How not to deal with a rising China: a perspective from south Asia HOW NOT TO DEAL WITH A RISING CHINA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM SOUTH ASIA The principal purpose of this article is to intervene in the robust debate on a rising China within western academia and the policy community by offering a perspective that is often missing and rarely given sufficient attention—a perspective from ‘the region’. A view from south Asia may offer pointers on ‘how not to deal with China’ and consequently enrich this debate. While there is a range of opinions in the West stridently arguing over how to cope with the rise of China, the perspective from the region is less visible.1 This article offers a subaltern perspective by drawing insights from three case-studies in south Asia. * 1 This article is part of the International Affairs September 2022 special issue: ‘International relations: the “how not to” guide’, guest-edited by Daniel W. Drezner and Amrita Narlikar. The article benefited immensely from the author’s initial discussions with Amrita Narlikar, the extremely valuable research assistance provided by Chetan Rana and the comments offered by the anonymous reviewers. Cartoon by Sequential Potential Comics, www.sequential potential.com. It is surprising how little attention is paid to south Asia in the academic discussion on China’s rise. See e.g. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘International Relations theory and China’s rise: assessing China’s potential for territorial expansion’, International Studies Review 12: 4, 2010, pp. 505–32; or even the two otherwise outstanding articles in this special issue: Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘How not to deal with a rising China: a US perspective’, International Affairs 98: 5, 2022, pp. 1635–52, and Janice Gross Stein, ‘How not to think like a hegemon’, International Affairs 98: 5, 2022, pp. 1615–33. A rare exception is Rush Doshi, The long game: China’s grand strategy to displace American order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), which accords significant importance International Affairs 98: 5 (2022) 1653–1675; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiac165 © The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 AMITABH MATTOO * Amitabh Mattoo 2 3 4 5 6 7 to the region in China’s grand strategic calculations. See also John M. Owen, ‘Two emerging international orders? China and the United States’, International Affairs 97: 5, 2021, pp. 1415–31; Kai He and Mingjiang Li, ‘Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, regional actors and beyond’, International Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 1–7. Similarly, while sensitive to non-western thinking and scholarship, the primary objective of the essay is not directed towards epistomologically ‘provincializing’ International Relations thinking on China. In the last decade, inspired by Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), a number of thoughtful articles have appeared on this theme, including in this journal. See the section on author’s positionality at the end of the article. To understand Kautilya’s thought, see George Modelski, ‘Kautilya: foreign policy and international system in the ancient Hindu world’, American Political Science Review 58: 3, 1964, pp. 549–60; Rashed Uz Zaman, ‘Kautilya: the Indian strategic thinker and Indian strategic culture’, Comparative Strategy 25: 3, 2006, pp. 231–47; Roger Boesche, The first great political realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002). See also the magisterial study by Deepshika Shahi, Kautilya and non-western IR theory (London: Palgrave, 2019); and the forthcoming Kajari Kamal, Kautilya’s Arthashastra: strategic cultural roots of India’s contemporary statecraft (New Delhi: Routledge, 2023). John Mearsheimer, ‘The inevitable rivalry: America, China, and the tragedy of Great Power politics’, Foreign Affairs 100: 6, pp. 48–59. See also John Mearsheimer, ‘China’s unpeaceful rise’, Current History 105: 690, 2006, pp 160–62. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger zone: the coming conflict with China (New York: Norton, 2022), read in advance of publication. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, ‘The rise and fall of the great powers in the 21st century: China’s rise and the fate of America’s global position’, International Security 40: 3, 2015–16, pp. 7–53; Michael Beckley, ‘China’s century? Why America’s edge will endure’, International Security 36: 3, 2011–12, pp. 41–78; Yan Xuetong, ‘The age of uneasy peace: Chinese power in a divided world’, Foreign Affairs 98: 1, 2019, pp. 40–6. For a recent corrective see Doshi, The long game. 1654 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 While anchored in theory, the ambition of this article is limited to drawing empirically and ethnographically from the case-studies to offer a decentred view of China’s rise as a way of furthering our understanding of the possible implications of Beijing’s recent assertiveness for the international system.2 From this perspective, drawn from the author’s own positionality,3 China is deploying all the instruments propounded by the ancient Indian philosopher and political strategist Kautilya in his treatise Arthashastra: saam, daam, dand, bhed (‘persuade or purchase or punish or exploit a weakness’) to dominate its neighbourhood, and this approach could well be applied beyond the region as well.4 This comes close to a western offensive–realist understanding that China, like any rising power, seeks primacy in its region.5 As China faces challenges and pushbacks, it is expected to become even more assertive in the region.6 However, while the literature on Great Power politics focuses primarily on the consequences for the United States and China,7 the aim of this study is to position the region at the centre of the debate and explore the historical context of and changing dynamics in relations with China. The three case-studies—drawn from Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka— underscore the dilemmas posed by the binaries of bandwagoning and balancing. These cases examine the trajectories of these relations and the scope for managing China while prioritizing values over short-term, narrow interests. Let me explain further. Graham Allison’s study on the ‘Thucydides Trap’ captured the essence of the challenge posed to the United States by a rising China. The study revealed that over the past 500 years, in 12 out of 16 cases ‘in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power’, the result was war. ‘When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of not just the challenger but also the challenged.’ For Allison, How not to deal with a rising China the defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’ Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago.8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Graham T. Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap: are the US and China headed for war?’, The Atlantic, 24 Sept. 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/. For the use of these terms drawn from ornithology, see Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘Hawks, doves and owls: a new perspective on avoiding nuclear war’, International Affairs 61: 4, 1985, pp. 581–89; Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive defense: a new security strategy for America (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Michal Onderco and Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Of hawks and doves: mapping policies toward Iran and North Korea’, Nonproliferation Review 19: 2, 2012, pp. 177–95. For Johnston, ‘Engagers argue that China is becoming socialized, though mainly in the sphere of economic norms (e.g., free trade and domestic marketization). Skeptics either conclude that this is not the case, due to the nature of the regime (for some, China is still Red China; for more sophisticated skeptics, China is flirting with fascism), or that it could not possibly happen because China as a rising power, by definition, is dissatisfied with the US-dominated global order (a power-transition realpolitik argument).’ Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a status quo power?’, International Security 27: 4, 2003, pp. 5–56 at p. 5. For a deeper understanding of Weber, see Rolf E. Rogers, Max Weber’s ideal type theory (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969). Johnston, ‘Is China a status quo power?’; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?’, International Security 37: 4, 2013, pp. 7–48; Stefan Halper and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘The China threat [with reply]’, Foreign Policy, no. 185, 2011, pp. 18–19. Nye, ‘How not to deal with a rising China’, p. 1647. See Francis P. Sempa, ‘Is H. R. McMaster the new Mr X?’, The Diplomat, 23 April 2020. H. R. McMaster, ‘How China sees the world—and how we should see China’, The Atlantic, May 2020, https:// www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/05/mcmaster-china-strategy/609088/. 1655 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 While the debate on the dilemmas posed by a rising China predated Allison’s study, the responses can be slotted along familiar Manichean lines of ‘accommodation’ by doves or ‘containment’ by hawks9—or, for Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘skeptics’ versus ‘engagers’.10 We use this binary typology as old-fashioned Weberian ‘ideal-types’: subjective mental constructs that may be exaggerated but are nonetheless useful analytical tools that help us to understand and make sense of a complex reality.11 We see ‘doves’, arguing mainly in favour of strategies of accommodation (Nye, Stein, Johnston and others), as excessively optimistic if not misguided, given not only China’s history of aggression in the second half of the last century but also its expansionism in recent years.12 Even in this special issue, Nye argues against a ‘demonization’ of China, describes the Sino-US relationship as ‘cooperative rivalry’ and advocates ‘equal attention’ being paid to both halves of the description. Nye also approvingly quotes Australia’s former prime minister Kevin Rudd, who argues that the challenge is to manage the competition with China rather than experience ‘defeat’ or ‘total victory.’13 Indeed, the former US National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, in an unusually incisive essay (even regarded by some as a contemporary avatar of George Kennan’s 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, ‘The sources of Soviet conduct’, which was written under the pseudonym Mr. X),14 viewed an accommodative approach as driven by American ‘strategic narcissism’ and its ‘long-held assumptions’ that greater integration of China into the world would have a ‘liberalizing effect on the country’, of which McMaster saw no evidence.15 My case-studies, too, reveal the costs that straightforward engagement or constructive cooperation has produced. Amitabh Mattoo the old containment was simple, if not easy. The new containment will have to blend a variety of policies, carefully coordinated with one another in design and execution. This will tax the ingenuity and flexibility of the United States and its allies.18 The cases I have selected are not sui generis but representative of a pattern of Chinese behaviour in the region; indeed, no state in the region has been excluded from Beijing’s strategy, which is applied to Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and even the small island state of the Maldives. In suggesting a strategy that combines interests with values I draw from my understanding of dharma, a concept most clearly articulated by Krishna in the epic depicting the great war, the Mahabharata, in his dialogue with Arjuna; here dharma combines statecraft rooted in realpolitik with righteousness.19 Nuclear proliferation: China and Pakistan The clearest example of China’s regional hegemonic aspirations, as well as its revisionism, has been its clandestine but well-documented support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. This has been in violation of the letter and spirit of the nuclear non-proliferation regime—despite China being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group since 2004, and having earlier become part of the International Atomic 16 17 18 19 Elbridge Colby, ‘Asia goes nuclear’, The National Interest, no. 135, 2015, pp. 28–37; Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner, ‘Opening gambit: roiling the waters’, Foreign Policy, no. 204, 2014, pp. 10–13. McMaster, ‘How China sees the world’. See also his memoir: H. R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: the fight to defend the free world (New York: Harper, 2020). Michael Mandelbaum, ‘The new containment: handling Russia, China, and Iran’, Foreign Affairs 2: 12, 2019, p. 6. Mandelbaum’s ‘new’ containment strategy includes three challengers: Russia, Iran and, of course, China. The concluding section of this article, on positionality, will expand on my views on dharma. 1656 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 But those arguing for an entirely interest-based strategy of containment (for instance, Elbridge Colby’s strategy of denial) may also be wide of the mark, especially when seen from the perspective of China’s neighbours.16 Colby argues from an American perspective that the United States should primarily sustain an antihegemonic coalition to deny China’s ambitions to dominate Asia, without much sensitivity to the costs that will be borne by the states in the region—even the countries that China is targeting. My case-studies show that containment—on its own and based entirely on interests (as divorced from values)—may not have reduced the risks associated with China, increasing both the incentives for bandwagoning among smaller states and Beijing’s willingness to punish those who are unwilling to capitulate to its hegemonic aspirations. Instead, a strategy that involves close cooperation with like-minded allies in the region, and one that will require attention to shared interests as well as shared values, is possibly a way forward to manage China, especially if critical norms regarding non-proliferation and human rights are also to be strengthened. As McMaster points out accurately: ‘China’s overall strategy relies on co-option and coercion at home and abroad, as well as on concealing the nature of China’s true intentions.’17 And, as Michael Mandelbaum argues, How not to deal with a rising China China’s role in Pakistan’s proliferation China was among the countries where Pakistani scientists and engineers were trained under the aegis of Atoms for Peace. While the seeds for nuclear intimacy between the two nations were sown in the mid-1960s (driven by the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and Chinese support for Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965), there is incontrovertible evidence for the direct transfer of nuclear technology and assistance to enrich uranium from the early 1980s onwards.22 China is also believed to have provided Pakistan with designs of nuclear weapons and delivery systems; there is evidence of no other bilateral collaboration on such a scale for the development of nuclear weapons.23 For instance, China was responsible for developing Pakistan’s Chashma reactors and M-11 short-range ballistic missiles; and Chinese assistance was provided for, among other projects, the development 20 21 22 23 Scott Sagan, ‘Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb’, International Security 21: 3, 1996–7, pp. 54–86. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s nuclear programme, its sources and motivations’, Modern Asian Studies 36: 4, 2002, pp. 873–4. See also: Andrew Small, The China–Pakistan axis: Asia’s new geopolitics (London: Hurst, 2015). For an early commentary read: P. K. S. Namboodiri, ‘China–Pak nuclear axis?, Strategic Analysis 6: 7, 1982, pp. 407–17. For an empathetic history of Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons, see: Feroz Khan, Eating grass: the making of the Pakistani bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012). Chidanand Rajghatta, ‘China gifted 50 kg uranium for two bombs to Pakistan’, Economic Times, 13 Nov. 2009, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/china-gifted-50-kg-uranium-for-twobombs-to-pakistan/articleshow/5226309.cms?from=mdr; Douglas Waller, ‘The secret missile deal’, Time, 30 June 1997. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 25 June 2022.) G. Parthasarathy, ‘Beware the China–Pakistan nuclear axis’, Hindu Businessline, 9 March 2018, https://www. thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/beware-the-china-pakistan-nuclear-axis/article22220540.ece1. 1657 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 Energy Agency (1984). It is also increasingly clear that this support was built on a common strategy of ‘containing’ India’s aspirations as well as establishing regional primacy by securing Pakistan’s subservience. Pakistan’s nuclear capability, rooted in a civil nuclear energy programme, eventually became the centre of many ‘proliferation’ networks, including those promoted by the nuclear scientist Dr A. Q. Khan, one of the founders of its nuclear programme. China has been critically significant in driving Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and missile delivery systems, unarguably in violation of its international treaty commitments. The collaboration continues to the present day, and as China rises and conflicts in the region intensify, the issue of nuclear proliferation requires renewed attention. As in the case of all other nuclear weapon states, a combination of factors explains the rationale behind Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons: security calculations, domestic factors and normative reasons such as prestige.20 However, the strongest motivation has been Pakistan’s need to deter India.21 In pursuing this goal, it has received unprecedented assistance from China. The Pakistani nuclear programme essentially began as a civilian nuclear programme following the US ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative but, in the 1970s (accelerated by defeat in the war of 1971 against India), its quest for nuclear weapons became the programme’s central feature. Amitabh Mattoo 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Siddhartha Ramana, China–Pakistan nuclear alliance: an analysis, IPCS Special Report 109, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Aug. 2011, http://www.ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/SR109.pdf. Timeline of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Arms Control Association, n.d., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-the-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT. Binoda Kumar Mishra, ‘The China factor in south Asian nuclear politics’, in Bhumitra Chakma, ed., The politics of nuclear weapons in south Asia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 103; Jing-dong Yuan, Assessing Chinese nonproliferation policy: progress, problems and issues for the United States, James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 4 Jan. 2002, https://nonproliferation.org/assessing-chinese-nonproliferation-policy-progress-problems-and-issues-for-the-united-states/. T. V. Paul, ‘Chinese–Pakistani nuclear/missile ties and the balance of power’, Nonproliferation Review 10: 2, 2003, pp. 3–6. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, ‘Scientist: China gave Pakistan nuke blueprint’, NBC News, 13 Nov. 2009, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna33904300. S. P. Shahi, Pakistan’s foreign policy (Delhi: Surendra, 2016), pp. 224–5. Marvin Kalb, The agonizing problem of Pakistan’s nukes, Brookings Institution, 28 Sept. 2021, https://www. brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/28/the-agonizing-problem-of-pakistans-nukes/. Joseph Hincks, ‘Saudi Arabia is investing $20 billion in Pakistan. Here’s what it’s getting in return’, Time, 19 Feb. 2019, https://time.com/5531724/saudi-arabia-pakistan-mbs-imran-khan/. SIPRI Yearbook 2021: armaments, disarmament and international security: summary (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021), pp. 16–17. ‘China–Pakistan new nuclear deal may push world towards renewed arms race, conflict’, ANI, 18 Sept. 2021, https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/china-pakistan-new-nuclear-deal-may-push-world-towards-renewed-arms-race-conflict20210918062533/. 1658 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 of gas centrifuges at Kahuta and the provision of heavy water for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor.24 Even though China acceded to the NPT on 2 March 1992,25 it sustained clandestine support to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.26 In later years, while China committed itself even more fully to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it did not stop supporting that programme.27 Moreover, China’s claimed adherence to the guidelines of the missile technology control regime runs counter to its deep involvement in the development of Pakistan’s missile-based delivery systems. Chinese assistance provided a channel for further proliferation through Pakistan. There is also evidence to link Dr A. Q. Khan and China;28 through this close collaboration, a ‘wider proliferation circle’ emerged, including North Korea’s and Libya’s nuclear programmes.29 There are also reports of Pakistan assisting Saudi Arabia in its quest for nuclear weapons,30 while Pakistan’s ties with several terrorist groups, including the Taliban, leaves open the possibility of these non-state actors accessing nuclear technology through their mentors in Pakistan’s military headquarters at Rawalpindi.31 Recent SIPRI reports provide further evidence of the increasing dangers of proliferation in the region because of this collaboration.32 The signing by China and Pakistan of the Framework Agreement on Deepening Nuclear Energy Cooperation on 8 September 2021 reflects continuing convergence in the nuclear realm, even while China is in the middle of a major modernization of its arsenal.33 Under the agreement, China will help build four more nuclear plants in Pakistan and will expand substantially nuclear cooperation with Islamabad. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is principally motivated by its concerns over India, making the relationship a a triadic one, involving China, Pakistan and India. A nuclear Pakistan allows China to complicate India’s nuclear calculations and doctrinal considerations, as well as to establish its dominance firmly in the region. How not to deal with a rising China Infrastructure investment: China and Sri Lanka Through its investment in and considerable assistance to the island state of Sri Lanka, China has dramatically increased its influence and arguably eroded Colombo’s capacity to make independent decisions on key issues of foreign policy. Not 34 35 36 37 38 39 Khalid Iqbal, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear program: the context’, Policy Perspectives 13: 1, 2016, p. 44; Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai’, p. 902. Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai’, p. 882. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s nuclear bomb: a story of defiance, deterrence and deviance (Delhi: Penguin Allen Lane, 2018), p. 71; Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Pakistan’, in Jozef Goldblat, ed., Non-proliferation: the why and the wherefore (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 135. Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai’, pp. 894–7. Masood Khalid, Pakistan–China relations in a changing geopolitical environment, ISAS working paper, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/ pakistan-china-relations-in-a-changing-geopolitical-environment/. Khalid, Pakistan–China relations in a changing geopolitical environment. 1659 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 While closer relations between India and the United States have further catalysed the Sino-Pakistani relationship, especially after the nuclear deal between Washington and New Delhi in 2006, the irony is that Pakistan was a close US ally during much of the Cold War.34 From the 1950s into the early 1970s, Pakistan was a member of the UK-inspired Central Treaty Organization and the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, while at the same time maintaining a close relationship with Beijing.35 After the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became a critical US ally. The Reagan administration provided Pakistan with US$3.2 billion in aid as part of its strategy to contain the Soviet Union.36 The Reagan and Bush administrations also ignored the Solarz and Pressler amendments (Pakistanspecific anti-proliferation legislation), which sought to promote non-proliferation to ensure Pakistan’s continued support in Afghanistan. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan bolstered existing Chinese–Pakistani nuclear cooperation and paved the way for clandestine collaboration in missile systems.37 The roots of Sino-Pakistani relations lie in their mutual security concerns vis-àvis India.38 The two began to build ties in the 1960s, agreeing to a border settlement treaty in 1963 soon after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Pakistan was crucial in facilitating US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971. Successive governments in both countries have committed to the ‘all-weather’ friendship, which is crucial for them to achieve their national and common regional goals.39 In recent decades, the balance has tilted in favour of India in US foreign policy calculations. Simultaneously, bilateral relations between India and Pakistan are going through a period of great mistrust and volatility. Inclusion and development of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), show China’s commitment to Pakistan while overlooking India’s concerns for its security and sovereignty. In addition to this, the Taliban’s coming to power in Afghanistan provides an incentive for Pakistan to commit itself to intensifying its proximity to Beijing. Amitabh Mattoo only is China the biggest trading partner of Sri Lanka, but the latter has also emerged as one of China’s most important partners in the BRI.40 Increasing Chinese investment in key areas in Sri Lanka has led to the widespread claim that Colombo may have compromised on its sovereignty by undertaking these projects.41 Chinese investment in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 European Commission, Countries and regions: Sri Lanka, n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countriesand-regions/countries/sri-lanka/. US Department of State, ‘A conversation with Ambassador Alice Wells on the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor’, Wilson Center, Washington DC, 21 Nov. 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/conversation-ambassador-alice-wells-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor; Meera Srinivasan, ‘Sri Lanka opposition, civil society mount legal challenge to Chinese-backed Port City Bill’, The Hindu, 15 April 2021, https:// www.thehindu.com/news/international/challenges-to-china-backed-colombo-port-project-land-in-sc/article34329231.ece. On the larger aspects of China’s international economic diplomacy see: Lina Benabdallah, ‘Contesting the international order by integrating it: the case of China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, Third World Quarterly 40: 1, 2019, pp. 92–108; Deborah Brautigam, ‘A critical look at Chinese “debt-trap diplomacy”: the rise of a meme’, Area Development and Policy 5: 1, 2020, pp. 1–14; Deborah Brautigam and Tang Xiaoyang, ‘Economic statecraft in China’s new overseas special economic zones: soft power, business or resource security?’, International Affairs 88: 4, 2012, pp. 799–816; Shaun Breslin, ‘China and the South: objectives, actors and interactions’, Development and Change 44: 6, 2013, pp. 1273–94. Nilanthi Samaranayake, ‘Are Sri Lanka’s relations with China deepening? An analysis of economic, military and diplomatic data’, Asian Security 7: 2, 2011, pp. 119–46. Umesh Moramudali, ‘The economics of the China–India–Sri Lanka triangle’, The Diplomat, 1 May 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/the-economics-of-the-china-india-sri-lanka-triangle. Bhagya Senaratne, ‘Chinese financing in south Asia: the story of Sri Lanka’, South Asian Voices (Stimson Center), 21 Jan. 2021. Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara and Divya Hundlani, Chinese investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 2020), p. 5. Ankit Panda, ‘Sri Lanka formally hands over Hambantota port to Chinese firms on 99-year lease’, The Diplomat, 11 Dec. 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/sri-lanka-formally-hands-over-hambantota-port-tochinese-firms-on-99-year-lease/; Selina Ho, ‘Infrastructure and Chinese power’, International Affairs 96: 6, 2020, pp. 1461–85. Gulbin Sultana, ‘“Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act” breeds economic and geostrategic concerns’, Financial Express, 2 June 2021, https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/colombo-port-cityeconomic-commission-act-breeds-economic-and-geostrategic-concerns/2263439/. 1660 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 For Sri Lanka, until the early 2000s, India was a far more important economic partner than China.42 It was in the 2010s that China emerged as its most important investment and trade partner. Between 2010 and 2020, ‘China has been the largest foreign investor in Sri Lanka’.43 China’s investment in Sri Lanka predates the BRI. However, since the launch of the BRI in 2013,44 Chinese infrastructure investment in the country has risen from US$5.4 billion between 2006 to 2012 to US$6.8 billion (2013–19).45 Hambantota port and Colombo Port City are good examples of growing Chinese encroachment in Sri Lanka. They are viewed as part of a ‘string of pearls’ strategy of encirclement that found takers within the strategic community after the leasing out of Hambantota port to China.46 In May 2021, Sri Lanka passed a bill to approve the Colombo Port City project despite protests in the country and concerns about the bill’s constitutionality.47 Approval of the bill in the face of such opposition marks another success for China’s creeping development diplomacy in the region. China’s infrastructure investment in Sri Lanka pays immediate economic dividends while also serving Beijing’s medium- and long-term strategic How not to deal with a rising China 48 49 50 51 52 53 Shu Zhang and Matthew Miller, ‘Behind China’s Silk Road vision: cheap funds, heavy debt, growing risk’, Reuters, 15 May 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-finance-idUSKCN18B0YS; How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China’s interests?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, n.d., https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/. Wignaraja et al., Chinese investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka, p. 8. Deep Pal, China’s influence in south Asia: vulnerabilities and resilience in four countries (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oct. 2021), p. 11. Shantanu Roy Chaudhury, ‘How China is expanding global influence via debt trap diplomacy’, The Wire, 7 March 2021, https://thewire.in/world/china-debt-trap-diplomacy-south-asia-europe. Pal, China’s influence in south Asia, p. 6. Press Trust of India, ‘Sirisena backs Xi’s Maritime Silk Road project’, Business Standard, 7 Feb. 2017, https://www. business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/sirisena-backs-xi-s-maritime-silk-road-project-117020700853_1. html. 1661 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 goals. China has been proactive in pushing for such development projects in other regions as well, even before demand emerges from the recipient states. This is also being witnessed, for instance, in China’s efforts to dominate the forthcoming 5G mobile communications infrastructure. China has provided large amounts of capital through its financial institutions, such as the China Development Bank and the Export–Import Bank of China, to enable its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to make highly competitive bids against competitors such as Japan.48 This allows China to expand its export markets and popularize the use of its currency. However, domestic needs and factors are also crucial drivers of this relationship. For example, the Hambantota project is located in former prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa’s constituency, and in an area in an area hit by the 2004 tsunami. Further, Sri Lanka suffers from a marked infrastructure gap,49 and China has been one of the major sources of finance to fill this gap when other countries were reluctant owing to Sri Lanka’s human rights record. Apart from the headline projects, Chinese investment has meant a vast expansion of Sri Lanka’s roads and the expressways, development of its non-renewable energy sector, and enhanced delivery of public services such as water and sanitation. Relations between the two countries are also built at people-to-people level, facilitated by growing tourism and the popularity of Buddhist historical sites in Sri Lanka. A key feature of China’s development assistance in the region has been the appointment of ambassadors such as Cheng Xueyuan, who came from the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party and not the traditional diplomatic corps.50 This, in effect, creates a direct link between the higher rungs of leadership of the two countries and takes project operation into fast-track mode. ‘Debt trap’ may be a reductionist way to encapsulate the relationship between China and Sri Lanka, as Sri Lanka may have initially used China’s economic diplomacy to fuel its development. However, over the years, its reliance on Chinese loans has increased.51 There has also been a rapid growth in government-togovernment interactions.52 The Chinese political leadership, as well as the heads of the SOEs, have built personal relationships with the formerly ruling Rajapaksa family. Even in the brief interregnum between the Rajapaksa regimes, the Sirisena government endorsed the BRI and continued the projects, despite having criticized them during the tenure of the preceding government.53 Amitabh Mattoo Although it is clear that Sri Lanka’s relationship with China has been tightening on the basis of increased economic, military, and diplomatic interactions, no evidence exists that Sri Lanka will be obligated to China strategically due to these stronger ties. Sri Lanka has economic debts to pay China due to infrastructure development loans and weapons used in its civil war, but there is no proof at this point that these will translate to Chinese strategic sway over major Sri Lankan foreign policy decisions such as band wagoning with China against India and the United States.58 Nevertheless, while the economic relations between China and Sri Lanka are the primary concern for this article, these relations are built on a strong political partnership. China was the main weapons supplier to the Sri Lankan government, and this helped the Rajapaksas end the civil war. Further, China has been a constant supporter of Sri Lanka at the UN, and has blocked several attempts to investigate the Sri Lankan government’s alleged human rights violations during the civil war. In 2017, Sri Lanka’s inability to service its debt forced it to lease out Hambantota to a Chinese company. Since 2019, China has risen to become Sri Lanka’s biggest bilateral lender, to the point where it owns roughly 10 per cent of all external loans taken out by Colombo. Initially, most loans were targeted for infrastruc54 55 56 57 58 N. P. R. Deyshappriya, A. A. K. A. Damanupola and M. M. T. D. M. Kumari, ‘Sri Lanka–China tourism relations: an analysis of recent trends in Chinese tourist arrivals to Sri Lanka’, Sri Lanka Journal of Advanced Social Studies 9: 1, 2019, p. 56. Ananth Krishnan, ‘China backs Sri Lanka on UNHRC resolution’, The Hindu, 22 March 2012, https://www. thehindu.com/news/international/china-backs-sri-lanka-on-unhrc-resolution/article3088478.ece. Pal, China’s influence in south Asia, p. 21. Srinivasan, ‘Sri Lanka opposition, civil society mount legal challenge to Chinese-backed Port City Bill’. Samaranayake, ‘Are Sri Lanka’s relations with China deepening?’, p. 139. 1662 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 China has used a variety of instruments to increase its influence in Sri Lanka, even during the civil war within the country. In 2002, when the tourism industry was struggling, China endorsed Sri Lanka as an official tourist destination. Today, China is one of the largest sources of tourists to Sri Lanka.54 China has defended Sri Lanka against charges of human rights abuses that have attracted widespread international attention as well as indictment by independent agencies.55 The two states often stand with each other, in multilateral forums, on sensitive domestic issues including those related to Taiwan, Tamil separatism and the Uyghurs.56 The lack of a strong civil society and robust state institutions in Sri Lanka has meant that even popular discontent has failed to restrain the progress of the projects endorsed and funded by Beijing.57 Moreover, China’s influence has increased dramatically while India’s involvement has waned; historically, New Delhi had been the most important external player in the country. In Sri Lanka, as in a few other states of south Asia, China has shown an ability to make great inroads by exploiting weak state institutions, building relationships beyond governments, and demonstrating remarkable consistency when other powers may have been fickle in their policies. However, there are voices that warn against an over-reading of Chinese influence. According to Nilanthi Samaranayake: How not to deal with a rising China Diplomatic sources in Colombo say Beijing is advising Sri Lanka against turning to the IMF and offering bilateral financial support of its own. China’s penetration of the Sri Lankan elite has been deep, and Beijing’s influence on the Rajapaksa government persists. But as the economic crisis deepens and political shifts continue in Sri Lanka, New Delhi and Washington will hope Colombo’s shift away from Beijing will accelerate.61 Robayt Khondoker and Rashed Uz Zaman believe that Sri Lanka has made use of ‘positive hedging’ while dealing with China by employing ‘active engagement and accommodation’.62 Hedging is a go-to option for Asian states where there is uncertainty about power transition, the influence of actors beyond China and the United States, and the existence of complex networks.63 A consequence of the ‘debt trap’ diplomacy has been the renewed interest in Sri Lanka on the part of countries such as Japan and the United States. The Sri Lankan government may be able to use the fear of Washington and other like-minded capitals to attract investment. Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s 2019 election manifesto projected a ‘friendly’ and ‘non-aligned’ foreign policy.64 Moreover, it specifically mentioned ‘working closely with India’ and ensuring ‘that ownership of strategic assets’ is not transferred to a foreign country. China, on the other hand, is mentioned in a list of 59 60 61 62 63 64 Moramudali, ‘The economics of the China–India–Sri Lanka triangle’. Dushni Weerakoon, Utsav Kumar and Roselle Dime, Sri Lanka’s macroeconomic challenges: a tale of two deficits, Asian Development Bank South Asia working paper no. 63, March 2019, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/ files/publication/493451/swp-063-sri-lanka-macroeconomic-challenges-two-deficits.pdf. C. Raja Mohan, ‘Across south Asia, US and India push back against China’, Foreign Policy, 6 April 2022, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/06/us-india-china-sri-lanka-south-asia-geopolitics/#. Robayt Khondoker and Rashed Uz Zaman, ‘Coping with rising China: responses of the small states of south Asia’, in Rajiv Ranjan and Guo Changgang, eds, China and south Asia: changing regional dynamics, development and power play (New Delhi: Routledge, 2022), p. 64. Van Jackson, ‘Power, trust, and network complexity: three logics of hedging in Asian security’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 14: 3, 2014, pp. 331–56. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Vistas of prosperity and splendour, 2019, p. 15. 1663 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 ture projects, but of late Sri Lanka has depended on Chinese loans for budgetary support and to manage its balance of payments.59 Between 2018 and 2022, Sri Lanka has signed multiple currency swaps and foreign currency term financing facilities with China. These instruments have provided China with great leverage over Sri Lanka. The 2022 economic crisis in Sri Lanka warrants attention. As a result of political and economic mismanagement, Sri Lanka suffers from a ‘twin deficit’ problem.60 Its domestic expenditure far exceeds its national income, and the state suffers from a stark current account deficit as well. The shortage of foreign currency and maturing international debt have rendered the economy dysfunctional. This crisis has also revealed that though Sri Lanka owes a significant amount to China in the form of high-interest loans, its current state is primarily the result of a lack of prudence in macroeconomics. Since 2020, as the pandemic has wiped out entire economic sectors in Sri Lanka, the country has looked for assistance from states such as India before China. It is, in effect, trying to reduce its economic reliance on China. As Raja Mohan points out: Amitabh Mattoo developed countries whose standing in commerce and trade must be acknowledged. There is a clear attempt to diversify relations. Rajapaksa’s first diplomatic meeting after his election victory was with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Sri Lankan foreign policy seems to be on the track of attracting interest but avoiding entanglements. It has used China’s rise and eagerness to invest in its development; however, it will avoid limiting its options and increasing interaction with India and the US attests to its attempts at striking a balance. The way China has escalated its border conflict with India over the past few years illustrates the extent to which Beijing is willing to punish regional players that are unwilling to accept its dominance and hegemony, or that seek to counter its growing power and influence within and outside the region. Beijing’s new aggressiveness has coincided with the strengthening of India’s ties with the United States, particularly after the nuclear deal of 2006.65 India shares its second longest border with China, and this is still contested. The border has been a source of tension between the two countries since the 1962 Sino-Indian war, despite the confidence-building measures initiated over the past three decades and China’s becoming one of India’s largest trading partners. Over the past decade, it has become obvious to key Indian decision-makers and negotiators that the hope that a web of rules-based arrangements would compel China into accepting the status quo and gradually produce an institutionalized commitment to a liberal order, domestically as well as internationally, has proven to be a chimera. It has also become clear that a privileging of Chinese strategic culture by some west and south Asian Sinologists, based on a Confucian–Mencian paradigm rather than a much more aggressive parabellum Chinese strategic culture, represented at the very least an underestimation of the challenge posed by Chinese revisionism.66 On the contrary, Indian negotiators believe that Chinese decision-makers have internalized what Johnston describes as a ‘parabellum strategic culture so that Chinese strategic behaviour exhibits a preference for offensive uses of force, mediated by a keen sensitivity to relative capabilities’. Here the external environment is viewed ‘as dangerous, adversaries as dispositionally threatening, and conflict as zero sum, in which the application of violence is ultimately required to deal with threats’.67 65 66 67 Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa, ‘India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle’, International Affairs 97: 3, 2021, pp. 801–22; Sidra Hamidi, ‘Constructing nuclear responsibility in US–India relations’, International Affairs 98: 2, 2022, pp. 707–25. See section on positionality at the end of this article. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural realism: strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) p. 155; also Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Cultural realism and strategy in Maoist China’, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 216–68; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China’s militarized interstate dispute behaviour 1949–92: a first cut at the data’, China Quarterly, vol. 153, 1998, pp. 1–30. 1664 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 Border conflict: China and India How not to deal with a rising China History of the border conflict The Sino-Indian border conflict is rooted in the colonial past. In 1913, the British convened a meeting in Shimla at which representatives from China, British India and Tibet came together to settle the borders. The agreement following the convention was signed in 1914.69 The 3,488-kilometre Sino-Indian border was divided into three sections. The Johnson line defines the western sector and marks the boundary between Ladakh and China. The middle sector is the relatively stable part of the border, the only part for which India and China have exchanged maps and have a broad agreement.70 The McMohan line delineates the eastern sector between India’s Arunachal Pradesh and China. The western and eastern sectors have been constant points of conflict between the two states. China claims parts of Indian territory in both sectors as its own, and has rejected both the Shimla Accord and the McMohan line.71 In the late 1950s, China also began construction of roads through Aksai Chin (Indian territory according to the Johnson line) to link Tibet with Xinjiang. Diplo68 69 70 71 Nirupama Rao, The fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949–62 (Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2021); Shivshankar Menon, India and Asian geopolitics: the past, present (Delhi: Penguin Allen Lane, 2021); Vijay Gokhale, The long game: how the Chinese negotiate with India (Delhi: Penguin, 2021); Vijay Gokhale, Tiananmen Square: the making of a protest—a diplomat looks back (Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2021); Ananth Krishnan, India’s China challenge: a journey through China’s rise and what it means for India (Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2020); Shyam Saran, How India sees the world: Kautilya to the 21st century (Delhi: Juggernaut, 2017). R. S. Kalha, The McMohan Line: a hundred years on, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 3 July 2014, https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheMcMahonLine_rskalha_030714. For the history of the Johnson line, see Mohan Guruswamy, ‘India–China border: learning from history’, Economic and Political Weekly 38: 39, 2003, pp. 4101–3. See also A. S. Bhasin, Nehru, Tibet and China (New Delhi: Penguin, 2021); A. G. Noorani, India–China boundary problem, 1846–1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Manoj Joshi, Understanding the India–China border: the enduring threat of war in High Himalaya (London: Hurst, 2022). Sushant Singh, ‘Line of Actual Control (LAC): where it is located, and where India and China differ’, Indian Express, 1 June 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/line-of-actual-control-where-it-is-locatedand-where-india-and-china-differ-6436436/. Rao, The fractured Himalaya, pp. 474–83. 1665 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 This hard-line approach was particularly clear in the negotiations over the disputed border between India and China, where Beijing’s apparent unwillingness to arrive at a pragmatic settlement also revealed a grander design to box India into south Asia, and to limit its influence within and outside its neighbourhood. Similarly, the deep connection between China and Pakistan over the latter’s nuclear programme was driven by a common hostility towards India and its extraregional aspirations, as well as by Islamabad’s historical disappointment in the inconsistency of US policies towards the region. Recent writings by key Indians involved in negotiations with China provide further evidence for the complex and often inscrutable Chinese policies towards India.68 Most importantly, it is evident that China is seeking primacy in the region and is willing to deploy a range of instruments to establish its regional dominance, including the promotion of a range of incentives to smaller states to promote bandwagoning. In sum, China has been limiting India’s abilities to balance while encouraging Sri Lanka and Pakistan to bandwagon. In doing so, China has demonstrated remarkable strategic patience while incrementally, slowly but surely, making inroads into the region. Amitabh Mattoo Recent escalations Narendra Modi’s government came into power with the promise of improving relations with China. The informal Wuhan summit of 2018 was widely viewed as a potential turning-point in the relationship between the two countries. At their second informal summit, near Chennai in 2019, the leaders agreed to not let ‘differences on any issue to become disputes’.75 However, the goodwill generated by the ‘Wuhan Spirit’ and ‘Chennai Connect’ has now receded into history. The first major confrontation had emerged before these informal summits, in Doklam in 2017. Doklam lies at a trijunction between India, China and Bhutan; Bhutan’s relationship with India has traditionally been deep and close.76 In June 2017, China started construction on a road near Doka La pass in the Doklam region, which falls inside Bhutanese territory. India supports Bhutan’s claims on the territory, while China claims that Doklam is part of Tibet. Moreover, Chinese presence in the region threatens India’s Siliguri corridor, often described as the ‘chicken neck’.77 For decades, the tensions in this area had been managed through diplomatic channels. Therefore, India (under Operation Juniper) responded on 18 June 2017 to prevent any new construction.78 Both India and China published historical reports to buttress their claims over the disputed territory.79 On 28 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Ivan Lidarev, ‘History’s hostage: China, India and the war of 1962’, The Diplomat, 21 Aug. 2012, https:// thediplomat.com/2012/08/historys-hostage-china-india-and-the-war-of-1962/; see also Srinath Raghavan, ‘Sino-Indian boundary dispute, 1948–60: a reappraisal’, Economic and Political Weekly 41: 36, 2006, pp. 3882–92. GPD, ‘India–China border: a new possibility’, Economic and Political Weekly 23: 18, 1988, p. 877. The wellknown China expert Govind Purshottam Deshpande wrote a regular column in the Economic and Political Weekly using the acronym GPD. Mihir Bhonsale, Understanding Sino-Indian border issues: an analysis of events reported in Indian media, occasional papers no. 143 (ORF, 2018), pp. 5–12. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘2nd India–China informal summit’, 12 Oct. 2019, https:// www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31938/2nd_IndiaChina_Informal_Summit. Sarina Theysand Katharina Rietig, ‘The influence of small states: how Bhutan succeeds in influencing global sustainability governance’, International Affairs 96: 6, 2020, pp. 1603–22. Josy Joseph, ‘What is the Doklam issue all about?’, The Hindu, 27 Jan. 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/ national/what-is-the-doklam-issue-all-about/article22536937.ece. Snehesh Alex Philip, ‘Operation Juniper—inside story of how Indian Army pushed China back from Doklam’, The Print, 17 Oct. 2019, https://theprint.in/defence/operation-juniper-indian-armys-human-wall-chinadoklam/307332/. Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘Letters show Nehru didn’t endorse British-era treaty with China on Sikkim border’, Hindustan Times, 4 July 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nehru-s-1959-letters-provechina-s-bluff-on-india-s-acceptance-of-sikkim-border/story-3pcPZxmYlHdilnxXSWr0yH.html. 1666 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 matic channels and high-level visits, including those of Premier Zhou Enlai to India, failed to settle the border conflict. This eventually led to a brief war in 1962, in the course of which China annexed Aksai Chin.72 The war of 1962 led to a breakdown of relations between the two countries that lasted for over two decades. In the 1980s, India and China—even though failing to demarcate the border—began negotiations on mutually agreeable principles.73 However, even during the years of relative calm, there were at least 30 reported incidents of Chinese incursions into Indian territory between 2003 and 2014.74 Since 2014, the border conflict has taken centre stage with the conflict at its most intense since the 1962 war. How not to deal with a rising China 80 81 82 83 84 85 Ashok Sajjanhar, The Doklam crisis ends: a diplomatic victory for India, Observer Research Foundation, 30 Aug. 2017, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-doklam-crisis-ends-a-diplomatic-victory-for-india/; Pragya Pandey, ‘2017 BRICS summit: post-Doklam, India, China meet in Xiamen’, The Diplomat, 7 Sept. 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/2017-brics-summit-post-doklam-india-china-meet-in-xiamen/. The Line of Actual Control is a notional line that separates Chinese-controlled territory from Indiancontrolled territory on the disputed Sino-Indian border. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Why are China and India skirmishing at their border? Here’s 4 things to know’, Washington Post, 2 June 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/02/why-are-china-india-skirmishingtheir-border-heres-4-things-know/. ‘Full text: PM Modi’s address to Indian armed forces in Leh’, Indian Express, 5 July 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/narendra-modi-speech-india-china-border-dispute-galwan-pangong-tso-ladakh-lehnimu/. ‘Galwan Valley: a year after the violent clash’, Indian Express, 14 June 2021, https://indianexpress.com/article/ india/galwan-valley-clash-timeline-india-china-disengagement-7358554/. ‘Explained: why China rakes up Arunachal Pradesh time and again’, Times of India, 14 Oct. 2021, https:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/explained-why-china-rakes-up-arunachal-pradesh-time-and-again/articleshow/87023193.cms. 1667 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 August 2017, after weeks of diplomatic negotiations, India and China mutually agreed to disengage; troops were demobilized and returned to their original posts. A week later, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping held lengthy bilateral discussions on the sidelines of the BRICS summit held in Xiamen, China. At that point, while there were doubts over the sincerity and longevity of de-escalation, both states were able to save face.80 On 15 June 2020, at the height of the COVID–19 pandemic, India and China clashed—in an almost medieval fashion, with clubs and rocks—in the Galwan valley in the western sector, with the loss of several military personnel on both sides. The stand-off had begun in May, with China mobilizing troops near the Galwan valley and Pangong Tso lake. This was apparently a reaction to India’s road construction near the Line of Actual Control81 but clearly a new Chinese assertiveness was on display.82 In fact, a scuffle had broken out at Naku La in Sikkim in early May, leading to the first violent confrontation between the two nations since 1975. Since then, a series of diplomatic and military talks have taken place with a view to mutual disengagement in this sector, but Chinese intransigence has prevented any chances of a breakthrough. However, on the domestic front, national passions have been stoked, and relations at a popular level have plummeted to a new nadir.83 The Indian government also imposed a ban on a number of Chinese web-based applications, including the video-sharing platform TikTok. Military and diplomatic efforts have brought about a gradual easing of tensions. Indian and Chinese troops began synchronized disengagement from the northern and southern shores of Pangong Tso in February 2021.84 The situation has not reverted to the pre-clash status quo, however, and is unlikely to do so. The Chinese and Indian governments have been very sensitive over the issue of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector. China lays claim to the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, with a primary interest in Tawang district that is directly rooted in China’s revisionism over the Shimla Accord and the McMohan line.85 Control over this district would provide China with access to India’s north-eastern states, which are currently buffered by Arunachal Pradesh. Further, Tawang hosts the world’s second largest Tibetan Buddhist monastery, the Tawang Ganden Amitabh Mattoo Namgyal Lhatse. The Dalai Lama, after escaping from Tibet through Tawang, spent time in this monastery in 1959. China has constantly opposed visits of highranking dignitaries, most prominently the Dalai Lama, to Arunachal Pradesh.86 In contrast to Ladakh, where its strategy may be aimed at acquiring small, uninhabited territories, in Arunachal China has been building villages.87 India’s response and future trajectories The future of the region vis-à-vis China The selection of these three case-studies reflects the multilayered nature and effects of China’s rise in the region; but they are not atypical of Beijing’s behaviour. The three actors chosen—Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India—have different kinds of relations with China. Pakistan has historically been an ally even while maintaining close ties with the United States, especially during the Cold War. India has sought to maintain its strategic autonomy and prefers to avoid any alliance commitments. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, owing to its history of civil war and human rights abuse, has found itself isolated from a large part of the world. The contexts, the 86 87 88 89 90 91 ‘Dalai Lama’s Arunachal Pradesh visit negatively impacts border dispute, says China’, Economic Times, 12 July 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/dalai-lamas-arunachal-pradesh-visit-negativelyimpacts-border-dispute-says-china/articleshow/58144382.cms. Vishnu Som, ‘China has built village in Arunachal, show satellite images’, NDTV, 18 Jan. 2021, https:// www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-has-built-village-in-arunachal-pradesh-show-satellite-images-exclusive-2354154. Dan Altman, ‘What the history of modern conquest tells us about China and India’s border crisis’, War on the Rocks, 9 July 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/what-the-history-of-modern-conquest-tells-usabout-china-and-indias-border-crisis/; for the strategy of fait accompli, see also Dan Altman, ‘By fait accompli, not coercion: how states wrest territory from their adversaries’, International Studies Quarterly 61: 4, 2017, pp. 881–91. Rory Medcalf and C. Raja Mohan, Responding to Indo-Pacific rivalry: Australia, India and middle power coalitions (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, Aug. 2014), pp. 15–17. See: https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network-vision-statement/. ‘India approved as observer of Indian Ocean Commission’, The Wire, 6 March 2020, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-approved-as-observer-of-indian-ocean-commission. 1668 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 As has been suggested, the killing of soldiers and capturing of small chunks of territory is viewed as a very contemporary Chinese form of conquest—a strategy of fait accompli—implying that China will annex small territories at little cost and without provoking India to the extent that it may want to escalate the situation into a fully fledged war.88 How should India respond? India is certainly seeking to diversify and deepen its engagement with likeminded countries both within and beyond the Indo-Pacific region.89 While India, Australia, Japan and the United States have strengthened their involvement in the Quad and the Blue Dot network (which aims to provide quality infrastructure development projects that are, inter alia, open and inclusive, transparent, economically viable and aligned with the Paris agreement90), India and France are also enhancing their maritime cooperation through platforms such as the Indian Ocean Commission.91 How not to deal with a rising China experiences of these states and their agency cannot be ignored in seeking to understand the response to China within the region. A major constraint in framing a common regional response to the rise of China is the institutionally fragmented nature of the south Asian region. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has been rendered dysfunctional by the rivalry between India and Pakistan.92 Escalatory behaviour of China 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Rajeesh Kumar, South Asian ‘zombie’: the futility of reviving SAARC, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses issue brief, 1 May 2018, https://idsa.in/system/files/issuebrief/ib-the-futility-of-reviving-saarc-rkumar-010518. pdf. Doshi, The long game, p. 4. Doshi, The long game, pp. 159–60. Doshi, The long game, p. 161. Doshi, The long game, p. 236. Mahendra P. Lama, ‘China’s Trishula approach in south Asia’, in Ranjan and Guo, eds, p. 53. Liza Tobin, ‘Xi’s vision for transforming global governance: a strategic challenge for Washington and its allies’, Texas National Security Review 2: 1, 2018, pp. 154–66. 1669 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 Rush Doshi defines the period 2008–16 as that of China’s ‘second strategy of displacement’.93 During these years, China began blunting US influence in its region and establishing its own hegemony. He emphasizes that Chinese grand strategy has been based on the ‘international balance of power’, a balance that was shifting as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis.94 This shift is reflected in China’s changing pattern of military spending—from sea denial capabilities to sea control and amphibious capabilities. In economic terms, China launched ‘offensive economic statecraft that would allow China to build its own coercive and consensual economic capacities over others’, along with a political strategy to develop its own alternative institutions.95 The BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank spearhead this policy shift. China’s infrastructure investments and economic diplomacy are motivated not by purely economic interests but with the aim of developing ‘economic leverage’, which could alter interdependence patterns among states, influence their internal politics and shape the framework of global economic activities.96 Similarly, Mahendra Lama describes China’s approach in south Asia as a ‘forward policy’ led by a three-pronged approach based on ‘making local entry through strategic entry points, engaging the neighbouring country nationally in core economic and other sectors, and partnering regionally with regional organizations’.97 President Xi Jinping’s focus on ‘national rejuvenation’ and a ‘community of common destiny’ in his recent addresses hint at an assertive China,98 which seeks to alter the current paradigm of international politics, beginning from its periphery. There are also concerns that, as China grows in power, its principle of the One China policy will expand to the point where ‘disputed’ territories are aggressively claimed. The recent and regular skirmishes between India and China, beginning with the 2017 Doklam crisis, reflect this changing reality. While both countries have put in place several mechanisms to negotiate and discuss border Amitabh Mattoo issues, including a range of confidence-building measures, the settlements near Arunachal Pradesh, the stand-off at Doklam and the confrontation in Galwan valley all bear testimony to a change in tactics by China. Conclusion Reflections and positionality The nature of the Chinese threat My views on China have been shaped, over time, by academia but more so by my involvement in various decision-making and advisory bodies of the government of India and of state governments. Until India’s 1998 nuclear tests and China’s ferocious response, I shared the dominant view (within both the academic and the policy community) that was in favour of an integrationist/accommodationist approach to China. The Sino-Indian model of conflict resolution (keeping contentious bilateral issues, especially those related to the border, on the back burner, while normalizing and improving relations in other areas) seemed to provide a template even for relations between India and Pakistan. The 1998 nuclear tests (by India, and then by Pakistan) represented a distinct rupture in the thinking of the policy elite as well as in my own ideas; there was a growing realization that China wanted to box India into south Asia, and its clandestine support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, for instance, was largely a function of this policy. Yet there was still a lack of clarity on how India should respond to China, especially since 1670 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 As the consequences of China’s rise are debated within academia and the policy community, south Asia provides a precursor for what may be witnessed within the international system. Our three cases suggest the following. China is not just firmly establishing its imprimatur in the region, but is also seeking dominance through a variety of instruments and the demonstration of remarkable strategic patience and clarity. Through extraordinary policies (including those on non-proliferation, human rights and development assistance) it has encouraged Pakistan and Sri Lanka to bandwagon while seeking to punish India’s attempts to balance Beijing’s influence in the region. China is increasingly unwilling to tolerate a regional challenger, especially one that has extraregional aspirations or is establishing a close relationship with its global rival—the United States. China will become increasingly more assertive and belligerent as India remains reluctant to accept Chinese dominance or acquiesce in its systematic violation of important international norms. A strategy that seeks to bolster a democratic India, militarily and diplomatically, may offer the chance of preserving stability and strengthening international norms in south Asia and beyond. There is also a need to provide an alternative to Chinese assistance and—learning from them—to engage with consistency. More importantly, developing a coherent response to China demands strategic patience and commitment even while Beijing continues to test the patience of the region and beyond. How not to deal with a rising China When in 1969 I joined the St Stephen’s College (Delhi), to my surprise, I found the very people from whom we had escaped a decade ago right next door. In fact my college proved to be the centre of the Naxalite activities. They used the same jargon, had the same convictions, and they held identical views to the Chinese communists. One of their popular slogans was: ‘China’s way is our way; and China’s Chairman Mao our Chairman.’101 While revelations about the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the events at Tiananmen Square had done much to erode this image, it continued to find takers within sections of opinion within the Indian left. Of note was China’s ability to take hard internal decisions as well as to face up to pressure from the West, which had been applauded by sections across virtually the whole spectrum of public opinion in India from the extreme left to the extreme right. Why can we not do a Tibet in Kashmir? Would China have capitulated before the hijackers in 99 Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, eds, The peacock and the dragon: India–China relations in the 21st century (Delhi: Har Anand, 2000). 100 Literally translated from Hindi: Indians and Chinese are brothers. 101 See Dawa Norbu, Tibet: the road ahead (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 1997), pp. xii–xiii. 1671 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 relations with the United States too had reached a nadir in the immediate period after the nuclear tests. The complex web of emotions, ideas and policies towards China was in evidence again in the very first days of the twenty-first century. On 4 January 2000, the arrival of the 14-year-old Ugyen Thinley Dorje, the 17th Karmapa of the Kagyupa sect of Tibetan Buddhism, from his monastery in Tsurphu near Lhasa in Tibet to the capital-in-exile of the Dalai Lama at Mcleodganj, brought to the fore many of the mixed feelings that have traditionally defined India’s attitude towards China: suspicion, empathy, shock, solidarity, rivalry, friendship, curiosity, fear, anger, awe, admiration, contempt and, above all, bewilderment. In 2000, I co-edited a volume that brought together different Indian perspectives on China.99 In the opening essay that I wrote on ‘Imagining China’, I described four distinct views of India’s eastern neighbour. First was the view of China as an ancient friend and modern ally: Hindi-Chinee Bhai-Bhai.100 The view of India and China as two ancient civilizations, with strong past links, in partnership together in the modern world, was essentially a normative, idealized view, rooted in the desire to see India and China emerge as strong allies in the contemporary international system. Understandably, therefore, this image of China often exaggerated both the historical links as well as the space for contemporary cooperation. In this sense, some critics found this image distinctly outdated at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Second, closely related to the image of China as both an ancient friend and a contemporary ally, was the view of China as a role model. There were aspects of this image that merited attention. One was the image of China as the near-ideal communist state and society. This image of China, although much eroded, had inspired a whole generation of communists as well as activists of the Naxalite movement and even middle-class radicals in Delhi colleges. As the Tibetan scholar Dawa Norbu recollects: Amitabh Mattoo Indian thought and the importance of dharma For me, long-term stability in the international system is dependent on ensuring respect for and commitment to shared norms, including democracy, respect for human rights, and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this sense, my views during the past two decades may be described as ‘modified’ realist. The importance of both interests and values to ensure stability in the international system was catalysed by my readings of Indian thinking on international relations, particularly the Mahabharata.103 In 1991, close to his death, Bimal Krishna Matilal, the Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at All Souls College, Oxford, wrote one of his final pieces: a brilliant polemical essay entitled ‘Krsna: in defence of a devious divinity’. The article challenged the western view of the apparently less-than-godly conduct of Krishna before and during the war in Mahabharata on the battlefield of Kuruk102 The Task Force was chaired by K. Subhramanyam and included the following members: M. S. Ananth, Tarun Das, Amitabh Mattoo, R. K. Pachauri, Vinod Patney, P. Rama Rao, Arvind Virmani and Uday Bhaskar (Member Secretary). It presented its report to the prime minister in June 2006. The report is still classified and not in the public domain. 103 For an easy English read, see John D. Smith, The Mahabharata (New Delhi: Penguin Classics, pb 2009). 1672 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 Kandahar? Would China have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under pressure? These were only some of the questions that were being rhetorically posed in public debates in India. Furthermore, China’s emergence as a significant economic and military power, and the manner in which it has been able to reform its economy without compromising on its security posture, was also viewed with awe and admiration. The third image was one of China as an unpredictable adversary and dangerous rival. By 2000, China was consistently identified as the most likely source of insecurity to India, and the greatest potential threat to Indian interests in the mediumterm and long-term future, in any survey of opinion among the strategic elite in the country. Fourth and finally was the view of China as inscrutable and mysterious. The image of the unfathomable Chinese was also one which struck a chord within most sections of public opinion. The positive image in this context was that of exotica, of fine silks and beautiful princesses in secret gardens. The negative image, at its most extreme, was a monochromatic one of teeming millions in Mao jackets deeply involved in hatching dangerous conspiracies. This growing dominance of the view of China as a dangerous rival and unpredictable adversary was reinforced by my tenure on the advisory board of India’s National Security Council from 2001 to 2003. I was tasked, along with my colleagues, with preparing an annual review of India’s national security challenges, and provided with access to papers and confidential briefings, including those on the neighbourhood. By 2006, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set up the Task Force on Global Strategic Developments,102 it was clear that seeking a modus vivendi with the United States was critical to help counter the threat from China, which was India’s principal long-term strategic challenger. How not to deal with a rising China shetra.104 In 2012, inspired, in part, by Matilal, and by the compendium of essays on the Mahabharata edited by Arvind Sharma of McGill University, I wrote— rather pretentiously: If all the books on war and peace were to suddenly disappear from the world, and only the Mahabharata remained, it would be good enough to capture almost all the possible debates on order, justice, force and the moral dilemmas associated with choices that are made on these issues within the realm of international politics.105 104 Bimal K. Matilal, ‘Krsna: in defence of a devious divinity’, Ethics and epics: philosophy, culture and religion (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 90–108. Originally published in Arvind Sharma, ed., Essays on the Mahabhartha (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), pp. 401–18. 105 Amitabh Mattoo, ‘An Indian grammar for international studies’ The Hindu, 11 Dec. 2012. 106 See George Tanham’s essay in Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, eds, Securing India: strategic thought and practice (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996). 107 Fortunately, we also now have the benefit of S. Jaishankar’s book, The India way: strategies for an uncertain world (Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2020), which recognizes the importance of the Mahabharata in a deeply perceptive chapter, ‘Krishna’s choice: the strategic culture of a rising power’. Earlier, we had the inspiring account of Amrita Narlikar and Aruna Narlikar, Bargaining with a rising India: lessons from the Mahabharata (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014). 1673 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 My article, along with other writings, was an attempt at confronting a major western critique of India; a Eurocentric belief that India and Indians had only episodically written about strategic issues, and that there was no real culture of strategic thinking in India. The vice-president of the RAND Corporation (a US think tank), George K. Tanham, had put this starkly in his 1992 article, ‘Indian strategic thought: an interpretative essay’ (commissioned by the US UnderSecretary for Defense), in which he argued that the Indian elite had not thought systematically or coherently about national security. Since then, many scholars have reviewed different traditions of strategic thinking in India: from Asoka’s post-Kalinga idealism to the more predictive hard-headed realism of Kautilya, to the more critical traditions of thinking about war and peace.106 Today, as India confronts some of its biggest strategic challenges, there are insights that the Mahabharata offers us, including from the immortal dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna.107 For Matilal’s western critics, ‘[Krishna] is a riddle, a paradox. If anything, he appears to be a devious diplomat’, an enigma. In reality, Krishna (even in his mortal form) is the ultimate strategic visionary, a political genius, who believes in upholding dharma, almost at any cost. What, then, does dharma mean, particularly in terms of strategic vision? First, dharma means upholding the larger righteous interest, the welfare of humanity, in both its mundane and its transcendental sense. For the leadership of a nation-state, it means protecting the national interest, defined as the interests of the people, from internal and external adversarial circumstances. Second, dharma means action not passivity; acting without material incentives, and without regard for narrowly defined gains from that action. And acting decisively while recognizing, however, that the fight to uphold dharma will almost necessarily always cause collateral damage (both in terms of a strict adherence to principles as well as possibly unrestrained violence). Amitabh Mattoo 108 Matilal, ‘Krisna: in defence of a devious divinity’, p. 106. 1674 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 Finally, the fight for dharma requires acting independently, without attachment, without fear and without external pressure. In sum, dharma in foreign policy can only be sustained through the doctrine of strategic autonomy. It is the only principle that can bring into harmony flexibility in diplomacy (even duplicity when needed) and purposeful violence when required; so much so that true statecraft and strategic autonomy become inseparable, bringing about a fusion of thought and action for the higher purposes of statecraft. Dharma is beyond selfinterest, it is beyond partisan causes, it is concerned almost always with the larger good; it reifies humanity, the people, and not necessarily the state. As Krishna emphasises to Arjuna: ‘Karmany evādhikāras te mā phales u kadācana mā karma-phalahetur bhūr mā te sańgo mā te sańgo ‘stv akarmani’ (You have a right to act but never to any fruits thereof. You should never be motivated by the results of your actions, nor should there be any attachment). In contemporary terms, what are the secular aspects of the wisdom that Krishna imparts to Arjuna, particularly in the Bhagavad Gita? Ultimately, for Krishna, our strategic policies must be rooted within the overarching framework of dharma and devoted to promoting the larger righteous national interest (Yato dharmas Tato Jaya: Victory and dharma go together), rather than any selfish or partisan cause. In many ways, this wisdom reinforces India’s longstanding quest for strategic autonomy, defined as the pursuit of stability, space and strength, as an instrument for promoting national dharma. As an illustrative example, even at the end of his teachings and his call for action, Krishna encourages Arjuna to reflect introspectively on what he has learned, and discard whatever he finds unsuitable: ‘Iti te jñānam ākhyātam guhyād guhyataram mayā, vimrśyaitad aś es enayathecchas itathā kuru’ (Thus, I have explained to you the most confidential of all knowledge. Deliberate on this fully, and then do what you wish to do.) In terms of moral philosophy with deep implications for statecraft, the concerns that define Matilal’s essay are similar to those raised by the sage Uttanka in Aśvamedhikaparvan, when he encounters Krishna after the war. Why does Krishna not successfully broker peace between the warring cousins rather than preside over genocide? Why does Krishna undermine his stature by apparently resorting to ‘duplicitous or even deceitful means in the course of war’? Matilal and others offer compelling explanations to provide a coherent justification of Krishna’s actions, including those rooted in moral consequentialism and the lack of omnipotence of the lord when he acquires an earthly form. Krishna is the final guardian of dharma, a leader; and on occasion, as Matilal points out, a leader needs to create ‘new paradigms for showing limitations of such a generally accepted moral code of truth-telling and promise-keeping’.108 One of the few in the West who understood the importance of dharma (otherwise, for most, an elusive term) was the scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer (leader of the Manhattan Project, which led to the development of the first atomic weapons). As he witnessed the first nuclear test in July 1945, ‘he thought of a verse from the Bhagavad Gita: divi sūryasahasrasya bhaved yugapad utthitā yadi bhāh sadrsī sā syād bhāsas tasya mahā hmanah (If How not to deal with a rising China 109 For Oppenheimer’s exact words, view: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pqZqfTOxFhY. 1675 International Affairs 98: 5, 2022 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1653/6686609 by guest on 23 November 2022 the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendour of the mighty one)’. And then the shloka or verse: (I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds).’109 Not surprisingly, Oppenheimer supported the development of nuclear weapons against fascism, but opposed the production of a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb during the Cold War. This, he believed, was the difference between dharma and adharma; and it is a distinction that thinkers on war and peace would do well to reflect upon and comprehend in its fullest and most inclusive sense. For as Napoleon Bonaparte was said to have predicted, ‘ ... when China awakes, she will shake the world’, with the Chinese Communist Party lending substance to what may be apocryphal wisdom through its revisionism. In contrast, India is, in its essence, driven by Dharma, and sees itself as not the Middle Kingdom but endorses normatively the idea of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family). In this Manichean contest, the world surely needs a stronger democratic India.