Peer-Reviewed Review Article
Is Brain-Dead NATO
Near Euthanasia?
Fahrİ Erenel*
Ahmet Gedİk**
Assoc. Prof.
İstinye University
Doctoral Student
İstanbul University
*Fahri Erenel graduated from the Military Academy in 1980 in the department of economics. He
completed his BA in Sociology and International Relations; his MA in National and International
Security; Educational Administration and Supervision; Occupational Health and Safety; and his PhD
in Human Resources Management. Between 1980 and 2010, he served at various levels in the Turkish
Armed Forces. He is a B-class occupational safety specialist. He became an Associate Professor in
Management and Strategy in 2017. He held various positions on the administrative and academic staff
at Altınbaş and Kent Universities. He is still working as a lecturer at Istinye University, Department of
Political Science and Public Administration. He is also the author of six books.
E-mail: ferenel@istinye.edu.tr
**Ahmet Gedik, graduated from Marmara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of
Public Administration (French) in 2016, studied at IEP de Lyon, in Lyon, France, for a year with
an exchange program during his undergraduate education. He completed his master's degree in
the Galatasaray University Social Sciences Institute Political Science program. He is continuing his
doctorate education at the Istanbul University Institute of Social Sciences, Political Science, and Public
Administration program. He speaks French and English.
E-mail: agedik@istinye.edu.tr
Received: 30.01.2023
Accepted: 20.03.2023
How to cite: Erenel, F. & Gedik, A. (2023). Is brain-dead NATO near euthanasia? BRIQ Belt & Road
Initiative Quarterly, 4(3), 6-19.
Fahri Erenel, Ahmet Gedik - Is Brain-Dead NATO Near Euthanasia?
ABSTRACT
Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has been a political and military international organization that
constitutes one of the most important actors in the international system. Although the prestige and
advantages of being a NATO member in a bipolar world have been questioned from time to time after
the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the Alliance has continued to sustain itself and, especially in the 2000s,
has tended to expand. The acceleration of NATO’s development and change after the collapse of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) suggests that the focus of this international organization is
not only on the Eastern Bloc but also on the need to organize for other current and future focal points.
Those who argue to the contrary suggest that in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR, which was
the focal point of NATO, and in an international system moving between unipolarity and multipolarity,
the existence and purpose of the organization has become meaningless. The structure of NATO has
been criticised due to factors such as the criticism of NATO’s mission to protect Europe within the
European Union (EU), especially in France, and the desire of the member states of the Union to take
part in the mission to protect Europe themselves. Within the scope of this analysis, NATO’s actions and
its position in the face of crises, especially in the 2000s, will be examined, and how the reflections of its
actions in the face of these political and military crises shed light on the future of the organization will
be discussed. In this context, issues such as what the Alliance countries, especially in Europe, expect
from NATO in the face of the recent crises will be analysed.
Keywords: Defence, deterrence, NATO, power, war
Introduction
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM THAT
emerged after the Second World War caused
the world to be stuck between two poles, and in
these two poles, the dominant powers directed
or influenced the other powers. Historian
A.J.P. Taylor said, “The purpose of great power
is to be able to make great wars. But the way
to remain a great power is not to enter such a
war.” This reminds us that the post-war order
is an important issue (Heilbrunn, 2018: 9). The
bipolar world order led by the Soviet Union
and the United States of America (US) as the
East and West Blocs reveals the capacity of
these two superpowers. In this respect, NATO,
as a military organization tool of the Western
Bloc, has acted in this direction and become an
important instrument to continue its deterrence
instead of an open challenge. However, despite
all this time, it has become questionable
whether NATO will continue to exist as a
deterrent power instead of a fighting force as in
the first days of its establishment. The potential
loss of power in the current situation, especially
with war and regional conflicts, has raised the
issue of whether the Alliance is in a phase of
disintegration and division.
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, first, the
unipolar world dominated by the US and then the
multipolar new world order, which has gradually
become more prominent in the current period,
perhaps gave NATO back its lost reason for existence.
We have seen a NATO that enlarges, transforms into
an independent structure from thirty-one member
states, and becomes rivals to Russia and China in
different dimensions instead of the Soviets. And at the
moment, sustainability is one of the most important
issues that needs to be addressed for NATO and the
states that comprise the organization.
With the impact of the Russia-Ukraine tension
that emerged in the first months of 2022, a war
environment is being experienced in a part of the
international system. For NATO, the former “enemy”
superpower is at war, which is being waged against a
country that has expressed its desire to join NATO.
This situation, similar to the Cold War years, caused
the US, the leader of the other pole, NATO under
its leadership, and indirectly European countries to
position on the other side of the war. As a defense
organization, will NATO protect its allies against war
and conflict, as discussed in the 2022 concept? Or
will this organization, which has expanded its field
of interest and activity with a global approach and
whose goal is to expand, be dragged into new wars?
In other words, will NATO take a positive
role in ensuring world peace and continue its
development, as it did in the Cold War era, or will
it begin the process of disintegration as a growing
and expanding organization? In this analysis, first of
all, the establishment of NATO and the position of
the US in the organization will be briefly discussed,
and then the decision-making mechanisms of
the organization and its blockage points will be
examined. Finally, the question of the future of
NATO will be discussed.
8
The Foundation of NATO and
the Position of the US
After World War II, the US signed the North
Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 for the “protection of
Europe” and to balance the Soviet military presence.
The treaty entered into force on 24 August 1949.
Although the purpose of the Alliance is collective
defense in the text of the treaty, it is designed as
a complement to the Marshall Plan, which is a
product of the US’s effort to revive Europe against
the Soviet Union (Hobsbawm, 2006:322). In this
context, NATO took its place on the stage as an
actor in the play, whose script was written by the
US.
The US, which took the place of England after
World War II, has taken the strategic idea of the
former hegemonic power, which is pushing the
Soviet Union back, preventing its access to the sea,
and keeping it fragmented for the continuation of
the hegemonic order. Therefore, after the war, it
was decided to accept Spykman’s Rimland theory
first and implement Kennan’s strategy to contain
the USSR, and communism was chosen as the
ideological enemy. NATO was designed as a tool
for the implementation of such hegemonic thinking
(Gürdeniz, 2022). In Spykman’s Rimland Theory,
the region extending from the east of Europe, which
we can define as Eurasia, to Siberia and China is also
defined as the Heartland, and it is stated that coastal
regions are the key to controlling the World-Island
(Foster, 2006). The edge region, namely Eurasia,
includes the Heartland, and whoever controls this
region will eventually control the World-Island,
Spykman says. Whoever controls the World-Island,
will soon control the world. Therefore, NATO’s
enlargement policy can be interpreted as controlling
the Heartland (Erenel, 2021: 11).
Fahri Erenel, Ahmet Gedik - Is Brain-Dead NATO Near Euthanasia?
Rimland Theory Map. (BRIQ , 2023)
The US has always been the most important
member of NATO compared to other member states.
In the words of Lord Ismay, NATO’s founding secretary
general and military adviser to Churchill during the
war, “NATO was established to keep the Americans
inside, the Russians outside, and the Germans under
control”. Later, the purpose of its existence was lost and
became questionable (Maunders, 2016; Guérot, 2016:
55). However, this ontological wavering was shortlived. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO
tried to transform itself rapidly, especially in the
1990s, in the face of various threats. With the historic
decisions taken at the 1999 Washington Summit,
the Alliance could carry out “out-of-area” military
operations. In this direction, NATO became usable
for solving crimes and problems such as weapons of
mass destruction, international terrorism, the drug
trade, racism, and human trafficking. Thus, after the
1999 Summit, the organization’s job description and
operation area changed, and the mission undertaken
was designed in accordance with the new conditions
of the period. Defined as a defense and military
international organization, NATO has gradually
turned into a general security organization (Irondelle
and Lachmann, 2011; Polat, 2020:335-336).
The fact that the US determines policies and
strategies on problems and issues concerning the
entire Alliance without adequate dialogue shows
the organization’s founding purpose. At the NATO
Summit held in London in 2019, the “plan to
designate the PYD/YPG as a terrorist organization”
presented by Türkiye was not accepted, and only a
general statement was used in the summit’s final
declaration, such as “the alliance will continue to fight
all forms of terrorism”. Although there is discussion
among its members, in the final declaration, in line
with the desire of the US, the statements of “acting
together as an alliance against China” and “safe and
flexible systems should be trusted in the transition
to 5G technology”, again against China, indicate that
decision-making mechanisms are not functioning
in coordination, and rhetoric and actions that
do not take into account the interests of the US
cannot find a place in the alliance (Alpar, 2021).
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This shows that NATO’s concerns and interests
regarding other European states are kept in the
background behind the interests of the US. In other
words, it can be concluded that security concerns may
be valid for other states within limits set by the US. In
these examples, it’s clear that NATO’s decision-making
mechanism differs in formality and operation.
NATO’s Decision-Making Mechanism
Although NATO’s decision-making mechanism
has remained stable in its basic lines since its
establishment, it has undergone partial changes
in the face of some unexpected situations.
NATO’s highest decision-making body is the
North Atlantic Council, where every member of
the Alliance has one vote. Decisions in the North
Atlantic Council are taken unanimously, not by a
majority (NATO, 2022). Therefore, the approval
and vote of all the member states are required.
This situation changed due to the tension between
NATO and France during the Charles de Gaulle
period of France, which was called the Fifth
Republic and switched to a semi-presidential
system. Charles de Gaulle, who did not want to
be a symbolic president, proposed a new foreign
policy doctrine for France with the new French
regime. In this direction, he tried to put France
in a prime position in the bipolar world in a way
that would not be too close to or engaged with
any pole. This has worked. Therefore, France
under Charles de Gaulle left the military wing
of NATO in 1966 (Vasse, 2009). The Defense
Planning Committee was established to handle
military issues while the North Atlantic Council
remained. After the return of France to the
military wing of NATO in 2009, this situation
was no longer concerning (Chevènement, 2009).
It is considered that NATO, as an organization,
10
has grown excessively while trying to adapt to
environmental conditions on the one hand, grows
old on the other, and is experiencing the Behemot
Syndrome, which means that the speed of reaction
to events decreases as a result of the overgrowth of
the organizational structure, becoming unwieldy
(Fasola and Lucarelli, 2008). 2020; Keçecioğlu,
2008:192). The most effective example of a low
reaction rate is the necessity of taking decisions
unanimously. At its establishment, the ninth
article of the North Atlantic Council officially
states that decisions are to be taken unanimously
and that it meets regularly twice a year with
the participation of the member states’ foreign
ministers. While unanimity is emphasized in
the decision-making process, open voting is not
carried out. An agreement is reached on whether
there is an objection through negotiations with
the members. Negotiation and dialogue methods
are used to overcome objections (Özsoy, 2022:
105).
If one of the member states uses its veto
right only for political or legal reasons, NATO’s
decision-making mechanism and process may
be interrupted and blocked. For example, North
Macedonia has been waiting years to become
a member due to the Greek veto. Suppose a
country vetoes any NATO decision for political
or private reasons. In that case, that country
can be questioned (Tarakçı, 2016:1). Because all
the decisions to be taken in the North Atlantic
Council must be accepted by the member
states, the council cannot pass the decision.
Again, as a good example, Sweden and Finland
quickly applied for NATO membership after
the Ukraine War, but Türkiye’s attitude due to
Sweden’s supportive position towards terrorism
interrupted the membership process and,
indirectly, the decision-making process.
Fahri Erenel, Ahmet Gedik - Is Brain-Dead NATO Near Euthanasia?
Finland accession ceremony to NATO, Brussels, Belgium. (Estonian Foreign Ministry, 2023)
Similarly, Türkiye declared that it did not want
Rasmussen, the former NATO Secretary General,
to be involved but had to accept it when it was
alone in its request (Kool et al., 2021). After NATO’s
Bucharest 2008 Summit, Albania and Croatia
joined the alliance, and rhetoric that Ukraine and
Georgia could become NATO members began to
emerge. However, after Russia’s harsh reaction to
the participation of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO,
the attitude towards the membership of these two
countries has changed in the alliance’s member
states. Even though the Cold War is over, the danger
that is insisting on an issue that will disturb Russia
and even seeing it as a national security problem that
may cause new crises in the international system
has been one of the most important obstacles in
opening the path to membership for Ukraine and
Georgia.
At the same time, NATO has the appearance
of a multinational company due to its structural
features. The problems these companies experience
continue to be experienced to a large extent. In
other words, NATO, when viewed as a whole, has
a multinational structure that includes military
and civilian personnel from many nations. Because
different cultures’ human resources work in the
same channel, countries have different perspectives
on security problems, their geopolitical importance,
proximity to the forces identified as threats, and
tensions between countries can seriously delay joint
decision-making.
As the number of member states increases,
NATO’s decision-making mechanism becomes
more debatable. The fact that the alliance, which
started with twelve founding members, continues
to exist with twenty-eight member states today and
the expectation of an increase in the number of
members in the near future may make it increasingly
difficult to take a unanimous decision. The veto
rights of each member slowed down the decisionmaking process regarding some crises and conflicts,
especially in the post-Cold War period. US political
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scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski proposes that
decisions in NATO should be taken by a majority
instead of a unanimous vote (Brzezinski, 2009:
15; Tarakçı, 2016:1).
With the end of the Cold War, the
bipolar international system ended,
and the USA remained the only
superpower in the world.
Changes in environmental conditions,
organizational corrosion caused by aging, and
expansion that is difficult to manage have caused
NATO’s effectiveness to decrease and become
unwieldy. In the unipolar world order after the
Cold War, the US’s strategies to create a New
World Order were reflected in the organization’s
existence. Aiming to take precautions against the
threats it has identified with seven concepts since
its establishment, NATO is about to prepare the
eighth one with the vision of NATO-2030. It will
probably revise this concept with the start of the
Ukraine-Russia War.1 Frequent concept changes
delay the war preparation and adaptation process,
making testing and developing the concept with
joint training and exercises difficult.
The Future of NATO
NATO’s new roadmap is clearly included in the
2022 Strategic Concept. In this concept, NATO
is presented as a kind of combined military
power of the US and the European Union (EU),
where the US and the EU focus on maintaining
the global leadership of the Atlantic system in
an integrated manner, despite the declining
military, economic, and political powers, and put
12
their ideological powers to new heights. It is seen
that they rely on the rule-based international
order they have determined. However, the extent
to which this system is complied with when it
comes to Atlantic interests has also been seen
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and in
Türkiye in the 15 July Fethullahist Terrorist
Organization (FETO) coup attempt and the
conspiracy cases before it (Gürdeniz, 2022).
With the end of the Cold War, the bipolar
international system ended, and the US
remained the only superpower in the world. As
stated by John O’Sullivan, one of the intellectual
supporters of the seventh President of the US,
Andrew Jackson, a “vigorous and fresh country
presented by God” had a “sacred duty on behalf of
the nations of the world” (Wilsey, 2017; Gomez,
2012). With the disintegration of the USSR, a
group calling themselves the neoconservatives
put forward the New American Century Project
(Al-Kassimi, 2017). In a study they presented
to the Pentagon in 1992, Vice President Dick
Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz argued that in
the post-Cold War period, the US needed to
lead in a way that would realize its interests by
establishing a unipolar order (Gaddis, 2002: 5057; Gözen, 2014:120).
It is seen that the emphasis on the unanimous
decision-making mechanism and presenting
NATO as a defense organization where the
members have the right of veto is to cover up
the US’s aim of using the organization as an
attack and occupation device. Throughout the
seventy-three-year history of NATO, despite
many demands, the question of why Article 5 of
the treaty has not been applied to other members
other than the US clearly shows that NATO is a
US-based organization and that the interests of
other member countries remain insignificant.
Fahri Erenel, Ahmet Gedik - Is Brain-Dead NATO Near Euthanasia?
In the post-Cold War era, in which US
hegemony indisputably dominated world
politics, conflicts or wars were not absent; on
the contrary, many military operations were
carried out under the name of combating
terrorism. From the end of World War II to the
period of the 11 September attacks, the data of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies
in London reveal that 22,456,000 people lost
their lives, and there were 188 military conflicts
in ninety countries during this fifty-five-year
so-called peace process after World War II
(Degirmencioglu, 2007:85).
Another important issue is the perception
of security and the perceptions of the member
states towards any phenomenon or event. The
security perception of each country differs
according to its geographical, political, and
cultural conditions. Although security threats
are often general, this issue can become
subjective when national interests come into
play. The changing and differing perceptions of
the members on security also cause collective
difficulties in producing solutions against
security threats. In other words, it is impossible
for terrorism and acts of terrorism in a region
to be perceived or accepted as a threat or a
problem for all members of the organization.
According to classical realism, states
inevitably use or manage non-state actors
for their national interests in a system where
chaos is dominant. So, if turmoil in one region
is necessary for one state’s interests, it may
threaten the interests of another state. It has
not been possible to create and implement a
common security policy not only for NATO
but also for the EU, despite all the integration
efforts of the union. Here, too, similar reasons
lie in the change of security policy according
to states and regions. For example, it is quite
natural that the level of security attributed to
France, which attaches great importance to the
Mediterranean politically, economically, and
socially, is not the same as that of Germany.
NATO has serious problems reaching a
consensus on any certain threat, which causes
NATO to become dysfunctional and only
habitually survive (Erenel & Gedik, 2022).
NATO tends to be an increasingly globalized
organization under the influence of the US. On
the other hand, for France, NATO’s mission for
European defense is inadequate and Americancentered (Casin & Gedik, 2019). Therefore, it
is necessary either to “Europeanize” NATO or
to have Europe be defended by the European
states themselves. Macron’s discourse on
NATO in 2019—which also inspired the title
of this work—points to exactly this. Regarding
Gaullism, which constitutes French foreign
policy, the defense of Europe should be left to
Europeans, not Americans. This foreign policy
strategy of France, which we can define as
exceptional, continued throughout the Cold
War period (Bozo, 2008). Being “friend, ally,
and disconnected” from the US created an
area of action for the French in the bipolar
world (Védrine et al., 2018). For this reason,
US hegemony in NATO is not something that
member states accept unconditionally.
The US’s intervention in the Middle East after
9/11 under the umbrella of NATO, benefiting
from the organization’s facilities and military
capacity and reflecting its national interest as
the general interest of the organization, caused
the reaction of France and the then President
Jacques Chirac (Lequesne, 2007). It has led to
harsh criticism not only from Chirac but also
from other EU countries.
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The US is also looking for a legitimate basis for
its hard power by using NATO military support
in operations such as the Iraq and Afghanistan
interventions. In short, the US does not hesitate
to instrumentalize NATO in line with its national
interests. For example, the NATO member states
provided all kinds of support, especially military and
medical aid, to the Afghanistan Operation. However,
the process of initiating operations by the US has
developed somewhat within the framework of the
fait accompli method. A similar phenomenon was
experienced in the Libyan Intervention. Here, not
the US, but France, under the leadership of Nicolas
Sarkozy, who returned to the military wing of NATO
in 2009, started the intervention in Libya on 19
March 2011, with the support of the US and England,
and NATO officially took over the operation on 30
March 2011. Therefore, the legal procedure came
from behind the actions to legitimize them.
The USA does not hesitate to
instrumentalize NATO in line
with its national interests.
NATO accepts members with an open door
policy. That is, it has a positive approach towards
countries that want to become members and wants
the alliance to expand until it holds the Heartland.
NATO is not just a military organization. Under
current circumstances, NATO offers its members
an ecosystem. This ecosystem includes arms trade,
technology transfer, credit, and economic aid and
support (Akdeniz, 2022: 13). While NATO aims to
continue its expansion and growth with its open
door policy, it also tries to avoid being an introverted
ecosystem. The military technology and weapons
used are transferred to the member countries. In
fact, it is desired to provide sustainability so that
14
the military ecosystem is the same in all member
countries. However, as a natural result of growth and
expansion, its mobility decreases and the decisionmaking mechanism is exposed to entropy. To avoid
this, the organization seeks areas to use its unused
energy and, so to speak, opens up problem areas.
It also needs conflicts and tensions to keep itself
more dynamic and active. As the Russia-Ukraine
War shows, there is also the issue of creating more
tension than usual and increasing the size of the
threat (Akdeniz, 2022: 13).
In an interview he gave in 2019, Macron made a
remarkable description of NATO’s impasse by saying,
“What we are experiencing right now is NATO’s
brain death,” referring to the Trump administration’s
decision to withdraw its forces from Syria without
consulting NATO. In addition, the subject of the 56th
Munich Conference held in 2020 was determined to
be “Westlessness” (Courmont and Deportes, 2022;
Baverez, 2020; Tokatlı, 2022: 75).
Members of the organization are reluctant to
implement the choices they support due to different
security perceptions. An example of this behavior
is the decision of NATO member countries at the
2014 summit to allocate 2% of their GDP to defense
spending over ten years until 2024 (NATO, 2014). In
theory, the target was approved as a resolution, but
there were no legally binding provisions to impose
sanctions on countries that did not comply with their
obligations. Consequently, failure to bear these costs
reflects the reluctance of the majority of members to
fulfill their obligations to NATO.
It is known that the former president of the US,
Donald Trump, who has undertaken almost all the
costs of the Atlantic Alliance alone, has expressed
his desire to leave NATO many times throughout
2018 (Ucler and Bulut, 2021: 44; Béraud-Dureau
and Giegerich, 2018). The fact that the US has
brought this idea to the table for the first time since
Fahri Erenel, Ahmet Gedik - Is Brain-Dead NATO Near Euthanasia?
France's President Emmanuel Macron meets with visiting NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg
at Elysee Palace in Paris, France, Nov. 28, 2019. (Xinhua/Gao Jing)
the establishment of NATO can be seen as the
beginning of an important paradigm shift in terms
of questioning the alliance’s future. However,
it is not yet clear to what extent the US, which
withdrew from many agreements in 2018, will be
able to implement this idea.
Today’s world is too complex for a single
nation to rule. Although the US has won the
wars it entered militarily, it has not reached the
desired end state. This shows that the US lags
behind the colonial British Empire in dealing
with various ethnic groups. Despite successful
colonial administrations in places like India, the
British Empire only survived for a little more
than a century (1815-1918). The US Empire, on
the other hand, started to show signs of collapse
in its sixtieth year (1944-2004) (Değirmencioğlu,
2007:87).
According to the American economist Herbert
Stein, “If something cannot continue, it will stop.” It
is clear that the US cannot continue with its current
policies and economic structure (Perry, 2018: 5254). Unrivaled power has begun to prepare its own
end. The US’s economic, military, technological,
and political superiority may continue in the
next twenty to twenty-five years. Still, with the
increasing power of its rivals (EU, the People’s
Republic of China, Russian Federation, India)
and with the effect of anti-US sentiment in world
public opinion, it is considered that the powers
will be more balanced over time (Değirmencioğlu,
2007: 91).
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The hegemonic entity, which can be defined
as the Western or Euro-Atlantic structure,
makes move after move to delay the decline and
collapse in the inevitable global leadership war.
In a press conference with the NATO Secretary
General, Biden’s use of the words “NATO instead
of Finnization of Europe”, making a scathing
reference to the Finnish model, which means
neutrality policy in European security jargon,
summarizes the situation. Now the Third World
(Hybrid) War has officially begun. States are
taking positions; the ranks are becoming clearer.
The situation is not much different from the
polarization of the First and Second World Wars
(Gürdeniz, 2022).
Today’s world is too complex for a
single nation to rule. Although the
US has won the wars it entered
militarily, it has not reached the
desired end state.
To increase its dominance on the Asian
continent in the face of rising powers, the US
has begun to participate more in the alternative
formations it has built outside of NATO. While
the US guarantees its national security with the
new formations QUAD (Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue) and AUKUS, which it tries to establish
by collaborating with its allies in the Asia Pacific
region in the face of the rising Chinese threat, it
tries to limit the movement area of the rising or
rival powers (Tokatlı, 2022: 80). New Zealand,
South Korea and Vietnam later joined QUAD,
which consisted of Australia, India, Japan, and
the US. AUKUS, on the other hand, consists
of Australia, the US, and England (Martynova,
16
2023; Upadhyaya, 2022). Although AUKUS is a
tripartite military agreement between these three
states, it has not yet become an alliance. This
agreement complements ANZUS, the military
alliance between Australia and the United States
in force since 1951, while excluding New Zealand,
which has denied nuclear ships access to its
territorial waters under the nuclear-free zone
policy implemented in 1984 (Cheng, 2022).
Concerning NATO’s survival, forecasts are
primarily influenced by the ongoing RussiaUkraine War and a potential Asia-Pacific war
involving China. Given this new strategic vision of
NATO, two major events are likely to significantly
impact how the organization will evolve in the
future. The first is that NATO will continue to
function due to the US alliance with the EU and
NATO during the Russia-Ukraine War. The fact
that Sweden and Finland started the process of
joining the organization as soon as the conflict
started is an indicator of this (Akdeniz, 2022:
16). This process is envisaged to equip fourteen
members with USSR weapons (many of which
were once part of the USSR), to equip potential
new members with Western/NATO weapons, and
to be completed in fifty years, given the life-span
of these weapons. This growth will undoubtedly
depend on the US maintaining its place as the
dominant power in the world. Although it seems
unlikely, the EU is far from achieving the goals
set out in its strategic orientation and the creation
of a European Army. Although China, its biggest
global rival, is very close, it has not yet been able to
prevent the US desire to rule the world militarily.
The second potential development concerns
the problems that all major organizations may
experience due to disorder. In this context, the
division or disintegration of NATO is the most
important question (Akdeniz, 2022:16).
Fahri Erenel, Ahmet Gedik - Is Brain-Dead NATO Near Euthanasia?
Quad Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,
inter-governmental security forum countries. (BRIQ , 2023)
Conclusion
The US’s distrustful behavior towards NATO’s
EU member states has accelerated the efforts
to create a new European Security Architecture autonomous from the US. The Strategic
Compass, issued to direct the activities, continues the efforts to create an autonomous
military force. While discussing the future of
NATO after the Ukraine-Russian War, it is
considered that the shaping of the EU security architecture will gain momentum. NATO
will not have much importance for the United
States after the problems with Russia are somehow resolved. Both its financial resources
and the difficulties it faces as a global power
can pull the US out of the hegemonic seat of
power. Western countries are also aware of
the approaching reality, and it can be said that
they can gradually increase their efforts to return to a Europe without the US. Due to the
administrative difficulties brought about by
the seventy-three years of NATO’s life, it can
now be predicted that such organizations with
broad participation, especially those for security purposes, may be replaced by regional and
smaller organizations.
If England is considered the master of
diplomacy in the West, then China is the master
of diplomacy in the East. In the last hundred
and ninety-five years, the country that has
participated in or started the most wars and
conflicts in the world is England, the symbol
of Western civilization. China ranks tenth in
initiating conflicts and fifth in participating in
any of them (White, 2017; Henrich, 2020). In
general war tendency, England ranks first, the US
fifth, and China tenth (Akgül, 2015: 503-510).
17
BRIq
•
Volu me 4 Issue 3 Summer 2023
As a temporary solution, it is reasonable to
assume that China will refrain from engaging
in such a war until it reaches a certain level
of naval and air competency. The United
States can put pressure on NATO, even if it is
inappropriate for NATO to take any action that
provokes China. A closer relationship between
China and Russia could emerge due to political
pressure from the United States and potentially
NATO. This could lead to a return to bipolarity
in the world.
Notes
1 NATO’s Seven Strategic Concepts define the
Alliance’s strategy and outline NATO’s enduring
purpose and nature, its key security tasks, and the
challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing
security environment. It also identifies elements of
the organization’s approach to security and provides
guidelines for its political and military adaptation.
The first Strategic Concept was published in 1949,
the second in 1950, during the Korean War, the
third in 1954, the fourth in 1966, the fifth in 1991,
the sixth in 1999, and the seventh in 2010. Finally,
another document was published in 2022, called the
New Strategic Concept.
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