Lucia corso VULNERABILITÀ E CONCETTO DI DIRITTO sommario: 1. Vulnerability theory e critica al di... more Lucia corso VULNERABILITÀ E CONCETTO DI DIRITTO sommario: 1. Vulnerability theory e critica al diritto.-2. Diritto come rimedio alle vulnerabilità elementari.-3. Diritto e ordine: dal caso alla prevedibilità.-4. Diritto ed estraneità: perdita di rilevanza della vulnerabilità.-5. Cosa resta della teoria della vulnerabilità?-Riferimenti bibliografici.
Intelligenza collettiva, intelligenza artificiale e principio democratico, 2022
The essay explores the relation between Collective Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, and the... more The essay explores the relation between Collective Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, and the Democratic Principle and argues that the enthusiasm for the potential of democratization of the AI is grounded on a misguided concept of Collective Intelligence.
In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutiona... more In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutionalism. Although anti-elitism is often defined as one of the two prongs of populist thin ideology,1 to define any possible attitude of populism towards constitutional democracy most, if not exclusive, attention has been paid to populism’s second prong, that is the appeal to a monolithic will of the people. The result has often been to end up in a vicious circle. Populist constitutionalism is usually described as proposing an institutional setting whereby populist governments entrench their power and privileges and weaken the media and the opposition by claiming to be morally backed by massive popular support. Populists are seen as betraying the core elements of liberal constitutionalism because they hold a perverted idea of popular sovereignty, which rejects most constitutional limitations that characterise liberal democracies.2 There is surely something appropriate in this reasoning and it is not my intention to question the conclusions of scholars who have followed this approach.3 My more limited aim is to enquire whether, and if so to what extent, the fundamental antagonism supported by populist ideology, and thus anti-elitism, can tell us something more about the attitude of populism towards constitutionalism.
In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutiona... more In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutionalism. Although anti-elitism is often defined as one of the two prongs of populist thin ideology,1 to define any possible attitude of populism towards constitutional democracy most, if not exclusive, attention has been paid to populism’s second prong, that is the appeal to a monolithic will of the people. The result has often been to end up in a vicious circle. Populist constitutionalism is usually described as proposing an institutional setting whereby populist governments entrench their power and privileges and weaken the media and the opposition by claiming to be morally backed by massive popular support. Populists are seen as betraying the core elements of liberal constitutionalism because they hold a perverted idea of popular sovereignty, which rejects most constitutional limitations that characterise liberal democracies.2 There is surely something appropriate in this reasoning and it is not my intention to question the conclusions of scholars who have followed this approach.3 My more limited aim is to enquire whether, and if so to what extent, the fundamental antagonism supported by populist ideology, and thus anti-elitism, can tell us something more about the attitude of populism towards constitutionalism.
Diacronia. Rivista di Storia di Filosofia del Diritto, 1, pp. 235-266 , 2021
In this essay we discuss the philosophy of law of Moses Ben Maimon, dedicating special attention... more In this essay we discuss the philosophy of law of Moses Ben Maimon, dedicating special attention to two issues: the function of the law and the golden middle way of the classic ethical tradition. We argue that the intersection among these two issues lies in the concept of the law as an instrument to temper human excess in order to achieve an ordered society, an ethical life, and a sufficient knowledge of God. Drawing on the philosophical, ethical, and medical writings of the Jewish thinker, we argue that the achievements of good habits and an educated inclination do not make laws irrelevant and superfluous. On the contrary, human beings are required to comply with both intelligible and less intelligible rules, to the extent these rules come directly or indirectly (via interpretation) from God. The revealed law (Torah) as paradigm of limit and moderation emerges as well in Maimonides conception of legal hermeneutics. In this way, we argue that the high moral value represented by the action’s attributes of God in Jewish thought is matched by the awareness of the limits of human intellect: it is according to these limits that the Jewish law (Halakha) outlines its rules.
The essay analyses the relationship between Artificial Intelligence and democracy through the con... more The essay analyses the relationship between Artificial Intelligence and democracy through the concept of collective intelligence
SOMMARIO: 1. Il diritto resiste alla scienza - 2. La scienza come criterio di legittimazione dell... more SOMMARIO: 1. Il diritto resiste alla scienza - 2. La scienza come criterio di legittimazione della norma giuridica - 3. Diritto come fenomeno normativo: incommensurabilita fra diritto e scienza - 4. Il diritto come super scienza - 4.1. Voracita processuale - 4.2. Verita giuridica e legittimazione dell’organo decidente - 4.3. Verita giuridica e falsificazione - 4.4. Margini del sindacato giudiziario - 5. Diritto come mediazione fra saperi distinti - 6. Conclusioni: diritto, scienza e gestione dell’incertezza.Law as system which incorporates distinct epistemological methods. Why legal reasoning did not retreat before scientific knowledgeABSTRACT: The central claim of this Article is that, despite the frequent references by legal acts to scientific knowledge, the scientific method has not supplanted or overshadowed the proper features of legal reasoning arising from the idea of law as an autonomous system of knowledge. In fact, just the opposite has occurred. It will be argued that the...
Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan = from the verb nemesao) as the emotional reaction of someo... more Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan = from the verb nemesao) as the emotional reaction of someone with a noble character at unmerited good fortune. That another’s good fortune is a central element of nemesis can also be inferred by the contraposition Aristotle proposed between nemesis and pity, which is pain at undeserved bad fortune. The modern concept of indignation, commonly used as a translation for the word nemesis, refers to outrage at a general form of injustice, and usually a serious one.
Populism is often identified with the appeal to a homogeneous will of the people and it is theref... more Populism is often identified with the appeal to a homogeneous will of the people and it is therefore opposed to constitutionalism for its over-majoritarian tendencies and its rejection of the rule of law. The Article argues that such a common view, typical of most European legal and political theory scholars, underestimates the oppositional and defensive aspect of populism, which becomes clear when emphasis is given to the anti-elitist prong of the phenomenon. Such a perspective is most commonly carried out by the US literature where populism is not simply opposed to constitutionalism and where some constitutional scholars qualify themselves as populist. Following what will be defined as the American Lesson, it will be argued that populism is, on its essence, rooted on a deep distrust towards power and aims at competing with constitutionalism on the field of limiting public power. However, while populism is engaged in a battle against any form of oligarchy, constitutionalism follows...
Lucia corso VULNERABILITÀ E CONCETTO DI DIRITTO sommario: 1. Vulnerability theory e critica al di... more Lucia corso VULNERABILITÀ E CONCETTO DI DIRITTO sommario: 1. Vulnerability theory e critica al diritto.-2. Diritto come rimedio alle vulnerabilità elementari.-3. Diritto e ordine: dal caso alla prevedibilità.-4. Diritto ed estraneità: perdita di rilevanza della vulnerabilità.-5. Cosa resta della teoria della vulnerabilità?-Riferimenti bibliografici.
Intelligenza collettiva, intelligenza artificiale e principio democratico, 2022
The essay explores the relation between Collective Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, and the... more The essay explores the relation between Collective Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, and the Democratic Principle and argues that the enthusiasm for the potential of democratization of the AI is grounded on a misguided concept of Collective Intelligence.
In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutiona... more In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutionalism. Although anti-elitism is often defined as one of the two prongs of populist thin ideology,1 to define any possible attitude of populism towards constitutional democracy most, if not exclusive, attention has been paid to populism’s second prong, that is the appeal to a monolithic will of the people. The result has often been to end up in a vicious circle. Populist constitutionalism is usually described as proposing an institutional setting whereby populist governments entrench their power and privileges and weaken the media and the opposition by claiming to be morally backed by massive popular support. Populists are seen as betraying the core elements of liberal constitutionalism because they hold a perverted idea of popular sovereignty, which rejects most constitutional limitations that characterise liberal democracies.2 There is surely something appropriate in this reasoning and it is not my intention to question the conclusions of scholars who have followed this approach.3 My more limited aim is to enquire whether, and if so to what extent, the fundamental antagonism supported by populist ideology, and thus anti-elitism, can tell us something more about the attitude of populism towards constitutionalism.
In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutiona... more In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutionalism. Although anti-elitism is often defined as one of the two prongs of populist thin ideology,1 to define any possible attitude of populism towards constitutional democracy most, if not exclusive, attention has been paid to populism’s second prong, that is the appeal to a monolithic will of the people. The result has often been to end up in a vicious circle. Populist constitutionalism is usually described as proposing an institutional setting whereby populist governments entrench their power and privileges and weaken the media and the opposition by claiming to be morally backed by massive popular support. Populists are seen as betraying the core elements of liberal constitutionalism because they hold a perverted idea of popular sovereignty, which rejects most constitutional limitations that characterise liberal democracies.2 There is surely something appropriate in this reasoning and it is not my intention to question the conclusions of scholars who have followed this approach.3 My more limited aim is to enquire whether, and if so to what extent, the fundamental antagonism supported by populist ideology, and thus anti-elitism, can tell us something more about the attitude of populism towards constitutionalism.
Diacronia. Rivista di Storia di Filosofia del Diritto, 1, pp. 235-266 , 2021
In this essay we discuss the philosophy of law of Moses Ben Maimon, dedicating special attention... more In this essay we discuss the philosophy of law of Moses Ben Maimon, dedicating special attention to two issues: the function of the law and the golden middle way of the classic ethical tradition. We argue that the intersection among these two issues lies in the concept of the law as an instrument to temper human excess in order to achieve an ordered society, an ethical life, and a sufficient knowledge of God. Drawing on the philosophical, ethical, and medical writings of the Jewish thinker, we argue that the achievements of good habits and an educated inclination do not make laws irrelevant and superfluous. On the contrary, human beings are required to comply with both intelligible and less intelligible rules, to the extent these rules come directly or indirectly (via interpretation) from God. The revealed law (Torah) as paradigm of limit and moderation emerges as well in Maimonides conception of legal hermeneutics. In this way, we argue that the high moral value represented by the action’s attributes of God in Jewish thought is matched by the awareness of the limits of human intellect: it is according to these limits that the Jewish law (Halakha) outlines its rules.
The essay analyses the relationship between Artificial Intelligence and democracy through the con... more The essay analyses the relationship between Artificial Intelligence and democracy through the concept of collective intelligence
SOMMARIO: 1. Il diritto resiste alla scienza - 2. La scienza come criterio di legittimazione dell... more SOMMARIO: 1. Il diritto resiste alla scienza - 2. La scienza come criterio di legittimazione della norma giuridica - 3. Diritto come fenomeno normativo: incommensurabilita fra diritto e scienza - 4. Il diritto come super scienza - 4.1. Voracita processuale - 4.2. Verita giuridica e legittimazione dell’organo decidente - 4.3. Verita giuridica e falsificazione - 4.4. Margini del sindacato giudiziario - 5. Diritto come mediazione fra saperi distinti - 6. Conclusioni: diritto, scienza e gestione dell’incertezza.Law as system which incorporates distinct epistemological methods. Why legal reasoning did not retreat before scientific knowledgeABSTRACT: The central claim of this Article is that, despite the frequent references by legal acts to scientific knowledge, the scientific method has not supplanted or overshadowed the proper features of legal reasoning arising from the idea of law as an autonomous system of knowledge. In fact, just the opposite has occurred. It will be argued that the...
Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan = from the verb nemesao) as the emotional reaction of someo... more Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan = from the verb nemesao) as the emotional reaction of someone with a noble character at unmerited good fortune. That another’s good fortune is a central element of nemesis can also be inferred by the contraposition Aristotle proposed between nemesis and pity, which is pain at undeserved bad fortune. The modern concept of indignation, commonly used as a translation for the word nemesis, refers to outrage at a general form of injustice, and usually a serious one.
Populism is often identified with the appeal to a homogeneous will of the people and it is theref... more Populism is often identified with the appeal to a homogeneous will of the people and it is therefore opposed to constitutionalism for its over-majoritarian tendencies and its rejection of the rule of law. The Article argues that such a common view, typical of most European legal and political theory scholars, underestimates the oppositional and defensive aspect of populism, which becomes clear when emphasis is given to the anti-elitist prong of the phenomenon. Such a perspective is most commonly carried out by the US literature where populism is not simply opposed to constitutionalism and where some constitutional scholars qualify themselves as populist. Following what will be defined as the American Lesson, it will be argued that populism is, on its essence, rooted on a deep distrust towards power and aims at competing with constitutionalism on the field of limiting public power. However, while populism is engaged in a battle against any form of oligarchy, constitutionalism follows...
Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan ¼ from the verb nemesao) as the 8 emotional reaction of som... more Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan ¼ from the verb nemesao) as the 8 emotional reaction of someone with a noble character at unmerited good fortune.
Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan ¼ from the verb nemesao) as the 8 emotional reaction of som... more Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan ¼ from the verb nemesao) as the 8 emotional reaction of someone with a noble character at unmerited good fortune.
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Papers by Lucia Corso
classic ethical tradition. We argue that the intersection among these two issues lies in
the concept of the law as an instrument to temper human excess in order to achieve
an ordered society, an ethical life, and a sufficient knowledge of God. Drawing on the
philosophical, ethical, and medical writings of the Jewish thinker, we argue that the
achievements of good habits and an educated inclination do not make laws irrelevant
and superfluous. On the contrary, human beings are required to comply with both
intelligible and less intelligible rules, to the extent these rules come directly or indirectly (via interpretation) from God. The revealed law (Torah) as paradigm of limit
and moderation emerges as well in Maimonides conception of legal hermeneutics. In
this way, we argue that the high moral value represented by the action’s attributes of
God in Jewish thought is matched by the awareness of the limits of human intellect: it
is according to these limits that the Jewish law (Halakha) outlines its rules.
classic ethical tradition. We argue that the intersection among these two issues lies in
the concept of the law as an instrument to temper human excess in order to achieve
an ordered society, an ethical life, and a sufficient knowledge of God. Drawing on the
philosophical, ethical, and medical writings of the Jewish thinker, we argue that the
achievements of good habits and an educated inclination do not make laws irrelevant
and superfluous. On the contrary, human beings are required to comply with both
intelligible and less intelligible rules, to the extent these rules come directly or indirectly (via interpretation) from God. The revealed law (Torah) as paradigm of limit
and moderation emerges as well in Maimonides conception of legal hermeneutics. In
this way, we argue that the high moral value represented by the action’s attributes of
God in Jewish thought is matched by the awareness of the limits of human intellect: it
is according to these limits that the Jewish law (Halakha) outlines its rules.