Erwin Straus

Certaines configurations de formes architecturales contestent une notion idealiste de l'espace et du temps, et creent une multiplicite de cellules espace-temps. Le rapport au monde qui se definit dans cette exploration par touches, par creusements successifs de l'espace du paysage, est celui du choix des temporalites dans notre rapport aux choses. Bien qu'affirmant leur geometrie lineaire (des lignes droites et des surfaces planes qui priment sur la matiere), les lignes narratives se repondent, et ce sont des styles de chemins qui se dessinent. Le repere apparait comme element figural preponderant, sans qu'une forme precise ne soit materiellement le point de centration de la vision. Cette cristallisation a-centree du repere est une structure spatiale et temporelle fragile et furtive, mais l'espace entre les reperes acquiert ainsi un sens pour le regardeur. La coexistence entre les reperes dans la perception permet la construction de chemins complexes de developpement de l'espace. Par cette esthetique des reperes, les formes n'apparaissent pas seulement dans leur presence monumentale, mais aussi par leur capacite a creer des espaces entre formes. Le repere definit plus qu'une difference de profondeur, mais une articulation entre differents espaces. Il signifie la distance aux formes et la maniere d'habiter l'espace interstitiel. La visibilite est un potentiel, une qualite qui habite non pas les choses mais provient d'entre les choses. Par le repere, c'est la relation entre formes dans l'espace qui donne son sens a l'apprehension.

In this text, the history of phenomenological research on learning is synthesized and brought forward into the areas of existential learning, the development of enthusiasm about learning (from childhood through adulthood), and paradigmatic creative experience. Original research findings are derived using the Giorgi method of descriptive phenomenological analysis in psychology. The results, structural and eidetic in nature, are then integrated from a holistic developmental viewpoint: that of Existential-Humanistic Self-Development Theory (EHSDT). An evolving developmental partnership between learning and creativity emerges as the proper conceptual frame for considering optimal growth and the relative maturity of situated becoming oneself (i.e., the process of self-cultivation). The resulting perspective is supported by cutting edge trends in neuroscience and related to pedagogy and education.

Modern psychiatry, as represented by Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), and phenomenology, as developed by Edmund Husserl, began around the same time, namely, during the last decades of the 19th century. Moreover, psychiatry and phenomenology have always shared a common goal: they have both sought detailed descriptions of human experience. This communality of goals has repeatedly led psychiatrists to turn to phenomenology for aid in explicating mental life. For many psychiatrists it has seemed that phenomenology offered a method that could help them better understand and conceptualize the experiences of their patients. As a result, psychiatrists have utilized various phenomenological approaches just as phenomenologists have explored subjects in psychiatry.

The history of this relationship has remained ambiguous, however. Frequently a gap has yawned between the broad theoretical perspectives adapted from phenomenology and the needs of clinical practice. Furthermore, psychiatrists-who are often trained in the biological and natural sciences-may feel disinclined to delve deeply into explorations of the subjective when these explorations appear to them to remain too abstract or metaphysical. And, returning the compliment, phenomenologists have usually exhibited a profound reluctance to ascribe centrality to biological and naturalistic perspectives. In the post-World War II years, impressive progress in empirical research has provided physicians with powerful means for diagnosis and treatment, for example, with psychopharmacology; because psychiatrists are always pragmatists at heart, these new insights have tended to supplant phenomenological insights.

More recently, the relationship has grown more complicated, and these complexities offer hope of a revitalized cross-fertilization between psychiatry and phenomenology. On the one hand, empirical research in psychiatry continues at an even more rapid pace. On the other hand, many physicians and patients are more aware of the gaps, inadequacies, and even untoward consequences of the one-sidedness of these new developments. This has spurred a turn towards holistic medicine, wellness, and environmental medicine that is more congenial to phenomenological views. Moreover, there is a growing recognition that phenomenological and neurobiological perspectives can no longer oppose one another; when properly conceived, each will strengthen the other. We shall first sketch a brief history of the relationships between phenomenology and psychiatry. Subsequently, we shall delineate possible directions that future inquiry might take.

This dissertation in Theory of Practical Knowledge contends that depression is a disorder of the self. Using the existential-phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I argue that if we want to disclose the basic structure of of depressed experience, then we must likewise disclose how self-experience is inseparable from depressed experience. However, even though depression is a contemporary psychiatric category of illness, it is nevertheless a historically and heterogenous concept.
To make sense of depression in the context of contemporary psychiatric practice, I show that depression has historically been characterized by two broad models of causation; that is, a phenomenon that is causally explained by either a biological dysfunction or a psychological conflict. But this stark characterization is not limited just to history; by conducting qualitative interviews with psychiatric professionals, I illustrate how this causal dichotomy remains prevalent in contemporary psychiatric practice. On one hand, the clinicians report dissatisfaction with the depression diagnostic criteria (i.e. it is impersonal or vague), while on the other hand, the clinicians also recognize that a depression diagnosis is useful insofar as a diagnosis facilitates access to various resources associated with psychiatric care. Consequently, clinicians have developed a coping strategy that is witnessed in their empathetic desire to distance patients from their depression diagnosis, which led to statements such as, “you are not the problem, the problem is depression.” One consequence of this approach is that depression is artificially cleaved from the person who experiences depression, which subsequently means that depression is viewed to be something independent of oneself.
Because I argue that depression and the self are mutually implicated, it is crucial to disseminate some of the most influential contemporary models of selfhood. I show that the brainbound, situated, psychological, and narrative model of self, all have respective strengths and weaknesses. But I also go beyond these models and characterize selfhood as a developmental phenomenon that is expressed as an embodied-style. This style reflects the way in which we establish perceptual contact with the otherness, without which there could be no self-experience. 
By adopting the notion of self-as-a-style, my phenomenological analysis of depression discloses the way in which an experiential structure of depression is inextricable from lived-space. More specifically, I show that depressed experience is an affective modification to the way spatial depth is experienced; things in the world are experienced as being distant, out of touch, or simply that one feels incapable of effortlessly engaging the surrounding world. Accordingly, I argue that the relationship between depression and selfhood may be characterized in two broad ways, as either a depressive-style, or as an interruption of self-style.
The distinction between depressive-style and interrupted self-style has implications for depression diagnosis and treatment. I show that persistent-depressive disorder is phenomenologically indicative of a depressive-style, whereas major-depressive disorder corresponds with interrupted self-style. In the context of depression treatment, I draw on the work of philosopher John Russon to offer an account of psychotherapy that is rooted in phenomenological sensibilities. Most notably, I show how “talk” therapy is also an existential project, one that attempts to raise our unreflective and embodied habits to the level of explicit awareness in an attempt to re-style the way in which the self is able to cope with the vicissitudes that arise from our everyday situations.

Stipulating that human being-in-the-world lies at the basis of phenomenological psychiatry, we move from the phenomenological notion of the correlation of experiencing subject with his or her experienced world to the level of the organism-environment relationship. Fundamental agreements between Hans Jonas's and George Canguilhem's philosophical biologies are shown. These agreements lie in elaborations of the "dynamic polarities" that relate the organism to its environment and the "norms" that preside over this relatedness. Three constituents of this relationship as explicated by Jonas are summarized: (1) since the organism is always threatened with non-being, it must of necessity always re-achieve its continued being by its own activity, (2) organisms are both enclosed within themselves, while they are also ceaselessly reaching out to their environments and interacting with them, and (3) organisms are both dependent on their own material components at any given moments and independent of any particular collection of these components across time. Since these three constituents of the organism-environment relationship are governed by norms the organism is also seen to valorize certain aspects of its environment and not others. In accordance with Canguilhem's conception of pathology as both restricting the organism's possibilities and causing pain and suffering, we examine two personality types, the anti-social
personality and the type that H. Tellenbach and A. Kraus call typus melancholicus. Changes in social environments greatly alter what can be termed the "pathology" of these personality
types.
We conclude by invoking Erwin Straus on the differences between norm and pathology of I-world relationships.
relationships.

Les paradoxes de la psychiatrie, entre cogitations complotisme et connerie sympathique, entre normal et pathologique, entre folie de la raison et raison de la folie, entre corps et esprit, avec le psychiatre & antipsychiatre Jacques Hochmann, le neurologue & psychiatre Erwin Straus, les penseurs de midi Raymond Aron et Albert Camus, et, toujours en arrière-plan, notre analyste préféré du désir et de l'intelligence collective spinoziste, Maxime Rovère...

Cette thèse porte sur l’esthétique au sein de la phénoménologie, et plus particulièrement sur le problème de l’unité de l’esthétique, sur la question de la continuité entre sensibilité et art telle qu’elle est posée dans les philosophies d’Erwin Straus, de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et d’Henri Maldiney. Nous montrons d’abord comment la phénoménologie, en devenant phénoménologie de l’art, reprend et accomplit la philosophie de l’art traditionnelle, retrouvant par-là même ses difficultés et impasses : la subordination de l’art à la philosophie, le primat théorique de l’œuvre d’art sur l’artiste, l’assimilation de l’artiste au génie, la promotion de la peinture et de la littérature et l’exclusion de la danse, l’identification du spectateur à un incréateur. Nous mettons ensuite en évidence le fait que la phénoménologie est irréductible à une philosophie de l’art, qu’elle est aussi une esthétique capable de dépasser les problèmes de la phénoménologie de l’art autant que de l’esthétique classique, intellectualiste et empiriste. Seulement l’esthétique phénoménologique rejoue plutôt qu’elle ne déjoue ces problèmes : l’art et l’artiste demeurent mystérieux, l’esthétique phénoménologique est encore une religion de l’art. C’est pourquoi, enfin, une nouvelle esthétique s’impose – une esthétique cosmologique –, nourrie de la double déconstruction de la phénoménologie de l’art et de l’esthétique phénoménologique, et dirigée vers l’impératif d’éconduire le mysticisme résurgent des doctrines sur l’art. En somme, ce travail vise à rendre compte philosophiquement, sans mythologie interposée, du phénomène artistique.

The text that follows is an excerpt –slightly adapted for clarity– from the chapter: Declerck, G., Lenay C. Living in space. A phenomenological account. in E. Pissaloux & R. Velazquez (Eds.), Mobility in Visually Impaired People. Fundamentals and ICT Assistive Technologies. Springer, 2017. This is a part of the chapter dealing centrally with the role that the anticipation of possibilities plays in the enacting and organization of lived space.

The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ (1891–1975) views on the problem of
time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality (all from the Erwin. W. Straus Archive, Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University, USA), with the primary focus on the1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first part of the article, the author introduces what he considers to be the central tension of the whole of Straus’ work on the issue of time, namely, the tension stemming from a dualistic account of time with its personal (experienced) and impersonal (clock time) dimensions. Interpretative
developments of this tension are followed covering Straus’ early German works and his late American scholarship. The author presents Straus’ way of overcoming the dualistic account of time and his arguments in favour of what is termed here the unified view of time. Of critical importance for the unified view is Straus’ concept of today, which is extensively commented upon. In the second part of the article, the
author focuses on the psychopathological consequences of the unified view as seen by Straus. A clear-cut boundary between a normal and a psychotic experience of time is supposed to lie in breaking the bond between the personal and the impersonal orders of time, leading to a fundamental estrangement. This view, it is claimed, is already present
in a nutshell in Straus’ earliest work, and is elaborated upon later. In conclusion, both the merits and the weaknesses of Straus’ account of temporality are presented. A major advantage is that Straus abstains from a dualistic conception of time and reappraises the often-devalued clock time. A fundamental drawback is that Straus does not venture to
explore the pathological varieties of temporal experience and fails to specify the acknowledged differences between, on the one hand, psychotic elements in depressive disorders, and, on the other hand, such elements in schizophrenic disturbances.

The View of Life is still under-studied despite its status as capstone to Simmel's work. Departing from Simmel's image as an unsystematic flâneur or bricoleur, I assess the affinity of his late theory of life forms with Schutz's analysis of human action in three steps: First, as a common concern with the clarification of foundational problems that coincide with interpretive sociology's basic idea of tracing back all cultural objectivations to the dynamics of living processes. Second, as an articulation of life's self-transcendence concordant with the tension between action as a projected act (modo futuri exacti) and as an ongoing process (modo presenti) uncovered by Schutz for the first time in his posthumously published book Life Forms and Meaning Structures. I follow with a third proposal about how Simmel's line of thought on freedom as a capacity to break through purposiveness and as a rise of ideal constructs might complement Schutz's attention to the growth of the acting self through life events, suggesting that The View of Life can be regarded as a precedent to Schutz for linking action projection to the development of aspirations and ideals, and to theorize how the realization of projects supports the development of individual integrity and the ability to appropriate one's life in the midst of unfamiliar and critical situations. Simmel and Schutz are thus shown to contribute to an approach to creative action in sociology.

"S’il me fallait choisir entre le destin d’être un homme qui sait comment et pourquoi telle chose est ce qu’on nomme « belle », et celui de savoir ce que c’est que sentir, je crois bien que je choisirais le second, avec l’arrière-pensée que cette connaissance, si elle était possible (...) me livrerait bientôt tous les secrets de l’art"
Valéry ajoute : « (...) et je crains bien qu’elle (cette connaissance du sentir) ne soit même pas concevable".

La question qui nous préoccupe dans cet essai est davantage esthésique qu’esthétique. Comme Paul Valéry, nous pensons qu'il est intéressant, avant d’étudier une théorie de l'art en tant que telle, de réfléchir à ce que serait une connaissance du sentir. En ce sens, nous nous poserons la question suivante : une connaissance du sentir, unifiant sensations et sentiments, est-elle possible ? Nous nous questionnerons, dans un premier temps, sur les liens entre sensations et sentiments humains et tenterons d'expliquer en quoi la physiologie ne peut être suffisante pour expliquer notre rapport au monde dans sa dimension affective. Pour cela, nous naviguerons au sein des esthétiques dites de l'«Einfülhung». Nous nous intéresserons plus particulièrement à Lipps qui a fait glisser le concept d'empathie de l'esthétique vers la psychologie. Dans un second temps, nous élargirons notre réflexion aux animaux non humains. Nous tenterons de montrer en quoi le sentir est un medium entre l'animal et le monde; mais aussi qu’à travers le sentir, l’animal, en modifiant le monde, est à son tour modifié par le monde. Pour ce faire, nous étudierons la psychologie phénoménologique d'Erwin Straus, psychiatre allemand du 20ème siècle. Il décrira le sentir comme pré-objectif et pré-conceptuel; il sera, donc, commun à tous les animaux. Nous achèverons notre parcours en élargissant encore une fois notre réflexion, en montrant en quoi l’être sentant et l’être vivant finalement coïncident. A ce titre, nous évoquerons en guise d'ouverture et de conclusion, la pensée de Canguilhem au sujet des particularités propres à la vie et à la connaissance de la vie.

Le récit d’exploration a pour fondement la question des frontières du monde connu : la description de la perte de repères, du corps désorienté y occupe une place centrale, là où la carte n’est d’aucun secours et ne peut se substituer à la mise en mots de l’expérience. Or l’aveu de défaite cède le pas à une mise au jour des processus sensori-moteurs élémentaires dans l’approche sensible de l’ailleurs. Les voyageurs consignent leurs observations sur la polysensorialité de la perception du paysage : ce sont, outre les cinq sens traditionnels, les dimensions proprioceptives et kinesthésiques. Accompagnée, à titre heuristique, par les propositions récentes de la neurophysiologie, la présente lecture de récits d’explorateurs français au Tibet – dernier blanc de la carte à la fin du xixe siècle – dégage les bénéfices épistémiques, éthiques et esthétiques de ces « paysages inchoatifs » reversés à la charge de la rencontre avec les altérités naturelles et culturelles.
DOI: 10.1163/9789401211796_004

Resumen: este ensayo plantea y desarrolla una cuestión referente a la separación entre teoría y práctica contable, analizando desde distintas perspectivas las posibles causas para esta situación. Se emplea un análisis crítico que discute sobre la condición actual de la investigación en epistemología contable y la práctica real de la disciplina. Además, trata sobre asuntos como la falta de creatividad de los doctrinarios o la dependencia a otras ciencias para promover adelantos significativos en materia contable, y se enfatiza en la reestructuración de las prácticas vigentes para desplegar la funcionalidad de la contabilidad en las organizaciones y de forma paralela conseguir verdaderos avances científicos para la disciplina. Abstract: this essay establishes and develops a matter relating to accounting practice and theory separation, analyzing from different views any possible causes to this situation. It applies a critic analysis that'll argue about the present condition of the investigation over accounting epistemology and real practice of the discipline. Furthermore, it does talk over questions like the doctrinaires absence of creativity, the dependence to others sciences in order to promote significant advances in regards of accounting, and it emphasizes about the restoration of the practices in force to spread accounting functionality in the organizations and at the same time to get true scientific advances to the discipline. Introducción El proceso evolutivo conjunto entre la práctica y la teoría de la contabilidad ha manifestado cierta desproporción, mostrando un considerable desarrollo las figuraciones o supuestos contables, mientras que la realidad práctica de esta disciplina se ve condicionada por ciertos factores que hacen muy notoria la incongruencia entre los preceptos que se suponen en la teoría y su efectiva implementación en el ámbito profesional. La idea generalizada de la consolidación y posicionamiento de la contabilidad dentro del marco de las ciencias, ha canalizado la mayor parte de los esfuerzos de la academia hacia ese fin, y ha convertido en su interés primordial la teorización, desatendiendo, en cierta medida, algunos otros escenarios fundamentales que son propios de la contabilidad. Si bien el concepto de ciencia contable resulta ser un estimulo sublime para los desenvueltos en este campo, y la investigación es la base para el desarrollo epistemológico de cualquier disciplina, no se puede dejar de lado la realidad o práctica de lo contable y enfocar las investigaciones hacia la realización de análisis que en cualquier caso se alejan de dicha realidad. La teoría de la contabilidad, en la actualidad, ha abarcado y estructurado figuras hasta hace muy poco ignotas, pero en algunos casos ha tratado de incorporar a esta disciplina conjeturas de diversas ciencias y adaptarlas a la contabilidad sin

At the root of many issues debated today in psychiatry lie basic conceptions of human nature. Arguments regarding the fruitfulness of biopsychosocial, integrative, or reductionistic models, biological versus social causality in mental illness, the adequacy of existing nomenclature and classificatory schemes, the role of psychotherapy, and numerous others reach no decisive resolution because the proponents of the different arguments presuppose fundamentally different views of human existence.

It would seem best then to address the topic of human existence directly and explicitly. Yet no one can address this topic today without granting full weight to the findings and claims of those many sciences and disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, and biology, that already concern themselves with things human. And herein lies precisely the largest conceptual problem: the empirical sciences of human life display no coherent and unified theoretical orientation. Empirical studies approach human life from a bewildering variety of "standpoints" and "perspectives." If the anarchy of "standpoints" in the human sciences is to be reduced, some overarching conceptual framework must be developed for them. And if this framework is to provide intellectual guidance for psychiatry in particular, it must meet specific requirements. It is undeniable first that any theoretical framework that is to be serviceable for psychiatry must ascribe a central place to human biology and to the rapidly growing field of neuroscience. It is evident secondly that this general theory must delineate the shaping of the human being through interpersonal relationships; it must be shown how interaction with a sociocultural environment influences the cognitive, emotional, and conative components of the human mind-brain. And thirdly the formation of the human individual through social interaction must become clear in its earliest stages.

We suggest that the most promising prospects for such an overarching theoretical framework lie in an orientation which in Continental Europe is called "philosophical anthropology." In this phrase the term "anthropology" retains its etymological meaning as the logos, science, of anthropos, the human. The narrower discipline which is labeled "anthropology" in English-speaking countries is usually called "ethnology" in Continental Europe.

Philosophical anthropology found its place within medicine years ago although that place has since been neglected. During the first half of this century, stubbornly irresolvable arguments regarding diagnosis and treatment led some physicians in Continental Europe to raise in a fundamental way the perplexing problem of human nature. Unlike earlier thinkers, however, they realized that this question could no longer be considered solely a "metaphysical" one. With the impressive growth of empirical scientific research into animal and human life, such as biology, zoology, psychology, and sociology, these physicians perceived the possibility of developing a comprehensive theory of human beings through a critical rethinking of empirical data. In addition to drawing on the many empirical sciences, this field adapted certain concepts from the emerging philosophy of human existence. The philosophical categories, however, were re-evaluated and redefined in the light of empirical findings. The central intellectual task lay in constructing a unified view of the multiple facets of human existence that the natural and social sciences as well as philosophy were progressively disclosing. Contrary to "existential philosophy" which conceived humans in total abstraction from their rootedness in nature, the "anthropologists" sought to understand human beings as natural living beings. They began, therefore, with the phenomenon of life itself, a phenomenon which is then conceived in different ways by philosophy and the natural and social sciences. This European orientation was called "anthropological medicine."

It is widely held in analytic philosophy of mind and cognition that olfactory perception – first and foremost – represents odours if it represents anything at all. Despite some controversies on the very nature of those odours we encounter in olfactory perceptual experience, the vast majority of today’s philosophers hold that the intentional objects of olfactory perception are the odorous emanations of so-called source objects – ordinary concrete things. So, broadly speaking, most discussants account for some version of the principle of ‘olfactory austerity’: When we smell we perceive nothing but odours, and never do we (directly) smell particular objects.

After depicting the main reasons for adopting such a view especially within a chiefly representationalist framework, I will examine one of the alleged benefits a bit more carefully. Namely I will address the anti-visuocentrism in austere theories of olfactory objects. It has been argued frequently that the view of olfactory austerity reveals our visuocentric biases and guides us to overcome them in theorising perception. In short, the idea goes pretty much as follows: Those who think that we could smell ordinary objects in olfactory experience just like we can see these objects in visual experience simply disregard the missing aspects of objecthood in what is really smelled there, particularly the missing spatial structure. To attribute such aspects to pure olfactory experience then would mean to fall for the supremacy of vision and to only infer the particular source object by the smelled odour from memory or recollection.

The main goal of my talk will come down to contrasting the so reproached visuocentrism of a source-object-theory of olfactory objects with the visuocentricism within the view of olfactory austerity itself, as it is still at work at the very core of this approach in that the criteria of ‘objecthood’ are obviously stipulated by means of the ordinary objects in visual perception. What is at stake in this comparison is to extrapolate visuocentrism as a crucial structure of perceptual consciousness – at least for the sighted – and hence accounting for the supremacy of vision as a fact instead of a fallacious bias.

Cet article se concentre sur la phénoménologie de la vie chez Erwin Straus. Nous commençons par clarifier son objet (l’être humain) et son objectif (fonder une nosologie humaine). Nous réexaminons ensuite deux aspects bien connus de sa pensée. Premièrement, la « situation animale primaire », laquelle implique différentes dualités conceptuelles (animal/homme, sentir/percevoir, paysage/géographie, monde de la vie/monde de la perception, schizophrénie/mélancolie) ainsi qu’une proposition philoso-phique majeure : l’identité entre le sentir et le mouvement. Secondement, nous étudions la relation Je-Monde, que Straus comprend comme une relation à la totalité, au sein de la totalité. Enfin, nous exa-minons sa conception moins connue de l’existence comme verticalité, laquelle conduit à définir l’être humain comme l’être vivant éminent. Seuls les hommes peuvent opposer une résistance au monde et réaliser leur individualité.

The article presents Erwin W. Straus' unpublished manuscript " Temporal Horizons " from 1952. In the paper, in addition to an extensive philosophical discussion with St. Augustine, Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud, Straus elaborates on his idea of a unified view of temporal experience, comprising both the personal and the impersonal dimensions of time. The manuscript also contains an interview with a psychotic patient, which is supposed to exemplify Straus' core idea on the psychotic temporal experience, according to which the break of the invisible bond between immanent or personal, and clock or impersonal time leads to a loss of a sense of reality.

Certaines configurations de formes architecturales contestent une notion idealiste de l'espace et du temps, et creent une multiplicite de cellules espace-temps. Le rapport au monde qui se definit dans cette exploration par touches, par creusements successifs de l'espace du paysage, est celui du choix des temporalites dans notre rapport aux choses. Bien qu'affirmant leur geometrie lineaire (des lignes droites et des surfaces planes qui priment sur la matiere), les lignes narratives se repondent, et ce sont des styles de chemins qui se dessinent. Le repere apparait comme element figural preponderant, sans qu'une forme precise ne soit materiellement le point de centration de la vision. Cette cristallisation a-centree du repere est une structure spatiale et temporelle fragile et furtive, mais l'espace entre les reperes acquiert ainsi un sens pour le regardeur. La coexistence entre les reperes dans la perception permet la construction de chemins complexes de developpement de l'espace. Par cette esthetique des reperes, les formes n'apparaissent pas seulement dans leur presence monumentale, mais aussi par leur capacite a creer des espaces entre formes. Le repere definit plus qu'une difference de profondeur, mais une articulation entre differents espaces. Il signifie la distance aux formes et la maniere d'habiter l'espace interstitiel. La visibilite est un potentiel, une qualite qui habite non pas les choses mais provient d'entre les choses. Par le repere, c'est la relation entre formes dans l'espace qui donne son sens a l'apprehension.

Memahami ancaman, tantangan, hambatan dan gangguan. Sebagai warga negara Indonesia yang terhormat, kita dapat berpartisipasi dalam melindungi negara dengan mengakui dan mengatasi berbagai bentuk ancaman, tantangan, hambatan, dan gangguan (ATHG). Ancaman, tantangan, hambatan, dan gangguan dapat datang dari mana saja di dunia, missalnya, dari luar negeri atau bahkan di dalam negeri.

Stipulating that human being-in-the-world lies at the basis of phenomenological psychiatry, we move from the phenomenological notion of the correlation of experiencing subject with his or her experienced world to the level of the organism-environment relationship. Fundamental agreements between Hans Jonas’s and George Canguilhem’s philosophical biologies are shown. These agreements lie in elaborations of the “dynamic polarities” that relate the organism to its environment and the “norms” that preside over this relatedness. Three constituents of this relationship as explicated by Jonas are summarized: (1) since the organism is always threatened with nonbeing, it must of necessity always re-achieve its continued being by its own activity, (2) organisms are both enclosed within themselves, while they are also ceaselessly reaching out to their environments and interacting with them, and (3) organisms are both dependent on their own material components at any given moments and independent of any particular collection of these components across time. Since these three constituents of the organism-environment relationship are governed by norms the organism is also seen to valorize certain aspects of its environment and not others. In accordance with Canguilhem’s conception of pathology as both restricting the organism’s possibilities and causing pain and suffering, we examine two personality types, the anti-social personality and the type that H. Tellenbach and A. Kraus call typus melancholicus. Changes in social environments greatly alter what can be termed the “pathology” of these personality types. We conclude by invoking Erwin Straus on the differences between norm and pathology of I-world relationships.