Jacopo Morelli

In this article, I will, first of all, briefly summarize Kitcher's Ethical Project main points1,providing both its analytical reconstruction of the evolution of ethics, the meta-ethical analysis of the issues that emerge from this reconstruction and the normative stance to continue this project. I will then try to underline both the problems and the useful ideas of Kitcher's proposal and compare them with other authors of the contemporary debate in ethics.

The relationship between finite and infinite, singularity and the universal, the contingent and the absolute, seems a bit like the question of the chicken and the egg: no answer regarding which comes first, which is the foundation of the other, seems possible. And in addition to this there is even a greater problem regarding their relation and the enormous leap between them. In this text, I want to take a position on this ancient question through reading three authors of the likes of Hegel, Heidegger, Arendt and making a chromatic comparison. Firstly, I will analyze the pure white that appears in the first section of chapter V of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of spirit”, and how the finite emerges from this pure unity of the absolute. Secondly, I will describe the black-tinted finite conception of Heidegger‘s being-towards-death in Being and Time, where “Dasein finds itself face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence“ (Being and Time 53: 310). Thirdly, I will introduce a way out of this dichotomous position in the figure of Anna Arendt, which recognize that all that actually happens is entirely contingent; however, this finding does not turn into a paralysis of the action, but rather into a triumph of the 'vita activa' and the natality rather than the mortality. The mixture of white and black does not turn into a dark gray as one would expect, but into red, the color of energy, passion, action.

In this article, I will claim that the problem of the other arises from an outdated subject-centered paradigm. I will argue that Sartre started a different approach to this problem, not focused solely on the subject point of view. This approach, passing through the work of Merleau-Ponty, has reached its full development with Habermas and his concept of communication.
In chapter one, after briefly describing the history of 'the problem of the others' and of the subject-center paradigm, I will argue that these two topics are intrinsically intertwined. In the chapter two, I will introduce how the Other appears in Sartre's analysis of the For-it-self, arguing that his reflection completely overturns the previous tradition, causing the subject-object relationship to collapse into a spiral and I will explain the importance of the body in Merleau-Ponty's account and the relations with the other and the world.  In chapter three, I will analyze Habermas’ philosophy of communication and why it leads to the lifeworld, an intersubjective background with no transcendental consequences. Finally, in the conclusions, I will show why an intersubjective approach resolve, once and for all, the problem of the others.

Recently, important steps have been made in trying to better understand a word of daily use as 'mind'. It now seems to be widely recognized by anyone, even by the definitions provided in the dictionaries, that this term does not refer to a single entity, but rather to a set of cognitive faculties. However, there are still some very widespread conceptions that tend to contrast the mind with the brain or in general the body and the physical world, and these are sometimes reflected even in the fields of research. In this article I will try to clarify the concept of mind, arguing that we do not need any 'marks of the mental' because this notion is just one of the many consequences of the tendency to unity that characterizes human reasoning and in some cases, like this, deflects research from empirical evidences. First I will introduce the Searle's distinction between basic facts and social phenomena, arguing that mind, according to this distinction, turns out to be an abstract social entity, since it is a set of states enclosed in a single concept through human language. Having done this, the attempt to make the mental phenomenon homogeneous under a single mark seems to lose meaning. Studying phenomena such as consciousness and intentionality without having the imperative to encapsulate under them all mental phenomena, allows us to see them for what they are: one of the many characteristics that constitute the umbrella-term 'mind'. In the third part of this work, I will just try to clarify the notion of consciousness, show how a concept like this can be studied according to the notion of agency, even if not all mental states require agency. Finally I will show how this clarification can provide a useful basis for future works on neuroscience, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations. The philosophy of mind must carry out a theoretical work of clarification in order to prepare the field for the various empirical discoveries.

In this thesis I present Pyrrho of Elide from a new perspective, which re-evaluates both the theoretical contribution and the practical one, starting from a perspective called "multifocal approach".
The work will be divided into three chapters:
1) In the first chapter I will deal with the life and the thought of Pyrro.
2)In the second chapter I will introduce the concept of "multifocal approach", an academic paradigm used at the University of Macerata.
3)In the third chapter I will try to interweave the two issues by checking the presence, in pyrrone, of the multifocal approach. He inherits, as we shall see, the theoretical nucleus of the paradigm, but actualizes it in its specific and complex historical context, bringing it to its "melting point"

Scientific evidence no longer leaves room for doubt that the primary driver of climate change, in its many components (especially global warming, mass species extinctions and radical transformations to both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems), is, nowadays, human activity. Thus far, most of the philosophical work regarding climate science has focused on the epistemology of climate modeling and climate dataset (Parker 2018), but in this paper I will focus mainly on the ethical aspects. Ethical questions arise since there is good evidence that climate change is already having harmful impacts on both humans and non-human nature. What moral and political philosophy should do is to provide a conceptual coherent framework of reference, able to distinguish elements of moral significance and climate injustice, showing how in some cases an intervention is not only supererogatory or desirable, but normatively necessary.  What I specifically will do in this paper is to provide a new and original model, inspired by the framework of Kantian constructivism and applied to the environmental field. I will firstly introduce the ethical Kantian constructivism broadly and then shows how it can be applied to a coherent model for climate justice, while trying to reply to some usual objections, referring specifically to Calder (2011).