E. Graham

The results of Ghana's 2012 and 2020 elections were challenged in the nation's Supreme Court. Even though the court processes in both cases did not alter the election results, they nevertheless exposed monumental flaws in the electoral processes. The flaws in the 2012 electoral processes were exposed at the Supreme Court and featured in the final judgment of the court in a manner that allowed the Electoral Commission to initiate moves towards electoral reforms. However, the challenges of the 2020 elections, though exposed at the courts, were never featured in the final judgment of the Supreme Court. This paper discusses the implications of the 2020 election petition for the future of electoral reforms in Ghana. It argues that the rigid application of the letter of the law by the Supreme Court and the relegation to the background of the thorny issues of electoral challenges in the 2020 elections, would render the quest for further electoral reforms difficult. This would then make the future of any attempt to fine-tune the electoral processes quite bleak.

Drawing on the analytical distinction between business as a development tool and business as a development agent, this chapter contends that if CSR is to become a more effective vehicle for promoting sustainable community development in rural communities in Africa, business would have to become more of a development agent and less of a development tool by shifting their CSR policies and practices geared towards community development (CD) from an emphasis on an imposed/directed community development framework to an emphasis on enabling self-help community development projects. Crucially, therefore, is the need to rethink CSR practices through the lens of community development rather than framing community development through the lens of CSR and the need for businesses to develop their community development capabilities.

The discovery of oil should transform economies, since oil revenues can be invested in infrastructure and the non-oil sector. Whilst oil discovery has transformed the economy of countries such as Indonesia, Norway and UK, the story is different in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available evidence in countries like Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria suggests that economic growth has an inverse relationship with oil production. Some researchers have attributed this to lack of quality institutions and the politics surrounding oil production. In this study, we take a critical look at the politics of oil production in Ghana and its potential implications for the oil sector and national development.

Abstract Economic development thrives on the availability and reliability of power supply. This is because energy is a vital input to every economic activity. In this study, we trace the electricity reforms of Ghana, examine the challenges and provide recommendations to improve power supply and supply in Ghana. Key literature and policy papers on the power reform in Ghana are evaluated. Further, the role of the private sector in electricity supply is examined. The study recommends that policies such as net metering, flexible, independent and investor friendly regulatory framework, reliable off-taker and investment in LNG facilities to ensure availability of natural gas for thermal power generation. Key words: Power Sector Reform, Electricity Demand, Electricity Supply, Intermittent power supply

Since Ghana started commercial production of oil in 2011, the overarching concern has been how to avoid a resource curse. This article examines the role civil society organisations (CSOs) have played in preventing Ghana from falling into the oil curse situation. It notes specific civil society initiatives that aim to promote transparency and accountability in oil governance. The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas has facilitated the creation of legislative frameworks, checks and monitoring systems to keep government and oil companies on their toes even though weak capacity, politicisation and lack of access to information remain a challenge to CSOs’ effective mobilisation. They need to pursue collaborative rather than adversarial relationships with the government, promote participatory learning in their internal management and instigate the government to promote macroeconomic stability, wealth creation, infrastructure development and employment for the youth with oil revenues.

Drawing on the analytical distinction between business as a development tool and business as a development agent, this chapter contends that if CSR is to become a more effective vehicle for promoting sustainable community development in rural communities in Africa, business would have to become more of a development agent and less of a development tool by shifting their CSR policies and practices geared towards community development (CD) from an emphasis on an imposed/directed community development framework to an emphasis on enabling self-help community development projects. Crucially, therefore, is the need to rethink CSR practices through the lens of community development rather than framing community development through the lens of CSR and the need for businesses to develop their community development capabilities.

The paper examines local actors' expectations against actual outcomes following Ghana's oil discovery in 2007 and oil production from 2010, respectively. The paper employed a mixed-method approach and collected data at different times from local actors in six districts located along the coast of the Western Region of Ghana. A Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test was used to compare differences in median responses on local actors' expectations and actual outcomes along 17 development dimensions, both positive and negative. The qualitative data was analysed thematically, and the results were presented in narratives to reflect the voices of the respondents. The results show that the high expectations of benefits to communities and local actors upon the discovery of the oil have declined significantly since the production of the oil. The differences between expectations of benefits and actual outcomes have sparked contentions between local actors and oil companies with local actors employing different strategies to achieve their interests. Contentious strategies are becoming rampant and creating tension in the area. The study further found that local actors' expectations of negative developments such as tenant evictions, restriction of fishing and children stopping schooling measure up with actual outcomes. The paper recommends that urgent legislation and policies that will create space for effective benefits negotiations between local actors and oil companies should be instituted.

Ghana discovered oil in June 2007 and commenced production inDecember 2010 under a peaceful democratic political order that isbeing hailed by all across the world as a beacon of hope. Basedon a desktop review, this paper examines how oil affects politicsand democratic development in Ghana. It argues that even thoughthere are efforts to protect Ghana from the ‘oil curse’ or potentialadverse socio-economic effects of oil production, conscious effortshave not been made to check the possible impact of oil productionon the nation’s democratic gains. Consequently, oil production hasresulted in tendencies that undermine democratic development,including politics of resource-patronage; high spending on socialservices such as infrastructure; high borrowing that increasesnational debt; and high corruption and perception of corruptionand security threats. The paper concludes with some theoreticaland policy implications of the findings for oil-producing countries inSub-Saharan Africa.

The longue duree of the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources is a good index of Africa’s position in the capitalist global economy. From the slave trade in the fifteenth century, through to colonialism in the nineteenth century, to neo-colonialism in the twentieth century, Africa’s natural resources have been the main ligament through which the economies of its countries are integrated into the global economy. Throughout these epochal moments of the history of the capitalist global economy, the continent and its people have been subordinated to the powerful states as a quarry for drawing valuable natural resources for development in their countries. Situated in this historical backdrop, our contribution probes the natural resources-led development discourses which have emerged from the new scramble for Africa in the twenty-first century global order. Making a radical break with the leftist discourses of imperialism and accumulation by dispossession, the new scramble is viewed as auspicious development opportunities for the continent to industrialize on the back of its natural resources. Popular even among African leaders and scholars, this new development thinking suggests a new world order in which the scramble for Africa, as The Economist put it, is benign; with bright prospects of Africans becoming winners. Problematizing this new thinking, this paper draws on Ghana’s oil rush to argue that the position of Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, has not changed. Despite the peculiarities of the new scramble and the twenty-first-century global order, Africa is exploited by extractive imperialism, the dynamics of which are unpropitious of industrialization in resource-rich countries

Using Ghana as a case study, the chapter posits that China is a development partner of Africa, and Ghana specifically, with a different approach, compared to the Western Eurocentric partners. It points out the divergences between the Eurocentric developmental approach to Ghana and the Chinese approach by focusing on the bilateral relations (i.e., socio-economic, political and cultural) between the Ghanaian state and China. The chapter seeks to examine the impact of sixty years of China-Ghana development partnership. It shows that six-decades of developmental partnership has led to trade and foreign direct investment, official development assistance (ODA), the development of infrastructure, technical cooperation and educational assistance. Conversely, some major contemporary limitations to Ghana-China bilateral relations persist, these are: the involvement of private business Chinese nationals in artisanal small-scale mining, growing anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of Chinese take-over of the local market and Ghana’s increasing debt to China. The chapter is based on a qualitative desktop content analysis of primary and secondary data. The primary data are from documentary sources, stakeholder reports, discussions and statements from experts and government officials available on various online platforms such as YouTube, GhanaWeb, Joy News and interviews conducted by several news agencies and journalists on the topic. The secondary data are from books, journals, online news outlets amongst others.

Ghana discovered oil in June 2007 and commenced production in December 2010 under a peaceful democratic political order that is being hailed by all across the world as a beacon of hope. Based on a desktop review, this paper examines how oil affects politics and democratic development in Ghana. It argues that even though
there are efforts to protect Ghana from the ‘oil curse’ or potential adverse socio-economic effects of oil production, conscious efforts have not been made to check the possible impact of oil production on the nation’s democratic gains. Consequently, oil production has resulted in tendencies that undermine democratic development, including politics of resource-patronage; high spending on social services such as infrastructure; high borrowing that increases national debt; and high corruption and perception of corruption and security threats. The paper concludes with some theoretical
and policy implications of the findings for oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The exploration and production of oil and gas continue to be vigorously pursued by African states and international corporations—both large and small. However, with unpredictable fluctuations in oil prices it becomes more difficult to exploit these resources in ways which accrue net benefits to both the state and its citizens. The oil and gas industry in Africa continues to grow and attract new investment, especially from China and India. Despite the lower price of oil, exploration and production activities continue to be carried out. At the same time, the possibilities for oil and gas to be a blessing narrow. Natural resource-based development has always been a difficult objective for any state. The question now may be whether embracing oil and gas is socially responsible: as renewable energy becomes more cost-effective and societies transition into a post-carbon world, the prospects for African states to make good use of carbon resources are waning. In exploring the closing window for petro-development in Africa, this paper uses a comparative cross-regional analysis of trends and developments to highlight how weak legal frameworks and a lack of institutional capacity pose major challenges for the continent's states in managing their natural resources.

The article examines Ghana’s oil sector within the context of the debate on the impact of globalization on oil-rich developing economies. Globalization is used in this context to mean the influx of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Ghana’s oil and gas sector. The research adopts the qualitative methodological approach and uses the concepts of resource curse and globalization as theoretical and conceptual frameworks, pointing out the correlations between them. It argues that after five years of oil production, globalization has had both positive and negative impacts on Ghana’s oil and gas sector. It has generated revenues, contributed to infrastructure development, engendered local content development, and effected corporate social responsibility. However, some challenges involving collateralization of the resources, employment, the environment, and socio-economic life in oil production remain.

The 1992 constitution of Ghana gives the Executive President of Ghana enormous and extensive powers of appointment. This over the years has led to the manifestations of the Winner-Takes-All (WTA) politics. As a result, Executive Presidents of Ghana have exercised their powers of appointment to the benefit of only party apparatchiks and loyalists without recourse to appointment based on apolitical or non-partisan meritocracy. In this regard, many Ghanaians, irrespective of their competence, experience and expertise, are denied the opportunity to serve their country simply because they do not belong to the ruling party. We argue that, the 1992 constitution of Ghana gives the Executive President so much power in appointing state officials, which promotes WTA politics and deepens clientelism. The paper reviews the extensive powers of appointment of the President and practically examines how the exercise of these powers promotes WTA politics and clientelism. It discusses previous attempts at promoting inclusive government through appointments and the challenges encountered. The paper finally proffers policy recommendations on how the powers of appointment could be exercised in a manner that promotes inclusivity and, to some extent, meritocracy.

Ghana's fourth attempt at constitutional democratic governance which started in 1992 has been plagued with negative acts of political vigilantism. Political vigilante groups play a key role in securing electoral victory for their parties. But they are also key agents in pushing their parties to opposition. Vigilante groups, particularly those belonging to the party that won elections have over the years, taken the laws of the country into their own hands, forcibly ejected officials of previous administration from their apartments and physically assaulted them, as well as engaged in seizures of public property and assets in the custody of public officials in an uncoordinated manner. These acts have fuelled polarization in Ghana's body politic and undermined the nation's drive towards democratic maturity. What accounts for the rise in the activities of vigilante groups? How useful are these groups to political parties? In what specific ways do vigilante groups pose a threat to Ghana's democratic governance? These and other allied questions are addressed in this article.

The article assesses the use of ethnocentrism as a political strategy in Ghana's electoral politics and the threat it poses to Ghana's democracy. It focuses on the strategic ethno-political communication employed by politicians to wield voter support and how voters behave at polls. It reveals that prior to independence Ghana's political parties were predominantly formed along ethnic and regional dimensions. This transcends into the current dispensation, as the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party are tagged as Ewe-Northerners party and Akans party, respectively. These ethnic affiliations tend to influence voters' behaviour at the polls. There is, therefore, an increasing incidence of non-evaluative voting because of ethnocentrism in the Ghanaian political domain. As a result, politicking in Ghana tends to rely heavily on ethnic dimensions to solicit votes using the media as the main platform. The incidence of ethno-politics in Ghana has the tendency to reverse the democratic successes chalked because of the unnecessary tensions that are often associated with ethnic politics. This article recommends the need for responsible media practice to minimise this rising phenomenon in Ghana's electoral politics. Also, it is our suggestion that the Political Parties ACT 574(2000) and the concerned articles of the 1992 constitution be reviewed to place sanctions on ethnocentrism as a political strategy.

Since Ghana started commercial production of oil in 2011, the overarching concern has been how to avoid a resource curse. This article examines the role civil society organisations (CSOs) have played in preventing Ghana from falling into the oil curse situation. It notes specific civil society initiatives that aim to promote transparency and accountability in oil governance. The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas has facilitated the creation of legislative frameworks, checks and monitoring systems to keep government and oil companies on their toes even though weak capacity, politicisation and lack of access to infor- mation remain a challenge to CSOs’ effective mobilisation. They need to pursue collaborative rather than adversarial relationships with the government, pro- mote participatory learning in their internal management and instigate the government to promote macroeconomic stability, wealth creation, infrastructure development and employment for the youth with oil revenues.

Although Ghana’s oil is drilled offshore, the industry has spawned profound changes in the inland communities dotted along the Western coastline of the country. Nowhere is the change greater than in the petro-city of Sekondi-Takoradi and surrounding communities. Now known as the ‘oil city’, once-quiet Sekondi-Takoradi has been transformed by oil production, yet its inhabitants have not seen the expected benefits. Oil has instead strained local infrastructure and led to a higher cost of living, forced evictions, a land rush, and various social ills. The ‘resource curse’ operates very differently at the local level. The Sekondi-Takoradi Municipal Assembly (STMA) does not benefit from oil revenues, nor have local linkages developed as expected. Additionally, oil companies as new development actors have consulted but not coordinated planning with local assemblies. The STMA has few policy options for mitigating the well-known negative impacts of the industry. It is experiencing all the negative impacts of oil with very little benefit in terms of revenues or employment. Through interviews with citizens and municipal officials, this paper attempts to explore the dynamics of change in Sekondi-Takoradi arguing that even under the best of circumstances, national plans for petro-development in Ghana were never designed to positively impact the so-called ‘oil city’.