P Journal Code A D 1 Article ID Dispatch: 26.03.14 6 8 0 No. of Pages: 13 CE: Sola, Martin ME: public administration and development Public Admin. Dev. (2014) Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.1680 PARTICIPATION AND PERFORMANCE: DECENTRALISED PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN ETHIOPIA KATHERINE A. SNYDER1, EVA LUDI2, BETH CULLEN3, JOSEPHINE TUCKER2, ALEMAYEHU BELAY3 AND ALAN DUNCAN3 1 International Water Management Institute, Ethiopia 2 Overseas Development Institute, UK 3 International Livestock Research Institute, Ethiopia SUMMARY This article discusses how decentralisation policies are enacted in the planning and implementation of natural resource management interventions in rural Ethiopia. A key element of decentralisation policy is the emphasis on greater participation by local communities. Drawing on qualitative research conducted with government staff and farmers, this paper illustrates how different actors perceive and implement national policy and how these actions affect the longer-term sustainability of land management interventions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. key words—participatory planning; Ethiopia; decentralisation; agricultural development; natural resources management INTRODUCTION Decentralisation has been the focus of considerable scholarly attention for the last 20 years. At the centre of donors’ ‘good governance’ agendas, decentralisation policies are embedded in a set of assumptions about the relationship between democracy and poverty reduction. These policies are directed at changing the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens through a re-design of institutions and new approaches to implementing development. Although research has focused on the failures of decentralisation and the impact of decentralisation on poverty (cf. Wunsch, 2001; Crook, 2003; Francis and James, 2003), fewer studies have looked at how decentralisation is actually implemented at the lower levels of a decentralised system and how the actors who are supposed to put these policies into action perceive and act upon them. This paper addresses this gap by focusing on how planning and implementation of agricultural development and natural resource management is carried out in rural areas of Ethiopia. In part, because land degradation is such a serious issue constraining agricultural production, much of Ethiopia’s government planning focuses on these natural resource management issues and is guided by the nation’s decentralisation policy. This analysis thus contributes to the growing literature that examines not why development may or may not work but rather how it works (cf. Mosse, 2004). This research examines a very specific aspect of decentralisation—that of devolution in the area of natural resources management in which there is supposed to be increased participation of citizens in decision-making and greater accountability of local government to citizens. It does not include an analysis of fiscal decentralisation or of how decentralisation may be carried out in other sectors, such as health or education. This research aimed to understand whether decentralisation policies and practices in Ethiopia were (i) incorporating local knowledge and experience into land management plans; (ii) tailoring plans to local conditions; and (c) bringing decision-making closer to farmers/citizens.1 These are, in theory, the goals behind decentralisation. The paper is based specifically on results of research on planning and implementation of soil and water conservation *Correspondence to: K. A. Snyder, International Water Management Institution, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. E-mail: k.snyder@cgiar.org 1 On the basis of a review of both the failures in past soil and water conservation interventions and our review of relevant criteria in decentralisation, we arrived at these criteria for assessing planning and implementation in Ethiopia. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 K. A. SNYDER ET AL. Colour online, B&W in print 2 Figure 1. Map of sites in Ethiopia. interventions in three weredas (districts) in the Nile Basin, two in Oromia region and one in Amhara.2 These sites were chosen to represent a spectrum of land degradation in the Ethiopian Highlands, which are areas of high potential but also of sometimes severe natural resources degradation (Figure 1). Sustainable land management (SLM) through improved soil and water management is a central focus of Ethiopia’s agricultural policy and planning and a key element in the country’s development agenda. We illustrate how, regardless of decentralisation policy, local conditions and community views are often overlooked or bypassed in soil and water conservation programmes. These omissions often lead to community abandonment of SLM. Throughout the Ethiopian Highlands, high population pressure and use of marginal land are causing land and ecosystem degradation. All sites in the study are mixed crop–livestock systems and were selected because they represent a range of common farming practices and degrees of land degradation in the Ethiopian Highlands. None of these sites have been part of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme in which food-insecure households receive cash or food payments for work on public works projects such as SLM interventions. Jeldu is 115 km west of Addis Ababa in West Shewa Zone, Oromia. Barley and teff are staple crops, and potato is an important cash crop. Land degradation is significant and results in a shortage of productive farm land. There is significant seasonal migration, mainly of landless youth, towards towns in eastern Ethiopia. The area suffers from market constraints due to poor road access. 2 This research established a baseline on the institutional environment for planning and implementing soil and water conservation measures. It is part of a larger project that aims to suggest ways to improve the resilience of rural livelihoods in the Ethiopian highlands through integrated water management. This component of the project focused on planning and implementation to identify innovative approaches to bring together different stakeholders, to better plan and manage challenges in agricultural development and natural resource management. The authors have drawn upon the results of this work to design and implement innovation platforms in the three wereda and to test a variety of new participatory planning methods in collaboration with local government staff. In addition to the authors, the research team members included the following: Andenet Deresse and Mulu Debela (Ambo University), Assefa Teferi and Zerihun Nigussie (Bahir Dar University), Dagnachew Lule and Dawit Samuel (Bako Agricultural Research Center), Yazie Chanie (Adet Agricultural Research Center) and Mathewos Belissa and Temesgen Oljira (Wollega University). Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Q1F1 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 PARTICIPATION AND PERFORMANCE 3 Diga is located further west, 343 km from Addis Ababa, in East Wollega Zone, Oromia, falling within the moist mid-highlands. Farmers depend mainly on maize and sorghum in lowland areas, and teff, millet and maize in the midlands. Sesame, coffee and fruit crops also contribute significantly to local livelihoods. In comparison with the other research sites, natural vegetation cover is relatively dense; however, increasing competition for crop land has resulted in widespread deforestation. Fogera is in South Gondar Zone, Amhara region, 625 km north-west of Addis Ababa. Fogera borders Lake Tana, the source of the Blue Nile, and is characterised by vast, seasonally flooded plains. Rice is a major crop, followed by maize, millet, teff and barley. DECENTRALISATION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW Throughout Africa and the developing world, from the 1980s to the present, decentralisation programmes have been rolled out and re-designed. Most of these initiatives have been in response to donor pressure, based on the premise that reducing the power of the central state would lead to greater efficiency in service delivery and to the formation of local governments that are more responsive to the needs and concerns of citizens. In some countries, decentralisation was seen as a ‘way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy’ (Bardhan, 2002, pg. 185). Decentralisation has several manifestations, including ‘fiscal, institutional and political’ (Smoke, 2003, pg. 7). Devolution (political) refers to the democratisation of the government system, or political decentralisation, in which there is greater citizen participation in decisions that affect their lives. Mechanisms are established to provide downward accountability of local political representatives and government officers to their constituents. Deconcentration is administrative and/or fiscal decentralisation in which powers are transferred to local administrative bodies to govern and manage development activities; it does not necessarily include political devolution in which there is greater responsiveness or accountability of local decision-makers to the communities they serve. The success of decentralisation programmes, particularly in Africa, has been mixed (Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003). There are significant differences among countries, but generally, a high degree of deconcentration has been achieved across the continent. Devolution, however, which would involve more active participation by communities and greater accountability to them, has been rare. Mohan and Stokke observe that there are two main arguments for decentralisation: one that promotes decentralisation as a more efficient use of resources by shifting responsibility for service provision to local stakeholders and one that promotes devolution as a fundamental component of democratic governance. They provocatively suggest the former is a ‘narrative of capital’, whereas the latter is a ‘narrative of community’ (2000, pg. 250). Although development policies emphasising devolution may promote an ideal world in which ‘everyone gets a chance to participate in the decisions that affect their lives’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, pg. 1044), this represents a world far removed from the realities of most people’s experience, both in industrialised countries and particularly for poor people in the developing world. One point frequently emphasised is the question of ‘who participates’ in these devolved systems? Local communities, it is observed, are rarely homogeneous, and ‘community participation’ may in fact mean participation by local elites, with more marginalised groups based on social stratification, gender or age remaining ‘voiceless’ (cf. Cleaver, 1999; Mansuri and Rao, 2004) Although participation may be limited, what is thought of as defining ‘participation’ varies considerably from country to country and from the level of donors to state actors to citizens. This multidimensional nature of participation makes it a slippery concept. Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin III’s study of participation in 52 USAID development projects looked at five contextual factors: (1) the level of development of the host country; (2) the skill level of beneficiaries; (3) the complexity of technology introduced; (4) the degree of beneficiary organisation; and finally, (5) the size of the project (1989: 574). From their analysis, they concluded that participation produced better project results and that the ‘main benefit of participation appears to be the building of community capacity’ (1989, pg. 591). The degree to which beneficiaries self-organise to participate and take ownership of the project was also found to affect success. Thus, they provide some evidence for strengthening devolution, though the links to poverty reduction are still vague. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 4 K. A. SNYDER ET AL. Although participation and community engagement with a decentralised governance and administrative system are considered ways to accelerate poverty reduction through better service delivery, there is in fact little evidence to suggest that this has been achieved by decentralisation policies to date (see review in Crawford 2008 and problems with elite capture in Crook, 2003). Indeed, as Larson and Ribot note, with ‘regard to natural resources’…‘democratic decentralisation has proven difficult to find’ (2004:4; see also Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). This lack of success may be rooted in the incomplete and often failed nature of true decentralisation through, as Golooba-Mutebi (2012) demonstrates, a host of structural and institutional constraints that deter real change from taking place. Persistent poverty however might also be traced to the realities of the wider political economy, which greatly limits the citizens of developing countries from achieving significant improvements in their livelihoods (trade barriers, costs of imported inputs, poor producer prices on the global market, insufficient attention by governments and donors to research findings in agriculture and rural development, alienation of customary land rights and so forth). HISTORY OF DECENTRALISATION IN ETHIOPIA In many African countries, the move to decentralise has come about in part through considerable donor pressure for governance reform. However, in Ethiopia, decentralisation is widely seen to be internally driven to ‘manage the fractious nature of national politics by accommodating the different nationalities through decentralised power’ (Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher, 2010, pg. 3). The transfer of responsibilities from the federal state to regional governments began in Ethiopia in 1991 with the installation of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) government that overthrew Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Derg regime and continued until 2001. Referred to as the ‘first wave of decentralisation’, a new constitution in 1995 gave regional governments legislative, judicial and executive powers to govern their areas and oversee all economic and social development (Gebre-Egziabher, 2007, pg. 1). Each region then further devolves authority to weredas (districts) and subsequently to kebeles (local government). Adem asserts that the EPRDF leaders ‘have publicly stated their intent to implement these provisions through participatory democracy’ to bring ‘government closer to the people … making it responsive to local concerns’ (2004, pg. 611). Regional governments developed their own constitutions and can pass laws and collect taxes following provisions set out in the Federal Constitution. Although this shift provides regional governments a degree of freedom from federal control, their ability to raise funds remains limited because of an inadequate tax base and poor private sector development (cf. Chole, 1994). Regions depend substantially on transfers from the federal government. Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher find that: Transfers from the federal level to the regional states cover from 45 percent to 80 percent of regions’ expenditure assignments (Gebre-Egziabher, 2009) (sic). Such high dependency of regional governments on the federal government reduces the autonomy of the states and compromises their decision-making capability (2010, pg. 12). This dependence on central state coffers is found in many African countries; Wunsch notes that ‘this system usually works in various ways to erode local authority, decrease the incentive and opportunity to engage in a local political process by the grassroots and, over time, inhibit development of a stable resource base for local governments’, as well as enabling central government to retain considerable control (2001, pg. 284). In 2001, the federal government took further action to devolve powers to weredas through the District Level Decentralisation Program and Urban Management Program. These programmes resulted in institutional restructuring, capacity building and staff redeployment from regional and zonal levels to weredas. There are elected councils at regional, wereda and kebele levels who, together with their executive cabinets, coordinate and plan administrative functions. Just as the regions face challenges raising funds internally, so weredas rely largely on block grants from the regions. The size of these grants is determined by a formula developed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. It includes variables such as population, difference in relative revenue raising capacities, difference in relative expenditure needs (to meet basic needs) and performance incentives aimed at an equal per capita distribution of grant, while considering the needs or capacities of regions and weredas (Calow et al., 2012). This formula then defines the level of planning and what can be implemented. Other funds for operations may come from donor funds targeted to specific activities or initiatives (Gebre-Egziabher, 2007). Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad Q2 Q3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 PARTICIPATION AND PERFORMANCE 5 There are five levels of government in Ethiopia through which decentralisation materialises: federal, regional (nine regional governments and two city administrations), zonal (which serves as a means by which regions coordinate and monitor weredas), weredas and kebeles (Gebre-Egziabher, 2007). These local-level structures were created during the Derg regime but were given new form by the EPRDF government. For purposes of communication and organising development activities, kebeles are organised into development teams (around 30 households), which are then further divided into ‘cells’ of five households (illustrated in Figure 2). F2 Although the progress of decentralisation has been significant and noteworthy in Ethiopia, there are still obstacles to achieving full devolution. This limited success can be traced partly to Ethiopia’s history, which is strongly characterised by top-down approaches and firm control. In addition, the dependence of regions, and ultimately weredas, on federal financial support limits their independence. As Ethiopia is largely a one-party state, the EPRDF dominates at all levels of government. Meheret’s research on decentralisation found that ‘EPRDF membership has become the single most important criterion to assume a position in wereda governance’ (2007:89). This deepening of the party reach to the lowest levels of administration and thus to the local populations can be seen either positively, as it ‘could enable effective channelling of demands from local levels to increasingly higher levels of government’, or less positively as a means by which greater state control is achieved through ‘clientelism, and top-down governance in which decentralized units perform more as transmission belts for central prerogatives than for upward transmission of local demands’ (Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher, 2010: 19). The presence of party politics at all levels of government and how it influences development is again not unique to Ethiopia and figures in Tanzania (Marsland, 2006), Ghana (Crawford, 2008) and Uganda (Francis and James, 2003) to name a few, so it is not unique to the Ethiopian context. Lack of capacity at wereda level has also been identified as a serious impediment to wereda functioning. Meheret’s (2007) research indicated that wereda staff reported unfilled posts for critical positions. This problem can be traced both to budgetary limitations that constrain hiring experts but also to the low salaries and benefits that make it difficult to attract highly qualified staff. A study on budget utilisation in the Colour online, B&W in print Figure 2. Governance structure of Ethiopia. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 6 K. A. SNYDER ET AL. water sector found that up to six out of nine expert positions at wereda level were vacant, both because of funding constraints and because of a country-wide shortage of trained personnel (Getnet et al., 2010). METHODS This project focused on how decentralisation planning processes aimed at greater devolution of decision-making over agriculture and land management are implemented at wereda and kebele levels. In each of the weredas, the research teams selected five kebeles (referred to often as Peasant Associations and the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia with elected representatives) in an attempt to capture a range of agro-ecological conditions and thus land degradation issues across the wereda (highland/midland/lowland). Approximately 125 interviews were conducted with farmers, agricultural extension agents [known as development agents (DAs) in Ethiopia], kebele and wereda experts, heads of line ministries, kebele and wereda administrators, staff of agricultural research centres and universities, NGOs and private sector actors. In addition, the team held 15 focus group discussions with approximately 15 men and women farmers (mixed and separately) in each wereda (total of 45 groups) and carried out community mapping and historical timelines in each site. The data from these exercises captured profiles of livelihoods in the kebeles as well as a picture of how planning and implementation of land management programmes are carried out and understood. We focused on how respondents defined the planning and implementation process and to what degree they perceived planning and implementation as being participatory. We also examined how different respondents defined participation. In this way, we attempted to understand not just how devolution is envisioned but how it happens—or does not—in reality. THE PLANNING PROCESS UNDER DECENTRALISATION Our findings indicate that planning is conducted on an annual basis, corresponding with the budget cycle. According to respondents, the planning process should follow the steps outlined in the succeeding text. The reality, however, often differs, as will be discussed later. 1. Cell (Shane in Oromiya, And-le Ammist in Amhara). This cell of five to six households is where planning is supposed to start. Each cell usually contains a ‘model’ farmer (a farmer chosen by the local government because of his/her farming success and willingness to adopt new government initiatives). 2. Development team (Garee in Oromiya, Yelemat buden in Amhara). Composed of 25–30 households, this unit is important for problem identification and priority setting. 3. Sub-kebele. This unit consists of 300–500 households and is led by one of the kebele DAs. Here, a consolidated list of priorities is agreed upon and passed upwards to the kebele. 4. Kebele. Here, elected officials representing different sectors produce a consolidated plan of development priorities. 5. Wereda. A total of 20–30 kebeles make up a wereda, and at this level, the priorities of all kebeles within the wereda are consolidated and reconciled against the available budget. This budget is a combination of local revenue and block grants coming from the region. It includes recurrent costs (e.g. salaries) and capital costs (e.g. investments). The wereda cabinet (which includes heads of the sector offices such as agriculture and water) and the wereda administrator (elected by the wereda council) approve final plans that are then sent to the Zone. Key actors include DAs, the kebele administration, sector experts and the wereda administration. Every kebele has three DAs, usually one with a background in crop science, another in livestock science and another in natural resources management. At wereda level, the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development is the most relevant sector office for soil and water conservation, with multiple experts representing different areas of expertise. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 PARTICIPATION AND PERFORMANCE 7 Although this process is recognised by informants in the wereda as the standard process for planning under decentralisation, the reality often differs.3 Interviews with farmers throughout the weredas indicated that planning did not actually follow such a bottom-up approach. They reported that their involvement consisted of attending meetings organised by the kebele council, where plans that originated in the wereda were presented to them. Many indicated that, rather than being asked to indicate local needs as a basis for planning, they were treated as implementers of an agenda that came from the wereda. One farmer in Fogera stated, ‘[F]armers seem to have had little or no role at all apart from implementing whatever plan is brought to them’. Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher found that a ‘citizen report card survey in seven regions in 21 weredas’ indicated that ‘87 percent of the households have no information on wereda level government budget, 83 percent have no knowledge of wereda strategic plans and 84 percent are not informed of the decision made by the wereda council’(2010, pg. 16). DAs, on the other hand, reported that plans are not only partially drafted at kebele level in consultation with farmers and kebele representatives but also follow directions given by wereda experts based on plans drafted at the wereda level. However, DAs stated that the consolidated plans they receive back from the wereda for implementation rarely resemble the plans they submitted. The plans received from the wereda may be modified according to the capacity and potential of the kebele, however, and have to be approved by the kebele council before being sent back to the wereda. These plans are subdivided among sub-kebeles and subsequently development teams and cells. It appears that DAs do not have much power to influence plans because plans are dictated to a large extent by implementation quotas assigned to weredas and then allocated to kebeles. In Fogera, for example, one kebele administration and DA identified a watershed that they perceived as severely degraded for rehabilitation. However, the approved plan received from the wereda identified a different watershed for the work. Respondents interpreted this shift as a move by regional authorities to establish a ‘regional model watershed’ closer to the road for access and visibility. Wereda experts’ descriptions of the system were quite similar to those of DAs: they receive plans from the region, which they adjust to the wereda situation and then send back to the region through the Zone. On the basis of plans the wereda offices receive from the Regional Bureaux, quotas are assigned to each kebele. Wereda experts noted the difficulty of reconciling plans with available budgets, government policy, strategic plans and directives whilst also taking account of local issues and priorities as formulated in kebele plans. There seems to be considerable tension at the wereda level as bottom-up planning—focusing on needs and priorities as formulated by kebeles— collides with top-down planning—implementing plans received from higher levels that reflect regional and national priorities in the form of quotas. Francis and James note a similar process for Uganda where priorities identified at the lowest levels are ‘rarely incorporated into subcounty plans’ (2003, pg. 331). And the ‘participatory planning process is thus more a matter of form than substance - a ritualized performance simulating local decision-making’ (2003, pg. 334). Wunsch finds a very similar situation in Kenya, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Ghana, where although bottom-up planning processes exist, ‘the reality is that the local effort was always for naught, and there is instead a top-down process through which national ministries select their priorities and determine what will be done at localities’ (2001, pg. 278). Among soil and water conservation measures, it is important to distinguish two different levels of planning and implementation. First, farmers carry out their own measures on their own land, such as drainage ditches, furrows, contour ploughing, crop rotation and fallowing and mulching, for which no kebele-wide plans exist but which farmers do on their own. Second are those interventions at a larger scale, which involve watershed protection, community forest management, area closures, gully rehabilitation, grazing land management and management and construction of physical soil conservation structures such as terraces and bunds, which require collective action and thus more planning and coordination. It is with regard to these latter plans that farmers feel that the planning process is dominated by a top-down approach not reflecting local realities. 3 In Ethiopia, policy and the way to implement it is communicated to government staff through intensive sensitisation workshops. With regard to sustainable land management, The Ministry of Agriculture has issued a project implementation manual that outlines the bottom-up process but does not elaborate on the specific methods for carrying it out. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 8 K. A. SNYDER ET AL. In addition to the limited nature of bottom-up planning, we also found that planning for natural resource management is highly fragmented and uncoordinated. Sector specialists at wereda level plan for their specific area, for example, livestock experts delineate grazing land or identify enclosures, natural resource management experts prepare land-use maps for watersheds and irrigation experts identify suitable land for irrigation and select appropriate crops. Coordination across these sectors within the weredas is however largely absent, and there is little integration across weredas and watersheds. A key driver in planning and implementation at all levels is the aim to meet targets. These targets are informed by national policies such as the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of 2010 and the earlier Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation strategy of 2007. In the GTP, the Federal Government sets out an ambitious target of an 11 percent growth rate for GDP (2010, pg. 7). Agriculture is planned to be the main driver of this growth, and smallholder farmers are targeted for improved productivity: ‘efforts will be exerted to bring farmers’ productivity close to the average productivity level of outstanding farmers and make it to continue as basic sources of agricultural growth’ (2010, pg. 20). Irrigation, production of high-value crops, improved technologies, natural resources management (‘In the next five years in all areas which require physical soil and water conservation works will be fully implemented through proactive and organized community participation’ {2010, pg. 22}) and improved livestock breeds and health are some of the means by which growth will be achieved. The GTP has established a target of rehabilitating 10.21 million hectares of land by 2015 (up from 3.21 million hectares in 2009/2010). Informants related that this national target is then broken down by region and finally to wereda and kebele level. Targets are translated into quotas that should be met by each sector ministry at each administrative level. Regions assign each wereda the task of establishing a certain number of kilometres of trenches or terraces to be build or a specified number of hectares to be rehabilitated. Weredas pass on quotas to kebeles based on an assessment of each kebele’s potential to provide the required labour force and, where possible, its degradation status. Other indicators used to assess potential include agro-ecology, farmers’ likelihood of technology adoption and past quota achievement.4 Although setting targets is possibly a useful planning tool, the focus on delivering quotas may result in overlooking the suitability, quality or effectiveness of interventions. For example, if length of terrace is the goal, rather than its quality or outcomes in terms of reduced erosion, there may be significant obstacles to sustainability and scaling out. Throughout the GTP, ‘community participation’ is emphasised: ‘[P]ublic participation is the central agenda to ensure citizens ownership for sustaining development and good governance initiatives. Citizens’ participates (sic) in the form of expressing their demands, aspirations, engaging in the process of formulation of policy and strategy, planning, monitoring and evaluation’ (2010, pg. 59). Participation, decentralisation and empowerment are all buzzwords used to ‘frame and justify particular kinds of development interventions’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, pg. 1043). However, how does participation actually get addressed? Ideally, as Marsland notes for Tanzania, a project ‘would not arrive with a pre-formulated plan…but would work together with local people to identify their needs and ways in which they can use their own knowledge and resources to improve their living conditions’… [but] in practice they ‘often come with a pre-identified “problem” ’ (Marsland, 2006, pg. 67). Then, communities are mobilised to address this pre-identified problem. This interpretation of participation ‘literally orders (commands) citizens to contribute to their country’s development’ (Marsland, 2006, pg. 78). This pattern parallels participation in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, a move towards more participatory approaches to natural resource management has been apparent since the 1990s when, according to Keeley and Scoones (2000, pg. 107), there was a change in approach to ‘awareness raising’, consultation and building projects from the ‘bottom-up’. This shift was prompted largely by reactions to previous policy under the Derg, which was perceived to be very top-down and inappropriate (indeed, many conservation structures created during the Derg have since been neglected or destroyed). In addition, there was a new focus on ‘sustainability’, ‘integrated natural resource management’ and a commitment to an appreciation of farmers’ knowledge and local technology (Keeley and Scoones, 2000, pg. 108). As a result, there has been a significant re-orientation of policy, but this has not necessarily been matched in implementation. Participation in the 4 Interviews with wereda staff in Diga. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 PARTICIPATION AND PERFORMANCE 9 context of natural resources management planning and implementation is generally understood to mean mobilising farmers to implement something, rather than involving them in decision-making (Harrison, 2002). Williamson’s research found that people at all levels in Ethiopia, from government to farmers, ‘consistently described participation as the annual ‘contribution’ of 21 or 22 days labour for development activities’ (2011, pg. 826). To determine the effectiveness of planning in reaching the stated goals at wereda and kebele levels and to investigate how closely plans represented local realities, this research used specific indicators described as follows: 1. Is planning evidence-based? Our research found that while basic information is collected from farm and household levels and used to formulate kebele-level plans, local priorities were largely lost in the development of final plans. This omission leads to plans that do not sufficiently take into consideration local conditions and capacity such as agro-ecology, social structures or available labour force. Kebeles are frequently burdened with quotas of soil and water conservation investments that they cannot achieve. 2. Is planning tailored to different social and ecological niches? Respondents alluded to numerous examples where technologies prescribed in the plans did not match local conditions. In Fogera, for example, farmers reported that a water harvesting pond was constructed without consideration of appropriate siting and soil characteristics, so accumulated water was quickly lost through infiltration. On the other hand, when farmers requested technology support, such as assistance in developing low-cost irrigation in feasible areas, it was not provided. 3. Is planning cross-sectoral? One of the key shortcomings of current soil and water conservation planning in particular, and agricultural planning in general, is that it is uncoordinated, and synergies between crops, livestock, natural resources and water are not exploited. 4. Is planning participatory? It is assumed that if land users are involved in planning activities related to soil and water conservation, they will feel a greater sense of ownership of investments and will be likelier to invest labour and cash in maintaining them. It is also assumed that by involving a range of stakeholders in the planning process, potential conflicts of interests can be identified early on and addressed in subsequent planning. Community members are involved in drafting kebele-level plans through discussions of problems and prioritisation of activities together with kebele executives and DAs. Communities however often feel disenfranchised as they feel their contributions are not reflected in final plans. They feel little ownership of the plans and quotas they are ultimately supposed to implement. Development agents emerge as key actors in the planning and implementation process, as the main interlocutors between government and farmers. However, DAs are caught between farmers and government, with the difficult task of reconciling top-down plans and quotas with local concerns and needs. They transmit information down to farmers but struggle to pass ideas and reflections back from farmers to higher levels and do not typically monitor the results of interventions. They are also often poorly trained and poorly paid, which leads to limited motivation to do their jobs differently. IMPLEMENTATION The same actors engaged in planning are also often involved in the actual implementation of soil and water conservation practices: farmers, DAs, kebele administration, technical experts from relevant wereda offices (agriculture, water, cooperatives and so forth), agricultural research centres, credit and savings associations, wereda Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 10 K. A. SNYDER ET AL. administration and NGOs. Farmers are the main implementers of soil and water conservation and receive technical support from DAs. Activities that require large investments, coordination across a watershed and more technical know-how (such as gully rehabilitation, hillside closures or terracing) are implemented by farmers as part of campaigns, under close supervision of DAs and with technical input from wereda experts. In these campaigns, farmers are usually organised into small teams for supervision. Participation is compulsory, and non-participation results in fines. Respondents noted that farmers often complain about having to provide labour for investments that they have not identified as priorities but are imposed on them from higher administrative levels as a result of disconnects in the planning process discussed earlier. Many soil and water conservation activities are carried out as one-off campaigns, focused on meeting quotas, without attention to future maintenance and sustainability. In Diga, both farmers and DAs reported that afforestation was carried out by mass mobilisation and thousands of seedlings were planted, but that most of these seedlings did not survive. This failure was attributed to the selection of afforestation areas by experts, without adequate consultation with farmers. The selected areas were in fact considered important for cropping or grazing. Farmers therefore did not carry out the planting with care and did not protect the trees afterwards but continued to graze livestock there. Development agents and kebele officials are responsible for following up on projects where labour has been provided by farmers, monitoring progress and identifying areas where further technical training of farmers might be required. They also inspect the quality of the work, and when it is judged sufficient, responsibility is handed over either to the land owner for follow-up maintenance or to the community, in the case of investments on communal land. As DAs are evaluated on achievement of quotas (outputs) rather than on the quality or effectiveness of the work done (outcomes), implementation is often of low quality. Follow-up maintenance is often neglected following campaigns, as ownership is unclear and longevity of investments is not a criterion for performance appraisal. Wereda experts are in principle also responsible for ensuring that investments are maintained by farmers. During campaigns, they visit kebeles to check progress and provide technical assistance. Such support and follow-up, however, seem to be less frequent during the rest of the year. Regular monitoring of investments does not happen, in part because of the small number of technical experts at wereda level and their limited budget and facilities to visit kebeles (e.g. cars and motorcycles). However, lack of interest on the part of wereda experts and the absence of incentives for them to visit kebeles and follow-up on conservation activities seem to be equally important. CONCLUSION Ethiopia’s programmes to address land degradation indicate that top-down policy and planning practices have, in the past, proved ineffective in dealing with questions relating to location-specific environmental conditions and sustainability of livelihoods of local communities (Campbell, 1991; Hoben, 1996; Mequanent, 1998; Rahmato, 2003). Although current decentralisation policy in Ethiopia suggests a shift to greater community decision-making, we have demonstrated that this participation is fairly limited. Achieving greater participation in planning and implementing SLM programmes in Ethiopia through decentralised structures is complex, and actors at various levels are operating under significant institutional and fiscal constraints. Despite their knowledge and experience, farmers’ role in the planning process is minimal and their views often overlooked. Lack of farmer ‘awareness’ is something that is regularly mentioned by a range of stakeholders. As Rahmato notes about the Derg era in Ethiopia, there is a common view that the ‘peasant farmer does not comprehend the forces behind land degradation’, and their actions are ‘born of ignorance’ (2003, pg. 208).This stereotyping of farmers by ‘experts’ is common throughout Africa and, as Marsland notes for Tanzania, is ‘the first step towards twisting the blame on to the poor’ (2006, pg. 70). Such widespread attitudes are not conducive to farmer participation, sense of ownership over development or capacity building. Farmers often have good reasons for resisting certain interventions/strategies. For example, fallowing is a strategy for addressing land degradation often promoted by government agents throughout Ethiopia, yet in Diga, the local administration considers any farmer with fallow land as lazy and may redistribute the land.5 5 Interviews with farmers in Diga. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 PARTICIPATION AND PERFORMANCE 11 There have certainly been moves to introduce more participatory approaches to natural resource management and soil and water conservation in recent years, but ‘old habits die hard’, and the evidence from our work suggests that planning and implementation is participatory in name only. If participation throughout the continent is more ritualised performance than reality, what are the implications of this approach for development? The answer is mixed. While community mobilisation, rather than truly devolved participation in decision-making, may be seen as essential for broader objectives such as rehabilitation of degraded lands, watershed protection and other public works projects, what about participation that is oriented more towards livelihoods improvements or providing public services? This study has shown the limits to devolution of decision-making in relation to land management in Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia presents some features unique to its history, similar patterns are found in countries across the continent (Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003). Planning and implementation of current soil and water conservation strategies are not as effective as they could be because they often ignore local perspectives and local agro-ecological conditions. It was evident in interviews throughout the sites that government officials clearly had knowledge of national policy on decentralisation and the GTP. However, when policies such as the GTP and Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation place such an emphasis on growth and meeting national production and conservation targets, considerable pressure is generated to meet quotas. DAs and other experts at the wereda level respond to incentives built around quotas and targets. This pressure to reach targets is not often compatible with more participatory and devolved approaches where communities may opt to pursue different goals. These issues are some of the institutional challenges that prevent practice from more substantially resembling the participatory rhetoric found in many national policies. In the Ethiopian context, the focus on quotas is a particular obstacle to sustainability of land management efforts as the emphasis on quantity ignores the importance of quality in implementation. Also, and not limited to Ethiopia, efforts have aimed more at reducing land degradation than at also improving livelihoods. This lack of attention to livelihood benefits, which could be better understood through greater participation, often leads to lack of adoption and maintenance of interventions. The disconnect between policy and implementation are by no means unique to Ethiopia, and the research undertaken thus has much broader applicability. Another common obstacle to true devolution is the entrenched view that farmers have little knowledge to contribute and must receive expert technical instruction from above. There is of course a place for external technical expertise and research into new technologies. However, this expertise needs to be paired with farmer knowledge and experience in a freer exchange of ideas if real innovations are to emerge, which can solve problems at local level. In their review of adaptive environmental management, Stringer et al. (2006) found that participatory processes enabled valuable social learning and collective understanding. However, participation should not be thought of as a panacea (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin, 1989), and how participation through decentralisation is designed and implemented is critical for its success. Indeed, ‘poorly designed processes can have negative effects’ (Van Korf et al., 2010: 2) such as (1) engendering stakeholder mistrust; (2) enabling poor decisions to be made and acted upon; (3) provoking refusal to participate in future or to agree to decisions made; and (4) lost time and money (Van Korf et al., 2010, pg. 2–3). Design of a strategy for actually implementing decentralisation is rare (Smoke, 2003). Finally, a paradigm shift is required in terms of participation. Although decentralisation policy is one step in this shift, development actors will have to learn to trust people in new ways, to see their role as supporting people’s own life ‘projects’ and innovative capacity rather than trying to determine how people should use the assets, information and opportunities they have. Smoke observes that decentralisation entails a ‘complex process that involves fundamental changes in attitudes about the way the public sector works. All major actors involved typically start from positions inconsistent with decentralisation’ (2003, pg. 14). This point is quite clear in the Ethiopia case here described, and the cultural shift required will no doubt take quite some time to come about. Currently, participation is often seen as nothing more than organising a village meeting to hear the ‘community’s’ priorities. A number of common assumptions need revisiting: that a ‘community’ as such exists with a single voice; that all people are able to express themselves at such events in spite of local power dynamics; that people taking part are voicing their real concerns rather than what they know experts are expecting them to say; and finally that a real understanding of Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad Q4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 12 K. A. SNYDER ET AL. people’s values, needs and struggles can be understood through such a limited process. Truly understanding the constraints different people face, and in particular why they may or may not choose to invest in soil and water conservation, requires much more intensive engagement and needs to go beyond simple participatory rural appraisal exercises. The benefits of greater participation are many, which include the following: (1) improved legitimacy of local government administrations because they are seen as responding to community members; (2) more relevant and less costly decisions made because stakeholders contribute important information and re-frame problems and solutions; 3) less likelihood that stakeholders will resist or reject a decision because they have been involved in forming it; and (4) increased social capital as interaction in participatory processes increases learning and capacity (Van Korf et al., 2010). As Shiferaw et al. assert: ‘The best way to ensure adoption of innovations for sustainable land and water management is to develop them iteratively, in collaboration with the target group’ (2009, pg. 616). Although participation is promoted as an important path to achieve sustainable development, Golooba-Mutebi’s research suggests that it may not be accurate to assume ‘that poor people want and have the ability to participate and that once avenues for participation exist they will take part in activities that may or may not improve their lives’(2004, pg. 301). While a change in mindset is one step perhaps in moving towards greater devolution, institutional obstacles to improved implementation must also be addressed through the design of incentives that measure quality and sustainability over quantity, which is now the focus of quotas and targets. Citizen report cards have been tried to improve extension, health and education service delivery. Perhaps a similar tool could be devised for SLM. Finally, although truly devolved decision-making and participation remains a worthy goal, we also have to be realistic about what such processes of decentralisation can achieve. As Green points out, regarding the emphasis on ‘community’ in development, this new development orthodoxy may in fact contribute ‘to the perpetuation of the very problems it seeks to resolve by failing to acknowledge the broader economic and institutional constraints which ensure the continued impoverishment of rural communities’ (2000, pg. 68). Ultimately, although improved soil and water conservation and NRM through more devolved decision-making can make significant differences in conserving natural resources and improving livelihoods, wider structural changes (trade laws, subsidy policies, access to credit, infrastructure development and so forth) must also occur to provide a better enabling environment for sustainable development. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to thank the Challenge Program for Water and Food for providing funding to the Nile Basin Development Project under which this research was conducted. 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Decentralization, local governance and ‘recentralization’ in Africa. Public Administration and Development 21: 277–288. Yilmaz S, Venugopal V. 2008. Local government discretion and accountability in Ethiopia. International studies program. Working paper no. 08–38. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/pad Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 Author Query Form Journal: Public Administration and Development Article: pad_1680 Dear Author, During the copyediting of your paper, the following queries arose. 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