Markku Hyrkkänen

Taylor and Francis Ltd RIHR_A_372463.sgm 10.1080/17496970902722932 Inte lectual History Review 749-6977 p n /1749-6985 online Original Article 2 0rnational So ety for Intellectual History 9 0 0002009 MarkkuHy kkanen m r .h @uta.fi In my article, I will propose an answer to the intertwined questions of what intellectual history is and what it is for. The questions and their answers are closely related in that the answer to the second question is presupposed by the answer given to the first. In answering the questions, I will draw on Collingwood’s philosophy of history, or rather, on my interpretation of it. My attitude towards both philosophy and theory is instrumental: a philosophy or theory has to work in practice, has to make practice work better. From this it follows that I not only take theory or philosophy seriously but also place a great deal of value on philosophical or theoretical reflection. One of the greatest merits of Collingwood’s philosophy of history is that he encouraged, even exhorted, historians to reflect on their own work. Collingwood reminded us that history is a special form of thought. Thus, questions about the nature, object, method and value of this form of thought must, according to him, be answered by people possessing two specific qualifications. First, they must have experience with that form of thought: they must be historians. Second, in addition to possessing experience of historical thinking, they must be able to reflect upon that experience: they must also be philosophers. This is also the ranking of the qualifications, because ‘experience comes first, and reflection on that experience second’.1 Encouraged by Collingwood’s exhortation, I have, at my own risk, eclectically taken insights from Collingwood’s texts, the insights being the ones which seem to me fruitful, useful, and worthy of reflection, and, accordingly, to be applied in doing intellectual history. I do not intend to consider the philosophical merits of Collingwood’s historical thinking, nor its alleged inconsistencies, nor conflicting interpretations of them, the classic controversy concerning re-enactment included. I do not intend or pretend to find out what Collingwood really meant by that term. I will, rather, consider what might be a fruitful way to understand it when doing intellectual history. I have utilized Collingwood’s views concerning historical methods as well as conflicting philosophical notions evolved during controversy over re-enactment and Collingwood’s philosophy of history in general. While I am not qualified to say on whose side I should be in this philosophical controversy, I can nevertheless say that philosophical controversies may be useful for a historian, not only in cases when a philosopher is offering methodological prescriptions, but also in those when he or she is ‘doing philosophy’. Mark Bevir for instance has exploited the theoretical and methodological debates of intellectual historians and philosophers as a means to explicate his understanding of post-analytic philosophy, whereas for me the philosophical discussion about Collingwood’s philosophy of history is a means to improve my understanding of intellectual history. I am not able to assess how well Bevir has succeeded in his philosophical labours,