Peer-Reviewed Research Article
The Changing Dynamics of
Cooperation Between China
and African Countries: A Global
Public-Goods Approach
Dennis Munene Mwaniki*
Director of Research and Executive Director of the
China-Africa Centre at the Africa Policy Institute
*Dennis Munene Mwaniki is Director of Research and Executive Director of the China-Africa Centre
at the Africa Policy Institute in Nairobi, Kenya. He is a PhD candidate in Development Economics
at the University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (UCASS). He completed Master of Arts in
International Conflict Management at University of Nairobi in 2019. As a governance and international
relations consultant, he has more than 10 years of experience in promoting peace and security,
supporting sustainable development and ad-dressing global challenges. Some of his studies include
“China-Africa Cooperation on Climate Change and Energy Transition”, “Africa’s Industrialization
Process, Challenges, Op-portunities and the Role of the Energy Sector”, “Research on the Resources,
Development, and Utilization of Key Minerals in Africa”, “China-Africa Energy Cooperation under
the Belt and Road Initiative. He speaks English and Swahili.
munenemwaniki@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0000-8993-8510
Received: 1.12.2023
Accepted: 28.1.2024
How to cite: Mwaniki, D. M. (2024). The Changing Dynamics of Cooperation Between China and African
Countries: A Global Public-Goods Approach. BRIQ Belt and Road Initiative Quarterly, 5(2), 154-171.
Dennis Munene Mwaniki - The Changing Dynamics of Cooperation Between China and African Countries: A Global Public-Goods Approach
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of China’s emergence as a global power on various African nations, emphasizing the
provision of “global public goods” as a key mechanism for fostering development. Global public goods are defined
as those with benefits extending to all citizens worldwide. Employing a desktop literature review methodology,
the paper conducts an in-depth examination through a process tracing of China’s major initiatives labeled as
global public goods from 2000 to 2023. Notable initiatives include the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the
Belt and Road Initiative, Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative,
and the Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa. These initiatives have played a pivotal role
in transforming Africa into a hub of development by leveraging mechanisms such as government concessional
loans, grants, aid, commercial financial institution credit funds, special investment and financing funds, and
promoting direct Chinese investments in Africa. Despite these positive outcomes, China’s growing influence in
Africa, particularly through the provision of global public goods, has elicited diverse reactions, especially from
traditional Western partners of African nations. Accusations of entangling Africa in a “debt trap” and other myths
have been a recurring critique. Consequently, this paper aims to explore the evolving dynamics of cooperation
between China and African countries within the framework of a public-goods approach.
Keywords: Africa, China, debt trap, neo-colonialism, public goods.
FOR DECADES, CHINA HAS LONG HAD
a comprehensive and strategic relationship with
African countries. The relationship classified as both
multilateral (within the African Union framework)
and bilateral (individual member-states) has evolved
in the 21st century and it is demonstrating substantial
efficacy in consideration of Beijing’s new goals of
building a modern socialist country in all respects
and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts
(Long, 2022). In common, both civilizations (China
and Africa) had in recent centuries been “politically
and economically dominated by external powers
while experiencing very low per capita incomes
and high rates of poverty and under-development”,
(Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009). Accordingly, as the
cooperation between the two civilizations continues
to grow, the paper tackles the following questions:
how do China’s initiatives contribute to global
public goods and the modernization of African
countries? How do traditional Western partners
react to China’s increasing influence in Africa? What
criticisms, particularly regarding the “debt trap,”
have been leveled against China? In tackling these
questions, this paper uses a desktop literature review
to assess the debt trap thesis and other Westerncentric propaganda myths, which involves gathering
information from existing sources, combining
the results, and analyzing them for interpretation
(Kariuki & Msuya, 2022). The analysis of China’s
contribution to global public goods and how China’s
relations with Africa have historically evolved is
conducted using process tracing, Process tracing,
resembling detective work, is a method focused on
logical analysis and evidence collection, where the
interpretivist approach allows for a flexible narrative
shaped by key actors and events (Gürcan, 2020).
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Figure 1. China’s Direct Investments in Africa
China’s direct investment in Africa between 2018-2021 in billion dollars (Figure: CGTN, 2023).
As observed, with the rise of China as a global
power in 21st century, political scientist Joseph
Nye vexed that Beijing might make the same fatal
mistake as the United States, which failed to provide
“global public goods” after replacing Britain as the
leading power by the turn of the 20th century (Nye,
2017). These led to the disastrous decade of the
1930s where the global system experienced the great
depression, genocide as democracies were on retreat,
and a tragic world war. For Nye and other sinologists,
the concern is whether China will make the same
mistake as it power and influence continues to grow.
However, in studying the historical events that led to
a lost decade for civilizations, China has embarked
on a “modernization doctrine’ of providing “global
public goods” such as the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, the Belt and Road Initiative, the
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Global Development Initiative, the Global Security
Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the
Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of
Africa to stabilize the global system and build a postCOVID-19 world order that is prepared to mitigate
another pandemic in the future.
Global Public Goods
Conceptually, global public goods are identified
as enablers of “international economic stability,
international
security
(political
stability),
the international environment, international
humanitarian assistance and knowledge” (Kaul,
Grunberg, & Stern, 1999).
Further, Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern (1999)
state that global public goods must satisfy two
Dennis Munene Mwaniki - The Changing Dynamics of Cooperation Between China and African Countries: A Global Public-Goods Approach
essential criteria. Firstly, their benefits must exhibit
pronounced qualities of publicness, characterized
by nonrivalry in consumption and nonexcludability, thereby classifying them within the
broader category of public goods. Secondly, these
benefits should demonstrate quasi-universality,
encompassing multiple countries, catering to
diverse population groups, and extending across
generations. This attribute designates humanity as
the collective beneficiary, rendering the entirety of
humanity as the publicum of global public goods.
Similarly, Nye (2017) observed that “in domestic
politics, governments produce public goods such
as policing or a clean environment, from which all
citizens can benefit and none are excluded. At the
global level, public goods – such as a stable climate,
financial stability, or freedom of the seas – are
provided by coalitions led by the largest powers”.
Nye’s observation is in tandem with China’s offer of
public goods to provide a central rationale for global
collective action to secure a future for all mankind.
Stability through the offer of global
public goods such as the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
and the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) among other initiatives
became the major focus in China’s
policy toward Africa.
Having emerged as the 21st century’s leading
economic power (Kariuki, 2022; Gürcan,
2022), China began a noble drive to offer global
public goods to both developed and developing
countries to mitigate the conflicts described
in Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilization
thesis (Huntington,1996). For China, a peaceful
environment is necessary to develop a stable
economy. Thus, stability through the offer of global
public goods such as the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) among other initiatives became
the major focus in China’s policy toward Africa.
According to China, development must not be a
monopoly of a few countries, or specific classes or
segments of society. It must be a shared prosperity.
Therefore, the rationale underlying China’s strategic
expansion beyond its territorial confines resides
in its endeavour to foster economic prosperity
within various regions of Africa and other global
locales, with the ultimate objective of cultivating
harmonious coexistence and facilitating sustainable
development.
Consequently, the “Going Global” strategy
especially in developing countries, has resulted in
China’s cumulative investment in Africa to exceed
over USD 200 billion (Wencheng, 2023). As part
of the “tangible global public goods”, Chinese
companies have built railways, highways, ports,
airports, special economic zones and industrial
parks, and other forms of infrastructure in Africa,
greatly improving the economic development of the
continent, attracting foreign investment, promoting
local employment, freeing people from poverty, and
gradually moving towards a prosperous and well-off
life (Wencheng, 2023).
Thus, the primary objective of this paper is
to analyze and comprehend the implications of
China’s role as a provider of global public goods
on the modernization and development of African
nations, exploring the mechanisms employed and
the reactions elicited from traditional Western
partners. Through this research, the aim is to
contribute valuable insights into the changing
dynamics of international cooperation between
China and African countries, specifically within
the context of global public goods.
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Figure 2. Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Africa
China’s infrastructure projects in Africa between 2018-2021, in billion dollars (Figure: CGTN, 2023).
China-Africa Relations
The debate on China-Africa cooperation forms
part of the ‘solidarity thesis’ that enchants the enduring relationship between the two civilizations
whose friendship is deeply rooted in ancient times
and hardened in the trenches of mutual struggles
against imperialism and shared aspirations for
freedom and development (Kagwanja, 2016). This
phenomenon was observed on two discrete instances. First, in December 1982 Chinese Premier
Zhao Ziyang visited eleven African countries. His
visit was to promote the ‘Four Principles’ of Chinese cooperation with Africa: equality and mutual
benefit; an emphasis on practical results; diversity
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in form; and economic development (Uchehara,
2009). Second, the May 1996 visit by then President Jiang Zemin to six African countries and his
keynote speech delivered at the headquarters of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor to the African Union, laid out a five-point proposal for the development and need to set
up an institutional platform for consultation and
cooperation with African countries to promote
in-depth development of China-Africa relations
(Anshan, 2012). These guiding events marked a
new era in China-African relations and a new shift
of sustaining its offer of public goods to a continent
that was impoverished by under-development in
all-fronts.
Dennis Munene Mwaniki - The Changing Dynamics of Cooperation Between China and African Countries: A Global Public-Goods Approach
Essentially, the collaboration between China and
Africa is deeply rooted in the longstanding historical
connections between their civilizations. It is founded
upon the extensive and enduring history of relations
between China and Africa, stretching back centuries
to a time when African traders, travelers, and scholars engaged with China, and Chinese sailors undertook numerous voyages to the African continent.
Moreover, this collaboration mirrors contemporary
China’s commitment to humanism, advocating for
the belief that every individual deserves dignity, and
respect, and the promotion of values that uphold
freedom and independence (Meinert, 2010 and Liu,
2015). Discussing how China’s offer of global public
goods could contribute to the modernization of the
African continent, the paper adopts a desktop literature review method (desk study). This also involves
an in-depth process tracing analysis (Gürcan, 2020)
of process China’s key initiatives, which the paper refers to as global public goods from 2000 to 2023 such
as the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, the Belt
and Road Initiative, Global Development Initiative,
Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative and the Outlook on Peace and Development in
the Horn of Africa that have transformed the Continent of Africa to become a hub of development.
China and the Making of a Modernized
Africa: A Process-Tracing Analysis
In the 1980s, dubbed the “lost decade” for Africa (Adjei, Kyei & Kwadwo, 2014), the externally borrowed
model of modernization plunged the continent into
a complex socio-economic crisis. One-party tyrannies, military coups, and personal dictatorships undermined Africa’s efforts to chart an alternative path
to modernization and economic recovery. Africa’s
traditional partners in the West, through the Bretton
Woods system (World Bank and International Mo-
netary Fund), responded by imposing the ruinous
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which
destroyed the continent’s economies rather than saving them (Geo-JaJa & Mangum, 2001). Modeled to
adopt the colonial way of governance, most African
countries were plagued by weak economic foundations. Diseases, instability, and poverty became the
trinity of discord in Africa. The Continent of Africa
quest for modernization was halted.
The continent adopted a “Look
East Policy” and forged a new
partnership with China, defined
by the trinity of ‘equal partnership’,
‘mutual cooperation’, and
‘solidarity’ in pursuit of a common
future and shared prosperity.
At the turn of the 21st century, success in Chinese
modernization began to inspire a spirit of African
renaissance and the continent’s independent path to
modernization. The continent adopted a “Look East
Policy” and forged a new partnership with China,
defined by the trinity of ‘equal partnership’, ‘mutual
cooperation’, and ‘solidarity’ in pursuit of a common
future and shared prosperity (Kagwanja 2016). China through its offer of global public goods tapped
into the spirit of Pan-Africanism as the ideology driving African modernization.
To effectively concretize the cooperation between
the two civilizations, China’s offer of public goods
has revolutionized Sino-Africa relations. Through
process tracing, the paper will scrutinize the key initiatives (global public goods) from the year 2000 to
2023 that are playing a vital role in modernizing Africa and strengthening the Sino-Africa cooperations
in the 21st century era.
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Figure 3. 2013-2022 China-Africa Trade
Total trade between China and African countries exceeded $2 trillion in 10 years (Figure: CGTN, 2023).
First, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), established in 2000, became the premier
official policy forum driving the engine of China-Africa relations (Kagwanja, 2020). A significant marker
of South-South cooperation, FOCAC signifies the needed dialogue of civilizations in our divided and polarized global community facing the anti-globalization
trends. Today, the “FOCAC Community” comprising
China and 54 African countries with an estimation of
more than 2.8 billion people has become an integral
story of the “Africa Rising narrative”. The formation of
FOCAC expressed the need to set up an institutional
platform for consultation and cooperation with African countries to promote in-depth development of
China-Africa relations (Anshan, 2012). Subsequently,
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every three years, the two civilizations meet to chart
new ways to enhance their strategic relations.
Taking stock of the triannual summit that has become an anchor on China-Africa Cooperation, in December 2003, the second Ministerial Conference of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) took
place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The primary focus of
this conference was to strengthen collaboration in human resource development, marked by China’s commitment to training over 10,000 African professionals
in diverse fields. Additionally, China expanded its
market access, granting tariff-exempt status to certain
commodities. The conference also highlighted tourism cooperation, identifying eight African countries
as potential destinations for Chinese tourist groups.
Dennis Munene Mwaniki - The Changing Dynamics of Cooperation Between China and African Countries: A Global Public-Goods Approach
Notably, the proposal for a China-Africa Youth Festival was introduced during this event (MFA, 2023).
Regarding education, capacity
building, and technology transfer,
China made several commitments,
including the formation of
a China-Africa Science and
Technology partnership.
The third Ministerial Conference and FOCAC
Summit took place in Beijing in November 2006.
During the summit, China allocated USD 5 billion
in loans and buyers’ credits, along with an additional
USD 5 billion in China-Africa Development Funds
(CADF). These funds were designated to support
Chinese companies investing in Africa. As part of its
commitments, China promised to construct an African Union Conference Centre and expand the list
of African export items from 190 to over 440, some
of which would enjoy zero-tariff status. Primarily,
health issues were included in the agenda for the
first time, with China vowing to contribute to the
fight against malaria by establishing prevention and
treatment centers and providing anti-malaria drugs.
In the realm of education, China pledged to build
one hundred rural schools across Africa and double
the number of annual scholarships to 2,000 by the
year 2009 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This
has resulted in a significant increase in the number
of African students studying in Chinese universities,
marking a notable departure from the previously
‘preferred traditional study destinations’ for most
students during the post-independence era.
The fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC
occurred in Sharma el-Sheikh, Egypt, on November
8-9, 2009. In attendance were Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, leaders
from 49 African countries, and representatives from
the African Union. During the meeting, participants adopted the Sharm el-Sheikh Declaration and
Action Plan for 2010–2012, outlining the course for
enhanced cooperation between China and Africa.
Emphasis was placed on addressing climate change,
with a commitment to respond proactively by establishing 100 clean energy projects. Further, regarding education, capacity building, and technology
transfer, China made several commitments, including the formation of a China-Africa Science and
Technology partnership. China pledged support for
science and technological research projects and offered to host 100 post-doctoral fellows for research
in China. Additionally, the meeting resolved to establish agricultural technology demonstration centers built by China, along with facilities to train over
2,000 African agricultural technicians. To ensure
the implementation of the outcomes of FOCAC IV,
China provided significant financial support, offering USD 10 billion in concessional loans and an
additional USD 1 billion for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Furthermore, China canceled the
debt associated with interest-free government loans
due to maturity by the end of that year, demonstrating its commitment to fostering economic cooperation between China and Africa (Enuka, 2010).
The Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC unfolded in Beijing on July 19-20, 2012, coinciding
with a shift in leadership within China. Notably, the
United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon,
participated in the conference for the first time, underscoring FOCAC’s burgeoning influence on the
global stage. Beijing, in a substantial move, extended a credit line of USD 20 billion to support diverse
sectors in Africa, including infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and small and medium-sized
enterprises (Zhang, 2015).
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In 1976, Chinese and Tanzanian workers lay track on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.
The 1860.5 km railway is a milestone in China-Africa friendship (Photo: FOCAC, 2016).
The financial commitment extended to the China-Africa Development Fund, initially established
during the 2006 FOCAC summit, experienced a significant increase from USD 1 billion to USD 5 billion.
Moreover, China entered into bilateral agreements on
investment protection with 32 African nations and
established Joint Economic and Trade Commissions
with 45 others. An investment totaling approximately
USD 1.806 billion was injected into 53 projects, part
of a broader initiative encompassing 61 projects across
30 African countries under the China-Africa Development Fund.
China also introduced new, non-conditional facilities aimed at supporting Africa’s infrastructure,
mining, manufacturing, and finance sectors. Additionally, a noteworthy commitment emerged with the
announcement of the “African Talent Programme,” designed to train 30,000 personnel across various sectors.
However, the 2012 summit brought attention to unmet
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promises concerning technology transfer and highlighted concerns about the prevailing trade dynamics,
where Africa continued to export raw materials while
importing China’s manufactured goods, resulting in a
trade imbalance (Bhura, 2016). To address the issues
of trade imbalance, China pledged to increase imports
of non-mining African goods and expand the list of
duty-free goods permitted into the Chinese market,
signaling a commitment to rectify the trade disparities between the two regions. Further, through the use
of private organizations such as AVIC International
Holding Corporation, China initiated the Africa Tech
Challenge (ATC) in 2014 to use digital technology and
provide African youth with rich knowledge in the vocational education field free of charge (Muthoni, 2023).
The sixth Summit of 2015 took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, where the agenda shifted towards
Africa’s industrialization. As a key global public good,
President Xi emphasized the importance of “industrial
Dennis Munene Mwaniki - The Changing Dynamics of Cooperation Between China and African Countries: A Global Public-Goods Approach
cooperation” and “strategic complementarity” in shaping China-Africa relations. As part of this new direction, China initiated the relocation of its labor-intensive industries to Africa. Demonstrating a significant
commitment, China pledged an unprecedented USD
60 billion in funding to Africa, comprising grants, interest-free loans, and commercial financing. This financial support included USD 5 billion for interest-free
aid, USD 35 billion for preferential loans and export
credits, an additional USD 5 billion each for the China-Africa Development Fund and the Special Loan for
the Development of Africa Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and USD 10 billion as the initial capital
for the China-Africa Production Cooperation Fund
(Xinhua, 2015).
A Pivotal Moment: 2018 FOCAC Summit
The 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
marked a pivotal moment in the relationship betwe-
en China and Africa. By May of that year, all African
UN member states had officially recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China, with Eswatini (Swaziland) being
the only exception due to its relations with Taiwan.
Remarkably, more African leaders attended the FOCAC summit in Beijing in early September than the
parallel UN General Assembly meeting. Knowing
China’s offer of global public goods has become a
key driver for sustainable development in Africa,
majority of leaders opted to attend the 2018 FOCAC Summit to secure bilateral agreements. During the summit, President Xi unveiled eight significant initiatives to guide Sino-Africa cooperation.
These initiatives encompassed industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation,
green development, capacity building, healthcare,
people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security. In support of these pillars, China committed
an additional USD 60 billion economic package.
The Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held on 3 September 2018 at the
Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China (Photo: Wang Ye, Xinhua, 2018).
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President Xi, in his opening remarks at the FOCAC
2018 summit, pledged USD 20 billion in new credit
lines, USD 15 billion in foreign aid in the form of
grants, interest-free loans, or concessional loans, USD
10 billion for a special fund dedicated to development
financing, and USD 5 billion for a special fund aimed at
financing imports from Africa. Additionally, President
Xi announced that the remaining USD 10 billion would
be contributed by Chinese companies (Xinhua, 2018).
At the 8th FOCAC meeting in 2021, significant announcements were made, and four resolutions were
adopted, namely, the Dakar Action Plan, the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, the Sino-African Declaration on Climate Change, and the Dakar Declaration of
the 8th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC. Further, President Xi outlined nine areas of focus for the initial three
years of the China-Africa Vision 2035 during the conference. These areas encompass health, poverty reduction
and agriculture, trade, investment, digital innovation,
green development, capacity building, people-to-people
exchanges, and peace and security (Xi, 2021). The 8th
session of FOCAC took place at a time when the world
was facing the multi-faceted impacts of the coronavirus
(COVID-19) pandemic. However, during the pandemic
period, the China-Africa cooperation was tested at great
heights. To note, China and Africa exhibit shared perspectives on numerous international and regional matters, maintaining relatively consistent positions.
Africa demonstrates unwavering support on issues
central to China’s core interests, contributing to the stability of the amicable relations between the two. Amid
the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19
pandemic, China not only faced immense pressure in
combating the outbreak domestically but also extended
substantial assistance to African countries and the African Union. This assistance included the provision of
approximately 5.4 million face masks, over a million
test kits, and thousands of personal protective gears to
bolster Africa’s resilience against the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, Jack Ma Foundation initiated a collaborative effort between the private and public sectors,
contributing around 4.6 million masks, 500,000 pairs of
3 September 2018, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China (Photo: Liu Weibing, Xinhua, 2018).
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gloves, 500,000 swabs and test kits, 200,000 face shields,
200,000 sets of protective clothing, 2,000 temperature
guns, 300 ventilators, and 100 body temperature scanners for distribution across all 54 African countries. President Xi Jinping further committed to supplying Africa
with 30 million test kits monthly, along with 10,000 ventilators and 80 million masks (Mwangi, 2020). Further,
in support of the African Union’s (AU) aim to vaccinate
60 percent of the African population by 2022, President
Xi declared that China would contribute an additional
one billion vaccine doses to Africa. This commitment
encompasses 600 million doses as a donation and 400
million doses through mechanisms like collaborative
production involving Chinese companies and pertinent
African nations (Huaxia, 2021). Furthermore, President
Xi announced China’s commitment to undertake 10
medical and health projects for African countries. Additionally, 1,500 medical personnel and public health
experts were dispatched to Africa as part of these initiatives. Actively supporting Africa in its battle against the
pandemic, China played a crucial role in strengthening
the continent’s response efforts (Elnor, 2022).
FOCAC became the policy
framework that has guided China
in offering its global public goods
to Africa, that have resulted to
Beijing overtaking the United States
of America to become the world’s
largest foreign direct investor into
Africa.
Holistically, FOCAC became the policy framework
that has guided China in offering its global public goods to Africa, that have resulted to Beijing overtaking
the United States of America to become the world’s largest foreign direct investor into Africa (Yu, 2021). The
implication, is that China has persisted in augmenting
its investment capacity in Africa, a void left by the United States, propelled by the strategic significance arising
from their compelling economic cooperation and Africa’s promising potential as the forthcoming catalyst for
global economic growth.
The Crucial Role of the Belt and Road
Initiative
Equally important in China’s efforts at contributing to
global commons in Africa is the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). In September 2013, President Xi Jinping while on
a high-level visit to Kazakhstan, introduced to the world
China’s grand plan of establishing a Silk Road Economic
Belt (SREB). A month later in Indonesia, he announced
a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) (Jiao, 2013).
These two initiatives thereafter became known as China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. However, to
create a cohesive economic area, the two initiatives were
merged and rebranded as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’
(World Bank, 2018).
Currently, the BRI has expanded and connected
transport networks and markets, improved production capacity, and facilitated the transit of goods, capital,
energy, raw materials, information, people, and culture
(Ghiasy & Zhou, 2017). Wholistically, BRI encompasses
the values that strengthen “people-oriented partnership”.
Thus, in cognizant of its vision and purpose, BRI has
and continues to achieve its collective goal of promoting
policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, promoting
unimpeded trade, promoting financial integration, and
fostering people-to-people bonds (NDRC, 2015). Finding common ground with the African Union’s Agenda
2063 and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), which push for greater regional
integration within the continent, BRI has managed to
become the driving architecture of industrialization and
manufacturing in Africa (Marais & Labuschagne, 2019).
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Further, 10 years after President Xi Jinping announced
his grand plan to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe,
the 21st century Belt and Road Initiative has morphed
into a broad program describing almost all aspects of
Chinese engagement abroad (World Bank, 2019).
Currently, there are more than 150 countries and
over 30 international organizations that have signed cooperation documents and participating in
the BRI. Globally, there are over 3000 projects that
have been implemented under BRI, with a total
expenditure of 1 trillion USD (Embassy of PRC in
Grenada, 2023). These emancipating projects under BRI in Africa have elicited the debate on ‘debt
trap’ diplomacy.
Third is the Global Development Initiative
(GDI). Committed to ensuring that there is peace
and development for humanity, in the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic, China moved the concept of
peaceful development to a whole new level. Globally, President Xi Jinping unveiled the GDI as China’s
new framework for providing global public goods.
GDI’s fundamental purpose is to assist the global community and the United Nations in achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and
reverse the devastating impacts of COVID-19 on
development in developing countries, address the
challenges of environmental degradation and climate change, poverty alleviation and food security,
promote green recovery and the principles of an
ecological civilization that harmonize development
and natural environment, industrialization, digital
economy, and connectivity in the digital era (United Nations, 2023).
Fourth is the Global Security Initiative (GSI). To
Chinese instructor Jiang Liping (right) and trainee Horace Owiti walk past a train carriage with a printed slogan
reading “Connecting nations, prospering people” on the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway in Nairobi, Kenya,
23 May 2023 (Photo: Wang Guansen, Xinhua, 2023).
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promote global stability, address common challenges, and safeguard the welfare of future generations
and their democracies, China unveiled the Global
Security Initiative. The initiative is anchored on six
pillars of common security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, legitimate security concerns of all countries, peaceful dispute resolution
between countries through dialogue and consultation, and security in traditional and non-traditional domains (PRC, 2023).
The GSI aims to uphold the
principles of multilateralism
and international solidarity, and
the shared desire of all peoples
to work together to overcome
difficulties at a time when
traditional and non-traditional
security threats are posing a
challenge to the existence of
humanity.
For China, without peace, there is no development, and the path to modernization will be rough and slippery. Thus, the GSI aims to uphold the
principles of multilateralism and international solidarity, and the shared desire of all peoples to work
together to overcome difficulties at a time when
traditional and non-traditional security threats are
posing a challenge to the existence of humanity.
This initiative is key in Africa, due to the continent’s
fragility in its governance architecture leading to
inter and intra-state conflicts.
Fifth is the Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa. As indicated above,
some of the democracies in the Horn of Africa are
unstable. The region has become the new theater
of renewed superpower tensions. The geopolitical
tensions from competitive and strategic positioning of vested interest in the region have made
the Horn region in Africa more volatile. Learning
from experience, China has avoided any military
conflict over the last three decades. As a result
of a long spell of peace, China has managed to
emerge as the most developed and fastest-developing nation in the world. Thus, guided by the
ethos of shared prosperity for all mankind, China
in January 2022, unfurled the “Outlook on Peace
and Development in the Horn of Africa” in Mombasa, Kenya (Azam, 2022). The initiative seeks to
localize the ideals of the GDI and GSI in the Horn
region. The initiative aims to support regional
countries to address security, development, and
governance challenges. Crystallizing the initiative, Beijing also appointed a Special Envoy for the
Horn of Africa Affairs to help galvanize regional
consensus on political, security, and development
agenda to realize lasting peace, stability, and prosperity.
Sixth is the unveiling of the Global Civilization
Initiative (GCI). During the opening ceremony
of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level
Meeting via video link on March 15, 2023, President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Civilization Initiative and called on world political parties to
closely integrate their development with their national modernization drives, to continuously steer
the course and marshal strength for modernization
(CGTN, 2023). As an initiative, the GCI focuses on
respecting the diversity of the world civilization, advocating the common values of humanity, highly
valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilizations, and jointly advocating robust international
people-to-people exchanges and cooperation.
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According to President Xi, peace, development, equity, justice, democracy, and freedom are the common
aspirations of all peoples. Holistically, GCI has become a custodian of humanism to advance modernization among different civilizations, and the epitome
of globalization. For Africa, the GCI becomes the
crown of jewel that galvanizes the mutual relationship between the two civilizations. It resonates well
with the African Governance Architecture (AGA).
As a framework guided by the Constitutive Act of
the African Union and the AU Shared Values, (AU,
2023) AGA recognizes “good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of
law” as critical enablers and drivers of integration,
prosperity, and development of Africa (AU, 2016).
Rekindling of Africa’s Rising Narrative
The offer of global public goods by China (namely
– FOCAC, BRI, GDI, GSI, Outlook on Peace and
Development in the HoA, and GCI) has inspired a spirit of African rebirth and the continent’s
independent path to modernization (Kagwanja,
2016). The continent adopted a “Look East Policy”
and forged a new partnership with China, defined
by the trinity of ‘mutual cooperation’, equal ‘partnership’ and ‘solidarity’ in pursuit of a community
with common future and shared prosperity. China
tapped into the spirit of Pan-Africanism as the ideology driving African modernization. Although
China has engaged each of the African Union’s 54
member states bilaterally, its partnership with Africa is on a continental scale. The AU’s architecture
of modernization has served as the framework of
Sino-Africa partnership and solidarity underpinned by the spirit of Pan-Africanism.
As a result, China has been Africa’s largest
trading partner for the 14 years since 2009. According to the China-Africa Trade Index, China’s
trade with Africa rose from less than 100 billion
yuan in 2000 to 1.88 trillion yuan in 2022, posting
a cumulative increase of more than 20 times, with
an average annual growth rate of 17.7 percent
(Xinhua, 2023).
At the 2009 Beijing Summit Gala Night, Chinese and African dancers performed together (Photo: FOCAC, 2009).
168
Dennis Munene Mwaniki - The Changing Dynamics of Cooperation Between China and African Countries: A Global Public-Goods Approach
The Global Effects of Sino-Africa
Cooperations
China’s growing footprint in Africa through
its offer of global public goods such as FOCAC,
BRI, GDI, GSI, GCI, and the Outlook of Peace
and Development in the HoA has fueled a
‘cold-war’ mentality from liberal democracies.
They have labeled China’s offer of public goods
to Africa as agents of “debt trap”. Accusations
of neo-colonialism and luring developing or
underdeveloped countries to request financial
loans for infrastructure projects and later
controlling them if they fail to pay off their loans
(TRT World, 2019) in time has become the
post-truth narrative driving the China-Africa
cooperation.
At various FOCAC conferences,
China has provided relief for the
substantial debts accumulated
by heavily indebted and poor
countries, as well as the least
developed countries in Africa,
through interest-free Chinese
government loans.
China has also been accused of perpetuating
resource extraction from Africa, a continent
that is endowed with natural resources such as
aluminum, copper, iron ore, cobalt, and lithium,
among other rare earth minerals. These resources
have become the source of renewed geopolitical
competition among global powers to influence
Africa to abandon its cooperation with China.
In a way to invalidate the propaganda narratives
on “debt trap diplomacy”, between 2000 and
2019, China has cancelled at least USD 3.4
billion of debt in Africa, and restructured or
refinanced about USD 15 billion in African
debt (Bartlett, 2022). At various FOCAC
conferences, China has provided relief for
the substantial debts accumulated by heavily
indebted and poor countries, as well as the least
developed countries in Africa, through interestfree Chinese government loans. The initial
FOCAC conference initiated a debt exemption
of RMB 10 billion for relevant African nations.
Subsequent conferences, including the 2006
Beijing Summit, the 2009 Sharm el Sheikh
Conference, the 2015 Johannesburg Summit,
and the 2018 Beijing Summit, successively
exempted inter-governmental interest-free
loans set to mature by the end of 2005, 2009,
2015, and 2018 (Aiping & Zhan, 2018). This
substantial measure significantly alleviated
the financial burdens of African countries.
Additionally, as part of the G20 Debt Service
Suspension Initiative, China has entered into
debt suspension agreements with 12 African
nations. Furthermore, China decided to waive
interest-free loans that matured by 2020 for 15
African countries, further contributing to easing
the financial challenges faced by these nations
(Li, 2020). Thus, the “debt trap diplomacy”
narratives hold no water in describing the
China-Africa cooperation and its partnership
in global public goods. Other post-truth
narratives regarding the projects done by China
to Africa are regarding the weaponization of
environmental concerns—often by lobbies, civil
society groups, and researchers. To mitigate
environmental concerns, China has done its best
to reconcile nature and development through
the implementation of strategic measures
through its guiding philosophy of enhancing
ecological civilization (Gürcan, 2021).
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Conclusion
Collectively, the offer of global public goods such as
FOCAC, BRI, GDI, GSI, GCI, and the Outlook of Peace and Development in the HoA by China to African
countries and other developing nations holds significant benefits for the South–South Cooperation. China’s
ties with Africa stand as the paramount and dependable facet of Beijing’s foreign relations with developing
nations. Through the provision of diverse “global public goods,” as stated in the paper, China is bolstering
connectivity, promoting infrastructure development,
promoting ecological civilization, and facilitating industrialization in Africa. China’s remarkable success
in its modernization process has not only served as
inspiration but has also empowered Africa in its quest
for an independent path to modernization. Within the
framework of Pan-Africanism, China has actively supported the African Union, Agenda 2063, the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and cultivated
robust connections with Africa’s sub-regional organizations and continental initiatives. The convergence of
Chinese modernization and the ‘African Renaissance’
has transformed the continent’s image from that of a
“hopeless continent” in 2000 to a “hopeful continent”
and a new frontier for global trade and foreign investments more than two decades later. This has elicited
criticism from Africa’s traditional partners who over
the years have implemented discriminatory policies
against the continent of Africa. Consequently, by overlooking such unfounded criticisms, the China-Africa
cooperation has engendered a community of shared
destiny for mankind.
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