learning; intentionality; consciousness in habits performance; neurological and psychiatric disorders related to habits, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, stereotypies or addiction; habits as enabling or limiting capacities for the agent.
Background / Purpose: The terms “identity” and “personality” are frequently used in medical liter... more Background / Purpose: The terms “identity” and “personality” are frequently used in medical literature in the attempt to classify certain dissociative disorders. The main diagnostic manuals used in psychiatry, the DSM-5 and the ICD-10, use the term “dissociative identity disorder” (DID) and “multiple personality disorder” (MPD) respectively, to define a disruption of identity characterized by two or more distinct personality states, or an experience of possession, as evidenced by discontinuities in sense of self, cognition, behavior, affect, perceptions, and/or memories. In scientific reports, identity and personality are apparently interchangeable terms. In our opinion, this poses an important conceptual problem that could lead to a misinterpretation of the patient condition. Main conclusion: Given this framework, we discuss the use of the terms “personality” and “identity” that underlies the DSM-5 and ICD-10 manuals, as well as the scientific literature regarding DID and MPD. In a...
Tesis doctoral inédita leída en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Medicina. Fecha de... more Tesis doctoral inédita leída en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Medicina. Fecha de lectura: 21 de Junio de 2006.
Striatal nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide phosphate reduced-diaphorase (NADPH-d)-positive (+) ce... more Striatal nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide phosphate reduced-diaphorase (NADPH-d)-positive (+) cells are one of the major classes of striatal interneurons. The present study analyzes their somatodendritic morphology, distribution pattern, and compartmental organization in the caudate nucleus (CN) and putamen (Put) of nine normal human brains. The following striatal territories are examined: 1) the precommissural head of the CN; 2) the postcommissural head of the CN; 3) the body of the CN; 4) the gyrus of the CN; 5) the tail of the CN; 6) the precommissural Put; and 7) the postcommissural Put. Three morphologically distinct types of NADPH-d+ neurons were found in each of these territories. The two most common NADPH-d+ neurons displayed an ovoid or triangular perikaryon from which several thick primary dendrites emerged, although much less numerous, bipolar-shaped NADPH-d+ cells were also observed. The highest density of NADPH-d+ neurons was found in the gyrus of the CN, followed by the body of the CN, tail of the CN, postcommissural head of the CN, postcommissural Put, precommissural head of the CN, and precommissural Put. The matrix was the striatal compartment with the densest NADPH-d+ neuronal population. Some of these cells also occurred in the center and peripheral regions of the striosomes located in the head of the CN and in the Put. In the body and gyrus of the CN, the striosomes were largely devoid of these striatal interneurons. Knowledge of the density and distribution of these interneurons should advance our understanding of the organization of the normal human striatum and help to evaluate the effects of neurodegenerative processes on cell density.
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 2011
Ventricular enlargement is one of the most consistent abnormal structural brain findings in schiz... more Ventricular enlargement is one of the most consistent abnormal structural brain findings in schizophrenia and has been used to infer brain shrinkage. However, whether ventricular enlargement is related to local overlying cortex and/or adjacent subcortical structures or whether it is related to brain volume change globally has not been assessed. We systematically assessed interrelations of ventricular volumes with gray and white matter volumes of 40 Brodmann areas (BAs), the thalamus and its medial dorsal nucleus and pulvinar, the internal capsule, caudate and putamen. We acquired structural MRI ( patients with schizophrenia (n = 64) and healthy controls (n = 56)) and diffusion tensor fractional anisotropy (FA) (untreated schizophrenia n = 19, controls n = 32). Volumes were assessed by manual tracing of central structures and a semi-automated parcellation of BAs. Patients with schizophrenia had increased ventricular size associated with decreased cortical gray matter volumes widely across the brain; a similar but less pronounced pattern was seen in normal controls; local correlations (e.g. temporal horn with temporal lobe volume) were not appreciably higher than non-local correlations (e.g. temporal horn with prefrontal volume). White matter regions adjacent to the ventricles similarly did not reveal strong regional relationships. FA and center of mass of the anterior limb of the internal capsule also appeared differentially influenced by ventricular volume but findings were similarly not regional. Taken together, these findings indicate that ventricular enlargement is globally interrelated with gray matter volume diminution but not directly correlated with volume loss in the immediately adjacent caudate, putamen, or internal capsule.
The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, ... more The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: 1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; 2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”); and 3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as cognitively controlled behaviors that in turn improve cognitive control of behavior, are a crucial resource for enhancing human learning and behavioral plasticity.
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Papers by Javier Bernacer
enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a
musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced
emotion.
volunteers. We recruited a sample of 57 subjects who underwent a decision-making task using a prospective, moderate, and sustained physical effort as devaluating factor. Effort discounting followed a hyperbolic function, and individual
discounting constants correlated with an indicator of sedentary lifestyle (global physical activity questionnaire; R = − 0.302, P = 0.033). A subsample of 24 sedentary volunteers received a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan while
performing a similar effort-discounting task. BOLD signal of a cluster located in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with the subjective value of the pair of options under consideration (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; cluster corrected for
multiple comparisons for the whole brain). Furthermore, effort-related discounting of reward correlated with the signal of a cluster in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; small volume cluster corrected for a region of interest
including the ventral prefrontal cortex and striatum). This study offers empirical data about the intrinsic subjective cost of effort and its neural correlates in sedentary individuals.
restrictive specialization, and establish an open dialogue with other disciplines. Such is the case of
the approach that neuroscience and philosophy are performing in the last decade. However, this
increasing interest in a multidisciplinary perspective should not be understood, in our opinion,
as a new phenomenon, but rather as a return to a classical standpoint: a proper understanding
of human features –organic, cognitive, volitional, motor or behavioral, for example– requires a
context that includes the global dimension of the human being. We believe that grand neuroscientific
conclusions about the mind should take into account what philosophical reflection
has said about it; likewise, philosophers should consider the organic constitution of the brain to
draw inferences about the mind. Thus, both neuroscience and philosophy would benefit from
each other’s achievements through a fruitful dialogue.
One of the main problems a multidisciplinary group encounters is terminology: the same term
has a different scope in various fields, sometimes even contradictory. Such is the case of habits:
from a neuroscientific perspective, a habit is a mere automation of an action. It is, therefore,
linked to rigidity and limitation. However, from a classical philosophical account, a habit is
an enabling capacity acquired through practice, which facilitates, improves and reinforces the
performance of certain kind of actions. From neuroscience, habit acquisition restricts a subject’s
action to the learnt habit; from philosophy, habit acquisition allows the subject to set a distance
from the simple motor performance to cognitively enrich the action. For example, playing piano
is a technical habit; considering the neuroscientific account, a pianist would just play those
sequences of keystrokes that had been repeatedly practiced in the past. However, according to
the philosophical perspective, it would allow the pianist to improvise and, moreover, go beyond
the movements of their hands to concentrate in other features of musical interpretation.
In other words, a holistic view of habits focuses on the subject’s disposition when facing both
known and novel situations.
We believe neuroscience could contribute to achieve a deeper understanding of the neural bases
of habits, whose complexity could be deciphered by a philosophical reflection. Thus, we propose
this Research Topic to increase our understanding on habits from a wide point of view. This collection of new experimental research, empirical and theoretical reviews, general commentaries
and opinion articles covers the following subjects: habit learning; implicit memory; computational
and complex dynamical accounts of habit formation; practical, cognitive, perceptual and
motor habits; early learning; intentionality; consciousness in habits performance; neurological
and psychiatric disorders related to habits, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, stereotypies
or addiction; habits as enabling or limiting capacities for the agent.
enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a
musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced
emotion.
volunteers. We recruited a sample of 57 subjects who underwent a decision-making task using a prospective, moderate, and sustained physical effort as devaluating factor. Effort discounting followed a hyperbolic function, and individual
discounting constants correlated with an indicator of sedentary lifestyle (global physical activity questionnaire; R = − 0.302, P = 0.033). A subsample of 24 sedentary volunteers received a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan while
performing a similar effort-discounting task. BOLD signal of a cluster located in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with the subjective value of the pair of options under consideration (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; cluster corrected for
multiple comparisons for the whole brain). Furthermore, effort-related discounting of reward correlated with the signal of a cluster in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; small volume cluster corrected for a region of interest
including the ventral prefrontal cortex and striatum). This study offers empirical data about the intrinsic subjective cost of effort and its neural correlates in sedentary individuals.
restrictive specialization, and establish an open dialogue with other disciplines. Such is the case of
the approach that neuroscience and philosophy are performing in the last decade. However, this
increasing interest in a multidisciplinary perspective should not be understood, in our opinion,
as a new phenomenon, but rather as a return to a classical standpoint: a proper understanding
of human features –organic, cognitive, volitional, motor or behavioral, for example– requires a
context that includes the global dimension of the human being. We believe that grand neuroscientific
conclusions about the mind should take into account what philosophical reflection
has said about it; likewise, philosophers should consider the organic constitution of the brain to
draw inferences about the mind. Thus, both neuroscience and philosophy would benefit from
each other’s achievements through a fruitful dialogue.
One of the main problems a multidisciplinary group encounters is terminology: the same term
has a different scope in various fields, sometimes even contradictory. Such is the case of habits:
from a neuroscientific perspective, a habit is a mere automation of an action. It is, therefore,
linked to rigidity and limitation. However, from a classical philosophical account, a habit is
an enabling capacity acquired through practice, which facilitates, improves and reinforces the
performance of certain kind of actions. From neuroscience, habit acquisition restricts a subject’s
action to the learnt habit; from philosophy, habit acquisition allows the subject to set a distance
from the simple motor performance to cognitively enrich the action. For example, playing piano
is a technical habit; considering the neuroscientific account, a pianist would just play those
sequences of keystrokes that had been repeatedly practiced in the past. However, according to
the philosophical perspective, it would allow the pianist to improvise and, moreover, go beyond
the movements of their hands to concentrate in other features of musical interpretation.
In other words, a holistic view of habits focuses on the subject’s disposition when facing both
known and novel situations.
We believe neuroscience could contribute to achieve a deeper understanding of the neural bases
of habits, whose complexity could be deciphered by a philosophical reflection. Thus, we propose
this Research Topic to increase our understanding on habits from a wide point of view. This collection of new experimental research, empirical and theoretical reviews, general commentaries
and opinion articles covers the following subjects: habit learning; implicit memory; computational
and complex dynamical accounts of habit formation; practical, cognitive, perceptual and
motor habits; early learning; intentionality; consciousness in habits performance; neurological
and psychiatric disorders related to habits, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, stereotypies
or addiction; habits as enabling or limiting capacities for the agent.