Svetozar Minkov

Chapter 1 Introduction-Bacon's Elusiveness Argument and Action Chapter 2 Chapter 1-Bacon's Intention: The Motive for Bacon's Project Bacon and the Philosophic Life: Arguments and Doubts Chapter 3 Chapter 2-Bacon on the Human Good: Passions and Virtues The Relation between the Common and the Private Good Chapter 4 Chapter 3-Bacon on Courage and Wisdom: Why Turn to Early Bacon and Of Tribute The Analysis of Fortitude "Truth" and the Defense of Philosophy in the Advancement of Learning Chapter 5 Chapter 4-Bacon on Justice and Death: The Analysis of Justice Death, Hope, and Immortality Chapter 6 Chapter 5-Bacon on Love: The Praise of Love in Of Tribute The Status of Love in the New Atlantis Dionysius, or Desire The Morality of Love in the Essays Cosmological Eros Chapter 7 Chapter 6-Bacon's Wise Ancients and the Future of His Project: Sirens, or Pleasures Orpheus, or Philosophy The Sphinx, or Science The Meaning of Bacon's Project Conclusion Chapter 8 Bibli...

The two manuscripts published here for the first time were written by Leo Strauss: the first in 1956 and the second between 1957 and 1962. The first, entitled “Lecture in Milwaukee: Michigan Midwest Political Science,” was written for the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists on May 4, 1956, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The second is an unpublished passage of “An Epilogue” Strauss wrote for Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, published in 1962. Together these pieces improve our understanding of both the context in which Strauss developed his critique of the new political science and the audience to whom that critique was addressed. These two texts are of “biographical” interest. They are biographical in the sense that they clarify Strauss's thought and its evolution. The “Lecture in Milwaukee” clarifies the context in which Strauss's critique of modern political science was born: confrontation with the political scientists of the 195...

... 12 Miriam Galston ferring something and avoiding something else. ... Just as the person who possesses theoretical knowledge is not a philosopher by virtue of inquiry (nazar) and investigation without attaining the end for the sake of which inquiry and investigation [exist], ie ...

The transcript published here for the first time is of Leo Strauss’s 1963 lecture on, and discussion of, the relation of religion to the commonweal in the tradition of political philosophy. In this lecture, Strauss considers the question of the establishment of religion, the relation of freedom of religion to freedom from religion, and the question of the truth of religion. The lecture has implications for American constitutional jurisprudence, especially concerning the First Amendment, which Strauss situates within the development of modern political philosophy.

The annual <em>Kronos Philosophical Journal</em> was established in Warsaw in 2012. The papers presented in the annual might be of interest to the readers from outside Poland, allowing them to familiarize themselves with the dynamic thought of contemporary Polish authors, as well as entirely new topics, rarely discussed by English speaking authors. Volume V/2016 comprises articles problematizing Russian phlosophy and literature as well as Ancient Greek philosophy and culture.

translated by Gabriel Bartlett and Svetozar Minkov [93] * IN THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED, Maimonides does not treat the doctrine of divine omniscience and divine providence in a strictly theological context. He arrives at this subject for the first time in the third section of the Guide, after he has concluded the thematic treatment of at least the following themes: (1) the names and attributes of God (I 1-70); (2) the proof of the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God (I 71-II 1); (3) the separate intelligences and the order of the world (II 2-12); (4) the creation of the world (II 13 (1)-31); and (5) prophecy (II 32-48). Directly following the discussion of prophecy is the thematic interpretation of ma'aseh merkabah *--Ezekiel 1 and 10--(III 1-7). This interpretation concludes with the remark that while all of the preceding "up to this chapter," that is, I 1-III 7, is indispensable for the understanding of ma'aseh merkabah, the discussion "after this ch...

Leo Strauss' "The Political Philosophy of Hobbes" deservedly ranks among his most widely acclaimed works. In it Strauss argues that the basis for Hobbes' natural and political science is his interest in 'self-knowledge of man as he really is.' The pieces collected in this book, each written prior to that classic volume, complement that account. Thus, at long last, this book allows us to have a complete picture of Strauss' interpretation of Hobbes, the thinker pivotal to the fundamental theme of his life's work: the conflicting demands of philosophy and revelation, or, as he termed it, 'the theologico-political problem.' It is no exaggeration to say that Strauss' work on Hobbes' critique of religion is essential to his analysis of Hobbes' political philosophy, and vice versa. This volume will spark new interest in Hobbes' explication of the Bible and in his understanding of religion by revealing previously neglected dimensions...

Perhaps surprisingly, one of the founders of the modern technological world, Francis Bacon, has a penetrating and sustained lifelong engagement with the phenomenon of love or eros. Bacon's reflections on eros come in two stages. He first examines the human and moral meaning of love. Bacon attends to the exorbitant promises of love—to bring us into a perfect condition, to grant us eternity—and finds them confused or unreasonable. Bacon then moves away from an engagement with the simple experiences of love and their promises. Departing from the human perspective, he proceeds to examine love, from the point of view of natural science or cosmology, as a fundamental property or principle of matter. This departure tends to lead, at least in the case of Bacon's followers, if not in…

On the "Possession" of Stavrogin and Kirillov in Dostoevsky's Demons I will examine the characters of Stavrogin and Kirillov. Since an examination of Stavrogin's character can serve to introduce the main causes of both his and Kirillov's "possession," I begin with him. Kirillov is less complex than Stavrogin but an analysis of his character adds to our understanding of the "possession" of both characters in at least two ways: the problem of the relation of will to reason and the problem of suicide, that is, the question of whether suicide is a remedy to or a manifestation of the "possession." The suspicion that Stavrogin is mentally ill spans the Demons (31, 154, 263, 433; his great paleness, 159, 339). Yet the fact that he spends two months in bed with "brain fever" (34) is no more illuminating than his observation to the narrator that he, Stavrogin, was "not well" when he dragged a harmless fellow by the nose and bit the governor's ear. For Dostoevsky, the medical diagnosis of his hero would be of little consequence. In his last letter to Darya Pavlovna, Stavrogin accompanies his confession that he has hallucinations (which he hopes the clean Swiss air will cure; 271; yet on 182-83 Stavrogin knows the "ghost" is no ghost and pays him to murder his wife) by a reference to his "well-known" moral illness (431); yet even those two illnesses are hardly the whole story (ibid.). That Stavrogin should see a doctor is mentioned as a matter of fact by Tikhon (263), but not as a fact that is revealing or decisive; the important part of their conversation is ahead of them. Moreover, the unity of Dostoevsky's work has as its source the discussion of two ideas: the nihilism of liberalism and the concomitant reaction to it (the "idea" of suicide and man-God, 396, 432). Stavrogin's relation to an "idea" (his being "eaten" by it; his believing or entertaining it, 396, 432) makes up who he is. To understand his character and his "possession" (bes, besi, 264, beshenstvo, 280), then, one would have to understand the condition of his mind and soul and the relation between the two. The last sentence of the Demons states that the doctors "completely and insistently ruled out [Stavrogin's] insanity." Stavrogin's face is said to resemble a mask (29). His surface is radically different from his depth. He appears modest, soft-spoken, handsome like a prince, and elegant (29, 258). (After all, he has the habits of a decent man, 432.). But his soul-to a perceptive woman who gets close to him and whom he perhaps loves somewhat (338)-is awful, sordid, and bloody (340). He says striking things which move others for years, but he either doesn't remember saying them (155) or doesn't believe in them (165). Yet even though his (presumable) depth is different from his surface, it has its outer manifestations. Many women are attracted to him precisely because of his reputation as a killer. He shows his "claws" not long after his arrival in his hometown (29). The surfacing of Stavrogin's fearless anger is so controlled that the narrator stresses that this kind of anger is calm, cool, and reasonable (129; 268). Yet the narrator is the first to admit that he cannot see what is inside the man. The startling pallor of Stavrogin hints at something which is captured neither by his apparent gentlemanliness nor by his rudeness and ruthlessness.

Extracts from Seth Benardete's discussion of the theoretical high point of Plato's Sophist, with reference to the Strauss-Kojeve debate concerning the "community of ideas" (Strauss and Benardete had discussed the Sophist in depth in the 1960s), and with the addition of informal notes from Christopher Bruell's 2008 course on the Sophist.

A paper on the three "foundings" of philosophy in Descartes: a theologico-metaphysical one; a mathematico-physical one eventuating in the project for the conquest of nature; and a modified dialectic-Socratic one based on a self-examination and the examination of others’ claims—modified since the other two foundings play a role not found in Socrates.

A draft of an interpretation of Strauss' interpretation of Book III of the Laws, as found in The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws (1975). As interpreted by Strauss, Laws III ultimately about freedom of thought: surrounded by corruption or its prospect from all sides—inauspicious beginnings, self-defeating imperialism, implacable necessities, the weakness of moral virtue and religious oaths, the ineluctable power of chance—the freedom to think survives despite or because of all the natural and political imperfections it alone can uncover.

Perhaps surprisingly, one of the founders of the modern technological world, Francis Bacon, has a penetrating and sustained lifelong engagement with the phenomenon of love or eros. Bacon’s reflections on eros come in two stages. He first examines the human and moral meaning of love. Bacon attends to the exorbitant promises of love—to bring us into a perfect condition, to grant us eternity—and finds them confused or unreasonable. Bacon then moves away from an engagement with the simple experiences of love and their promises. Departing from the human
perspective, he proceeds to examine love, from the point of view of natural science or cosmology, as a fundamental property or principle of matter. This departure tends to lead, at least in the case of Bacon’s followers, if not in Bacon’s own case, to an obliviousness to both his cynical and appreciative insights into love.

Drawing upon a wealth of previously unpublished archival material, Leo Strauss on Science brings to light the thoughts of Leo Strauss on the problem of science. Introducing us to Strauss’s reflections on the meaning and perplexities of the scientific adventure, Svetozar Y. Minkov explores questions such as: Is there a human wisdom independent of science? What is the relation between poetry and mathematics, or between self-knowledge and theoretical physics? And how necessary is it for the human species to exist immutably in order for the classical analysis of human life to be correct? In pursuing these questions, Minkov aims to change the conversation about Strauss, one of the great thinkers of the past century.

In the early modern period, thinkers began to suggest that philosophy abjure the ideal of dispassionate contemplation of the natural world in favor of a more practically minded project that aimed to make human beings masters and possessors of nature. Humanity would seize control of its own fate and overthrow the rule by hostile natural or imaginary forces. The gradual spread of liberal democratic government, the Enlightenment, and the rise of technological modernity are to a considerable extent the fruits of this early modern shift in intellectual concern and focus. But these long-term trends have also brought unintended consequences in their wake as the dynamic forces of social reason, historical progress, and the continued recalcitrance of the natural world have combined to disillusion humans of the possibility—even the desirability—of their mastery over nature.
The essays in Mastery of Nature constitute an extensive analysis of the fundamental aspects of the human grasp of nature. What is the foundation and motive of the modern project in the first place? What kind of a world did its early advocates hope to bring about? Contributors not only examine the foundational theories espoused by early modern thinkers such as Machiavelli, Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes but also explore the criticisms and corrections that appeared in the works of Rousseau, Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Ranging from ancient Greek thought to contemporary quantum mechanics, Mastery of Nature investigates to what extent nature can be conquered to further human ends and to what extent such mastery is compatible with human flourishing.

Natural Right and History is widely recognized as Strauss’s most influential work. The six lectures, written while Strauss was at the New School, and a full transcript of the 1949 Walgreen Lectures show Strauss working toward the ideas he would present in fully matured form in his landmark work. In them, he explores natural right and the relationship between modern philosophers and the thought of the ancient Greek philosophers, as well as the relation of political philosophy to contemporary political science and to major political and historical events, especially the Holocaust and World War II.

Previously unpublished in book form, Strauss’s lectures are presented here in a thematic order that mirrors Natural Right and History and with interpretive essays by J. A. Colen, Christopher Lynch, Svetozar Minkov, Daniel Tanguay, Nathan Tarcov, and Michael Zuckert that establish their relation to the work. Rounding out the book are copious annotations and notes to facilitate further study.

Drawing upon a wealth of previously unpublished archival material, Leo Strauss on Science brings to light the thoughts of Leo Strauss on the problem of science. Introducing us to Strauss’s reflections on the meaning and perplexities of the scientific adventure, Svetozar Y. Minkov explores questions such as: Is there a human wisdom independent of science? What is the relation between poetry and mathematics, or between self-knowledge and theoretical physics? And how necessary is it for the human species to exist immutably in order for the classical analysis of human life to be correct? In pursuing these questions, Minkov aims to change the conversation about Strauss, one of the great thinkers of the past century.

On "demagoguery."---
The Knights seems to be the least fanciful among the Aristophanic conceits that have come down to us. The play takes a hard look at democracy, depicting the people as a cynical, fickle, and spoiled master. The people's only hope, of which they are unaware, is for someone endowed with the special natural gifts of intelligence and shamelessness to emerge from their own lowest ranks (a sausage-seller) and to save them from their own excesses. To be sure, the presentation of the people as a unified persona, the character Demos, is a kind of fiction, as is the non-presence of women and children; and this points to the simplification of treating the people as a single, educable character (among other things) required for the beautification and rejuvenation of the people by the sausage-seller (1321; cf. Plato's Second Letter, 314c4). And the character of the sausage-seller himself, if not impossible, is at least a very unlikely type: someone who does exactly what's needed for political success, nothing more, nothing less; the real-life successor of Kleon would be the far less effective and gifted Hyperbolos (1300-15).