Journal of Politics & Governance, Vol. 4, No. 1-4, December 2015
Journal of Politics & Governance,
Vol. 4, No. 1-4, December 2015, Pp. 17-24
ISSN: 2278473X
Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana:
The Case for Effective Council of State
Ransford Gyampo
Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Ghana
E-mail: vangyampo@yahoo.com
Abstract
This paper is the sixth in a series of publications aimed at addressing the severe challenges
posed to Ghana’s effort at national development and cohesion by the practice of “WinnerTakes-All” (WTA) politics. It discusses WTA politics, highlighting its dangers such as the
conferment of excessive powers on the president, marginalization of perceived political
opponents and the feeling of exclusion from the governance process by those who do not
belong to the government/ruling party. It reviews the performance of Ghana’s current
Council of State as a potential countervailing constitutional arrangement to bridle the
excessive powers of the executive and promote inclusive politics. The paper finally makes
recommendations to strengthen the Council of State as an effective check on the powers of
the executive and mechanism for promoting inclusive politics in Ghana.
Keywords: Winner-Takes-All; Politics; Inclusivity; Council of State; Ghana; 1992 Constitution
Introduction
Winner-Takes-All (WTA) politics can be explained in terms of the partisan monopolization
of state resources, facilities and opportunities, as well as the exclusion of political
opponents from national governance. It is considered very problematic as it manifests as "a
zero-sum tendency in politics" characterized by marginalization and exclusion of actors in
opposing groups from access to resources and other entitlements and incentives (Abotsi,
2013). Even though Ghana’s constitution provided for Winner-Takes-All, it was only
intended to serve as a formula for selecting leaders. It is instructive that the framers of
Ghana's 1992 Constitution wanted to ensure an effective executive presidency. However,
they did not contemplate a “winner-takes-all situation” by which the political party that
forms the government following a general election would in the exercise of its powers,
antagonize and completely exclude the political opposition from national governance (ibid).
The scholarly works of Oquaye (2013), Linton and Southcott (1998), Abotsi (2013), Prempeh
(2003), and Ayelazuno (2011) have highlighted the pervasiveness and polarizing dangers of
the problem of winner-takes-all politics in Ghana and in many other African countries. In
addressing the challenges posed by WTA politics, policy and scholarly recommendations
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such as the need for an independent parliament to play the role of countervailing authority
to the powers of the executive; the need for an inclusive and bi-partisan preparation of a
long term national development plan that benefits from the input of all across the political
divide and is implemented by all successor regimes; as well as the need for a review and
possible adoption of a customized variant of the proportional representation formula for
selecting leaders in Ghana have all been discussed by scholars such as Oquaye (2013);
Abotsi (2013); Gyampo (2015a) and Gyampo (2015b).
This paper is a radical departure from the studies of the scholars highlighted above. It
identifies the absence of an effective Council of State as one major cause of WTA politics in
Ghana and discusses the need for a strong Council of State to play a role that checks the
unbridled exercise of power and promote inclusivity in a manner akin to the traditional
Council of Elders in Ghana and many parts of Africa. One major feature of WTA politics is
that it confers excessive powers on the executive arm of government. However, given that
power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely1, the framers of the 1992
Constitution provided for the Council of State as a possible check on the excessive powers of
the executive and WTA politics.
The Council of State emanated from the concept of “Council of Elders” in Ghana’s traditional
political setting as. In the traditional setting, members of the Council of Elders were the
various lineage and clan heads who represented their people in the chief’s palace and
played a key role in checking the political excesses of the chief (Busia, 1951). The chief had
no hand in the selection of members of the Council and he was bound to follow whatever
advice given him by them. One ground for the removal of a chief was his failure to heed to
the advice of the Council of Elders (ibid). The role of the Council of Elders in the traditional
setting is therefore to play a role as countervailing authority to the powers of the chief
(executive) in a manner that fetters the exercise of power and promote constitutionalism
(ibid).
On the contrary, it has been argued that Ghana’s Council of State established under the
1992 Constitution is a mere pale shadow of its counterpart in the traditional setting. How
did Ghana’s Council of State evolve? How is it composed? What are its roles? How has it
been effective in checking the powers of the executive and promoting inclusive governance?
How can it be strengthened to play its role as an oversight countervailing authority to the
powers of the executive and an effective mechanism in fighting WTA politics? The
subsequent chapters of this paper are devoted to answering the questions posed.
The Council of State
Brief Historical Note: The Council of State was perceived with Ghana’s traditional political
system in mind as an advisory and countervailing authority to the powers of the chiefs. As
indicated earlier, members of the traditional Council of Elders were the respective clan or
lineage heads who assisted the chief in the day-to-day administration of the traditional
political community. They were in the chief’s palace as of right and proffered authoritative
advice on all governance and political issues which had binding effect on the chief (Busia,
1951). Members of the traditional Council of Elders held permanent positions in the chief’s
palace and in this regard, their tenures overlapped that of the chiefs. Per their permanent
positions, they were the repositories of traditional customs, values and conventions which
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Journal of Politics & Governance, Vol. 4, No. 1-4, December 2015
imbued them with enough wisdom and positioned them as credible sources of advice to the
chief (Oquaye, 2014). The Akans say, “ye wo ohene no, na obrempon te ase”, meaning,
before the chief was born, the elders were already in existence. This makes it imperative for
the chief to listen to wise counsel from the elders (ibid). Again, an Akan chief who for
instance attempted to disobey the advice of members of the Council of Elders was quickly
reminded that “nana, wo be to yen”, to wit, “you came to meet us here in the palace”. The
position and role of the Council of Elders in the traditional political setting was therefore an
exalted position that made them it a powerful check on the powers and political excesses of
the chief (Busia, 1951).
The Current State of Affairs: Article 89 clause 1 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution provides for a
Council of State to counsel the President in the performance of his function in a manner
akin to what pertained in the traditional setting. However, the Council is perceived as weak
in terms of composition and mandate. Generally, the Council of State in Ghana has not been
able to work effectively to counter the exercise of power by the President. Three main
reasons account for this challenge. In the first place, the President has an overriding power
of appointment in terms of the composition of the Council. Notably, the Council of State
which was first conceptualized under the 1979 Constitution was crafted with the concept of
the Chief’s Council in the traditional system in mind as already indicated.
However, the fundamental principle underscoring the membership of the Chief’s Council in
the traditional setting has been ignored. In the traditional Ghanaian society, no chief
appoints any member of his Council of Elders. The Council Members are Heads of the
various groups or lineages in the society and are sub-chiefs themselves (Busia, 1951). They
come to the Council as of right and are independent of the chief. The Members of the
Council normally support the chief to rule but if the latter should abuse his position, the
Council Members will take a bold stand against the chief. To disregard an advice from the
Council of Elders is indeed a ground for removal of the chief.
However, Ghana’s current constitutional arrangements give the President the powers to
appoint some members of the Council of State. It is also possible for the President to
influence the selection of the other members of the Council from the regions. Most
invariably, the President ends up appointing or having an influence over the appointment of
almost all members of the Council of State2. Indeed, there are three categories of members
of the Council appointed by the President. First, Ten People elected from the Regions by the
various Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAS). Even though the
President cannot override this process, he has enormous influence in determining who is
elected by the various MMDAs in view of his direct appointment and control over the
mayors and chief executives who heads the MMDAs.
Secondly the President is expected to appoint, four (4) persons who come through
institutional representation – one former Chief Justice; one former Chief of Defence Staff
(CDS); one former Inspector-General of Police (IGP) and President of the House of Chiefs.
Here too, the President may have a choice if more than one former occupant is alive. Finally,
the President has a free hand to choose or appoint eleven (11) other persons to serve as
members of the Council. This is alien to the Ghanaian culture as no chief selects/appoints
members of his Council. They are sub-chiefs who come as of right. This results in a
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countervailing authority and avoids despotism (Oquaye, 2014). Therefore, the appointment
of members of the Council of State by the President certainly undermines the independence
of the Council of State and renders it deficient in delivering on its mandate in a manner akin
to what pertained in the traditional setting where members owed their office as of right and
not to the chief.
The second issue relates to the mandate of the Council which is presently purely advisory
and with regards to the President only. Unlike what pertained in the traditional certain, the
President is not bound to follow the advice of the Council of State. The Council of State does
not also play any role in the day-to-day administration of the state as the Council of Elders
did in the traditional political setting. It is instructive to note that the Committee of Experts
on the 1992 Constitution made a number of recommendations, which go to the root of the
Council’s powers3. These were not included in the 1992 Constitution and should be
revisited. Article 90(1) of the 1992 Constitution provides: “A bill which has been published in
the Gazette or passed by Parliament shall be considered by the Council of State if the
President so requests”. The Committee of Experts provided differently and more broadly
under section 4(1) as follows: A bill which has been published in the Gazette or passed by
Parliament shall be considered by the Council of State –
(a) If the President requests;
(b) If the chairman of the Council of State determines;
(c) If no less than five members of the Council of State so demand; or
(d) If the bill was passed under a certificate of urgency.
Notably, this was already in existence by Article 107(1) of the 1979 Constitution. Why was it
removed in the 1992 constitution to weaken the Council of State? The Committee of Experts
also provided for Judicial Committee of the Council of State akin to the Privy Council in the
U.K. Five eminent Judges who are qualified to be Supreme Court Judges under the
Constitution and four other experts will be invited to assist the Council of State in a variety
of ways and assume membership by dint of their expertise. Among other things, they will
assist in determining the constitutionality of a bill, any important measure proposed by the
Executive, any appointment or vital issue of State whatsoever. Unfortunately, this was also
watered-down in the 1992 Constitution in a manner that has rendered the Council of State a
pliable tool in the hands of the President (Oquaye, 2014).
The third issue of relevance is the term of office of the Council of State. Members of the
traditional Council of Elders held their office so long as they lived. They were already in the
chief’s palace before the chief was installed and they remain when the chief is no more.
However by article (89) (6) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the appointment of a
Member of the Council of State can be terminated by the President with the prior approval
of Parliament. In the view of Oquaye (2004), this is enough to tame an independent mind
because any person can be removed by a President since the President can easily obtain a
majority through his/her majority party in Parliament.
Effectiveness of the Council of State
Given the above challenges, we do not need a soothsayer to tell us about the ineffective
role of the Council of State in bridling the powers of the executive and checking WTA
politics. Indeed, in the IEA-WTA public consultations held in 2014, the Council was variously
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described by a cross-section of Ghanaians as “superfluous” “toothless bull dog”
“unnecessary” “wasteful charge on public expenditure” “too much attached to the
President”, “not capable of giving independent or meaningful advise”. It was in
demonstration of the lack of confidence in the Council of State that many well-meaning
Ghanaians called on the President to broaden consultations beyond the Council of State in
seeking or appointing a new chairperson of the Electoral Commission.
Civil society organizations such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA-Ghana), Ghana
Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), Institute for Democratic Governance
(IDEG) and other seasoned statesmen including the national chairmen of the four main
political parties with representation in parliament were unanimous in calling on the
President not to only rely on the advice of the Council of State (which he is not bound to
follow) but to consult key stakeholders in Ghana’s democracy to promote inclusive politics
and ensure easy acceptance of the appointee. These calls arose as a result of the dent on
the mandate, credibility and effectiveness of the Council of State. Professors Daniel AdzeiBekoe and Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor, former Chairmen of the Council of State during the
administration of the respective regimes of Kufuor and Atta Mills regime have all recounted
their frustrations as chairs of the Council at one point in time or the other. Whiles Kofi
Awoonor lamented the appointment of party faithful and sycophants to the Council in a
manner that compromised their sense of objectivity and complained about the presidency
not being easily accessible to the Council4, Adzei-Bekoe noted that “…the Council has really
no powers. Even though the President is obliged to consult us on certain appointments, he
was not bound to take our advice…”5 The comments from these eminent statesmen speaks
volume about the ineffectiveness of the Council and satisfy the akan adage that “when the
toad comes from the sea to tell you the crocodile is dead, you don’t challenge it”.
Recommendations
In addressing the weaknesses of the Council of State, some Ghanaians including the IEAWTA Advisory Committee have recommended the need for the Council of State to be
transformed into a Second Chamber of Parliament with oversight responsibilities beyond
their current advisory role. However there are clear cut conditions that countries must
satisfy in order to opt for bicameralism6. The two most important of these conditions
include the size of a country’s population and the nature (homogenous/heterogeneous) of
the population (O’Neill, 2006; Ball and Peters, 2005; Chazan, 1982). In terms of size, Ghana
is a relatively small country of just about 25 million people compared to countries like
Nigeria, US and other populous countries that have Second Chambers. Again, research and
empirical studies on the nature of Ghana’s population points to a fairly homogenous
population compared to the heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian, UK or US population. In
other words, even though Ghanaians seem to be polarized, the population is homogenous.
There are about 92 ethnic groups in with the major ones being the Akan (49.1%), GaAdangbe (8.0%), Ewe (12.7%), Grunsi (2.8%), Guan (4.4%), Gurma, (3.9%), Mande-Busanga,
(1.1%) and Mole Dagbani (16.5%).7 The ethnic diversity of the country has nevertheless not
seriously dented and compromised the homogenous nature of its population (Frimpong,
2006; Handelma, 2006). Again, in spite of the fact that recently ethnic-voting seems to be
rearing its ugly head in voting patterns, the kind of divisive ethnic cleavages and divisons in
the population of the magnitude that warrants the adoption of a Second Chamber is not
what is witnessed in Ghana today (Shillington, 1992; Chazan, 1982; Frimpong, 2006). It is
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even more significant to note that even though Nigeria’s population is heterogeneous with
over 250 ethnic groups8, their adoption of a Second Chamber has not solved the
fragmentation and feeling of marginalization by some ethnic minorities (Handelma, 2006).
In this regard, for Ghana to transform its Council of State into a Second Chamber as a
solution to WTA politics may be simplistic.
To give more teeth to Ghana’s Council of State, first, the entire architecture captured in the
1992 Constitution should be reframed in line with the recommendation of the Committee of
Experts who drafted the Constitution. Article 89 (1) of the 1992 Constitution says: “There
shall be a Council of State to counsel the President in the performance of his functions”. By
Section 3(1) under Council of State, the Experts provided: “The Council of State shall aid and
counsel the President, the Council of Ministers, Parliament and other organs of State in the
performance of their functions under this Constitution or under any other law”.
Secondly, in terms of composition the Committee of Experts provided for “all former
Presidents able and willing to act as members of the Council of State”. President Rawlings
rejected this because he did not want former President Hilla Limann (Shillington, 1992,
Oquaye, 2014). However, the era of personal idiosyncrasies should be over and as a people,
we should include former Presidents and Vice Presidents on the Council except those who
left office on impeachment.
Third, membership of the Council of State should emphasize institutional representation
without a single nomination from any serving President. Mike Oquaye’s list of institutional
representation is instructive and may be considered as follows:
i. Every former Chief Justices
ii. Every former Chief of Defence Staff or General Officer Commanding the Armed
Forces.
iii. Every former Inspector General of Police.
iv. Every former Governor of the Bank of Ghana.
v. Every former Speaker and deputy Speaker.
vi. Every Former Majority and Minority Leader of Parliament.
vii. Every Former Auditor-General.
viii. The Secretary General of TUC
ix. 10 chiefs, each from the 10 Regional Houses of Chiefs.
x. 10 women, nominated by the Regional Queen mothers, though nominees need not
be Queen mothers.
xi. Representatives of identified Civil Society groups - The Christian Council, The Catholic
Secretariat, The Muslim Council, the Ghana Bar Association/Professional Bodies
Association, the Ghana Journalists Association, Women Groups, Student Groups,
TUC, Association of Ghana Industries etc.
Furthermore, the term of office of members of the Council should be six years and separate
from that of the President. By Article (89) (6), the appointment of a Member of the Council
can be terminated by the President with the prior approval of Parliament. As argued earlier,
this is enough to tame an independent mind because any person can be removed by a
President since the President can easily obtain a majority through his/her majority party in
Parliament. It is recommended that once a person is brought to the Council by an
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institution, only that body can recall the member by a prescribed method devoid of political
manipulation.
The new Council of State should be free to operate and advise ALL State bodies. Hence,
Article 92 (8) should be amended. It reads: “The Council of State may, with the approval of
the President, commission experts and consultants to advise it or assist it in dealing with any
specific issue”. In the view of Oquaye (2014), this is tragic as it makes it difficult for the
Council to investigate any controversial application of public funds and corruption
associated with the President or his ministers. The question is, will the President approve
such request? The Council should be empowered to independently engage experts to help it
arrive at “scientific” conclusions in all its investigations. The Council of State should be
strengthened to become so inquisitorial that it can even advocate impeachment process
against the President where necessary.
Another anomaly is found in Article 90(1) of the Constitution: “A bill which has been
published in the Gazette or passed by Parliament shall be considered by the Council of State
if the President so requests”. The Committee of Experts provided differently and more
broadly under section 4(1) as follows: A bill which has been published in the Gazette or
passed by Parliament shall be considered by the Council of State –
(a) If the President requests;
(b) If the chairman of the Council of State determines;
(c) If no less than five members of the Council of State so demand; or
(d) If the bill was passed under a certificate of urgency.
Notably, this was already in existence by Article 107(1) of the 1979 Constitution. Why was it
removed in the 1992 constitution to weaken the Council of State? The Experts also provided
for Judicial Committee of the Council of State akin to the Privy Council in the U.K. Five
eminent Judges who are qualified to be Supreme Court Judges under the Constitution and
four other experts will be invited to assist the Council of State in a variety of ways and
assume membership by dint of their expertise. Among other things, they will assist in
determining the constitutionality of a bill, any important measure proposed by the
Executive, any appointment or vital issue of State whatsoever. Why this was also sacrificed?
Conclusion
A return to the recommendations on the Council of State by the Committee of Experts who
drafted Ghana’s 1992 Constitution as well as the provisions of the 1979 Constitution on the
Council of State would help strengthen the Council and enable it deliver on its mandate in a
manner that checks the excesses of the executive and reduces WTA politics. Indeed, the
advice from such a strengthened and powerful state body may not be binding but can
certainly not be ignored by the President.
Endnotes
1
See Lord Acton @ http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/l/lordacton109401.html
2
See article 89 clauses 2 to 4 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution
3
See Committee of Experts’ Report on Ghana’s 1992 Constitution
4
Author interviewed Prof Kofi Awoonor on 11th September 2011 in Accra.
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5
Interview with Prof Daniel Adzei-Bekoe on 23rd September 2015 in Accra.
6
A bicameral legislature is a Two-Housed Legislature, divided into a Lower House or First
Chamber and an Upper House or Second Chamber.
7
Ghana Statistical Service Report (2000)
8
Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, has more than 250 ethnic groups. The most
populous and politically influential ones are the: Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo
18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, and Tiv 2.5%. See more details at
http://start.csail.mit.edu/startfarm.cgi?query=How+many+ethnic+groups+exist+in+Nigeria.
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