I teach and work on philosophy of language and philosophy of mind at the University of Napoli Federico II (Ph.D. at the University of Naples "L'Orientale"). I hold the position of associate professor (with National Academic Qualification as Full Professor) in Philosophy and Theory of Languages. My research interests focus on Kant, Wittgenstein, self-consciousness, self-knowledge, intentionality and mental content; theories of meaning; I-thoughts.
Mi occupo di filosofia del linguaggio e filosofia della mente (Ph.D Università di Napoli "L'Orientale"). Attualmente sono professore associato all'Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II; nel 2017 e nel 2023 ho conseguito l'abilitazione scientifica nazionale a professore ordinario nel settore scientifico disciplinare di filosofia e teoria dei linguaggi (M-Fil 05). Tra gli altri, i miei interessi di ricerca riguardano Kant, Wittgenstein, l'autocoscienza, la self-knowledge, la cognizione e la razionalità negli animali non umani, le teorie del significato e del contenuto intenzionale con particolare riferimento alla semantica degli indicali e ai cosiddetti pensieri sull'Io.
This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant's philosophy. As Kant writes in his maj... more This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant's philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation 'I think' that the subject's capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant' s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: (1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation 'I'; (2) an epistemic problem regarding the type of knowledge relative to the thinking subject produced by the representation 'I think'; and (3) a strictly metaphysical problem regarding the features assigned to the thinking subject's nature. The author connects the relevant scholarly literature on Kant with contemporary debates on the huge philosophical field of self-knowledge. He develops a formal reading according to which the unity of self-consciousness does not presuppose the identity of a real subject, but a formal identity based on the representation 'I think'.
Questo libro indaga la natura dell’autocoscienza, ossia la capacità tutta umana di essere consape... more Questo libro indaga la natura dell’autocoscienza, ossia la capacità tutta umana di essere consapevoli della propria sfera mentale. E si colloca nell’alveo della riflessione strettamente filosofica, privilegiando sia un approccio filosofico-linguistico e mentalista sia una ricostruzione del pensiero di alcuni tra i protagonisti della modernità e del dibattito contemporaneo. In particolare, vengono affrontate le caratteristiche specifiche della capacità dell’uomo di rappresentare linguisticamente e mentalmente il proprio io, esaminando gli aspetti problematici dell’argomento: se si parte dal cosiddetto modello riflessivo e si considera l’autocoscienza come una scissione del soggetto che prende a oggetto del suo pensiero se stesso, emergono svariate questioni e difficoltà epistemiche emetafisiche, evidenziate inmodo sorprendentemente simile da diverse tradizioni filosofiche: da Descartes a Husserl, da Kant a Wittgenstein, passando tra gli altri per Strawson, Henrich, Castañeda, Shoemaker, Evans e Frank. In questo quadro viene difesa la cosiddetta tesi dell’ubiquità, che afferma una sorta di pervasività della dimensione soggettiva in ogni esperienza cosciente.
È un'introduzione alla semiotica del cinema, divisa in tre parti che affrontano alcune specifiche... more È un'introduzione alla semiotica del cinema, divisa in tre parti che affrontano alcune specifiche dimensioni teoriche. La prima parte si sofferma sulla nascita del dibattito in semiotica del cinema, dalla metà degli anni '60 fino agli anni '70, per approfondire le nozioni di segno, codice, testo. La seconda parte affronta in chiave narratologica gli studi filmici: la questione è stabilire le caratteristiche che definiscono la nozione di narratività e la possibilità di assegnare al testo filmico lo statuto narrativo emerso dagli studi strettamente legati all'analisi testuale di natura scritturale. Infine, la terza parte si sofferma sulla dimensione pragmatica, in particolare approfondisce il dispositivo dell'enunciazione e sempre in chiave comparata prova a cogliere contiguità e differenze tra l'ambito scritturale e quello filmico.
In this issue of Studies in Transcendental Philosophy five scholars enquire about the theoretical... more In this issue of Studies in Transcendental Philosophy five scholars enquire about the theoretical aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy related to the notions of subject, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge. Andrew Brook examines Kant’s views on transcendental apperception at the end of the Critical Period, focusing on Opus Postumum which contains some of Kant’s most important reflections on the subjective dimension. As is known, the self-conscious act designated by the proposition ‘I think’ is an act of spontaneity, and this spontaneity is the reason that the subject calls itself an intelligence. In his article Addison Ellis examines the theoretical and practical dimension of spontaneity, calling into question the distinction between a merely ‘relative’ spontaneity and one that is ‘absolute’. Luca Forgione points to two forms of self-consciousness introduced by Kant: inner sense, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira’s article presents a systematic and a historical approach, linking the contemporary debate on transcendental argument to Kant’s philosophy. It addresses both Stroud’s objection and Strawson’s perspective on transcendental argument and introduces a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation as successful truth-directed transcendental argument. In contrast to the contemporary movement of transhumanism and its claims that creatures like us can exist independently of our bodies, Robert Hanna develops a generalist perspective on the subjective dimension, according to which all rational human creature are synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves. I would like to thank the authors for participating in this issue and for helping to make it really special.
In recent years, nonconceptual content theories have seen Kant as a reference point for his notio... more In recent years, nonconceptual content theories have seen Kant as a reference point for his notion of intuition (§ § 1-3). This work aims to dismiss the possibility that intuition is provided with an autonomous function of de re knowledge. To this end, it will explore certain epistemological points that emerge from Garroni's reading of the Third Critique in the conviction that they provide a suitable context to verify the presence of autonomous, epistemically nonconceptual content in the transcendental system (§ § 4-5). It is here, in fact, that Kant discusses those cases where intuition is given without bringing into play the conceptual component. As Garroni posits, in this frame of reference, such content cannot subsist without the interplay between aesthetic and conceptual dimensions (§ § 6-7). Long before the development of the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism, and during the period in which the Kantian debate on the epistemic considerations contained in the Third Critique was developing deeply for the first time, Garroni had already identified a theoretical position on these issues, which can be labelled aesthetic conceptualism, thanks to his fundamentally epistemological reading of the Third Critique.
The of aim of this paper is to enquire about some theoretical aspects of Kant's philosophy that a... more The of aim of this paper is to enquire about some theoretical aspects of Kant's philosophy that are connected to the representation 'I' and the question of self-identification in self-consciousness. The subjective capacity to represent itself through the representation 'I' will be articulated on the basis of the structure the so-called de se or I-thoughts developed by Perry and Recanati. In this regard, a contrast between Longuenesse's view and my approach on self-identification and the different uses of I as subject will be considered.
Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based... more Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. As we will see, the doctrine of apperception is not to be confused with an introspective psychological approach: in reality, it is a formal model for the thinking activity itself which explains the most central concepts regarding subjecthood.
Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2019
The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and ... more The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory?
The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphy... more The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns and focus on the same type of reference involved in the “I", obviously via different philosophical paths and antipodal metaphysical assumptions.
As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a r... more As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke's essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kant's slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz's approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant's contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting with textual evidence even from the logical corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant's adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference.
Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded... more Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in a sensory form of self-awareness and transcendental apperception. The aim of this paper is to show that a sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness, which contains a pre-reflective self-consciousness as its first level, is provided by the notion of transcendental apperception. The necessity for a pre-reflective self-consciousness has been pointed out in phenomenological literature. According to this account, every self-ascription of any property implies a more fundamental form of self-consciousness, i.e., a kind of immediate familiarity with oneself. This pre-reflective self-consciousness is a non-relational and non-identificational form of self-consciousness and concerns an immediate acquaintance of the subject with itself. In the specific terms of transcendentalism every thought contains an implicit reference to a first-personal “givenness” or a sense of “mineness” that articulates a non-relational and non-identificational form of a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness.
La voce e il logos. Filosofie dell’animalità nella storia delle idee. A cura di Stefano Gensini. Edizioni ETS, 2020
The minds of animals have always been one of the most fascinating topics in the philosophical and... more The minds of animals have always been one of the most fascinating topics in the philosophical and scientific debate. In this chapter some classical questions of this field will be examined, in particular I will consider two philosophical approaches that refer to the instrumentalist position of Dennett and that of intentional realism, thus giving a philosophical answer to Stich and Davidson who deny that animals possess thought and reasoning due to the absence of verbal language.
I segni fra teoria e storia. Per Giovanni Manetti. A cura di Stefano Gensini e Alessandro Prato. Edizioni ETS, 2019
In un recente intervento dal titolo eloquente, But is it science?, due tra i più importanti filos... more In un recente intervento dal titolo eloquente, But is it science?, due tra i più importanti filosofi inglesi in circolazione, Roger Scruton e Timothy Williamson, hanno dibattuto con toni anche ruvidi sulla natura della filosofia e sulle differenze che intercorrono tra filosofia e scienze sul metodo e sui diversi oggetti di analisi. È impossibile ripercorrere qui tutti gli snodi di questo intervento a quattro mani, che solo in modo superficiale può essere inquadrato come una dialettica di approccio tra filosofia analitica e continentale, se non sintetizzando alcuni contributi contemporanei sull’indicalità per evidenziare il progresso compiuto dalla filosofia del linguaggio sul tema della soggettività autocosciente.
Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thoughts which can be described as... more Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thoughts which can be described as thoughts about oneself 'as oneself'. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume's approaches to self-consciousness , as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes's view on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as herself, while Hume's seems to lack those features assigned to the consciousness of self-as-subject.
Resumen: La autoconciencia puede ser entendida como la habilidad para lle-var a cabo reflexiones sobre uno mismo, las cuales pueden ser descritas como los pensamientos sobre tu propia persona como " individuo ". La autoconciencia comprende dos características relacionadas entre sí: la primera tiene que ver con el hecho de que está basada en una perspectiva en primera persona, mien-tras que la segunda tiene que ver con el hecho de que debe ser considerada como la conciencia del yo como sujeto en lugar de como objeto. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar algunas cuestiones acerca del punto de vista de Des-cartes y de Hume sobre la autoconciencia, ya que ambos filósofos introducen un método de acceso en primera persona a la dimensión subjetiva a través de un
L'indagine kantiana sull'appercezione trascendentale e sull' 'Io penso' propone, tra le altre, tr... more L'indagine kantiana sull'appercezione trascendentale e sull' 'Io penso' propone, tra le altre, tre diverse tipologie di questioni: 1) una questione semantica, che riguarda il tipo di riferimento della rappresentazione 'Io'; 2) una questione epistemica, che si interroga sul tipo di conoscenza che si può assegnare al soggetto pensante a partire dall' 'Io penso'; 3) una questione strettamente metafisica, incentrata sulle caratteristiche attribuite alla natura del soggetto pensante. In questo intervento si approfondirà la questione semantica, analizzando la natura della rappresentazione 'Io' e ciò che Kant chiama 'designazione trascendentale', ossia l'apparato autoreferenziale coinvolto nell'appercezione trascendentale. L' 'Io penso' sembra essere un unicum rappresentazionale nel sistema kantiano: la coscienza di sé del soggetto pensante è espressa appunto dalla rappresentazione intellettuale 'Io' che presenta una funzione referenziale ben precisa, designando il soggetto senza alcuna mediazione epistemica: "si prescinde completamente dalle proprietà del soggetto, allorché ci si limita a designarlo per mezzo dell'espressione integralmente priva di contenuto 'io' (applicabile a qualsiasi soggetto pensante)" (A355). In primis, cosa intende Kant quando afferma che l'Io è una semplice e vuota rappresentazione? In secondo luogo, le caratteristiche della rappresentazione 'Io', e quelle relative alla designazione trascendentale, sono riconducibili alla sua natura indicale? Infine, come suggeriscono alcuni illustri commentatori all'interno del dibattito kantiano (Peacocke, Howell, Longuenesse) le considerazioni kantiane sull''Io penso' anticipano l'approccio, o anche solo lo spirito, della teoria del riferimento diretto?
In recent years, Kant has been seen as a reference point by non conceptual content theorists for ... more In recent years, Kant has been seen as a reference point by non conceptual content theorists for his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The aim of present work is exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 3). This work intends to dismiss the possibility that the intuition is provided with an autonomous function of de re knowledge. To this end, an exploration of certain epistemological points emerging from the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU) will be carried out in the conviction that these make up a suitable context to verify the presence of an autonomous, epistemically non-conceptual content in the transcendental system (§§ 4-6): it is here, in fact, that Kant discusses those cases where the intuition is given without bringing into play the conceptual dimension. As will be said, in this frame of reference such a content cannot subsist without any intellectual legacy.
I saggi contenuti nel volume analizzano il rapporto tra comunicazione e potere con particolare ri... more I saggi contenuti nel volume analizzano il rapporto tra comunicazione e potere con particolare riferimento alle tecniche retoriche utilizzate per il controllo del consenso. I temi trattati riguardano sia l’influenza dei media sul comportamento delle persone e sulla formazione dell’opinione pubblica, sia i meccanismi della persuasione ingannevole e della personalizzazione della politica, oltre che il ruolo svolto dai mass media nella produzione delle paure collettive.
This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant's philosophy. As Kant writes in his maj... more This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant's philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation 'I think' that the subject's capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant' s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: (1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation 'I'; (2) an epistemic problem regarding the type of knowledge relative to the thinking subject produced by the representation 'I think'; and (3) a strictly metaphysical problem regarding the features assigned to the thinking subject's nature. The author connects the relevant scholarly literature on Kant with contemporary debates on the huge philosophical field of self-knowledge. He develops a formal reading according to which the unity of self-consciousness does not presuppose the identity of a real subject, but a formal identity based on the representation 'I think'.
Questo libro indaga la natura dell’autocoscienza, ossia la capacità tutta umana di essere consape... more Questo libro indaga la natura dell’autocoscienza, ossia la capacità tutta umana di essere consapevoli della propria sfera mentale. E si colloca nell’alveo della riflessione strettamente filosofica, privilegiando sia un approccio filosofico-linguistico e mentalista sia una ricostruzione del pensiero di alcuni tra i protagonisti della modernità e del dibattito contemporaneo. In particolare, vengono affrontate le caratteristiche specifiche della capacità dell’uomo di rappresentare linguisticamente e mentalmente il proprio io, esaminando gli aspetti problematici dell’argomento: se si parte dal cosiddetto modello riflessivo e si considera l’autocoscienza come una scissione del soggetto che prende a oggetto del suo pensiero se stesso, emergono svariate questioni e difficoltà epistemiche emetafisiche, evidenziate inmodo sorprendentemente simile da diverse tradizioni filosofiche: da Descartes a Husserl, da Kant a Wittgenstein, passando tra gli altri per Strawson, Henrich, Castañeda, Shoemaker, Evans e Frank. In questo quadro viene difesa la cosiddetta tesi dell’ubiquità, che afferma una sorta di pervasività della dimensione soggettiva in ogni esperienza cosciente.
È un'introduzione alla semiotica del cinema, divisa in tre parti che affrontano alcune specifiche... more È un'introduzione alla semiotica del cinema, divisa in tre parti che affrontano alcune specifiche dimensioni teoriche. La prima parte si sofferma sulla nascita del dibattito in semiotica del cinema, dalla metà degli anni '60 fino agli anni '70, per approfondire le nozioni di segno, codice, testo. La seconda parte affronta in chiave narratologica gli studi filmici: la questione è stabilire le caratteristiche che definiscono la nozione di narratività e la possibilità di assegnare al testo filmico lo statuto narrativo emerso dagli studi strettamente legati all'analisi testuale di natura scritturale. Infine, la terza parte si sofferma sulla dimensione pragmatica, in particolare approfondisce il dispositivo dell'enunciazione e sempre in chiave comparata prova a cogliere contiguità e differenze tra l'ambito scritturale e quello filmico.
In this issue of Studies in Transcendental Philosophy five scholars enquire about the theoretical... more In this issue of Studies in Transcendental Philosophy five scholars enquire about the theoretical aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy related to the notions of subject, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge. Andrew Brook examines Kant’s views on transcendental apperception at the end of the Critical Period, focusing on Opus Postumum which contains some of Kant’s most important reflections on the subjective dimension. As is known, the self-conscious act designated by the proposition ‘I think’ is an act of spontaneity, and this spontaneity is the reason that the subject calls itself an intelligence. In his article Addison Ellis examines the theoretical and practical dimension of spontaneity, calling into question the distinction between a merely ‘relative’ spontaneity and one that is ‘absolute’. Luca Forgione points to two forms of self-consciousness introduced by Kant: inner sense, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira’s article presents a systematic and a historical approach, linking the contemporary debate on transcendental argument to Kant’s philosophy. It addresses both Stroud’s objection and Strawson’s perspective on transcendental argument and introduces a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation as successful truth-directed transcendental argument. In contrast to the contemporary movement of transhumanism and its claims that creatures like us can exist independently of our bodies, Robert Hanna develops a generalist perspective on the subjective dimension, according to which all rational human creature are synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves. I would like to thank the authors for participating in this issue and for helping to make it really special.
In recent years, nonconceptual content theories have seen Kant as a reference point for his notio... more In recent years, nonconceptual content theories have seen Kant as a reference point for his notion of intuition (§ § 1-3). This work aims to dismiss the possibility that intuition is provided with an autonomous function of de re knowledge. To this end, it will explore certain epistemological points that emerge from Garroni's reading of the Third Critique in the conviction that they provide a suitable context to verify the presence of autonomous, epistemically nonconceptual content in the transcendental system (§ § 4-5). It is here, in fact, that Kant discusses those cases where intuition is given without bringing into play the conceptual component. As Garroni posits, in this frame of reference, such content cannot subsist without the interplay between aesthetic and conceptual dimensions (§ § 6-7). Long before the development of the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism, and during the period in which the Kantian debate on the epistemic considerations contained in the Third Critique was developing deeply for the first time, Garroni had already identified a theoretical position on these issues, which can be labelled aesthetic conceptualism, thanks to his fundamentally epistemological reading of the Third Critique.
The of aim of this paper is to enquire about some theoretical aspects of Kant's philosophy that a... more The of aim of this paper is to enquire about some theoretical aspects of Kant's philosophy that are connected to the representation 'I' and the question of self-identification in self-consciousness. The subjective capacity to represent itself through the representation 'I' will be articulated on the basis of the structure the so-called de se or I-thoughts developed by Perry and Recanati. In this regard, a contrast between Longuenesse's view and my approach on self-identification and the different uses of I as subject will be considered.
Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based... more Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. As we will see, the doctrine of apperception is not to be confused with an introspective psychological approach: in reality, it is a formal model for the thinking activity itself which explains the most central concepts regarding subjecthood.
Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2019
The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and ... more The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory?
The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphy... more The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns and focus on the same type of reference involved in the “I", obviously via different philosophical paths and antipodal metaphysical assumptions.
As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a r... more As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke's essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kant's slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz's approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant's contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting with textual evidence even from the logical corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant's adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference.
Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded... more Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in a sensory form of self-awareness and transcendental apperception. The aim of this paper is to show that a sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness, which contains a pre-reflective self-consciousness as its first level, is provided by the notion of transcendental apperception. The necessity for a pre-reflective self-consciousness has been pointed out in phenomenological literature. According to this account, every self-ascription of any property implies a more fundamental form of self-consciousness, i.e., a kind of immediate familiarity with oneself. This pre-reflective self-consciousness is a non-relational and non-identificational form of self-consciousness and concerns an immediate acquaintance of the subject with itself. In the specific terms of transcendentalism every thought contains an implicit reference to a first-personal “givenness” or a sense of “mineness” that articulates a non-relational and non-identificational form of a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness.
La voce e il logos. Filosofie dell’animalità nella storia delle idee. A cura di Stefano Gensini. Edizioni ETS, 2020
The minds of animals have always been one of the most fascinating topics in the philosophical and... more The minds of animals have always been one of the most fascinating topics in the philosophical and scientific debate. In this chapter some classical questions of this field will be examined, in particular I will consider two philosophical approaches that refer to the instrumentalist position of Dennett and that of intentional realism, thus giving a philosophical answer to Stich and Davidson who deny that animals possess thought and reasoning due to the absence of verbal language.
I segni fra teoria e storia. Per Giovanni Manetti. A cura di Stefano Gensini e Alessandro Prato. Edizioni ETS, 2019
In un recente intervento dal titolo eloquente, But is it science?, due tra i più importanti filos... more In un recente intervento dal titolo eloquente, But is it science?, due tra i più importanti filosofi inglesi in circolazione, Roger Scruton e Timothy Williamson, hanno dibattuto con toni anche ruvidi sulla natura della filosofia e sulle differenze che intercorrono tra filosofia e scienze sul metodo e sui diversi oggetti di analisi. È impossibile ripercorrere qui tutti gli snodi di questo intervento a quattro mani, che solo in modo superficiale può essere inquadrato come una dialettica di approccio tra filosofia analitica e continentale, se non sintetizzando alcuni contributi contemporanei sull’indicalità per evidenziare il progresso compiuto dalla filosofia del linguaggio sul tema della soggettività autocosciente.
Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thoughts which can be described as... more Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thoughts which can be described as thoughts about oneself 'as oneself'. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume's approaches to self-consciousness , as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes's view on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as herself, while Hume's seems to lack those features assigned to the consciousness of self-as-subject.
Resumen: La autoconciencia puede ser entendida como la habilidad para lle-var a cabo reflexiones sobre uno mismo, las cuales pueden ser descritas como los pensamientos sobre tu propia persona como " individuo ". La autoconciencia comprende dos características relacionadas entre sí: la primera tiene que ver con el hecho de que está basada en una perspectiva en primera persona, mien-tras que la segunda tiene que ver con el hecho de que debe ser considerada como la conciencia del yo como sujeto en lugar de como objeto. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar algunas cuestiones acerca del punto de vista de Des-cartes y de Hume sobre la autoconciencia, ya que ambos filósofos introducen un método de acceso en primera persona a la dimensión subjetiva a través de un
L'indagine kantiana sull'appercezione trascendentale e sull' 'Io penso' propone, tra le altre, tr... more L'indagine kantiana sull'appercezione trascendentale e sull' 'Io penso' propone, tra le altre, tre diverse tipologie di questioni: 1) una questione semantica, che riguarda il tipo di riferimento della rappresentazione 'Io'; 2) una questione epistemica, che si interroga sul tipo di conoscenza che si può assegnare al soggetto pensante a partire dall' 'Io penso'; 3) una questione strettamente metafisica, incentrata sulle caratteristiche attribuite alla natura del soggetto pensante. In questo intervento si approfondirà la questione semantica, analizzando la natura della rappresentazione 'Io' e ciò che Kant chiama 'designazione trascendentale', ossia l'apparato autoreferenziale coinvolto nell'appercezione trascendentale. L' 'Io penso' sembra essere un unicum rappresentazionale nel sistema kantiano: la coscienza di sé del soggetto pensante è espressa appunto dalla rappresentazione intellettuale 'Io' che presenta una funzione referenziale ben precisa, designando il soggetto senza alcuna mediazione epistemica: "si prescinde completamente dalle proprietà del soggetto, allorché ci si limita a designarlo per mezzo dell'espressione integralmente priva di contenuto 'io' (applicabile a qualsiasi soggetto pensante)" (A355). In primis, cosa intende Kant quando afferma che l'Io è una semplice e vuota rappresentazione? In secondo luogo, le caratteristiche della rappresentazione 'Io', e quelle relative alla designazione trascendentale, sono riconducibili alla sua natura indicale? Infine, come suggeriscono alcuni illustri commentatori all'interno del dibattito kantiano (Peacocke, Howell, Longuenesse) le considerazioni kantiane sull''Io penso' anticipano l'approccio, o anche solo lo spirito, della teoria del riferimento diretto?
In recent years, Kant has been seen as a reference point by non conceptual content theorists for ... more In recent years, Kant has been seen as a reference point by non conceptual content theorists for his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The aim of present work is exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 3). This work intends to dismiss the possibility that the intuition is provided with an autonomous function of de re knowledge. To this end, an exploration of certain epistemological points emerging from the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU) will be carried out in the conviction that these make up a suitable context to verify the presence of an autonomous, epistemically non-conceptual content in the transcendental system (§§ 4-6): it is here, in fact, that Kant discusses those cases where the intuition is given without bringing into play the conceptual dimension. As will be said, in this frame of reference such a content cannot subsist without any intellectual legacy.
I saggi contenuti nel volume analizzano il rapporto tra comunicazione e potere con particolare ri... more I saggi contenuti nel volume analizzano il rapporto tra comunicazione e potere con particolare riferimento alle tecniche retoriche utilizzate per il controllo del consenso. I temi trattati riguardano sia l’influenza dei media sul comportamento delle persone e sulla formazione dell’opinione pubblica, sia i meccanismi della persuasione ingannevole e della personalizzazione della politica, oltre che il ruolo svolto dai mass media nella produzione delle paure collettive.
in Massimo Dell'Utri e Antonio Rainone, I modi della razionalità
Se la mente degli animali rappresenta da sempre uno dei temi più affascinanti del dibattito filos... more Se la mente degli animali rappresenta da sempre uno dei temi più affascinanti del dibattito filosofico e scientifico, nei due ultimi decenni vi è stata una tale proliferazione di studi che alcuni autori hanno iniziato a impiegare l’etichetta filosofia delle menti animali per indicare un campo di ricerca autonomo. Questo saggio isola alcune questioni classiche di questo campo d’indagine, focalizzandosi soprattutto sul modo in cui alcuni contributi filosofici hanno articolato il plesso che lega la cognizione animale alla razionalità pratica a partire dall’approccio critico di Donald Davidson.
The aim of this paper is to single out certain characterizations of the " I think " and the " tra... more The aim of this paper is to single out certain characterizations of the " I think " and the " transcendental subject " in an attempt to find out a connection with certain specific metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject introduced by Kant in the critical period: the thinking, as spontaneity, is the being itself. For it accompanies every single representation, the I think refers to the thinking subject regardless of its metaphysical nature. At the level of the metaphysics of the self, Kant speaks of the I (das Ich), the mind (das Gemüt), the thinking subject (das denkende Subjekt), and the soul (die Seele). Three points at issue stand out: (1) a semantic question concerning the type of reference of the representation I; (2) an epistemic question concerning the type of knowledge about the thinking subject produced by the representation I think; (3) a more strictly metaphysical question1 on the characteristics assigned to the nature of the thinking subject. Two distinct meanings of " I think " need be identified: according to the first, mainly found in the Transcendental Deduction, " I think " is the act of apperception, whereas, according to the second, found in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms in particular – I think is assumed in its representational nature. Secondly, the notion of the " transcendental subject " will be interpreted in formal terms as a specific concept that, mutatis mutandis, holds the same function of the concept of the " transcendental object " .
In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account ... more In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). This work intends to dismiss the possibility that intuition may have an autonomous function of de re knowledge in support of an interpretative reading which can be labelled as weak conceptualism. To this end, the exploration will be conducted from a strictly transcendental perspective – i.e., by referring to the socalled theory of the “concept of a transcendental object”.
Organon - An international journal of analytic philosophy
Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a th... more Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless self-ascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least two diametrically opposed attitudes: the first – exemplified in the works by Hacker, Becker, Sturma and McDowell – considers the features of the I think according to Wittgenstein’s approach to the I as subject while the second, exemplified by Kitcher and Carl, criticizes the various commentators who turn to Wittgenstein in order to interpret Kant’s I think. The hypothesis that I will attempt at articulating in this paper starts off not only from the transcendental apperception form, but also from the characterizations of empirical apperception. It may be assumed that Kant’s reflection on the problem of self-identification lies right here, truly prefiguring some features of Wittgenstein’s uses of I, albeit from different metaphysical assumptions and philosophical horizons.
Трансцендентальный поворот в современной философии (5): трансцендентальный метод и современная наука (естествознание, математика, когнитивные науки, теология, этика), May 2020
The volume presents the abstracts of the 5th annual Moscow international scientific workshop «Tra... more The volume presents the abstracts of the 5th annual Moscow international scientific workshop «Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy: the transcendental method and modern science », dedicated to the discussion of the transcendental method as a methodological and theoretical basis of transcendental philosophy in its Kantian, neo-Kantian and phenomenological modes, as well as applied transcendental modes in various fields of scientific knowledge (philosophy of science (natural sciences, mathematics, humanities), cognitive research, theory of mind, philosophy of language, theology, ethics, aesthetics, social studies and law). The volume is meant for reaserchers, preoccupied with philosophical problems of epistemology, philosophy and methodology of science, philosophy of consciousness, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion [theology] and society.
В сборнике представлены тезисы 5-го ежегодного московского международного семинара «Трансцендентальный поворот в современной философии: трансцендентальный метод и современная наука», посвященного обсуждению трансцендентального метода как методолого–теоретического базиса трансцендентальной философии в ее кантианском, неокантианском и феноменологическом модусах, а также прикладных трансцендентальных исследований в различных областях научного знания (философия науки (естествознание, математика, гуманитарное знание), когнитивная наука, теория сознания, философия языка, теология, этика, эстетика, социальные исследование и право). Издание ориентировано на исследователей, интересующихся философскими проблемами эпистемологии, философии и методологии науки, философии сознания, философии языка, философии религии (теологии) и социума.
Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy – 4 (draft):, 2019
The volume presents proceedings of the international scientific workshop «Transcendental Turn in ... more The volume presents proceedings of the international scientific workshop «Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy – 4: transcendental metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of science, transcendental theology and theory of consciousness » dedicated to the discussion of the «general idea and main features of the tran-scendental philosophy in the aspects of its main modern modalities: Kant’s philosophy, neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, Post-Kantian transcendentalism, etc. The volume is for researchers concerned in philosophical problems of ontology, epistemology (theory of knowledge), philosophy and the methodology of science and philosophy (theory) of consciousness.
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Books by Luca Forgione
epistemic problem regarding the type of knowledge relative to the thinking subject produced by the representation 'I think'; and (3) a strictly metaphysical problem regarding the features assigned to the thinking subject's nature. The author connects the relevant scholarly literature on Kant with contemporary debates on the huge philosophical field of self-knowledge. He develops a formal reading according to which the unity of self-consciousness does not presuppose the identity of a real subject, but a formal identity based on the representation 'I think'.
Papers by Luca Forgione
Resumen: La autoconciencia puede ser entendida como la habilidad para lle-var a cabo reflexiones sobre uno mismo, las cuales pueden ser descritas como los pensamientos sobre tu propia persona como " individuo ". La autoconciencia comprende dos características relacionadas entre sí: la primera tiene que ver con el hecho de que está basada en una perspectiva en primera persona, mien-tras que la segunda tiene que ver con el hecho de que debe ser considerada como la conciencia del yo como sujeto en lugar de como objeto. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar algunas cuestiones acerca del punto de vista de Des-cartes y de Hume sobre la autoconciencia, ya que ambos filósofos introducen un método de acceso en primera persona a la dimensión subjetiva a través de un
epistemic problem regarding the type of knowledge relative to the thinking subject produced by the representation 'I think'; and (3) a strictly metaphysical problem regarding the features assigned to the thinking subject's nature. The author connects the relevant scholarly literature on Kant with contemporary debates on the huge philosophical field of self-knowledge. He develops a formal reading according to which the unity of self-consciousness does not presuppose the identity of a real subject, but a formal identity based on the representation 'I think'.
Resumen: La autoconciencia puede ser entendida como la habilidad para lle-var a cabo reflexiones sobre uno mismo, las cuales pueden ser descritas como los pensamientos sobre tu propia persona como " individuo ". La autoconciencia comprende dos características relacionadas entre sí: la primera tiene que ver con el hecho de que está basada en una perspectiva en primera persona, mien-tras que la segunda tiene que ver con el hecho de que debe ser considerada como la conciencia del yo como sujeto en lugar de como objeto. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar algunas cuestiones acerca del punto de vista de Des-cartes y de Hume sobre la autoconciencia, ya que ambos filósofos introducen un método de acceso en primera persona a la dimensión subjetiva a través de un
В сборнике представлены тезисы 5-го ежегодного московского международного семинара «Трансцендентальный поворот в современной философии: трансцендентальный метод и современная наука», посвященного обсуждению трансцендентального метода как методолого–теоретического базиса трансцендентальной философии в ее кантианском, неокантианском и феноменологическом модусах, а также прикладных трансцендентальных исследований в различных областях научного знания (философия науки (естествознание, математика, гуманитарное знание), когнитивная наука, теория сознания, философия языка, теология, этика, эстетика, социальные исследование и право). Издание ориентировано на исследователей, интересующихся философскими проблемами эпистемологии, философии и методологии науки, философии сознания, философии языка, философии религии (теологии) и социума.