There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, wh... more There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N data sets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly twentieth-century Latin American phenomenon. Yet the cases of Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the twenty-first century. Focussing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites, while possibilities for democratisation are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilise the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.
[Excerpt] In the social sciences and humanities, Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populism has proven t... more [Excerpt] In the social sciences and humanities, Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populism has proven to be one of the most influential and seminal approaches to the phenomenon, spawning a body of literature that has both engaged with the conceptual claims made in his work, as well as applying it to cases from across the globe—an influence that has not just been limited to the halls of academia, but has also included the practice of left-populist politicians and parties in Latin America and Europe. This literature, to be sure, has not remained static, nor has Laclau’s theory remained uncritiqued and unchallenged, even by sympathetic authors who have followed in his wake. Laclau’s approach from 1985 onward was clearly a product of the post-modern (and poststructuralist) discursive turn in circles of political theory. As such, Laclau eschewed his older original work, written from a solid Marxist analytic perspective. In doing so, Laclau ended up, in the process, equating sociological analysis with (historical) materialism, explicitly rejecting talk of social actors as objectively defined sociological categories, and, most certainly, social change as necessarily centred on a privileged “historical agent”. He embraced in any case the broad assumption that everything meaningful is discursively constructed—and conversely, that there is nothing meaningful outside of discourse. Yet something may have been lost in this shift: we want to argue in this chapter that one does not have to throw away the sociological baby with the bathwater, in the turn towards studying populism as a discourse. Instead, we would like to argue, from a more “in-between” though robust position, that the notion of “lived experience” stands exactly halfway between pure discursivism and objectivism, thus at the same time also reintroducing an embodied (and oft-times passionate) dimension that includes suffering, anger, envy, resentment, etc. Although Laclau and Mouffe have of course stressed the affective dimension of populism, we argue that in practice, identification is in fact only possible and effective at this crossroad of discourse and experience
Form is often also content. Populists, more than any other kind of politicians, are certainly hig... more Form is often also content. Populists, more than any other kind of politicians, are certainly highly aware of this. As Samuel Beckett once wrote: “Here, form is content, content is form. . . . It is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to” (2005, 1067). Form is a way of relating to people; or more accurately, specific forms are ways of relating to specific publics. Form includes rhetoric and style, but also logics, emotions, and affects. That this fundamental and distinctive aspect of the populist mode of identification, apparent to most observers, has gone under-theorized is at the very least surprising—particularly in a context in which the mediated performances of populists, from Donald Trump’s public rallies, Hugo Chávez’s hours-long improvisations on his television show Alo Presidente, and the inflammatory social media behavior of many a populist is understood as central to their political appeal. This volume aims to change this situation by elaborating a distinctive approach to the study of the topic centered on the relational, performative role that populist appeals play in relating to their publics, and in the constitution of popular identities—one that links content and form. Several years ago, it was common to begin an article on populism stating how little consensus there was on its definition. In European political science in particular, we may now have gone to the other extreme—with perhaps undue consequences for intellectual life. Moreover, the presence of a normative debate around the term should positively be thought of as a source of politically stimulating debates, including in the scholarly world, especially when populism is assessed across global regions
UNIRED: PROYECTO PADRINAZGO PUBLICACIONES PERIODICAS ARGENTINAS. Título (A): Peronismo y antipero... more UNIRED: PROYECTO PADRINAZGO PUBLICACIONES PERIODICAS ARGENTINAS. Título (A): Peronismo y antiperonismo : bases socioculturales de la identidad política en la Argentina, pp 133-215. Autor Personal (A): Ostiguy, Pierre. ...
Hugo Chávez is by all accounts one of the most emblematic 21st-century populist, particularly lef... more Hugo Chávez is by all accounts one of the most emblematic 21st-century populist, particularly left-populist, leaders. Oddly, there has been little academic analysis of his populist rhetoric and remarkable political performative style, so effective with his public. This chapter conducts an inductive, evidence-based discursive analysis, identifying and illustrating in four sections the characteristic hallmarks of Chávez’ populist rhetoric. First, Hugo Chávez was a master of what I call ‘the low’: uninhibited, coarse, sophisticatedly vulgar, skilled at incisive ad hominem insults, also much emphasizing the “from here” and a persona-based political leadership. The chapter then delves into his trademark performative mode, with its epic register, cadence, purposeful graphic exaggerations, folk poetry, and singing to relate to his public, highlighting his actio. Third, the chapter newly brings forth the peculiar logic of Chávez’ rhetoric, equating purposely the meaning of different political terms, the widespread political use of metonymy, and a “re-arranged” narrative of Venezuelan history bridging Bolivar´s time (and project) with his. Finally, the chapter calls attention to Chávez’—surprisingly unnoted--deeply religious rhetoric. In the process, it critically revisits Anderson’s notion of prophetic time, returning to Benjamin’s idea of Messianic time for Chávez’ redemptive politics and to Auerbach’ Christian “figural interpretation” for Chávez’ announced revolution. Rather than proceeding in a conceptually top-down manner as many “ideational” scholars of populism have done, the chapter attends closely to what uber populist Hugo Chávez was actually saying, and how.
In 2014, a group of young congressional deputies in Chile proposed reducing legislators' compensa... more In 2014, a group of young congressional deputies in Chile proposed reducing legislators' compensation by 50%. The goal was to solve a legitimacy problem stemming from the high income received by Congressional representatives in a context of severe social inequality. The literature generally states that legislative compensation has been a prerequisite for broadening democracy, as it allows people without income from sources other than daily work (e.g., rent or investments) to exercise a representative function in Congress. However, political science has not pondered the fact that legislative compensation is not always viewed as an instrument in the service of the quality of representation, but can instead become a source of political conflict, especially when its relative magnitude is very significant. This article aims to explore that dimension, through a study of the debates that legislative salaries (and especially their amount) have generated in Chilean society from 1924 to 2021. We argue that, over the course of those ninety years, legislative compensation has evolved from being viewed as a useful tool for incorporating new social sectors into political life to one generating a distortion of representation by giving parliamentarians a standard of living that puts them out of touch with the majority and makes them part of a select high-income minority.
Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach, 2021
This chapter outlines one of the key Laclauian-influenced theories of populism that has been deve... more This chapter outlines one of the key Laclauian-influenced theories of populism that has been developed in recent years: the “performative-relational” approach to populism, whereby populism is understood as a socio-cultural phenomenon and a performative “political style”. This approach, developed by authors such as Ostiguy, Moffitt, and others, seeks to ground the sometimes abstract and “post-foundational” work of Laclau more sociologically, taking into account—but in Laclauian terms—the embodied and particularistic dimension of populist identification, especially with regards to the incorporation of the “excess”. The chapter’s key contribution is to introduce the notion of “overflowing signifiers”, more adequate for explaining identification and the populist logic than “empty signifiers”. “Empty” signifiers, the chapter argues, never actually become empty, but quite on the contrary, what characterizes them is the inscription of both a surplus of meaning and a “fleshy excess”, itself generally on “the low”. Identification, moreover, occurs not as the product of a mere hegemonic substitution, as Laclau suggests, but because of something in the embodied persona and praxis of the populist leader or multitudes, with traits facilitating identification coming to the fore at the moment of embodiment. The chapter thus moves beyond what might be thought of as the discursively “formal” level of Laclauian political logic, which often overlooks the mediatized nature and aesthetic dimensions of populist performances, as well as the back-and-forth processes at play between populist leaders—qua overflowing signifiers —and “the people”, in populist politics.
Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach, 2021
This chapter outlines the main theoretical and empirical contributions of the book to the study o... more This chapter outlines the main theoretical and empirical contributions of the book to the study of populism. It posits that when dealing with a concept as complex as populism, the question of what a concept “is” and how it is defined is inextricable from the question of what a concept “does” and how it is applied within a community of scholars. The conclusion focuses on how the chapters engage and together contribute to advancing discussion of five questions at the very heart of the contemporary debate on populism: the relation of identification between the leader and the people; “the people” as a relational category; populism, anti-populism, and antagonism; populism and institutions; and populism and democracy. Contributors to the volume have shown that the critically-minded work that takes place under the broad rubric of post-Laclauian populism research is not “too abstract” for empirical analysis, but on the contrary can be particularly relevant in its application to real-life instances of populism. This volume, the authors express, has demonstrated the importance of placing a discursive-performative approach at the center of the study of populism.
Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach , 2021
The chapter situates the post-Laclauian discursive-performative approach in the wider literature ... more The chapter situates the post-Laclauian discursive-performative approach in the wider literature on populism, outlining its key tenets, theoretical assumptions and core influences, drawing on authorities in adjacent fields, and comparing it to the other central approaches to populism. It then outlines the key themes and structure of the volume.
There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, wh... more There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N data sets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly twentieth-century Latin American phenomenon. Yet the cases of Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the twenty-first century. Focussing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites, while possibilities for democratisation are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilise the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.
This paper introduces a crucial dimension for the spatial and comparative analysis of party syste... more This paper introduces a crucial dimension for the spatial and comparative analysis of party systems, cleavages, and the conduct of political campaigns. It presents the concepts of “high” and “low” in politics, and the related high-low dimension. High and low are about ways of appealing, and thus relating, to people in sociologically differentiated ways. Politicians on the high are “well behaved,” more restrained, and proper, both in manners and institutional procedures. Politicians on the low sublimate less and are more down-to-earth, coarser, earthier, and personalistic, both in manners and institutionally. The high-low dimension is fully neutral, or orthogonal, with regard to the left-right axis. We argue that this is in sharp contrast to Kitschelt’s authoritarian/libertarian divide or to Inglehart’s materialist/post-materialist political cleavage. The paper also provides a solid conceptual discussion of the classic and quasi universal polarities of left and right, which (like the high-low axis) is in fact comprised of two subdimensions. Together, the high-low and left-right dimensions form a two-dimensional space of politics, highly useful for characterizing certain political arenas and political strategies. The concept of “low” moreover provides a much-needed, uncontroversial, and highly intuitive central component of the definition of populism. It also brings to the fore the neglected phenomenon of anti-populism. Finally, the paper illustrates the relevance of the high-low dimension in Argentina, with its “double political spectrum” divided between Peronism and anti-Peronism, Venezuela with Chavismo and anti-Chavismo, and Ecuador.
There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, wh... more There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N data sets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly twentieth-century Latin American phenomenon. Yet the cases of Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the twenty-first century. Focussing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites, while possibilities for democratisation are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilise the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.
[Excerpt] In the social sciences and humanities, Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populism has proven t... more [Excerpt] In the social sciences and humanities, Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populism has proven to be one of the most influential and seminal approaches to the phenomenon, spawning a body of literature that has both engaged with the conceptual claims made in his work, as well as applying it to cases from across the globe—an influence that has not just been limited to the halls of academia, but has also included the practice of left-populist politicians and parties in Latin America and Europe. This literature, to be sure, has not remained static, nor has Laclau’s theory remained uncritiqued and unchallenged, even by sympathetic authors who have followed in his wake. Laclau’s approach from 1985 onward was clearly a product of the post-modern (and poststructuralist) discursive turn in circles of political theory. As such, Laclau eschewed his older original work, written from a solid Marxist analytic perspective. In doing so, Laclau ended up, in the process, equating sociological analysis with (historical) materialism, explicitly rejecting talk of social actors as objectively defined sociological categories, and, most certainly, social change as necessarily centred on a privileged “historical agent”. He embraced in any case the broad assumption that everything meaningful is discursively constructed—and conversely, that there is nothing meaningful outside of discourse. Yet something may have been lost in this shift: we want to argue in this chapter that one does not have to throw away the sociological baby with the bathwater, in the turn towards studying populism as a discourse. Instead, we would like to argue, from a more “in-between” though robust position, that the notion of “lived experience” stands exactly halfway between pure discursivism and objectivism, thus at the same time also reintroducing an embodied (and oft-times passionate) dimension that includes suffering, anger, envy, resentment, etc. Although Laclau and Mouffe have of course stressed the affective dimension of populism, we argue that in practice, identification is in fact only possible and effective at this crossroad of discourse and experience
Form is often also content. Populists, more than any other kind of politicians, are certainly hig... more Form is often also content. Populists, more than any other kind of politicians, are certainly highly aware of this. As Samuel Beckett once wrote: “Here, form is content, content is form. . . . It is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to” (2005, 1067). Form is a way of relating to people; or more accurately, specific forms are ways of relating to specific publics. Form includes rhetoric and style, but also logics, emotions, and affects. That this fundamental and distinctive aspect of the populist mode of identification, apparent to most observers, has gone under-theorized is at the very least surprising—particularly in a context in which the mediated performances of populists, from Donald Trump’s public rallies, Hugo Chávez’s hours-long improvisations on his television show Alo Presidente, and the inflammatory social media behavior of many a populist is understood as central to their political appeal. This volume aims to change this situation by elaborating a distinctive approach to the study of the topic centered on the relational, performative role that populist appeals play in relating to their publics, and in the constitution of popular identities—one that links content and form. Several years ago, it was common to begin an article on populism stating how little consensus there was on its definition. In European political science in particular, we may now have gone to the other extreme—with perhaps undue consequences for intellectual life. Moreover, the presence of a normative debate around the term should positively be thought of as a source of politically stimulating debates, including in the scholarly world, especially when populism is assessed across global regions
UNIRED: PROYECTO PADRINAZGO PUBLICACIONES PERIODICAS ARGENTINAS. Título (A): Peronismo y antipero... more UNIRED: PROYECTO PADRINAZGO PUBLICACIONES PERIODICAS ARGENTINAS. Título (A): Peronismo y antiperonismo : bases socioculturales de la identidad política en la Argentina, pp 133-215. Autor Personal (A): Ostiguy, Pierre. ...
Hugo Chávez is by all accounts one of the most emblematic 21st-century populist, particularly lef... more Hugo Chávez is by all accounts one of the most emblematic 21st-century populist, particularly left-populist, leaders. Oddly, there has been little academic analysis of his populist rhetoric and remarkable political performative style, so effective with his public. This chapter conducts an inductive, evidence-based discursive analysis, identifying and illustrating in four sections the characteristic hallmarks of Chávez’ populist rhetoric. First, Hugo Chávez was a master of what I call ‘the low’: uninhibited, coarse, sophisticatedly vulgar, skilled at incisive ad hominem insults, also much emphasizing the “from here” and a persona-based political leadership. The chapter then delves into his trademark performative mode, with its epic register, cadence, purposeful graphic exaggerations, folk poetry, and singing to relate to his public, highlighting his actio. Third, the chapter newly brings forth the peculiar logic of Chávez’ rhetoric, equating purposely the meaning of different political terms, the widespread political use of metonymy, and a “re-arranged” narrative of Venezuelan history bridging Bolivar´s time (and project) with his. Finally, the chapter calls attention to Chávez’—surprisingly unnoted--deeply religious rhetoric. In the process, it critically revisits Anderson’s notion of prophetic time, returning to Benjamin’s idea of Messianic time for Chávez’ redemptive politics and to Auerbach’ Christian “figural interpretation” for Chávez’ announced revolution. Rather than proceeding in a conceptually top-down manner as many “ideational” scholars of populism have done, the chapter attends closely to what uber populist Hugo Chávez was actually saying, and how.
In 2014, a group of young congressional deputies in Chile proposed reducing legislators' compensa... more In 2014, a group of young congressional deputies in Chile proposed reducing legislators' compensation by 50%. The goal was to solve a legitimacy problem stemming from the high income received by Congressional representatives in a context of severe social inequality. The literature generally states that legislative compensation has been a prerequisite for broadening democracy, as it allows people without income from sources other than daily work (e.g., rent or investments) to exercise a representative function in Congress. However, political science has not pondered the fact that legislative compensation is not always viewed as an instrument in the service of the quality of representation, but can instead become a source of political conflict, especially when its relative magnitude is very significant. This article aims to explore that dimension, through a study of the debates that legislative salaries (and especially their amount) have generated in Chilean society from 1924 to 2021. We argue that, over the course of those ninety years, legislative compensation has evolved from being viewed as a useful tool for incorporating new social sectors into political life to one generating a distortion of representation by giving parliamentarians a standard of living that puts them out of touch with the majority and makes them part of a select high-income minority.
Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach, 2021
This chapter outlines one of the key Laclauian-influenced theories of populism that has been deve... more This chapter outlines one of the key Laclauian-influenced theories of populism that has been developed in recent years: the “performative-relational” approach to populism, whereby populism is understood as a socio-cultural phenomenon and a performative “political style”. This approach, developed by authors such as Ostiguy, Moffitt, and others, seeks to ground the sometimes abstract and “post-foundational” work of Laclau more sociologically, taking into account—but in Laclauian terms—the embodied and particularistic dimension of populist identification, especially with regards to the incorporation of the “excess”. The chapter’s key contribution is to introduce the notion of “overflowing signifiers”, more adequate for explaining identification and the populist logic than “empty signifiers”. “Empty” signifiers, the chapter argues, never actually become empty, but quite on the contrary, what characterizes them is the inscription of both a surplus of meaning and a “fleshy excess”, itself generally on “the low”. Identification, moreover, occurs not as the product of a mere hegemonic substitution, as Laclau suggests, but because of something in the embodied persona and praxis of the populist leader or multitudes, with traits facilitating identification coming to the fore at the moment of embodiment. The chapter thus moves beyond what might be thought of as the discursively “formal” level of Laclauian political logic, which often overlooks the mediatized nature and aesthetic dimensions of populist performances, as well as the back-and-forth processes at play between populist leaders—qua overflowing signifiers —and “the people”, in populist politics.
Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach, 2021
This chapter outlines the main theoretical and empirical contributions of the book to the study o... more This chapter outlines the main theoretical and empirical contributions of the book to the study of populism. It posits that when dealing with a concept as complex as populism, the question of what a concept “is” and how it is defined is inextricable from the question of what a concept “does” and how it is applied within a community of scholars. The conclusion focuses on how the chapters engage and together contribute to advancing discussion of five questions at the very heart of the contemporary debate on populism: the relation of identification between the leader and the people; “the people” as a relational category; populism, anti-populism, and antagonism; populism and institutions; and populism and democracy. Contributors to the volume have shown that the critically-minded work that takes place under the broad rubric of post-Laclauian populism research is not “too abstract” for empirical analysis, but on the contrary can be particularly relevant in its application to real-life instances of populism. This volume, the authors express, has demonstrated the importance of placing a discursive-performative approach at the center of the study of populism.
Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach , 2021
The chapter situates the post-Laclauian discursive-performative approach in the wider literature ... more The chapter situates the post-Laclauian discursive-performative approach in the wider literature on populism, outlining its key tenets, theoretical assumptions and core influences, drawing on authorities in adjacent fields, and comparing it to the other central approaches to populism. It then outlines the key themes and structure of the volume.
There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, wh... more There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N data sets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly twentieth-century Latin American phenomenon. Yet the cases of Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the twenty-first century. Focussing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites, while possibilities for democratisation are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilise the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.
This paper introduces a crucial dimension for the spatial and comparative analysis of party syste... more This paper introduces a crucial dimension for the spatial and comparative analysis of party systems, cleavages, and the conduct of political campaigns. It presents the concepts of “high” and “low” in politics, and the related high-low dimension. High and low are about ways of appealing, and thus relating, to people in sociologically differentiated ways. Politicians on the high are “well behaved,” more restrained, and proper, both in manners and institutional procedures. Politicians on the low sublimate less and are more down-to-earth, coarser, earthier, and personalistic, both in manners and institutionally. The high-low dimension is fully neutral, or orthogonal, with regard to the left-right axis. We argue that this is in sharp contrast to Kitschelt’s authoritarian/libertarian divide or to Inglehart’s materialist/post-materialist political cleavage. The paper also provides a solid conceptual discussion of the classic and quasi universal polarities of left and right, which (like the high-low axis) is in fact comprised of two subdimensions. Together, the high-low and left-right dimensions form a two-dimensional space of politics, highly useful for characterizing certain political arenas and political strategies. The concept of “low” moreover provides a much-needed, uncontroversial, and highly intuitive central component of the definition of populism. It also brings to the fore the neglected phenomenon of anti-populism. Finally, the paper illustrates the relevance of the high-low dimension in Argentina, with its “double political spectrum” divided between Peronism and anti-Peronism, Venezuela with Chavismo and anti-Chavismo, and Ecuador.
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Together, the high-low and left-right dimensions form a two-dimensional space of politics, highly useful for characterizing certain political arenas and political strategies. The concept of “low” moreover provides a much-needed, uncontroversial, and highly intuitive central component of the definition of populism. It also brings to the fore the neglected phenomenon of anti-populism. Finally, the paper illustrates the relevance of the high-low dimension in Argentina, with its “double political spectrum” divided between Peronism and anti-Peronism, Venezuela with Chavismo and anti-Chavismo, and Ecuador.
Together, the high-low and left-right dimensions form a two-dimensional space of politics, highly useful for characterizing certain political arenas and political strategies. The concept of “low” moreover provides a much-needed, uncontroversial, and highly intuitive central component of the definition of populism. It also brings to the fore the neglected phenomenon of anti-populism. Finally, the paper illustrates the relevance of the high-low dimension in Argentina, with its “double political spectrum” divided between Peronism and anti-Peronism, Venezuela with Chavismo and anti-Chavismo, and Ecuador.