Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
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Political Geography
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo
Invisible power, visible dispossession: The witchcraft of a
subterranean pipeline
Amber Murrey
School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford, OX1 3QY, UK
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Available online
There has been a lack of attention to the role of la sorcellerie (witchcraft) and the occult in geographical
work on extraction, power and resistance, despite the ways in which these epistemologies inform
conceptions of power, wealth and violence. In two towns along the ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline,
epistemologies of la sorcellerie frame understandings and critiques of the invisible actors and processes
that effect the pipeline's uneven distributions of violence, wealth and risk. Far from expunging the experience(s) of extraction by erasing the pipeline's visible traces on the landscape, the oil consortium's
infrastructural and discursive erasures serve to situate the pipeline within a knowledge system that
associates invisible actors and materials with evil, wrongdoing, suspicion and distrust. This article addresses (i) how the production of dispersed extractive landscapes reinforce epistemologies of witchcraft
by alienating the people who live within them from networks of power in ways that provoke a mistrust
and jealousy that is absorbed within families and communities and (ii) the socio-political significance of
this epistemological structuring of the pipeline as a logic of resistance against hydrocarbon capitalism.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Oil pipeline
Geographies of extraction
Witchcraft
Politics of the invisible
Resistance
Introduction
Although there have been calls for more nuanced understandings of the interactions between ‘local’ knowledges and
‘local’ socio-political relationships within development geographies (Agrawal, 1995; Briggs, 2005; Briggs & Sharp, 2004;
Routledge, 1996), witchcraft, sorcery and occult epistemologies
have remained almost completely unexplored, with the examination of mining, albino murders and magic in Tanzania by Deborah
Bryceson, Jønsson, and Sherrington (2014) a noted exception. By
and large, political geographers have yet to systematically consider
witchcraft in the complex spatial relationships made and unmade
through the uneven distributions of power and wealth within
extractive landscapes. Yet the significance of such knowledges in
shaping the meanings, interpretations and constructions of space,
power and violence on the African continent and elsewhere make
this a ripe area of study for human geographers. At the same time,
the recent intervention from Garth Andrew Myers (2014: 125)
identifies on-going omissions in the subfield of political geography
as a whole where Africa is concerned, arguing that ‘geography has a
E-mail address: amber.murrey-ndewa@jesus.ox.ac.uk.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.04.004
0962-6298/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
geography to it’. Political geography has a geographic orientation in
which ‘African topics are still marginal’ (Myers, 2014: 125).
This article contributes to the on-going project of opening political geography to non-Euro-American epistemological orderings
of place and power by asserting the centrality of Cameroonian
epistemologies of la sorcellerie (witchcraft)1 in considerations of
resource extraction, power and resistance in two communitiesdNanga-Eboko (hereinafter Nanga) and Kribidalong the
ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline. What does a rigorous theorising of
witchcraft, power and resistance in dispersed extractive landscapes
reveal about the potentials for non-Euro-American, non-capitalist
or ‘local’ knowledge to open up new avenues of capitalist critique
and resistance? This article approaches this central enquiry
through two points of analysis.
The first is to demonstrate how the particularities of the
dispersed geographies of extraction (including the ways in which
pipeline infrastructure, oil wealth and consortium employees and
representatives fluctuate between invisibility and visibility) are
understood by people in Nanga and Kribi, Cameroon, through
epistemologies of witchcraft. Geographies of extraction are
comprised of diverse visibilities and obscurities that provoke
distinctive modes of resistance. As they struggle to make sense of
visible dispossessions and ecological destructions effected by
mostly invisible actors, people in Kribi and Nanga have positioned
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
the subterranean and diffuse spatial and temporal qualities of the
extractive processes of the ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline within
frameworks of la sorcellerie. Engaging with epistemologies of la
sorcellerie illustrates the complexity of understandings, negotiations and contestations of power and resistance within these situated landscapes. Rather than pointing out what actor(s) or
structure(s) are not apparent to people along the pipeline, the
analysis focuses on how people, in place, understand invisible
features of reality, power and politics. This political geography
necessarily attends to the visible as well as the invisible, without
privileging the visible: while the pipeline, as a dispersed incursion
on the landscape, is infrastructurally subterranean (and thus below
the view of the human eye), the structural processes and actors of
the pipeline's socio-political infrastructure are knowable to people
in their invisibility (and not despite it). Importantly, the way(s) that
power and empowerment are conceived informs people's responses and shapes attempts to assert power along the pipeline.
The particular socio-spatial operations of the pipeline lend themselves to an accounting for their (political) materials and maledictions through witchcraft epistemologies. These socio-political
operations are detailed below and include: the pipeline as (i)
dispersed across the landscape, (ii) implemented by shadowy figures and (iii) effecting an uneven and exclusionary accumulation of
wealth (Fig. 1).
The second is to recognise the paradoxical nature of witchcraft
in Cameroon as both (i) an epistemology that is highly critical of the
uneven distribution of wealth and risk along the pipeline and (ii) a
mode of social control in which social and economic tensions are
propelled into micro-level conflict. Although human geographers
have been relatively slow to study the complex relationships between socio-politics in the extractive landscapes of capitalist
frontiers and witchcraft, cultural anthropologists have made
important inroads in expanding our understanding of the heterogeneous ways in which variegated witchcraft epistemologie, far
from being representative of ‘traditional’ or pre-colonial cultures,
65
can assert powerful counter-epistemes to extractive capitalism
(Ekholm Friedman, 2011; Nash, 1979; Reyna, 2011; Taussig, 1980).
June Nash (1979) argues that in miners in Bolivia are fortified
against the harsh and dangerous mining conditions by sacrifices
and gestures to Tío Lucas (the devil), who is believed to spiritually
own and operate the (deadly) tin mines. Michael Taussig (1980)
similarly contends that Bolivian miners elucidate a complex
critique of the mythical illusions of capitalism (as a wealth generating panacea) through a changing symbolisation and understanding of the devil and capitalismdan ascription that connects
the impoverishment, illness and disease of capitalism with Tío
Lucas. This literature suggests that witchcraft epistemologies provide powerful frameworks of critique against capitalist extraction.
This analysis explores the potential for epistemologies of Cameroonian la sorcellerie to provide a logic of resistance that conceptualises and critiques the large-scale dispossessions effected by the
pipeline.
In answering the article's central question, a paradox of the
socio-political relationships bound up within the practices of
Cameroonian sorcellerie, on the one hand, and their epistemological
potential, on the other, is confronted. Epistemologies of la sorcellerie engender understandings of the invisible networks and exchanges of power that produce petroleum infrastructures; in so
doing, these epistemologies create space for what might be a
powerful metacritique of the invisible actors of hydrocarbon capitalism. However, la sorcellerie does not seem to advance a mode of
resistance against the social and environmental violence caused by
the pipeline in Nanga and Kribi. Instead, the particular and situated
practices of la sorcellerie in these two communities relegate action
to the intimate scale of the familydin some cases accelerating the
rupturing of the community began by the pipeline (Fig. 2).
Recognizing the ambivalent nature of la sorcellerie (as both an
expression of social control and epistemology that describes and
critiques violence) bridges conversations between two strands of
witchcraft analysis: that literature that addresses la sorcellerie as an
Fig. 1. Pump reduction station, outside Kribi, Cameroon.
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A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
Fig. 2. Satellite image of Nanga-Eboko, Cameroon.
Source: “Nanga-Eboko.” 4 390 .34.7800 N and 12 220 43.7800 E. Google Earth. Image Date 12/28/2013. Accessed 04/06/2015.
epistemology or world view (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1993;
Nyamnjoh, 2001) and that literature which addresses la sorcellerie
as social practice (Fisiy & Geschiere, 2001; Geschiere, 1997, 2013): la
sorcellerie is/does both. This is an important recognition within the
burgeoning scholarship that stresses the importance of ‘local’
knowledges within complex socio-political landscapes on the African continent. The article concludes with reflections on calls for
transparency and visibility in both policy and scholarly debates
around ‘slow’ or ‘structural’ forms of violence.
The ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline
At the time of its construction, the ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline
was the largest onshore private investment on the African continent (Grovogui & Leonard, 2007). The 4.1 billion$US pipeline came
to fruition through the engineering, implementation and funding of
an oil consortium made up of ExxonMobil (the world's third
highest grossing corporation), Petroliam Nasional Berhad (i.e.,
Petronas, a Malaysian gas company), Chevron-Texaco (a US oil
corporation), the World Bank (the world's largest and most influential ‘development’ institution) and the governments of Chad and
Cameroon2 The pipeline is 1070 km long, originates in Chad's Doba
Basin and terminates in Cameroon's port city of Kribi. With the
construction of the pipeline in 2000, existing places, including
forests, vegetation, farmlands, ancestral lands and human habitats,
were destroyed along a 30 to 50 m-wide corridor. A material land
space as large as the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg) was appropriated in Cameroon and southwest Chad
for the initial 30-year operational period of the pipeline. This period
has since been prolonged, following the announcement in July 2014
that the pipeline will be extended 600 km to access Niger's Agadem
block (Fig. 3).
The World Bank Press Release announcing its approval to fund
the project on 6 June 2000 ambitiously describes the pipeline as ‘an
unprecedented frame-work to transform oil wealth into direct
benefits for the poor’. The 2004 ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship
Report positions the key for project success as ‘the creation of a
strong partnership with the World Bank, which viewed the project
as an opportunity to help promote economic development in Chad’
(38). Through a number of spending requirements imposed on the
government of Chad through the project's financial structuring, the
pipeline was crafted to be the project that would alter the paradox
of the so-called ‘oil curse’, or the propensity for oil exporting
economies to experience declines in economic growth rates and
productivity expressed through increases of poverty (Carmody,
2009). Alongside a number of novel approaches introduced by
the consortium (which were designed to link social development
with oil extraction) was the incorporation of some ‘local’ knowledges within the otherwise institutionalized and top-down infrastructural implementation. The oil consortium, for example,
sponsored animal sacrifices along the pipeline corridor as a means
to honour those sacred areas that were destroyed to make way for
the pipe. So many animal sacrifices were conducted that the anthropologist hired by the World Bank to oversee community
outreach in southern Chad, Ellen Brown, was dubbed ‘Madame
Sacrifice’ (Smith, 2010). These ceremonies pacified a measure of the
public outrage over the destructive and dispossessing components
of development projects. Moreover, they provided a veneer of
‘authenticity’ to an otherwise unaltered extractive framework.
Indeed, despite contentions from the World Bank and the oil consortium that poverty alleviation and development ventures would
be coupled with commercial and capitalist interests in a manner
beneficial for all parties involved, the pipeline not only failed to
bring development to the towns and villages affected by the project, it aggravated and exacerbated poverty through the destruction
of local livelihoods and ecologies. In January 2007, Ron Royal, the
President of Esso Chad (ExxonMobil's chief manager in Chad) told a
parliamentary delegation from the German Bundestag that, ‘We
should never have called [the ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline] a
development project’ (qtd. in Horta, Nguiffo, & Djiraibe, 2007: 5)
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
67
Fig. 3. Map of ChadeCameroon oil pipeline.
and on 9 September 2008, the World Bank issued a press statement
indicating that it was unable to continue its support for the project
due to noncompliance (World Bank, 2008). The Press Release reads,
Chad failed to comply with key requirements of this agreement.
A new agreement was signed in 2006, but once again the
government did not allocate adequate resources critical for
poverty reduction indeducation, health, infrastructure, rural
development and governance. Regrettably, it became evident
that the arrangements that had underpinned the Bank's
involvement in the Chad/Cameroon pipeline project were not
working. (World Bank, 2008: n.p.)
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A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
This article is part of a doctoral project on structural violence
and resistance along the pipeline. Ethnographic research was carried out in Kribi on Cameroon's Southern coastline and Nanga in
the central regiondareas that are tied together by their proximity
to an oil pipeline. This political geography considers people's reflections of the project after a decade of struggle for reimbursement
and compensation. The encroachments and dispossessions effected
by the pipeline are situated within the long histories of structural
violence. In this context, ‘local’ epistemologies are reworked to
grasp changing political, territorial and socioecultural relations.
People's stories of the pipeline capture a sense of longitudinal
frustration. Perceptions of time and history become suspended and
elongated within landscapes characterised by structural violence,
so that people's narrative accounts describe one genre of structural
violence as seeming to bleed into another into another violence and
into another across time and space (Murrey, 2015b). These historically saturated narratives provide important insights into the
diverse epistemologies drawn upon to narrate longitudinal experiences of life within extractive landscapes.
Epistemologies of la sorcellerie along the pipeline
The ontological pluralism of Cameroonian la sorcellerie defies
any monolithic designation or delimitation. Francis Nyamnjoh
(2001) explains that instead of being a belief, la sorcellerie is an
inescapable component of life and one's being in the world in
Cameroon: it is a shared popular epistemology of witchcraft that is
‘both self-evident and solemnly real’. People might not be able to
explain why witches target one person and not another, but they
know when a person has been targeted (Geschiere, 1997). In Nanga
and Kribi, the invisible forces of violence, evil and malediction
permeate everyday life. Epistemologies of la sorcellerie are drawn
upon to explain sudden death, mysterious illness, financial insecurity, nightmare, natural disaster, climate change and failed harvest, which are often understood as signs of spiritual foul play. The
forest is conceived of as a mysterious place where spirits abide and
witches meet. There are moments in one's life, particularly during
sleep, when one becomes susceptible to infiltration by the spirit of a
witch. These spiritual attacks might manifest themselves in reoccurring sexual dreams or nightmares, which steal the body's power.
Such spirits are not visible to the untrained eye but only to ‘seers’ or
les marabouts. People can be physically present at the same time
that their spirit has left the body to travel or hunt in invisible
realmsdthe latter referring to the night-time hunting of human
souls to sacrifice, sell or eat (Nyamnjoh, 2001). These invisible
realms intersect with the visible world to evoke a modern globalised topography characterised by time-space compression
(Kearney, 1995: 549; Shaw, 1997: 857). Time is fluid, with the
contemporary moment rooted in a lived past and in an abiding
respect for ancestors.
In such epistemologies, malevolent actors and their acts are
hidden from view at the same time that they are understood,
sensed and known in the visible world through their material
consequences. Visible and invisible forces, energies and agents are
inseparable to one's being in the world. The vaporous qualities of
the material of the Chad Cameroon Oil Pipelinedthe 1.5 m of dirt
and soil atop it, the partial presence of pipeline actors and the
enigmatic processes of constructiondlead to different interpretations by people in Nanga and Kribi, including direct and
indirect accusations of witchcraft or la sorcellerie from community
members to Cameroon Oil Transportation Company (COTCO)
employees.
Cameroonian epistemologies of la sorcellerie are dynamic and
have shifteddand continue to shiftdthroughout and across space
and time (Geschiere, 1997, 2013; Nyamnjoh, 2001). Contemporary
epistemologies of Cameroonian sorcellerie have been influenced
and altered through complex historical-political processes; among
them has been the barrage of loss, domination and violence
experienced through slavery, imperialism, colonialism and the reentrenchments of poverty following the 1980s economic crisis
and attendant Structural Adjustment Programmes, or SAPs (Fisiy &
Geschiere, 2001).3
Cyprian F. Fisiy and Peter Geschiere (2001) traces what he calls
the ‘increasing ambiguity’ of witchcraft during the mid-1980s,
when Cameroon experienced a perfect storm of economic catastrophe: the collapse of global market prices for cocoa, coffee and
cotton devastated agricultural sectors. The price for a barrel of
crude fell from 29$US in 1984 to 26$US in 1985, descending even
more to 10$US in 1986 (Takougang, 2004: 112). As part of IMF and
World Bank comprehensive reform, Cameroon's monetary unit, the
franc CFA (Central African Franc), was depreciated by 40 per cent in
1986 and then 50 per cent in 1994 (Mentan, 2003: 120). As a
consequence, Cameroon received remarkably less for its exports
than it had in previous years. The loss was enormous, as Joseph
Takougang (2004: 113) observes: Cameroon's total exports, which
‘had exceeded 1000 billion francs CFA in 1984/85, dropped to 575
billion francs CFA in 1986/87’. At the same time, civil employee
salaries were reduced by 60 per cent under SAP restrictions. One
consequence of this reduction was an increase in small-level corruption: as civil servants (from court clerks to teachers) scrambled
to make ends meet, some began to require a gumbo or choko (an
unofficial fee) on previously uncharged state services. The generation born in the 1980s became known as la g
en
eration perdue (the
lost generation), signifying the desperation and the disappointment of the decades between 1980 and 2000. Alongside the economic changes of the 1980s, Fisiy and Geschiere (2001) note,
‘witchcraft discourses’ in Cameroon produced ‘ever-new meanings’, including ‘secret ways to get rich [through] access to global,
occult networks’ (Fisiy & Geschiere, 2001: 241). Witchcraft epistemologies are, as Nyamnjoh (2001: 43) observes, ‘widely shared
and invoked, particularly in times of stress, misfortune and uncertainty’. Rumours emerged in Cameroon around a ‘new witchcraft of wealth’ that took nation-wide interest and fascination,
associating concentrations of wealth with magical practices. At
approximately the same time, negotiations were underway for the
implementation of the ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline.
Dispersed oil infrastructures & witchcraft
The geographies of oil pipelines are distinct from the pointbased geographies of extraction within oil-producing regions, in
this case the Doba Basin of southern Chad. The concept of ‘petroviolence’ (Watts, 1999) has been developed by political geographers
to note the particular violence that emerges within regions of
point-based extraction. Petro-violence is characterised by ecological violence, social deprivation, criminality and violent resistance
in a context of political corruption, rent-seeking and state violence
with multinational support (Le Billon, 2004; Obi, 1997; Okonta,
2008; Watts, 1999). Petro-violence manifests in physical violence,
often armed conflict, and is highly visible.
In the case of the ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline, the conceptualisation of a petro-specific violence does not sufficiently account for the dispersed geography of the 1070-m-long
underground pipeline. The dispersed nature of the oil pipeline,
unlike a spatially confined production and extraction zone, means
that hundreds of different villagesdin this case, the pipeline passes
beneath 238 villages and is within 2 km of 794 additional villages
(Lo, 2010: 155)dare drawn unevenly into the project, in heterogeneous ways according to their spatial proximity to the pipeline.
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
This spatial diffusion is one factor that has contributed to the lack of
unified, collective or organised opposition movements against the
pipeline between villages in Cameroon (Murrey, 2015b). Instead,
engaging with the pipeline through the lens of structural violence
illustrates that the pipeline both participates in a context of preexisting structural violence and perpetuates new forms of political violence (Carmody, 2009) and social and ecological destruction
(Murrey, 2015a). At the same time that wealth is unevenly
distributed through the project, dispossession and risk are also
unevenly distributed. This uneven distribution of dispossession and
risk alongside an inversely uneven distribution of wealth and profits
fits the pipeline project within the body of academic literature on
forms of structural or slow violence (Galtung, 1969; Nixon, 2011), so
named for their spatial and temporal dispersion(s) within networks
of globalised capitalism.
On consortium maps, the pipeline runs straight and flat across
territories that appear as clean voids; only a handful of villages are
named in the pure, flat topographical space. Andrew Barry (2009:
69) employs the concept of ‘visible invisibility’ to capture the overabundance of documents surrounding the otherwise ‘unseen’ underground Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, designed as it was to be
‘safe, secure, unseen’. The uneven dispossessions effected by oil
pipelines in these landscapesdwhere discursive and infrastructural erasures unite through processes that are similarly
visibly invisibledare enacted through large-scale, complex
bureaucratic structures. These structures are characterised by
concentrations of private and political power that delegitimise the
invisible spaces where the maximisation of profit shapes policy
negotiations (see Thorne & Kouzmin's, 2013 analysis of the ‘mutual
interplay between visibility and invisibility’ in the operations of
power and hegemony). Structural violence is perpetuated exactly
through these intentional discursive and material erasures, which
obscure the relationships between cause and effect, actors and
actions, intangible infrastructures and tangible dispossessions and
bureaucratic procedures and consequent ecological and social destructions (Murrey, 2015b). Unseen phenomena are intrinsically
69
hard to measure and document and, therefore, to contest. For some
in Nanga and Kribi, epistemologies of la sorcellerie lay bare these
uneven socio-political infrastructures (Fig. 4).
The construction of the ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline was subcontracted to France's Spie-Capag group and the United States'
Fluor and Willbros between 2000 and 2003. People in Nanga and
Kribi describe pipeline work crews arriving on their land with little
or no notice. They recall that bulldozers first destroyed crops and
then labour crews arrived to lay the pipe. There was little sense
among people who or what had taken control of the place. As
quickly as the construction crews arrived, they were gone again.
The construction process took approximately two weeks in each
village, although places where labour camps were erected, like
Nanga and Kribi, experienced longer integration and construction
periods, of up to three months. When the crews departed, they left
behind a barren terminal in the otherwise forested landscape of the
equatorial Congo Basin, which stretches as far as the eye can see in
both directions.
In Mpango, a village nearby Kribi, the mystery of the pipeline
project was captured best by those living in the shadows cast by the
communications tower of the pipeline's pressure-reducing regulator station near the Atlantic coast. The sub-sea pipeline extends
11 km into the Gulf of Guinea to the Floating Storage and Offloading
(FSO) vessel, where crude is exported on tankers for refining and
eventually for exchange on the global market. From Kribi's beaches,
the FSO flare is just visible on the ocean's skyline. One resident of
Mpango, Sewa, told me, ‘COTCO operates like a religious sect. It is a
total mystery what goes on over there’.4 He indicated with a wave
of his hand towards the workstation tower that was a couple
hundred yards from where he was seated near the gendarmerie
checkpoint at Mpango's entrance. Sewa continued, ‘All we know is
that new uniforms and new trucks go in but they never come out.
We have the impression that they do magic in there’ (Sewa D., in
Mpango, 02/01/13). COTCO security personnel strictly monitor the
regulator station, which occupies 5 ha of land between Kribi and
Mpango. Cameroonians are not allowed onto the site and
Fig. 4. Satellite image of Kribi, Cameroon.
Source: “Kribi.” 2 550 23.9200 N and 9 540 46.1900 E. Google Earth. Image Date 3/10/2005. Accessed 04/06/2015.
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A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
barricades (made with organic debris) are set-up at intervals to
hinder movement off the road (Sewa D., in Mpango, 02/01/13).
The destruction of much of the physical proof of the pipeline
rendered the pipeline invisible to those who had not experienced it
first-hand. At the same time that the object cannot be seen, the
social and ecological violence(s) of the pipeline (including the
destruction of water sources, aggravated hunger following the
destruction of plantations along the pipeline right-of-way,
increased distances to walk to new plantations, which tended to
be farther distances from peoples' homes, to name a few) are
materially and visibly acute (Murrey, 2015a). In Nanga, community
members witnessed the effacing of the pipeline's infrastructure
through the destruction of the temporary work camp located
outside the town. A group of temporary labourers who had been
employed during the pipeline's construction phase revealed that
the heavy machinery used during construction was dismounted
and buried upon completion. The roofless, half-demolished buildings of the former labourer work camp are testimony of the
attempted erasing or concealment of the pipeline's passage. The
destruction of these ‘surplus’ materials, which could very well have
been used by nearby villages, echoes the stories of abandonment
and disregard that people describe experiencing at the hands of the
shadowy figures of COTCO employees and politicians who profited
through the project.
around, making the exclusion all the more acute. Similarly, during a
discussion with Sandra in Bilolo, she said:
Sometimes you see COTCO people; they don't even say hello;
they just get directions to the pipeline and go into the brush to
do whatever they do in there. Not even a thank you … [Before]
they came for [village] reunions [meetings] to educate us about
what to do if we see a little bit of black liquid … they [would]
bring a little envelope with 3000 CFA and tell the chief to sign
that he is okay with it. (Sandra B., Bilolo, 07/02/2013)
These stories allude to the COTCO employees as misbehaving
and disrespectful foreign visitors. COTCO employees and representatives fail to observe basic salutations. Sandra describes COTCO
employees as chiche (unreasonably ungenerous) with villagers,
meaning they do not fulfil the neighbourly norms of reciprocity and
deference. Similarly, in Bisiong, Christiane said,
they [COTCO] told their workers to never purchase food from
the villages. They got their food and water from town [either
Kribi or Douala] and brought it with them … The local boys went
to the bush to work … [and found that] when you kill a serpent
they take you off the job! They [COTCO employees] did not eat
meat. They do mysterious things! (Christiane L., Bisiong, 07/03/
2013)
Invisible power & unseen actors
Indeed, some of the most heated debates in Kribi and Nango are
those in which people struggled to identify the culprits or actors
responsible for the mismanagement of the pipeline project. When
pressed to explain the processes of crop destruction or the actions
and actors involved in the pipeline's implementation, construction
and decision-making network, people sometimes used frameworks
of la sorcellerie to refer to shadowy figures compelled by greed with
no apparent care for the wellbeing of other humans. Pipeline processes were described as or likened to acts of poisoning, a favoured
mechanism of destruction used by les sorciers. So that while
invisible powers came together to produce the pipeline, la sorcellerie confronts the epistemic challenge of knowing unseen infrastructural and technical systems that cannot be sensed in their
entireties because they are deliberately hidden (either underground or behind highly securitised boundaries). In epistemologies
of la sorcellerie, the material and immaterial are not dichotomous.
The visible material of the world is understood as emerging out of a
profusion of invisible forcesdas with the construction of the
pipelinedthat comes in and out of visible realms.
In narratives of the pipeline in Nanga and Kribi, consortium
employees were variously associated with or described as les
sorci
eres/sorciers, as evildoers or as greedy, bad neighbours. People
sometimes understood the employees of the Cameroonian national
oil oversight body (COTCO) as embodiments of a dangerous and
hurtful threat: operating in unseen boardrooms, zooming past in
gleaming new vehicles and disappearing behind the barbed wiretopped fences of the COTCO stationsdbut always just beyond the
reach of local people.
In Mpango, Frankie said, ‘We see them enter, [but] they never
exit. We can never go in ourselves. Maybe we need to go to Douala
[the financial capital] to ask permission or to apply to work … they
don't even make purchases at local markets! They never come
down to our village and we have no contact with them … Look first
at all the battalion of security that keeps us out of the worksite.
Their security is like a military base’ (Frankie N., Mpango, 30/01/
2013). Frankie emphasised that COTCO employees, despite their
close proximity to the village, fail to engage with the people of
Mpango except through exclusion: power and wealth exists all
Christiane associates COTCO with magical materials, for
example pointing out their access to seemingly self-generating or
exclusionary wealth, their affinity for visiting the bush or uncultivated forests and their lack of fear for dangerous animals, such as
snakes. People remarked, for example, with confusion and exacerbation that COTCO employees would walk intodinstead of
arounddremote sections of bush. This propensity for walking into
the forest for unknown reasons likens them to les sorciers, who
practice magic in these areas of dark, mystical forest. In Nanga,
Gisele explained in passing, ‘you know, the forest is mystical’
(mystique) to refer to why people in Nanga are hesitant to work
trimming and slashing in the bi-annual clearing of the pipeline's
right-of-way. The suspected affinity of COTCO employees for the
forest and for the magic that resides theredsnakes, for example,
are dangerous to non-sorci
eres/sorciers but their skin is a source of
empowerment for les sorciersdreinforces their connections to les
choses myst
erieuses (Fig. 5).
The invisible domains of power, the demolition of pipeline
buildings and the underground, liquid properties of petroleum give
credence to understandings of oil as mysterious, dangerous and
socially and environmentally poisoning. Watts (2001: 205-6) describes the magical qualities surrounding oil as ‘petro-fetishism’ or
as a sort of ‘petro-magic’. This petro-magic is likened to the ‘El
Dorado Effect’, where wealth is ‘ephemeral, here today gone
tomorrow … in the popular imagination, oil produces all manner of
extraordinary magical events and mythic properties’ (Watts, 2001:
206). Similarly, Fernando Coronil (1997: 370) explains the magic of
Venezuela's exceptional petro-wealth: ‘politicians [were transfigured] into magicians who embodied the myth of progress and
gave it specific form.’ This petro-magic mirrored, he explains, in
particular ways the colonisation of the Americas by Spanish conquerors, particularly the system ‘which treated wealth less as the
result of productive labor than as the reward for activities not
directly connected with production, including conquest, plunder, or
pure chance’ (Coronil, 1997: 390). Similarly, Mandana E. Limbert
(2010) writes of the abrupt socio-political, economic and infrastructural transformations brought about by an influx of oil wealth
in Bahla, Oman. She recounts the mixed feelings of joy and fear: ‘Or
is it a dream? Will all the apparent wealth and infrastructural
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
71
Fig. 5. Group discussion near Bilolo, outside Kribi, Cameroon.
glamour disappear … as mysteriously and suddenly as it appeared?’
(Limbert, 2010: 3). Not only is oil wealth seemingly magical in its
effortlessness and dearth of labouring, but also in its material
invisibility (as explained above). The subterranean aspect of the
crude reaffirms the surreal or even supernatural origins of the
wealth. In Cameroon, petroleum is not associated with the supernatural for its self-generating wealth but, instead, for the enchantments needed to access the networks of power through
which that wealth can be acquired.
An uneven distribution of petro-wealth
At the same time that the oil consortium engineered infrastructural erasures designed to render invisible the pipeline and its
effects (underground pipelines also restrict possibilities for syphoning and sabotage), the influx of oil wealth has remained acutely
visible. During the immediate construction period, reimbursement
and compensation funds combined with the salaries of male migrant
labourers flooded rural areas (which were previously dominated by
subsistence agriculture) with cash. In the temporary boom between
2000 and 2003, the cost of food staples increased significantly. The
juxtaposition of the influx of this wealthdparticularly the ostentatious wealth of the foreign and migrant labourersdwith the lived
poverty of the majority of those along the pipeline inspired jealousy,
anger and suspicion. The widespread distrust is reflected in speculative kongossa (rumours) around la sorcellerie.
This kongossa was employed at both the scale of the nation and
the scale of the family. It was suspected, for example, that politicians and government officials benefited from keeping people in
the dark about the project. These apprehensions fit the pipeline
within a larger socio-political narrative, as politicians were accused
of partaking in sorcery as a mode of amassing power and wealth.
This includes popularised stories of politicians feeding off the energies of political opponents or sexual partners. President Paul Biya,
infamously a member of the Rosicrucian Order (a secret society), is
rumoured to have come to power through a secret occult initiation
with the country's first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo. While he
named himself the ‘l'homme lion’ (the lion-man) as an indication of
his status as the ‘king of the jungle’, political opponents liken Biya
to a snake in the grass because of his propensity to stay out of the
national and international limelight, rarely appear in public and
consistently avoid interviews (Emvana, 2005).5 Michel Roger
Emvana (2005: 27) describes his rule as, ‘le biyaïsme’: a complex,
undulating and mythical (‘mythique’) power of ‘l'apathie, a
la fain
l'absent
eisme, a
enantise’ (apathy, absenteeism and inaction).
Popular idioms connect widespread political corruption with forms
of la sorcellerie. For example, the notion that a political post is ‘une
mangeoire’das in, ‘il est dans une mangeoire qui n'a pas de nom’ (he
is in a never-ending trough that can't even be named)dreveals the
sentiment that political power is an opportunity to eat, feed or
consume indefinitely, in the same way les sorciers/sorci
eres
(witches) feed from the souls and labours of their victims.
Even non-believers (or sceptics) employ epistemologies of la
sorcellerie to expose illegitimate and dishonest wealth generation,
such as the uneven distribution of wealth through the pipeline's
reimbursement policies. Along the pipeline a handful of nonbelievers deployed narratives of la sorcellerie in inverse: here la
sorcellerie is a form of wealth generation practiced by imitator
marabouts or imitator sorci
eres/sorciers through elaborate and often
time-intensive ploys designed to trick les mougous (naïve folk) into
believing the ‘fake marabout’ possesses magical powers. By
convincing the victim (usually targeted for their pre-existing access
to wealth) that the ‘fake marabout’ possess magical powers, a sum
of money is requested to d
esensorceler (disenchant) a curse placed
on the person that threatens to end their privilege or power.
The association with politics and wealth is more than speculation. Michael Rose (2012: 59) describes this propensity for petrowealth to disappear as ‘the slippery nature of oil revenues’dlikening the fluid and liquid material properties of oil to its
similarly ‘slick’ and vanishing profits. The governments of both
Cameroon and Chad are distinctively opaque, with each publishing
‘virtually no information’ on their annual budgets (Rose, 2012: 81).
Between 1977 and 2006, for example, 54 per cent of Cameroonian
oil revenues were unaccounted for, i.e., they slipped silently out of
public view (Rose, 2012: 59). Shortly after the pipeline began
pumping oil in 2003, a Cameroonian newspaper, Le Messenger, reported that between November 1982 and September 2011,
approximately 2000 million CFA Francs (4,138,000$US) had been
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
72
misappropriated by high-ranking government officials and transferred to personal bank accounts in Switzerland, France, the United
States and the West Indies (Takougang, 2004: 111; see also Mentan,
2003: 112). The report sparked widespread suspicion of this underbelly of wealth creation that was evident in people's characterisations of COTCO and government officials in relation to the
ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline. Through epistemologies of la sorcellerie, the buried materialities of the pipeline, the unseen actors of
the oil consortium and the uneven distribution of wealth are
likened to the invisible malevolent forces of power within witchcraft epistemologies. These epistemologies, in this way, reflect a
sophisticated articulation of invisible social, political and material
infrastructures.
Resistance & la sorcellerie
Embedded within the connections between petro-wealth,
petro-infrastructure and witchcraft are possibilities of a witchcraft epistemology that critiques capitalist extraction and
‘speaks back’ to its violence(s). On the Chadian side of the
ChadeCameroon Oil Pipeline, for example, Steven Reyna (2011)
looks at the potential for witchcraft practices to open up space
for direct opposition within local contexts through his analysis
of the lionmen combatants in southern Chad who targeted
employees of TOTCO [Chad Oil Transportation Company].
Orange-clad construction flagmen (who were migrant labourers) stood on the roadside using advanced radar guns to detect
the speed of passing cars, astounding locals with precise readings of vehicle speed. People interpreted the radar guns to be an
indication of witchcraft practices, as they mysteriously allowed
the flagmen to know a car's speed. These rumours incited fear
and anger and, Reyna argues, ‘creat[ed] a desire to oppose’ the
TOTCO flagmen. This ‘desire to oppose’ manifested through
subsequent rumours that shape shifting lionmen (powerful
witchdoctors who transform into lions to hunt and consume the
witches that endanger their communities) were attacking the
flagmen. These rumours, Reyna argues, functioned as powerful
resisting forces within the Doba Basin, challenging the authority
of TOTCO and the oil consortium and creating a narrative of local
empowerment.
Although there were no similar narratives of lionmen in Nanga
and Kribi, Cameroonian epistemologies of la sorcellerie provide a
situated framework through which people understand the structural violence of the pipeline and, moreover, they establish a
narrative of how the world should be arranged and how people
should self-comport in ways that everyone's needs and wellbeing
are met (Nyamnjoh, 2001). Emphatically, epistemologies of
witchcraft castigate COTCO and the oil consortium as ‘bad neighbours’, dispossessing local people and failing to observe even the
most rudimentary courtesies. In Bipindi, a village between Mpango
near Kribi, Blanche told me,
and Ebome
We have a memory of the pipeline. In our tradition, when an
event occurs, there should be a task [or a ceremony] that shows
that [it] has happened. But in fact, no, we have no [such] good
memory of the pipeline. There was no good act to show that it
happened … the moment that our plantations were destroyed,
we arrived one day to find it so [and] we started to cry, but no
one wanted to listen, no one wanted to take our hands …
(Blanche, Bipindi, 10/02/2013)
Epistemologies of la sorcellerie provide a powerful language
against selfishness, greed, individualism and domination. They
provide commentary on forms of social violence and domination
and rebuke them. Nyamnjoh (2001: 31) explains that in such an
epistemology people are ‘allowed to pursue his or her own needs,
but not greed’. Agency in this paradigm is much different from that
stressed in Euro-American and capitalist idologies, where the focus
is on the principality of the individual. In Cameroon, agency is one
of interconnectedness and ‘harmony between individual interests
and group expectations’ as people are expected to pursue their own
diverse avenue towards individual self-worth while maintaining a
faithful and respectful eye on collective wellbeing (Nyamnjoh,
2001). These epistemologies inform the social realities along the
pipeline and reveal seemingly irreconcilable differences in the
epistemologies of Cameroonians and the teleology of individualism
and profit that are at the core of corporate practices. As Ngoulo
Ngali emphasised,
[COTCO] needs to look at their relationship with the public. No
one in this village has ever touched anyone in COTCO. But it is
like they are not human. How can you install yourself in a village
and the first thing you do is turn your back on the village? And
they say they are well educated! You would think that we were
chez-COTCO [in their house] instead of the contrary. (Ngoulo
Ngali, Mpango, 2013)
By associating COTCO with sorcerers, people conduct an
important censoring of the individualistic procedures and practices
of the pipeline. These censoring narratives demand respect for life
in a context where the oil consortium is characterised as being a
poor neighbour and as having a ‘bad heart’ (Marcelline N., near
Kribi, 16/09/12). According to epistemologies of la sorcellerie,
violence occurs naturally and all humans have the potential for
violence and greed; but violence is emphatically negative for the
wellbeing of the community and is curtailed by a framework of
social and familial responsibility and expectation (Nyamnjoh,
2001).
Epistemologies of sorcellerie might provide a metacritique of
those uneven violence(s) that arise from unseen networks of power
in a global financial context marked by enchantments, shadow
players and the magical production of wealth through finacialisation. Global financial ‘enchantments’ are bound up within the
pernicious greed of the ‘economic underworld’ (Akerlof & Romer,
1993) and include, for example, speculative bubbles, derivative
swapping, shadow banking, financial ‘hidden hands’, the swift
devaluation of currencies, volatile exchange rates, insolvent institutions and the mystifications of central banking. The obscure
financial and policy transactions and transfers of hydrocarbondependent economies are likewise a form of financial enchantment. It should be reassuring that there are epistemologies that
account for these invisible forces compelled by greed, particularly
as a significant body of work on structural and slow violence is
precipitated by the notion that scholar-activists should be
compelled to ‘render visible’ this otherwise ‘unseen’ violence (this
is a central theme, for example, of Rob Nixon's 2011 powerful
appraisal of ‘slow violence’).
Might, then, Cameroonian popular epistemologies provide a
framework for an imaginary capable of resisting ‘the economic and
cybernetic “babble” of the “neoliberal project”’ and its individualistic nature (Thorne & Kouzmin, 2013: 125)? Might these epistemologies open up space for a metacritique of the imperceptible
global financial flows that constitute the ‘oil ontology’ (Szeman,
2007) of hydrocarbon capitalism? Epistemologies of la sorcellerie
are well suited to name and condemn the violence(s) of hydrocarbon extraction in Cameroondhowever, we must first come to
terms with the intra-communal violence(s) embedded within
practices of witchcraft, particularly in extractive landscapes where
social tensions are exacerbated by the uneven distribution of petrowealth.6
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
Jealousy & conflict when ‘La Sorcellerie Ne Vient Jamais De
Loin’
The construction of the pipeline brought with it a certain
temporary euphoria in the lives of people along its course.
Alongside a widespread local campaign by the oil consortium to
promote the pipeline as a development vehicle, people thought
that the pipeline would translate into permanent wealth for their
communities. Families that customarily made less than 200$US a
year suddenly had access to reimbursement and compensation
lump sums of several thousand dollars, with, they said, little sense
of the temporality of this wealth and the long-term ramifications
of the destruction of their plantations. Much like the financial
escroquerie (scams) of the fake marabout, people were ‘tricked’ out
of their land through promises of wealth (Theo O., Kribi, 02/15/
13).
In Kribi and Nanga, people's access to the pipeline project's
wealth was limited and, on many occasions, people reported their
reimbursement and compensation monies being appropriated by
those with access to networks of power. COTCO employees as well
as political leaders and bureaucrats with local power and regional
power were suspected of having alternately ‘sacrificed’ local people
to ensure their own profit (by not ensuring proper environmental
oversight, for example) or as having ‘eaten’ the reimbursement and
compensation monies rightfully belonging to villagers. The
despotic underbelly of wealth and power creation is understood as
existing (albeit necessarily out-of-sight). Power is understood
indirectly and with an awareness of its invisible components. At the
same time, the uneven distribution of wealth, dispossession and
risk affected by the pipeline caused jealousy, unease and distrust
among community members, resulting in rupture and conflict
because frustrations were directed at family members and neighbours. In this sense, the pipeline intensified friction within the
community based on wealth inequality and jealousy. Indeed, people's accounts reveal anger, jealousy and tension over the reimbursements allocated from pipeline damages. Theo said,
The pipeline created huge discord between families. The forest
was touched [i.e. farmed] by me, [so] if I do not give millions of
CFA [to my family members] that creates jealousy. Even my
brothers think my papers of reimbursement were fake and that I
lied, that I was keeping money from them. I even heard stories of
assassination like that in Lolodorf [a nearby town]. That project
was poison! (Theo O., Kribi, 02/15/13)
People report being uninformed, poorly informed or misled
about the financial benefits of the project. As such, most people
report spending all of their reimbursement monies within the first
year. These were monies calculated by the World Bank and oil
consortium to last the six to seven years that it takes the fruit
bearing trees cultivated in the area to produce. In Mpango outside
said it best: ‘The pipeline was like a mirage: at the
of Kribi, Andre
beginning we saw it like a beautiful thing, but it was corrupt inside’
, 30/01/2013).
(N. Andre
The exacerbation of poverty that accompanied the pipeline
and the simultaneous creation of new economic inequalities
tore families apart and set people against each other. Because
reimbursement was issued individuallydin spite of the widespread local practice of collectively managing land under the
custody of the head of the familydfamilies report being caught
up in disputes over the allocation and use of reimbursement
funds due to speculation that family members were not properly
sharing. Reimbursements were often not spent, as the consortium deemed necessary, on reinvesting in seeds, land and
labour for the destroyed crops. Reimbursements issued to an
73
individual were generally split up between extended families
(including uncles, aunts, cousins and in-laws), so as to give to
each family member what was considered their share. These
shares were subsequently divided into smaller sums and spent
on immediate material needs: school fees, medications, doctor's
visits, food and sometimes to ‘faire la coq’ (or to ‘strut like a
rooster’) and impress others through le farrotage or excessive
spending and giving (for more on visible displays of wealth,
power and le farrotage in Cameroon see Malaquais, 2001;
Mbembe, 2002; Rowlands, 2011).
In cases where people were properly reimbursed, the valorisation of visible displays of power and wealth undermined the
process of reconstructing plantations after their destruction during
pipeline construction. The politics of power in Cameroon are such
that sizeable social pressure is exerted to ensure that people share
power and wealth among family and community members. Adding
to this is a culture that venerates visible displays of conspicuous
consumption. In many instances reimbursement for the destruction of plantations was the first occasion for rural and peri-urban
people nearby Kribi and Nanga to enter into the privileged spaces
of wealth spectacle. Of course, those with institutional power are
first and foremost to engage in rituals of extravagance and wealth;
this includes the president, who is renown for his multi-month
European vacations. However, when practiced at the lowest
socio-economic levels, by people living in the rural villages and
peri-urban neighbourhoods of Cameroon, these practices are
drawn upon to dismiss people as unthinking, irresponsible and
wasteful. This was evident during my conversations with figures in
positions of power, including COTCO employees, who dismissed
people's claims that the pipeline brought about new poverties and
dispossessions by arguing that poverty is a reflection of people's
propensity for irresponsible spending and partying. According to a
former COTCO programmer, people ‘drank’ and ‘partied’ away reimbursements only to ‘cry’ and ‘complain’ when their plantations
were not replaced (Steven Coll's 2012 discussion of the project's
reimbursement likewise reflects this notion that people were
irresponsible in their money managing). Consortium and government officials blamed villagers for ‘improperly investing reimbursements’, implying that the failure of the project was a result
of local mismanagement of reimbursement funds. The consortium's
disregard for existing tenants of social interdependence in
Cameroon, alongside peoples' misunderstandings of the brevity of
reimbursement in a context where petro-wealth is distributed
unevenly across class, gender, time and space, created a context for
intra-communal violence and an ideal space for witchcraft accusations, further rupturing the communities. Omolade Abundi
(2011: 106e107) observes a similar connection between the illusions of wealth within extractive communities and localised
violence in the Niger Delta, elucidating the relationship between
the material infrastructures of extraction (as ‘platforms of possibilities’ for material wealth generation) and macro-level conflict
that accompanies oil extraction (what he terms ‘pipelines of
violence’).
In one case, a woman told me that the pipeline destroyed her
family's plantation and that her brother, Roger, was ‘driven mad
with jealousy’ under the impression that his father had become
enormously wealthy through the reimbursement process. According to his sister, who lives in a village outside Nanga, Roger and his
father, Crispin, argued for several years over the family's reimbursement, which was issued to Crispin. Roger was not satisfied
with his father's assertions that the money had been spent and felt
betrayed by his father, eventually growing to hate him. Believing
that his father was selfishly keeping the money to himself, Roger
shot his father in the chest and then sought out his father's second
wife, Afana, and shot her several times, killing both. A stray bullet
74
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
grazed the torso of a neighbour's ten year-old child. Roger's halfsister, sick inside the house, died a few hours after the shooting.
A neighbour told me that the sister's tongue turned black just
before her death and rumours started soon after that the third
death was the result of witchcraft and that Roger was possessed.
For Roger's sister and two neighbours, this is a case of greedinduced witchery: the social ruptures caused by the pipeline
exasperated pre-existing dissatisfactions and triggered homicide. A
young man living near Kribi succinctly described the impasse, ‘It is
lamentable. It hurts so much. We hate to even speak of [the pipeline]. Not only did they not bring us development or good things,
they are in the middle of creating a big conflict in the community.
We need to create structures that live’ (Frankie, Mpango, 03/03/
2013).
Epistemologies of la sorcellerie engage with issues of personal
ambition, inequality and power. The work of Peter Geschiere (1997,
2013) is insightful in highlighting the relationship between
witchcraft, accumulation and family relationships in Cameroon.
Witchcraft accusations and violence unfold within what Gescheire
describes as a ‘triad of uncertainty’ (comprised of witchcraft, intimacy and trust) that reveals deep anxieties regarding intimacy
and trust (Geschiere, 2013: 22). This triad is conceived of as
‘constantly shifting’ in relation to a ‘continuous and uncertain
struggle [to] establish … or maintain … trust’ (Geschiere, 2013: 23).
This particular sociality of power, as intimate relationships are
entangled with jealousies and anxieties (Geschiere, 2013), can have
violently destructive consequences within extractive landscapes.
Geschiere asks, ‘If witchcraft is the unsettling realization that intimacy can be terribly dangerous, how is it possible to build
nonetheless the degree of trust necessary to live and work with
one's intimates?’ (2013: ix). This characteristic of la sorcelleriedthe
association of la sorcellerie with intimate distrust and jealousydmeans that instead of expressing frustrations and anger
towards pipeline employees or government officials, people accuse
family members or close acquaintances of mistreatment, malice
and greed. These accusations, in turn, fracture families and weaken
community solidarity. Importantly, the problem should not be
likened to one of ‘traditional’ culture; it is, instead, an inability to
cope with the complex, structural forms of violence that (re)shape
everyday experience, transform landscapes and aggravate social
tensions within extractive landscapes. The macro-level socio-political transformations in contexts of structural violence sometimes
manifest in emotional and psychological violence(s) at the microlevel (Moyo, 2008: 425). Not only does this contribute to the dispossessions of the pipeline project, but also such community
fracturing risks expediting future exploitative projects by pitting
people against each other (Fig. 6).
Final thoughts
The exploitation of fossil fuels is a crucial component of la
mangeoiredthe magical promise of unlimited profit and neverending consumptiondof hydrocarbon capitalism. Imre Szeman
(2007, 2012) identifies the capitalist epistemology as one deeply
and complexly entrenched within oil. Humanity, Szeman argues in
reference to Euro-America, has an ‘oil epistemology’: knowledge of
the world and senses of the world arise within and because of the
particular properties and relationships of ‘hydrocarbon capitalism’,
or capitalism since the twentieth century (Watts, 1999: 1). Oil is at
the heart of modern capitalism and without it the trajectory of
capitalism, since its emerging development in 1765, would have
been irrevocably dissimilar. We would be without cars, air travel,
plastic consumer goods, and the communication revolution.
Contemporary senses of being in the world and one's relations to
others are imbedded within ideas of what exists and what is
possible according to a history, present and future with oil (Szeman,
2007). Might an epistemology of witchcraft resist the epistemology
of oil?
Cameroonian epistemologies of la sorcellerie offer situated illustrations that total knowledge or total transparency may not be
obligatory for emancipatory activist-intellectual projects precisely
because people in Nanga and Kribi have a vocabulary and an
epistemology for describing the relationship between illicit power,
invisible processes of economic domination and violence. For the
last fifteen years or so, a dominant policy concern has centred upon
the drive for ever-increasing transparency, total exposure, total
Fig. 6. COTCO station, near Nanga-Eboko, Cameroon.
A. Murrey / Political Geography 47 (2015) 64e76
knowledge and/or total accountability as a means to navigate or
reduce the economic forms of exploitation and oppression
imbedded within the standard operating procedures of hydrocarbon capitalism and this has particularly been the case in transnational petroleum regimes, which have historically operated
without transparency. Yet in a global media and publicity context
where transnational corporations and politicians deftly ‘flux’ between the visible and invisible to transfix the public and continue
personal and corporate enrichment (Thorne & Kouzmin, 2013),
there is an inherent risk embedded within an over-emphasis on the
importance of ‘the visible’ or exposing ‘the invisible’ in extractive
projects.
In answering this question on the Cameroonian side of the
pipeline, we realize that an inquiry into epistemologies of la sor-vis hydrocarbon capitalism must deal with a central
cellerie vis-a
contradiction: the dual longing for a powerful anti-capitalist
worldview and the angers, pains and resentments that unfold in
communities dispossessed by modernity's oil ontology. Within some
post-development and poststructuralist literature, there is an
implicitdand importantdturn towards non-Euro-American epistemologies to resist capitalist violence and to provide alternate ‘world
imaginings’ (Escobar, 2001; Mignolo, 2000). Cameroonian epistemologies of witchcraft, as this article has shown, are capable of
capturing and explaining the ways that people move in and out of
unseen spaces, through unseen processes, which result in hypervisible structural forms of violence. However, on-the-ground practices of la sorcellerie sometimes reify or aggravate the violence of
extraction. This double role of witchcraft in Cameroondas both (i) an
epistemological framework to criticise illicit accumulation,
inequality and dispossession as well as (ii) a provoker of intimate or
intra-communal violencedmust be taken into account in an analysis
of the complex intersections between ‘local’ epistemologies, transnational politics and extractive geographies.
This article has emphasised the paradoxical and ambivalent
roles of witchcraft epistemologies in Kribi and Nanga without
providing ‘solutions’dprecisely because there are no easy or tidy
resolutions. Although articulations of la sorcellerie in Nanga and
Kribi are empowering in their critique of the violence(s) of
extraction and their ability to expose the concealed practices and
rhetoric of extractive capital, this article has exposed the limitations
of such articulations within complex socio-political landscapes that
aggravate jealousy and mistrust amongst family and community.
This paradox of witchcraft is suggestive of the difficulty of putting
emancipatory epistemologies into practice. The sub-field of political
geography is well placed to continue the intellectual project of
attending to the complexities of understandings of power in place
(always concrete, actual, on-the-ground) where both domination
and resistance come into being through complex visible and
invisible networks of power.
Note
As per Google's Permissions and Attribution guidelines, the
Google Earth maps and images that appear herein have not been
altered in any way and attribution has been accurately given.
Source: http://www.google.com/permissions/geoguidelines.html.
Conflict of interest
None declared.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by a Clarendon Fellowship at the
University of Oxford. I am thankful to the African and African
75
Diaspora Studies Program at Boston College for funding my final
write-up year. Thanks to Dali Islam, Patricia Daley, Ian Klinke and
Chambi Chachange, whose close readings yielded much needed
critiques, insights and suggestions for improvement on earlier
drafts of this paper. Yvonne Aburrow patiently guided me though
the history of Western European witchcraft and anti-witchcraft
movements, including a synopsis of present-day paganism. The
feedback from members of the Transformations Cluster in the School
of Geography and the Environment at Oxford was much appreciated. All errors within are my own.
Endnotes
1
The terms witchcraft, the occult, magic, sorcery and enchantment are used to refer
to a wide range of activities and beliefs. Each of these terms is rooted in western
European early modern period (from the sixteenth to seventeenth century) beliefsystems and, as such, perpetrate a discursive violence when applied to African
contexts. The term witchcraft in the Christian Eurocentric imagination holds nontheistic, polytheistic, animist and/or ancestor-centric cosmologies as evil and/or
primitive (Hutton, 1999). While the terms have European origins, Cameroonian la
sorcellerie did not come into being through colonial encounters. The terms la sorcellerie and witchcraft are used interchangeably here although preference is given
for the French form (as that most commonly used in Cameroon).
2
Chevron-Texaco later changed its name to Chevron Corp. and in June 2014
Chevron Corp. sold its 25 per cent stake to the Republic of Chad for 1.3 billion$US.
3
A wide scholarship reveals that witchcraft epistemologies have played significant
historical and contemporary roles in informing the ways that diverse peoples across
Africa, the Caribbean and Asia situate themselves amidst changing social and
economic conditions (Ashforth, 1996; Ekholm Friedman, 2011; Eves, 2000; Fisiy &
Geschiere, 2001; Geschiere, 1997; Moore & Sanders, 2001; Rajah, 2005; Schmoll,
1993; Shaw, 1997).
4
The interviews discussed herein occurred near Nanga-Eboko and Kribi, Cameroon
between August 2012 and April 2013. All names are pseudonyms except when the
respondent has explicitly indicated a preference to be named (see Murrey, 2015a:
17, for a more detailed discussion of this technique).
5
Biya is also sometimes called le sphinx d'Etoudi in reference to his immovable
.
power at Le Palais d'Etoudi in Yaounde
6
‘Witchcraft never comes from far’ (i.e., la sorcellerie is practiced within the family
or within the community).
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