Giuseppe Spolaore

This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine's fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted-in an absolute manner-by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb's being tasty and the state of rhubarb's being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework-we argue-our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration.

This paper explores mutable futurism, the view according to which the future can literally change-that is, it can happen that a future time t changes from containing an event E to lacking it (or vice versa). Mutable futurism has received little attention so far, and the details and implications of the view are underexplored in the literature. For instance, it currently lacks a precise metaphysical model and a formal semantics. Although we do not endorse mutable futurism, our goal here is to strengthen the case for mutable futurism and help establish it as a worthy contender in the debate on the philosophy of time. To attain this goal, (i) we try to make mutable futurism, along with its metaphysical and inferential commitments, as clear as possible, by providing it with a coherent metaphysical model and a plausible semantics, and (ii) we show that it can be backed by theoretical reasons.

Fictional truth, or truth in fiction/pretense, has been the object of extended scrutiny among philosophers and logicians in recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been paid to its inferential relationships with time and with certain deliberate and contingent human activities, namely, the creation of fictional works. The aim of the paper is to contribute to filling the gap. Toward this goal, a formal framework is outlined that is consistent with a variety of conceptions of fictional truth and based upon a specific formal treatment of time and agency, that of so-called stit logics. Moreover, a complete axiomatic theory of fiction-making TFM is defined, where fiction-making is understood as the exercise of agency and choice in time over what is fictionally true. The language L of TFM is an extension of the language of propositional logic, with the addition of temporal and modal operators. A distinctive feature of L with respect to other modal languages is a variety of operators having to do with fictional truth, including a ‘fictionality’ operator M (to be read as “it is a fictional truth that”). Some applications of TFM are outlined, and some interesting linguistic and inferential phenomena, which are not so easily dealt with in other frameworks, are accounted for.

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is 'open,' i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Kit Fine to (standard) tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, (branching-time) open futurists must (i) adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and (ii) subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of " actual future, " (iii) it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions.

Jaakko Hintikka proposed treating objectual perception sentences, such as "Alice sees Bob," as de re propositional perception sentences. Esa Saarinen extended Hintikka's idea to eventive perception sentences, such as "Alice sees Bob smile." These approaches, elegant as they may be, are not philosophically neutral, for they presuppose, controversially, that the content of all perceptual experiences is propositional in nature. The aim of this paper is to propose a formal treatment of objectual and eventive perception sentences that builds on Hintikka's modal approach to propositional attitude ascriptions while avoiding controversial assumptions on the nature of perceptual experiences. Despite being simple and theoretically frugal, our approach is powerful enough to express a variety of interesting philosophical views about propositional, objectual, and eventive perception sentences, thus enabling the study of their inferential relationships.

So-called Locke’s thesis is the view that no two things of the same kind may coincide, that is, may be completely in the same place at the same time. A number of counter-examples to this view have been proposed. In this paper, some new and arguably more convincing counter-examples to Locke’s thesis are presented. In these counter-examples, a particular entity (a string, a rope, a net, or similar) is interwoven to obtain what appears to be a distinct, thicker entity of the same kind. It is argued that anyone who subscribes to certain standard metaphysical arguments, which are generally taken for granted in the debate about Locke’s thesis, is virtually compelled to accept the counter-examples.

Michelangelo thought that stone statues pre-exist their sculptors’ performance. Michelangelo’s view gives rise to a puzzle, which we call Michelangelo’s puzzle. Michelangelo’s puzzle looks structurally similar to so-called problems of material constitution (e.g., the puzzle of the statue and the clay, or the puzzle of Tibbles the cat); so it is tempting to suppose that it can be similarly accounted for. This paper argues that the supposition is misguided. Michelangelo’s puzzle raises specific problems, which cannot be adequately dealt with unless one is prepared to give up either the natural view that stone sculptures are human creations, or a very plausible principle concerning the persistence of middle-sized material objects. A tentative solution to the puzzle is provided, in which borders can play an ontological role in the making of material objects. This solution is intuitively more palatable than Michelangelo’s view, but is nonetheless at odds with a commonsensical, realist attitude towards material objects. Thus, Michelangelo’s puzzle poses a serious challenge to common sense, which is unparalleled by other problems of material constitution.

The so-called paradox of knowability is usually regarded as questioning the principle that all truth is knowable (knowability principle). In this paper we examine the connection of the principle of knowability with other principles (epistemic versions of the disjunc- tion property), which concern the relationships between knowledge of a disjunction and knowledge of the disjuncts, and between knowledge of an existentially quantified sentence and knowledge of one of its instances. Some epistemic versions of the disjunction property are apparently weaker than the knowability principle. Still one of them seems to have paradoxical, or at least not easily acceptable, consequences as well. This puzzling result is diagnosed as depending on the association of a strongly intensional view of propositions with the impredicative way in which they are conceived and dealt with. If correct, the diagnosis directly applies to the paradox of knowability as well.

The paper criticizes an argument recently presented by Ross Cameron. The argument purports to show that, if time is gunky (that is, if there are no time atoms), and if changes in existence are underwritten by events of coming to be, then there are cases of indeterminate existence. The putative reason is that, if time is gunky, then events of coming to be cannot be instantaneous, and hence, changes in existence must be gradual, non-clear-cut. The paper argues that this argument conflates two different readings of " event of coming to be ". Under one reading, the argument is unsound. Under the other, the argument is valid only if a further, nontrivial premise is added, which concerns the relation between time atoms, instants, and instantaneous events.

In this paper, I introduce and discuss a paradox that I call "subtrac on paradox". The subtrac on paradox has the same basic structure as many other puzzles involving the no on of nothingness. Roughly, the structure is this: some mes we presuppose, when we speak, that "nothing" ("nothingness") denotes something; however, if so, the thing denoted by "nothing", viz., nothing, cannot be nothing (for no thing is nothing). It may be temp ng to think that the subtrac on paradox ul mately depends on the fact that the no on of nothingness is especially problema c. In this paper, I draw doubt on this view, showing that essen ally the same paradox can be formulated with no appeal to the no on of nothingness. In the Appendix, I suggest that the paradox ul mately depends on a principle connec ng facts and truths and on the possibility of (impredica ve) quan fica on over facts. I also suggest that the paradox is a fact-based version of standard an nomies such as Cantor's paradox.

Il saggio \ue8 una voce enciclopedica dedicata alla nozione di impegno ontologico, con particolare attenzione alla formulazione di W.V.O. Quine. Tanto i presupposti filosofici generali della nozione, tanto formulazioni alternative a quella quineana sono esaminati

ABSTRACT In metaphysical theorizing, it is common to use expressions whose function is that of denoting or being true of absolutely everything. Adopting a scolastic term, these may be called ‘transcendentals’. Different metaphysical theories may adopt different transcendentals, the most usual candidates being ‘thing’, ‘entity’, ‘object’, ‘be’, ‘exist’, and their counterparts in various languages dead or alive. We call ‘transcendental disagreement’ any dissent between philosophical theories or traditions that may be described as a disagreement in the choice of transcendentals. Examples of transcendental disagreement include the debate about Lewis's conception of actuality and a number of recent discussions between Meinongians and their ‘Quinean’ rivals. A case is made for the conclusion that, as such, transcendental disagreements are purely terminological in character. It is argued that transcendental disagreements are generally to be assessed on pragmatic rather than on metaphysical grounds. Finally, the paper makes a start in the analysis of those pragmatic grounds which include the pursuit of univocity, fairness, and ease of comparison between theories.