The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A... more The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper, we elaborate upon David Lewis’ account of subject matter. Lewis’ proposal is simple and elegant but lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis’ but also includes an attractive characterisation of sentential subject matter.
The target article presents a new version of if-thenism: call it IF-thenism. In this commentary I... more The target article presents a new version of if-thenism: call it IF-thenism. In this commentary I discuss whether IF-thenism can solve a problem that besets classic if-thenism. The answer will be that it can, on certain assumptions. I will briefly examine the tenability of these assumptions.
(Neo)Meinongians in general, and Routley in particular, subscribe to the principle of the indepen... more (Neo)Meinongians in general, and Routley in particular, subscribe to the principle of the independence of Sosein from Sein (Routley 1980). In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of the independence principle that philosophers working outside the Meinongian tradition can accept. Drawing on recent work by Stephen Yablo and others on the notion of subject matter, I offer a new account of the notion of Sosein (Being-so) as a subject matter (or topic) and argue that in some cases Sosein might be independent from Sein (Being, Existence). The question whether numbers exist, for instance, is not part of the question of how numbers are, which is the topic mathematicians are interested in.
The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A... more The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper we elaborate upon David Lewis' account of subject matter. Lewis' proposal is simple and elegant but lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis' but also includes an attractive characterisation of sen-tential subject matter.
In the recent literature there has been some debate between advocates of deflationist and fiction... more In the recent literature there has been some debate between advocates of deflationist and fictionalist positions in metaontology. The purpose of this paper is to advance the debate by reconsidering one objection presented by Amie Thomasson against fictionalist strategies in metaontology. The objection can be reconstructed in the following way. Fictionalists need to distinguish between the literal and the real content of sentences belonging to certain areas of discourse. In order to make that distinction, they need to assign different truth-conditions to the real and the literal content. But it is hard to see what more is required for the literal content to be true than for the real content to be true. So, fictionalism is an unsatisfactory position. Here I offer a novel reply to Thomasson's challenge. I argue that the literal and the real content need not be distinguished in terms of their truth-conditions; rather, they can be distinguished in terms of their different subject-matters, leaving it open whether their truth-conditions coincide or not. I explain how replying to Thomasson's objection is crucial for deepening our understanding of fictionalist strategies in metaontology.
Mathematical platonism is the view that abstract mathematical objects exist. Ontological pluralis... more Mathematical platonism is the view that abstract mathematical objects exist. Ontological pluralism is the view that there are many modes of existence. This paper examines the prospects for plural platonism, the view that results from combining mathematical platonism and ontological pluralism. I will argue that some forms of platonism are in harmony with ontological pluralism, while other forms of platonism are in tension with it. This shows that there are some interesting connections between the platonism-antiplatonism dispute and recent debates over ontological pluralism. 1. Mathematical Platonism and Ontological Pluralism Mathematical platonism is the doctrine that abstract mathematical objects exist (see Linnebo 2013). Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different modes of existence (McDaniel 2009,Turner 2010) and (usually) that abstract objects have a different mode of existence than concrete ones (McDaniel 2009, Tuner 2010 both attribute to abstracta and concreta different modes of existence). Ontological monism, by contrast, is the view that there is just one mode of existence. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether pluralist platonism, the combination of mathematical platonism and ontological pluralism, might reveal itself to be superior to monist platonism, the combination of mathematical platonism and ontological monism. I will argue that some versions of platonism are in harmony with ontological pluralism, while other forms of platonism are in tension with it. Kris McDaniel has argued that "accepting that there are different ways of being might impact certain ontological disputes, such as the dispute between nominalists and realists over mathematical entities" (McDaniel 2009, 291). I am going to argue that also the reverse holds: the dispute between platonists and nominalists might impact recent debates over ontological pluralism, in the sense that whether platonists find ontological pluralism attractive depends on the kind of platonist account they favor.
Two conceptions of the nature of mathematical objects are contrasted: the conception of mathemati... more Two conceptions of the nature of mathematical objects are contrasted: the conception of mathematical objects as preconceived objects (Yablo 2010), and heavy duty platonism (Knowles 2015). It is argued that some theses defended by friends of the indispensability argument are in harmony with heavy duty platonism and in tension with the conception of mathematical objects as preconceived objects. Keywords: indispensability argument; heavy duty platonism; metaphysical grounding. RESUMEN: Se contrastan dos concepciones de la naturaleza de los objetos matemáticos: la concepción de los objetos ma-temáticos como objetos preconcebidos (Yablo 2010), y el platonismo de deber fuerte (Knowles 2015). Se argu-menta que algunas de las tesis defendidas por los amigos del argumento de la indispensabilidad están en armo-nía con el platonismo de deber fuerte y en tensión con la concepción de los objetos matemáticos como objetos preconcebidos. Palabras clave: argumento de la indispensabilidad; platonismo de deber fuerte; fundamentación metafísica.
The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether nu... more The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether numbers and other mathematical objects exist. Platonists believe the answer to be in the positive, nominalists in the negative. According to non-factualists (about mathematical objects), the question is ‘moot’, in the sense that it lacks a correct answer. Elaborating on ideas from Stephen Yablo, this paper articulates a non-factualist position in the philosophy of mathematics and shows how the case for non-factualism entails that standard arguments for rival positions fail. In particular, showing how and why non-factualists reject nominalism illuminates the originality and interest of their position.
Recent work in the philosophy of language attempts to elucidate the elusive notion of aboutness (... more Recent work in the philosophy of language attempts to elucidate the elusive notion of aboutness (Berto 2018; Lewis 1988; Fine 2017a, b; Hawke 2017; Moltmann 2018; Yablo 2014). A natural question concerning such a project has to do with its motivation: why is the notion of aboutness important? Stephen Yablo (2014) offers an interesting answer: taking into consideration not only the conditions under which a sentence is true, but also what a sentence is about opens the door to a new style of criticism of certain philosophical analyses. We might criticize the analysis of a given notion not because it fails to assign the right truth conditions to a class of sentences, but because it characterizes those sentences as being about something they are not about. In this paper, I apply Yablo's suggestion to a case study. I consider meta-fictionalism, the view that the content of a mathematical claim S is 'according to standard mathematics, S'. I argue, following Woodward (2013), that, on certain assumptions, meta-fictionalism assigns the right truth-conditions to typical assertoric utterances of mathematical statements. However, I also argue that meta-fictionalism assigns the wrong aboutness conditions to typical assertoric utterances of mathematical statements.
Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, foc... more Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, focussing on the most recent trends in the discipline.
Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the reader with concrete examples of the latest research in the field. The basic sub-fields of ontology are covered here via an accessible and captivating exposition: events, properties, universals, abstract objects, possible worlds, material beings, mereology, fictional objects.
The guide's modular structure allows for a flexible approach to the subject, making it suitable for both undergraduates and postgraduates looking to better understand and apply the exciting developments and debates taking place in ontology today.
Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (20... more Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest (1999, 2000, 2006).
The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A... more The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper, we elaborate upon David Lewis’ account of subject matter. Lewis’ proposal is simple and elegant but lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis’ but also includes an attractive characterisation of sentential subject matter.
The target article presents a new version of if-thenism: call it IF-thenism. In this commentary I... more The target article presents a new version of if-thenism: call it IF-thenism. In this commentary I discuss whether IF-thenism can solve a problem that besets classic if-thenism. The answer will be that it can, on certain assumptions. I will briefly examine the tenability of these assumptions.
(Neo)Meinongians in general, and Routley in particular, subscribe to the principle of the indepen... more (Neo)Meinongians in general, and Routley in particular, subscribe to the principle of the independence of Sosein from Sein (Routley 1980). In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of the independence principle that philosophers working outside the Meinongian tradition can accept. Drawing on recent work by Stephen Yablo and others on the notion of subject matter, I offer a new account of the notion of Sosein (Being-so) as a subject matter (or topic) and argue that in some cases Sosein might be independent from Sein (Being, Existence). The question whether numbers exist, for instance, is not part of the question of how numbers are, which is the topic mathematicians are interested in.
The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A... more The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper we elaborate upon David Lewis' account of subject matter. Lewis' proposal is simple and elegant but lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis' but also includes an attractive characterisation of sen-tential subject matter.
In the recent literature there has been some debate between advocates of deflationist and fiction... more In the recent literature there has been some debate between advocates of deflationist and fictionalist positions in metaontology. The purpose of this paper is to advance the debate by reconsidering one objection presented by Amie Thomasson against fictionalist strategies in metaontology. The objection can be reconstructed in the following way. Fictionalists need to distinguish between the literal and the real content of sentences belonging to certain areas of discourse. In order to make that distinction, they need to assign different truth-conditions to the real and the literal content. But it is hard to see what more is required for the literal content to be true than for the real content to be true. So, fictionalism is an unsatisfactory position. Here I offer a novel reply to Thomasson's challenge. I argue that the literal and the real content need not be distinguished in terms of their truth-conditions; rather, they can be distinguished in terms of their different subject-matters, leaving it open whether their truth-conditions coincide or not. I explain how replying to Thomasson's objection is crucial for deepening our understanding of fictionalist strategies in metaontology.
Mathematical platonism is the view that abstract mathematical objects exist. Ontological pluralis... more Mathematical platonism is the view that abstract mathematical objects exist. Ontological pluralism is the view that there are many modes of existence. This paper examines the prospects for plural platonism, the view that results from combining mathematical platonism and ontological pluralism. I will argue that some forms of platonism are in harmony with ontological pluralism, while other forms of platonism are in tension with it. This shows that there are some interesting connections between the platonism-antiplatonism dispute and recent debates over ontological pluralism. 1. Mathematical Platonism and Ontological Pluralism Mathematical platonism is the doctrine that abstract mathematical objects exist (see Linnebo 2013). Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different modes of existence (McDaniel 2009,Turner 2010) and (usually) that abstract objects have a different mode of existence than concrete ones (McDaniel 2009, Tuner 2010 both attribute to abstracta and concreta different modes of existence). Ontological monism, by contrast, is the view that there is just one mode of existence. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether pluralist platonism, the combination of mathematical platonism and ontological pluralism, might reveal itself to be superior to monist platonism, the combination of mathematical platonism and ontological monism. I will argue that some versions of platonism are in harmony with ontological pluralism, while other forms of platonism are in tension with it. Kris McDaniel has argued that "accepting that there are different ways of being might impact certain ontological disputes, such as the dispute between nominalists and realists over mathematical entities" (McDaniel 2009, 291). I am going to argue that also the reverse holds: the dispute between platonists and nominalists might impact recent debates over ontological pluralism, in the sense that whether platonists find ontological pluralism attractive depends on the kind of platonist account they favor.
Two conceptions of the nature of mathematical objects are contrasted: the conception of mathemati... more Two conceptions of the nature of mathematical objects are contrasted: the conception of mathematical objects as preconceived objects (Yablo 2010), and heavy duty platonism (Knowles 2015). It is argued that some theses defended by friends of the indispensability argument are in harmony with heavy duty platonism and in tension with the conception of mathematical objects as preconceived objects. Keywords: indispensability argument; heavy duty platonism; metaphysical grounding. RESUMEN: Se contrastan dos concepciones de la naturaleza de los objetos matemáticos: la concepción de los objetos ma-temáticos como objetos preconcebidos (Yablo 2010), y el platonismo de deber fuerte (Knowles 2015). Se argu-menta que algunas de las tesis defendidas por los amigos del argumento de la indispensabilidad están en armo-nía con el platonismo de deber fuerte y en tensión con la concepción de los objetos matemáticos como objetos preconcebidos. Palabras clave: argumento de la indispensabilidad; platonismo de deber fuerte; fundamentación metafísica.
The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether nu... more The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether numbers and other mathematical objects exist. Platonists believe the answer to be in the positive, nominalists in the negative. According to non-factualists (about mathematical objects), the question is ‘moot’, in the sense that it lacks a correct answer. Elaborating on ideas from Stephen Yablo, this paper articulates a non-factualist position in the philosophy of mathematics and shows how the case for non-factualism entails that standard arguments for rival positions fail. In particular, showing how and why non-factualists reject nominalism illuminates the originality and interest of their position.
Recent work in the philosophy of language attempts to elucidate the elusive notion of aboutness (... more Recent work in the philosophy of language attempts to elucidate the elusive notion of aboutness (Berto 2018; Lewis 1988; Fine 2017a, b; Hawke 2017; Moltmann 2018; Yablo 2014). A natural question concerning such a project has to do with its motivation: why is the notion of aboutness important? Stephen Yablo (2014) offers an interesting answer: taking into consideration not only the conditions under which a sentence is true, but also what a sentence is about opens the door to a new style of criticism of certain philosophical analyses. We might criticize the analysis of a given notion not because it fails to assign the right truth conditions to a class of sentences, but because it characterizes those sentences as being about something they are not about. In this paper, I apply Yablo's suggestion to a case study. I consider meta-fictionalism, the view that the content of a mathematical claim S is 'according to standard mathematics, S'. I argue, following Woodward (2013), that, on certain assumptions, meta-fictionalism assigns the right truth-conditions to typical assertoric utterances of mathematical statements. However, I also argue that meta-fictionalism assigns the wrong aboutness conditions to typical assertoric utterances of mathematical statements.
Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, foc... more Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, focussing on the most recent trends in the discipline.
Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the reader with concrete examples of the latest research in the field. The basic sub-fields of ontology are covered here via an accessible and captivating exposition: events, properties, universals, abstract objects, possible worlds, material beings, mereology, fictional objects.
The guide's modular structure allows for a flexible approach to the subject, making it suitable for both undergraduates and postgraduates looking to better understand and apply the exciting developments and debates taking place in ontology today.
Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (20... more Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest (1999, 2000, 2006).
Profili, bacheche, post virali ed epic fail, like e dislike, ci introducono alla logica senza che... more Profili, bacheche, post virali ed epic fail, like e dislike, ci introducono alla logica senza che ce ne accorgiamo.
A *very* crude presentation of Stephen Yablo's Aboutness (Princeton 2014). Some people found it h... more A *very* crude presentation of Stephen Yablo's Aboutness (Princeton 2014). Some people found it helpful, so I decided to share it.
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Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the reader with concrete examples of the latest research in the field. The basic sub-fields of ontology are covered here via an accessible and captivating exposition: events, properties, universals, abstract objects, possible worlds, material beings, mereology, fictional objects.
The guide's modular structure allows for a flexible approach to the subject, making it suitable for both undergraduates and postgraduates looking to better understand and apply the exciting developments and debates taking place in ontology today.
Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the reader with concrete examples of the latest research in the field. The basic sub-fields of ontology are covered here via an accessible and captivating exposition: events, properties, universals, abstract objects, possible worlds, material beings, mereology, fictional objects.
The guide's modular structure allows for a flexible approach to the subject, making it suitable for both undergraduates and postgraduates looking to better understand and apply the exciting developments and debates taking place in ontology today.