Elisa Magrì
Boston College, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- German Idealism, Phenomenology, Habitus, Empathy (Philosophy), Philosophical Psychology, Memory, and 22 moreBody Schema, Husserlian phenomenology, Phenomenology- Mind/Body Problems/ Merleau-Ponty's Philosophical Thought/Phenomenology and Embodiment, Transcendental Idealism, Transcendental Arguments, Hegel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Erwin Straus, Merleau-Ponty, G.W.F. Hegel, Plato's discussion on knowledge in the Theaetetus, Plato, Intersubjectivity, Hannah Arendt, Jean Paul Sartre, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Embodied/embedded/enactivist Approaches to the Self, Existential Psychology, Ludwig Binswanger, Karl Jaspers, Eugène Minkowski, and The Hegelian Recognition / The Dialectic of Master and Slave Relationshipedit
- I specialize in modern and contemporary European philosophy across different traditions, including post- Kantian phil... moreI specialize in modern and contemporary European philosophy across different traditions, including post- Kantian philosophy (esp. Hegel) and contemporary phenomenology. I am currently working on two projects: (1) a project in contemporary phenomenology revolving on the structure and reaches of social sensitivity, and (2) a project on Hegel's philosophy of memory and responsibility.edit
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Come è noto ai lettori di Hegel, la logica hegeliana rappresenta la scienza del puro pensiero, priva di presupposti assunti da altre scienze e fondata interamente sulla capacità del pensiero di dare a se stesso forma e contenuto. Il... more
Come è noto ai lettori di Hegel, la logica hegeliana rappresenta la scienza del puro pensiero, priva di presupposti assunti da altre scienze e fondata interamente sulla capacità del pensiero di dare a se stesso forma e contenuto. Il volume interroga se e come la logica pura abbia una rilevanza per la sfera della soggettività, guardando alle modalità di costituzione del principio di autoriferimento sia nella Scienza della logica che nella Filosofia dello spirito soggettivo. Lungi dal proporre un isomorfismo fra logica e filosofia dello spirito, così come dal proporre una lettura psicologica delle categorie logiche, il volume suggerisce di considerare l’autoriferimento come il principio di una genesi tanto logica quanto psicologica. Tale principio, che si trova incarnato nello spirito soggettivo nelle sfere dell’abitudine e della memoria, consente di rileggere la soggettività in Hegel come modello di una libertà basata sull’apertura all’alterità e all’indeterminato.
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Il rapporto tra la filosofica classica tedesca e il movimento fenomenologico novecentesco è ancora poco studiato, ma in anni recenti sta destando notevole interesse. Questo volume raccoglie contributi, in gran parte di giovani studiosi,... more
Il rapporto tra la filosofica classica tedesca e il movimento fenomenologico novecentesco è ancora poco studiato, ma in anni recenti sta destando notevole interesse. Questo volume raccoglie contributi, in gran parte di giovani studiosi, accomunati dall’intento di instaurare un dialogo filosofico tra la filosofia di Hegel e la fenomenologia trascendentale pur nel rispetto delle reciproche differenze. L’obiettivo è mostrare come indagini comparate possano illuminare aspetti delle rispettive esperienze filosofiche.
Con contributi di: Andrea Altobrando, Michela Bordignon, Ilaria D’Angelo, Daniele De Santis, Alfredo Ferrarin, Luigi Filieri, Stéphane Finetti, Guido Frilli, Luca Illetterati, Elisa Magrì, Danilo Manca, Federico Orsini, Giovanni Zanotti
Con contributi di: Andrea Altobrando, Michela Bordignon, Ilaria D’Angelo, Daniele De Santis, Alfredo Ferrarin, Luigi Filieri, Stéphane Finetti, Guido Frilli, Luca Illetterati, Elisa Magrì, Danilo Manca, Federico Orsini, Giovanni Zanotti
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Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy. Vol. 5. No. 1, 2017
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"Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy" invites interested authors to explore the topics of intersubjectivity and recognition across different traditions, including phenomenology, critical theory, and German... more
"Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy" invites interested authors to explore the topics of intersubjectivity and recognition across different traditions, including phenomenology, critical theory, and German Idealism. Questions that arise may include: What is distinctive of the phenomenon of being with others? Is apperceiving another the same as recognising her/him as subject? To what extent do intersubjective-shared practices inform our encounter with the other? In what sense do intersubjectivity and recognition refer to distinct and yet different forms of encounter with another?
The deadline for submissions is 31/12/2016.
Please submit your papers online:
http://www.metodo-rivista.eu/index.php/metodo
The deadline for submissions is 31/12/2016.
Please submit your papers online:
http://www.metodo-rivista.eu/index.php/metodo
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Hegel Bulletin, vol. 38, 2017
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Social sensitivity is a crucial aspect of interpersonal relation- ships, as it is intrinsic to the understanding of other selves as subjects situated in a social world. In revitalizing such a concept in the philosophical literature, this... more
Social sensitivity is a crucial aspect of interpersonal relation- ships, as it is intrinsic to the understanding of other selves as subjects situated in a social world. In revitalizing such a concept in the philosophical literature, this article examines the relation between habit, attention, and critical self-awareness that lies at the core of social sensitivity. On the one hand, I reconsider the so-called “passivity” of habit and tackle the role of attention as the power of varying point of view. On the other hand, I con- trast Husserl's view of attentiveness with Murdoch's account of loving attention, arguing that social sensitivity centers on a type of striving that is closer to Husserl's methodology than Murdoch's approach to moral perfectionism.
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With the exception of James Ostrow’s 1990 study, social sensitivity has re- ceived scarce attention in philosophy, whilst it has become an important area of research in social and clinical psychology, where it is commonly known as... more
With the exception of James Ostrow’s 1990 study, social sensitivity has re- ceived scarce attention in philosophy, whilst it has become an important area of research in social and clinical psychology, where it is commonly known as interpersonal sensitivity. The latter is usually understood as a form of social skill to appropriately recognise and decode the appearance and behaviour of others. However, this view suffers from conceptual limitations in that it tends to reduce social sensitivity to standardised skilful behaviour. Drawing on Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, I disambiguate social sensitivity from social skills, arguing that the former builds on the receptivity of habit to beliefs and cognitive dissonance. In this revised sense, social sensitivity informs processes of attitude change that challenge ingrained dispositions and potentially defy social codes and expectations.
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In contemporary philosophy of emotions, it is often argued that moods facilitate certain ranges of object-directed emotions, but they form a class apart in that, unlike emotions, they never target specific objects. From a phenomenological... more
In contemporary philosophy of emotions, it is often argued that moods facilitate certain ranges of object-directed emotions, but they form a class apart in that, unlike emotions, they never target specific objects. From a phenomenological and existential angle, however, moods bring to light a specific element, namely the quality of one’s sense of reality. This chapter aims to further develop the analysis of moods by investigating whether they manifest attunement and sensitivity to intersubjective experience. Through a comparison of Martin Heidegger’s and David Foster Wallace’s respective approaches to boredom, this chapter explores how boredom is influenced by receptivity to other people’s states, an aspect that is crucially missing in Heidegger’s account of boredom.
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This paper explores the relation between habit and ethical life in Hegel’s philosophy drawing on both Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. For Hegel, habituality underlies the constitution of dispositions,... more
This paper explores the relation between habit and ethical life in Hegel’s philosophy drawing on both Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. For Hegel, habituality underlies the constitution of dispositions, including the sense of belonging to the the community and the state that is distinctive of ethical life. However, habit in itself does not suffice to motivate or to justify trust in the state. In this light, I reconsider the difference between habit and trust in ethical life by looking at the specific nexus that holds together institutions and citizens. This will lead to a reconsideration of ethical life as a form of inhabiting the social and political dimension that is informed by conscious acknowledgment and appropriation. Accordingly, I argue that while habituality in the Anthropology is crucial for the cultivation of sensibility, ethical trust involves the cultivation of interest, memory, as well as theoretical and practical position-taking.
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This paper aims to situate the roles of attention and habit in contemporary approaches to embodied cognition with particular regard to the conceptualisation of affordances. While Chemero has argued that affordances have a relational... more
This paper aims to situate the roles of attention and habit in contemporary approaches to embodied cognition with particular regard to the conceptualisation of affordances. While Chemero has argued that affordances have a relational character that rules out dispositions, Rietveld and Kiverstein have suggested that engaging with affordances amounts to exercising skills. By critically reconsidering the distinction between dispositions and abilities proposed by Chemero, as well as the standard theory of habit that underpins accounts of skilful coping (including Rietveld's and Dreyfus'), I propose to disambiguate habit from skill and to reassess the phenomenology of dispositions. Dispositions are motivational factors that depend on two elements: (i) sensitivity to context clues, which is regulated by habit and attention, and (ii) the positionality of the subject, which is inseparable from context-awareness. Drawing on Hus-serl's and Merleau-Ponty's insights, I argue that both (i) and (ii) can accommodate a dispositional view of affordances.
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This paper reconsiders Heather Battaly’s argument that empathy is not a virtue. Like Battaly, I argue that empathy is a disposition that includes elements of virtue acquisition, but is not in itself a virtue in the Aristotelian sense.... more
This paper reconsiders Heather Battaly’s argument that empathy is not a virtue. Like Battaly, I argue that empathy is a disposition that includes elements of virtue acquisition, but is not in itself a virtue in the Aristotelian sense. Unlike Battaly, however, I propose a distinction between care and respect. Drawing on Darwall’s view of recognition respect as well as on phenomenologically inspired views of empathy, I argue that respect can be regarded as the moral feeling that is distinctive of empathy. In my view, the feeling of respect towards another’s situated experience grants epistemic dignity, which is the recognition of the intrinsic significance of subjective experience. By way of conclusion, I suggest that the relation between empathy and respect can be relevant for an account of vulnerability that is not opposed to autonomy.
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In this paper, I wish to explore Stein’s early phenomenology by looking at the relation between empathic experience and emotional life. On Stein’s account, empathy is grounded on the stratification of affectivity, which outlines a range... more
In this paper, I wish to explore Stein’s early phenomenology by looking
at the relation between empathic experience and emotional life. On Stein’s account, empathy is grounded on the stratification of affectivity, which outlines a range of embodied experiences. In my view, Stein’s investigation on empathy is centred upon the passive flow of experience and it can be translated into enactive theory. Yet Stein’s approach calls into question the enactive model of the rainbow of emotions when it comes to justifying how empathy is receptive to features of personality and character.
at the relation between empathic experience and emotional life. On Stein’s account, empathy is grounded on the stratification of affectivity, which outlines a range of embodied experiences. In my view, Stein’s investigation on empathy is centred upon the passive flow of experience and it can be translated into enactive theory. Yet Stein’s approach calls into question the enactive model of the rainbow of emotions when it comes to justifying how empathy is receptive to features of personality and character.
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Research Interests: Phenomenology and Hegel
In this paper, I shall focus on the role of bodily self-displacement in Stein’s account of empathy, pointing out its relevance in the general dimension of affectivity. In my view, Stein grounds empathy on a dynamic model of embodied... more
In this paper, I shall focus on the role of bodily self-displacement in Stein’s account of empathy, pointing out its relevance in the general dimension of affectivity. In my view, Stein grounds empathy on a dynamic model of embodied self-experience, which shares significant similarities with Varela & Depraz’s neurophenomenology. However, I shall argue that Stein’s view of empathy cannot be reduced to a naturalised phenomenological sense and that bodily self-displacement is pre-condition of a more complex
disposition towards others as in line with Ratcliffe’s theory of radical empathy.
disposition towards others as in line with Ratcliffe’s theory of radical empathy.
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Book Symposium of Dan Zahavi’s "Self and Other. Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame", Oxford 2014
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Hegel's use of the master-servant relationship in the Phenomenology of Spirit sets the stage for the problem of recognition. Since Alexandre Kojève presented his lectures on Hegel, a long philosophical tradition has been isolating the... more
Hegel's use of the master-servant relationship in the Phenomenology of Spirit sets the stage for the problem of recognition. Since Alexandre Kojève presented his lectures on Hegel, a long philosophical tradition has been isolating the fourth chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit as a freestanding essay on anthropology or social philosophy. However, I contend the account of recognition provided in this chapter does not ground Hegel's theory of ethical life. In this paper, I shall defend an allegorical reading of the master-servant dialectic that privileges Hegel's response to Kant. In doing so, I will take issue with McDowell's and Pippin's epistemological readings of this chapter. Both authors have argued that Hegel's strategy entails a critique of Kant's theory of apperception. While McDowell and Pippin have different views about the function of desire and the process constituting self-consciousness, I will object that both McDowell and Pippin fail to acknowledge the relevance of motivation and affectivity for self-consciousness. Hegel's phenomenological discourse takes place at the abstract level of consciousness, yet the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology (PhG) is one of the richest in offering practical situations and theoretical principles that are reciprocally intertwined. Under
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Sommario Fin dai suoi primi scritti, Hegel polemizza duramente con Kant, concentrandosi sul rapporto fra intelletto e sensibilità esposto nella Critica della ragion pura. In particolare, negli scritti jenesi, Hegel critica la funzione... more
Sommario
Fin dai suoi primi scritti, Hegel polemizza duramente con Kant, concentrandosi sul rapporto fra intelletto e sensibilità esposto nella Critica della ragion pura. In particolare, negli scritti jenesi, Hegel critica la funzione dell’immaginazione trascendentale e accusa Kant di psicologismo. L’autore sostiene che il filo conduttore della critica hegeliana a Kant dipende dalla forma dei rapporti stabilita, nel passaggio dalla prima alla seconda edizione della Critica della ragion pura, fra intelletto e sensibilità. Hegel critica il modello kantiano dell’auto-affezione dell’immaginazione perché surrettiziamente basato su una forma di causalità efficiente esercitata dall’intelletto a scapito della sensibilità. L’autore mostra che la critica della causalità efficiente conduce Hegel a gettare le basi del processo di auto-determinazione spirituale in stretta correlazione con l’esame di attività formative quali il lavoro e la memoria.
Parole chiave: auto-affezione, auto-determinazione, causalità, Hegel, Kant, memoria
Self-affection and Self-determination. On Hegel’s Criticism of Kant in the Jena writings
Abstract
Since his early writings, Hegel takes issue with Kant’s argument in the Critique of Pure Reason concerning the relation between understanding and sensibility. Notably, Hegel criticises the role of transcendental imagination, and charges Kant with psychologism. The author argues that Hegel’s critique has to do with the changes occurring between the first and second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason dealing with the relationship between understanding and sensibility. On Hegel’s account, the Kantian model of the self-affection of imagination illegitimately constrains sensibility on the basis of the efficient causality exercised by understanding. The author shows that Hegel’s critique of efficient causality leads him to lay the foundation for the self-determination of spirit. This is closely related to the analysis of formative activities such as work and memory.
Key words: Causality, Hegel, Kant, Self-affection, Self-determination, Memory
Fin dai suoi primi scritti, Hegel polemizza duramente con Kant, concentrandosi sul rapporto fra intelletto e sensibilità esposto nella Critica della ragion pura. In particolare, negli scritti jenesi, Hegel critica la funzione dell’immaginazione trascendentale e accusa Kant di psicologismo. L’autore sostiene che il filo conduttore della critica hegeliana a Kant dipende dalla forma dei rapporti stabilita, nel passaggio dalla prima alla seconda edizione della Critica della ragion pura, fra intelletto e sensibilità. Hegel critica il modello kantiano dell’auto-affezione dell’immaginazione perché surrettiziamente basato su una forma di causalità efficiente esercitata dall’intelletto a scapito della sensibilità. L’autore mostra che la critica della causalità efficiente conduce Hegel a gettare le basi del processo di auto-determinazione spirituale in stretta correlazione con l’esame di attività formative quali il lavoro e la memoria.
Parole chiave: auto-affezione, auto-determinazione, causalità, Hegel, Kant, memoria
Self-affection and Self-determination. On Hegel’s Criticism of Kant in the Jena writings
Abstract
Since his early writings, Hegel takes issue with Kant’s argument in the Critique of Pure Reason concerning the relation between understanding and sensibility. Notably, Hegel criticises the role of transcendental imagination, and charges Kant with psychologism. The author argues that Hegel’s critique has to do with the changes occurring between the first and second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason dealing with the relationship between understanding and sensibility. On Hegel’s account, the Kantian model of the self-affection of imagination illegitimately constrains sensibility on the basis of the efficient causality exercised by understanding. The author shows that Hegel’s critique of efficient causality leads him to lay the foundation for the self-determination of spirit. This is closely related to the analysis of formative activities such as work and memory.
Key words: Causality, Hegel, Kant, Self-affection, Self-determination, Memory
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It is noteworthy that both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophist Plato aporetically introduces the notion of holon. The author argues that it is possible to outline a connection between the two dialogues by focusing on the methodological... more
It is noteworthy that both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophist Plato aporetically introduces the notion of holon. The author argues that it is possible to outline a connection between the two dialogues by focusing on the methodological relevance of holon and heteron. Several hints contained in the Theaetetus suggest that Plato conceives of holon as a method of dialectical thinking, underlying the process of soul’s reasoning. The Theaetetus presents this notion ex negativo due to the lack of distinction between difference (heteron) and negation (not being). By contrast, the Sophist shows that heteron guides the dialectics of forms as well as the communication between the soul and the eidetic sphere. Accordingly, the Sophist entails that the process of soul’s reasoning is correlative to the eidetic horizon in so far as they both rely on a holistic methodology that is activated by the quest for the difference.
Research Interests: Plato and Theaetetus
Research Interests: Hegel and Hegel's Logic
From a phenomenological perspective, social perception allows degrees of flexibility and critical self-assessment that are not entirely conditioned by the social environment. My goal in this chapter is to take into closer consideration... more
From a phenomenological perspective, social perception allows degrees
of flexibility and critical self-assessment that are not entirely conditioned
by the social environment. My goal in this chapter is to take into closer consideration the processes that engender perceptual learning and unlearning in Husserl’s phenomenology. I proceed by examining the relation between social perceptionand the intersubjective sense of reality, before identifying the doxastic positionality that characterizes perception, and its relation to typification and perceptual unlearning. By way of conclusion, I explain in what sense Husserl’s approach lends itself to an account of social sensitivity.
of flexibility and critical self-assessment that are not entirely conditioned
by the social environment. My goal in this chapter is to take into closer consideration the processes that engender perceptual learning and unlearning in Husserl’s phenomenology. I proceed by examining the relation between social perceptionand the intersubjective sense of reality, before identifying the doxastic positionality that characterizes perception, and its relation to typification and perceptual unlearning. By way of conclusion, I explain in what sense Husserl’s approach lends itself to an account of social sensitivity.
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This chapter explores the concept of sedimentation in Hegel’s account of absolute knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s 1954-1955 course notes on institution and passivity. I proceed by identifying first the... more
This chapter explores the concept of sedimentation in Hegel’s account of absolute knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s 1954-1955 course notes on institution and passivity. I proceed by identifying first the notion of sedimentation that informs Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on institution. Such a sedimentation involves a non-egoic modality of retention that activates critical thinking. I then explain why absolute knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit rests on a process of sedimentation that is very much in line with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis. My argument revolves on the self-appropriation and ownership that characterize Hegel’s account of absolute spirit, which is integral to a Hegelian-inspired view of ethical memory.
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Meine Arbeit konzentriert sich auf das Problem der Gewohnheit in Hegels Philosophie . Wie hinreichend bekannt ist, hat Hegels Philosophie dem Problem der Habitualität viel Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. So geht Hegel in der Philosophie des... more
Meine Arbeit konzentriert sich auf das Problem der Gewohnheit in Hegels Philosophie . Wie hinreichend bekannt ist, hat Hegels Philosophie dem Problem der Habitualität viel Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. So geht Hegel in der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes (Werke 10) und in der Philosophie des Rechts (Werke 7) davon aus, dass Habitualität für zweite Natur steht, insofern sie die Inbesitznahme des Geistes und somit den Übergang von Natur zum Geist vermittelt. Während in der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes Gefühlsbestimmungen durch Gewohnheit verleiblicht und zu Willensbestimmungen werden, legt die Philosophie des Rechts die Verbindung zwischen Gewohnheit und ethischer Gesinnung dar. Bemerkenswerterweise verbindet Hegel Gewohnheit in der Philosophie des Rechts mit der Sittlichkeit, indem er zeigt, dass das Sittliche an die Stelle des ersten, bloß natürlichen Willens gesetzt ist, und als allgemeine Handlungsweise erscheint (Werke 7, 301). Das heißt, dass anhaltende ethische Dispositionen notwendig sind, um die Moralität zu aktualisieren. Somit kann zu Recht behauptet werden, dass Hegel eine Theorie der Habitualität vorgelegt hat, die im dem Reich der Subjektivität verankert ist, ohne dabei das Feld der allgemeine Handlungsfähigkeit zu ignorieren.
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In this paper, I will explore the role of habit in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, arguing that its relevance should not be restricted to the Anthropology. Hegel distinguishes between habituality as the second nature of the... more
In this paper, I will explore the role of habit in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, arguing that its relevance should not be restricted to the Anthropology. Hegel distinguishes between habituality as the second nature of the embodied self and a more sophisticated form of habituality presented in the Psychology as memory. Memory is the function of intelligence that is committed to the production of language, thereby giving rise to thinking and the possibility of theoretic freedom. Since Hegel himself warns against the automatic and impersonal character of habituality, I wish to explore to what extent habit and memory influence the development of theoretical spirit. Is there any room for a notion of freedom that is independent from habituality? I will first assess the difference between habit and memory. Then, I will tackle the possibility of freedom from a Hegelian standpoint.
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Dublin conference 3-5 May 2017
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Leussein, 6/2013, n. 3, pp. 133-140
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Please follow the link above to read my review of Ferrarin's latest book on Hegel. Guido Frilli's review and Ferrarin's reply to both Frilli and myself are also available on Critique.