Max Kistler
Université Paris 1 - Panthéon-Sorbonne, Philosophie, Faculty Member
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Metaphysics of Consciousness, and 18 moreCausation, Metaphysics of Mind, Emergence, Metaphysics of Science, Causality, Mental Causation, Emergent Phenomena, Laws of Nature (Philosophy), Reductionism, Causal Exclusion, Causal Mechanisms: In Social Theory, Practice, Levels, Functions, Genres, Agents, Philosophie, and Psychologyedit
- I am professor in the department of philosophy of université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.edit
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DANS LA MEME COLLECTION BAILHACHE (P.) : Essai de logique déontique, 224 p. BARTHÉLÉMY (G.) : Newton mécanicien du cosmos, 216 p. BELNA(J.-P.) : La notion de nombre chez Dedekind, Cantor, Frege, préface de Cl. Imbert, 376 p. BOOLE(G.) :... more
DANS LA MEME COLLECTION BAILHACHE (P.) : Essai de logique déontique, 224 p. BARTHÉLÉMY (G.) : Newton mécanicien du cosmos, 216 p. BELNA(J.-P.) : La notion de nombre chez Dedekind, Cantor, Frege, préface de Cl. Imbert, 376 p. BOOLE(G.) : Les Lois de la ...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Humanities
In his new book, Alexander Bird brings together many of his important contributions to the recent debate on the metaphysical status of natural properties and laws of nature. The result is a powerful and detailed theory according to which... more
In his new book, Alexander Bird brings together many of his important contributions to the recent debate on the metaphysical status of natural properties and laws of nature. The result is a powerful and detailed theory according to which the fundamental natural properties ...
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Review, Nonfiction, and 3 moreMind, Erkenntnis, and Reading Process
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Nous sommes des etres a la fois spirituels et corporels. Mon poids est un attribut corporel. En revanche, le fait de songer a la vue de la mer est un attribut mental. Une fois posee la dualite des attributs, la question se pose... more
Nous sommes des etres a la fois spirituels et corporels. Mon poids est un attribut corporel. En revanche, le fait de songer a la vue de la mer est un attribut mental. Une fois posee la dualite des attributs, la question se pose inevitablement : comment le corps et l’esprit peuvent-ils agir l’un sur l’autre ? Face a l’echec des doctrines dualistes d’expliquer cette interaction, cet ouvrage defend une variante du materialisme reductionniste qui est cependant attenuee par une mise en perspective nouvelle : corps et esprit se situent au sein de toute une hierarchie de niveaux de realite. Les personnes, tout en etant exclusivement composees, comme tout autre objet materiel, d’atomes ont des proprietes emergentes que ne possede aucune de leurs composantes. Nous developpons une nouvelle conception de l’emergence qui la rend compatible avec la reduction. Une personne peut songer alors qu’aucune partie de son corps ne le peut : en ce sens la capacite de songer emerge au niveau de la personne. Cela n’empeche qu’il est en principe possible d’expliquer cette capacite en termes des parties physiologiques de la personne. Cependant, une telle integration dans la conception scientifique du monde ne prive notre esprit ni de realite ni d’efficacite : lorsque je raconte mon songe a un ami, mon songe et le desir de le partager figurent parmi les causes de la vibration de mes cordes vocales.
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Dans la communaute philosophique de langue anglaise, Jaegwon Kim, professeur a l'universite Brown a Providence aux Etats-Unis, jouit d'un immense prestige. Dans le domaine de ce qu'on appelle la " philosophie de... more
Dans la communaute philosophique de langue anglaise, Jaegwon Kim, professeur a l'universite Brown a Providence aux Etats-Unis, jouit d'un immense prestige. Dans le domaine de ce qu'on appelle la " philosophie de l'esprit ", ce sont souvent ses theses et arguments qui servent de points de depart des debats. La philosophie de l'esprit est cette branche de la philosophie qui prend pour objet le rapport entre notre esprit et le monde tel qu'il fait l'objet de la connaissance scientifique. Le travail de Kim dont le present recueil contient un echantillon important, se distingue avant tout par sa rigueur exemplaire, par la clarte et transparence de son argumentation
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Can laws of nature be universal regularities and nevertheless have exceptions? Several answers to this question, in particular the thesis that there are no laws outside of fundamental physics, are examined and rejected. It is suggested... more
Can laws of nature be universal regularities and nevertheless have exceptions? Several answers to this question, in particular the thesis that there are no laws outside of fundamental physics, are examined and rejected. It is suggested that one can account for exceptions by conceiving of laws as strictly universal determination relations between (instances of) properties. When a natural property is instantiated, laws of nature give rise to other, typically dispositional properties. In exceptional situations, such properties manifest themselves either in an unusual way or not at all.
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Nous proposons une reconstruction realiste du concept de causalite. Deux concepts de causalite sont degages. La relation causale fondamentale est une relation de transfert d'une quantite de grandeur conservee qui a lieu entre deux... more
Nous proposons une reconstruction realiste du concept de causalite. Deux concepts de causalite sont degages. La relation causale fondamentale est une relation de transfert d'une quantite de grandeur conservee qui a lieu entre deux evenements. En revanche, le fait que a est f est dit "causalement responsable" du fait que b est g si et seulement si l'evenement a possede la propriete f,b possede la propriete g, a est cause de b et une loi de la nature relie les proprietes f et g. Nous utilisons ces outils conceptuels pour repondre a deux questions centrales de la philosophie de l'esprit. Les proprietes mentales - par example, les croyances - peuvent-elles pretendre a l'efficacite causale bien qu'elles aient premierement un caractere relationnel (ce sont des attitudes envers un contenu) et bien que deuxiement les proprietes cerebrales sous-jacentes semblent les vouer au statut d'epiphenomenes ? la deuxieme question abordee est de savoir s'il est pos...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Humanities
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Two conceptual frameworks-in terms of phase space and in terms of structural equations-are sketched, in which downward causal influence of higher-level features on lower-level features is possible. The "Exclusion"... more
Two conceptual frameworks-in terms of phase space and in terms of structural equations-are sketched, in which downward causal influence of higher-level features on lower-level features is possible. The "Exclusion" principle, which is a crucial premise of the argument against the possibility of downward causation, is false in models constructed within both frameworks. Both frameworks can be supplemented with conceptual tools that make it possible to explain why downward causal influence is not only conceivable and compatible with the "Closure" principle, but also why it is often relevant to causally explain facts in terms of downward causal influence. It is briefly shown that 1) the analysis of downward causation in the two frameworks complements Bennett's (2003) analysis of overdetermination, 2) the analysis does not entail the failure of the "Closure" principle and 3) it does not require the postulate of synchronic downward causation.
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HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific research documents, whether they are pub-lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad,... more
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific research documents, whether they are pub-lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et a ̀ la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. 146 max kistler conditions under which support fails to transmit to C is correct; we simply deny that in the voting example (normal) those conditions are in fact satisfied. If this is right, then Wright’s account of why evidential support may fail to transmit across entailment is validated by a Bayesian analysis, just as the proof above suggested at first sight. Where B entails C, then if A supports B conditionally on C but not otherwise,...
Humans have only finite discriminatory capacities. This simple fact seems to be incompatible with the existence of appearances. As many authors have noted, the hypothesis that appearances exist seems to be refuted by reductio: Let A, B, C... more
Humans have only finite discriminatory capacities. This simple fact seems to be incompatible with the existence of appearances. As many authors have noted, the hypothesis that appearances exist seems to be refuted by reductio: Let A, B, C be three uniformly
Research Interests: Psychology and Routledge
Esfeld's new book is a powerful and well-argued statement for an original position in the metaphysics of science. In Esfeld's view, rational reflection on relativity theory and quantum theory leads to a metaphysical conception of... more
Esfeld's new book is a powerful and well-argued statement for an original position in the metaphysics of science. In Esfeld's view, rational reflection on relativity theory and quantum theory leads to a metaphysical conception of reality as built on powerful structures: first, the fundamental building blocks of reality are structures rather than properties of space-time points or of matter localized at such points; second, these structures are not categorical or inert but inherently powerful and sources of relations that hold necessarily.
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I propose an argument for the thesis that laws of nature are necessary in a metaphysical sense, on the basis of a principle I propose to call the Causal Criterion of Reality (CCR). The CCR says: for an entity to be real it is necessary... more
I propose an argument for the thesis that laws of nature are necessary in a metaphysical sense, on the basis of a principle I propose to call the Causal Criterion of Reality (CCR). The CCR says: for an entity to be real it is necessary and sufficient that it is capable to make a difference to causal interactions. The crucial idea is that the capacity to interact causally - or to contribute to determining causal interactions - is not only the ultimate justification for the existence of an entity, but it also provides a criterion for determining the nature of that entity, i.e. its properties. The alternative is to conceive of laws of nature as contingent: they could be different from what they are like in the actual world, where that possibility is understood to be metaphysical, not only epistemic. For the sake of this paper, I shall accept Armstrong's (1983; 1997) thesis that laws of nature are relations between universals. I also follow Armstrong in the view that both the existe...
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Causation is analysed in terms of transference of amounts of conserved quantities between events. Such amounts are tropes. However, causal explanations are directly made true, not by transmission relations but by relations of causal... more
Causation is analysed in terms of transference of amounts of conserved quantities between events. Such amounts are tropes. However, causal explanations are directly made true, not by transmission relations but by relations of causal responsibility, of a fact Fc about the cause event c for a fact Ge about the effect event e. Causal responsibility is analysed in terms of causation between events c and e and a law of nature holding between the properties F and G. This account overcomes many objections against other process theories, as well as against accounts in terms of counterfactual dependency and conditional probabilities.
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Les proprietes mentales ou cognitives sont des proprietes reelles au sens ou elles ont des pouvoirs causaux propres, distinctes des pouvoirs causaux des proprietes des neurones individuels. Cela n'empeche pas qu'elles soient en... more
Les proprietes mentales ou cognitives sont des proprietes reelles au sens ou elles ont des pouvoirs causaux propres, distinctes des pouvoirs causaux des proprietes des neurones individuels. Cela n'empeche pas qu'elles soient en principe reductibles : la reduction consiste dans la decouverte des lois qui font emerger la propriete macroscopique. Ce modele est cense couvrir tous les paliers de l'echelle qui va du microscopique au macroscopique, jusqu'a la determination des proprietes mentales par l'ensemble des proprietes d'activation des neurones et de leurs interactions. Il est cense fournir une interpretation ontologique de la reduction : les reductions scientifiques sont fondees, non simplement sur l'existence de correlations, mais sur la decouverte de relations de determination nomique des proprietes macroscopiques, a partir de leurs parties. Cela montre, a l'encontre de la these de Causey (1977), que l'identification n'est pas la seule mani...
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The search for a nomological account of what determines the content of concepts as they are represented in cognitive systems, is an important part of the general project of explaining intentional phenomena in naturalistic terms. I examine... more
The search for a nomological account of what determines the content of concepts as they are represented in cognitive systems, is an important part of the general project of explaining intentional phenomena in naturalistic terms. I examine Fodor's (1990a) "Theory of Content" and criticize his strategy of combining constraints in nomological terms with contraints in terms of actual causal relations. The paper focuses on the problem of the indeterminacy of the content of natural kind concepts. A concept like water can pick out either a phenomenological property or a scientific one. Moreover, even on the assumption that the latter is shown to be most adequate, a given sample will still come out as falling into different natural kinds, according to the taxomomy of each particular science of which it constitutes an object. Both chemistry and physics contain concepts which are scientific counterparts of the common sense concept water, yet their extensions differ. As a criteri...
Most philosophers of physics are eliminativists about causation. Following Bertrand Russell’s lead, they think that causation is a folk concept that cannot be rationally reconstructed within a worldview informed by contemporary physics.... more
Most philosophers of physics are eliminativists about causation. Following Bertrand Russell’s lead, they think that causation is a folk concept that cannot be rationally reconstructed within a worldview informed by contemporary physics. Against this thesis, I argue that physics contributes to shaping the concept of causation, in two ways. (1) Special Relativity is a physical theory that expresses causal constraints. (2) The physical concept of a conserved quantity can be used in the functional reduction of the notion of causation. The empirical part of this reduction makes the hypothesis that the transference of an amount of a conserved quantity is a necessary and sufficient condition for causation. This hypothesis is defended against several objections from physics: that amounts of energy do not possess the appropriate identity conditions required for being able to be transmitted, that there is no universal principle of the conservation of energy in General Relativity, and that the...
A vase falls from high on hard ground. Small wonder it breaks. Is its fragility among the properties causally efficacious for its breaking? It is controversial whether a property can be both dispositional and causally efficacious.... more
A vase falls from high on hard ground. Small wonder it breaks. Is its fragility among the properties causally efficacious for its breaking? It is controversial whether a property can be both dispositional and causally efficacious. Fragility is a dispositional property because its identity depends essentially on a counterfactual conditional: an object is fragile to the extent that it would, in otherwise normal circumstances, break if it were to fall from high on hard ground. The antecedent of this conditional need never be actually satisfied: dispositional properties can be possessed while they do not manifest themselves, and even without ever manifesting themselves. The identity of categorical properties does not so depend on what would happen in certain counterfactual situations: whether an object is spherical is determined by a criterion that can be spelled out in terms of actuality: all points on the surface of the object are at the same distance from its centre. Among others, Ar...
Research Interests: Psychology and Ashgate
Does science need a concept of causality, and if it does, how may this concept be analyzed? The chapter introduces to the main debates regarding causality in contemporary philosophy of science. Eliminativism, as defended by Russell, is... more
Does science need a concept of causality, and if it does, how may this concept be analyzed? The chapter introduces to the main debates regarding causality in contemporary philosophy of science. Eliminativism, as defended by Russell, is the first target: it is argued that even if the concept of causality were eliminable in fundamental physics, it would still be needed in many other contexts, including those covered by other branches of science such as biology or neuroscience. Various possible explications for the concept of causation are then successively considered, in terms of counterfactual conditionals, of probability raising, in terms of manipulability and in terms of processes.
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The identity of a natural kind can be construed in terms of its causal profile. This conception is more appropriate to science than two alternatives. The identity of a natural kind is not determined by one causal role because one natural... more
The identity of a natural kind can be construed in terms of its causal profile. This conception is more appropriate to science than two alternatives. The identity of a natural kind is not determined by one causal role because one natural kind can have many causal roles and several functions and because some functions are shared by different kinds. Furthermore, the microstructuralist thesis is wrong: The identity of certain natural kinds is not determined by their microstructure. It is true that if A and B have the same microstructural composition then a sample of a chemical substance A is of the same chemical substance as a sample of B. However, the reverse does not hold. It is not the case that if a sample of a chemical substance A is of the same chemical substance as a sample of B then A and B have the same microstructural composition. This is because a macroscopic NK can be “multiconstituted” by different microstructures.
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Research Interests: Psychology and De Gruyter
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RÉSUMÉ Kim attribue aux émergentistes un modèle de « réduction logique » dans lequel la prédiction ou l’explication d’une occurrence de la propriété réduite ne requiert, outre des informations sur le niveau réducteur, que des principes... more
RÉSUMÉ Kim attribue aux émergentistes un modèle de « réduction logique » dans lequel la prédiction ou l’explication d’une occurrence de la propriété réduite ne requiert, outre des informations sur le niveau réducteur, que des principes logiques et mathématiques. Sur la base de cette interprétation, je conteste deux thèses de Kim. La première concerne la légitimité du modèle émergentiste de réduction. J’essaie de montrer, à l’aide de l’exemple de l’addition des masses, que l’adoption de la réduction logique rendrait irréductibles certaines propriétés qui sont clairement réductibles. La deuxième est la thèse selon laquelle la réduction fonctionnelle correspond aux exigences émergentistes sur la réduction. Telle que Kim la caractérise, la réduction fonctionnelle comporte, outre une définition fonctionnelle de la propriété à réduire, l’indication des propriétés réalisatrices. Or cette information, qui correspond à la découverte d’une loi de correspondance (locale), est empirique et non ...
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à paraître, Lato Sensu : revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences Résumé L'identité d'une espèce naturelle peut être conçue en termes de son profil causal. Une telle conception correspond mieux à la science que deux alternatives.... more
à paraître, Lato Sensu : revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences Résumé L'identité d'une espèce naturelle peut être conçue en termes de son profil causal. Une telle conception correspond mieux à la science que deux alternatives. L'identité d'une espèce naturelle n'est pas déterminée par un rôle causal unique parce que 1) une espèce peut avoir plusieurs rôles causaux ainsi que plusieurs fonctions et 2) certaines fonctions sont partagées par différentes espèces. Par ailleurs, en général, la thèse microstructuraliste n'est pas correcte : l'identité de certaines espèces naturelles n'est pas déterminée par leur microstructure. Il est vrai que si les substances chimiques A et B ont la même composition microstructurelle, alors un échantillon de l'espèce de substance A appartient à la même espèce qu'un échantillon de la substance B. Cependant, l'implication inverse ne vaut pas. Le fait qu'un échantillon A appartienne à la même espèce que l'échantillon B ne garantit pas que A et B aient la même composition microstructurelle. Certaines espèces naturelles macroscopiques peuvent en effet être « constituées de manière multiple » ou « multiconstituées » par différentes structures microscopiques. Abstract The identity of a natural kind can be construed in terms of its causal profile. This conception is more appropriate to science than two alternatives. The identity of a natural kind is not determined by one causal role because one natural kind can have many causal roles and several functions and because some functions are shared by different kinds. Furthermore, the microstructuralist thesis is wrong: The identity of certain natural kinds is not determined by their microstructure. It is true that if A and B have the same microstructural composition then a sample of a chemical substance A is of the same chemical substance as a sample of B. However, the reverse does not hold. It is not the case that if a sample of a chemical substance A is of the same chemical substance as a sample of B then A and B have the same microstructural composition. This is because a macroscopic NK can be " multiconstituted " by different microstructures.
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The Interventionist account of causation (Woodward 2003) seems to provide a rigorous framework for evaluating the possibility of downward causation. However, it has turned out 1) that only a modified version (Woodward 2014) of... more
The Interventionist account of causation (Woodward 2003) seems to provide a rigorous framework for evaluating the possibility of downward causation. However, it has turned out 1) that only a modified version (Woodward 2014) of interventionism can be applied to situations of apparent downward causation and that 2) this model, though compatible with downward causation, makes it in principle impossible to find empirical support for downward causation (Baumgartner 2013). In this paper I show in which sense downward causation can be justified by using more fine-‐grained notions of causation, such as stable, proportional and specific causation (Woodward 2010). In particular, the intervention on a higher-‐level variable H(t) with respect to a lower-‐level variable P(t*) (where t* is later than t) may be more proportional compared to the parallel intervention on lower-‐level variable R(t) w.r.t. to P(t*), if R(t) is too determinate with respect to P(t*), i.e. if an intervention on R(t) is not necessary for manipulating P(t*).