A Human Rights Analysis of (Amendments To) The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2012 By Ojijo Pascal Al Amin The author is a lawyer specializing in legal rhetoric, financial services law, ICT law, and African jurisprudence; independent consultant on collective investment schemes (cooperatives, saccos and investment clubs), communications expert (on public speaking, document drafting, and strategic planning), author of 51 books, performance poet, armature pianist, Inua Kijana Fellow, and entrepreneur. ojijo@lawpronto.com. +256 776 100059. Presented on Behalf of Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum (www.umydf.org) At the Parliamentary Forum On Thursday, May 14, 2015  Table of Contents Introduction 3 Terrorism & Response to Terrorism 3 Why A Human Rights Analysis? 3 Proviso 3 Islam & Terrorism 4 Anti Terrorism Legislation Is Not New 4 Response to Terrorism In East Africa 4 Objectives of the Bill & Act 4 The Objective of the Act 4 The Objective of the Bill 4 Specific Objects 5 Provisions Analysis & Proposed Amendments of Act and Bill 5 Expanded Police Powers 5 Regulation of Firearms 5 Terrorist Activities 5 Financing Of Terrorism 6 Prohibition Against Torture 6 Broadening the Definition of Terrorism and Terrorism Offences 6 Potential for Abuse of Legislation 7 Punishment Provisions 7 Rights of Refugees 7 Detention/Access to Legal Counsel 8 Freedom of Association and Access to Information 8 Privacy and Access to Information 9 From information Gathering to Disruptive Activities 9 Lack of Oversight 9 Apportioning Responsibility and (Potential) Liability 10 Other Issues 10 Policy Statement 10 Partnerships with CSOs 10 Support to Victims Organizations 10 Criminalizing Sensationalism and Reckless Stereotyping 11 Conclusion 11  Introduction Terrorism & Response to Terrorism If you want to know terrorism, look at Garrisa, and what they did to 140 students, and 9 security officers and staff at the university. If you want to be reminded to the terror in terrorism look back to 2010, Kampala, and the bombings that left over 78 dead, and countless in physical and emotional turmoil till date. Indeed, if you want to understand the fear, the pain, and the heat of terrorism, look to Nairobi, Tanzania, United States of America, UK, and countless other destinations where mothers bury their children, wives bury their husbands, and nations bury their youth. It chills, and stops dead, peace and development. Indeed, in terms of defining terrorism, the sudden, dramatic, and horrifying effects of terrorist acts are perhaps the most, if not the only, identifiable nature of terrorism. Why A Human Rights Analysis? However, even as terrorism is chilling the hearts of the innocent citizens and the security agents, so are the various provisions of draconian laws that governments have come up with to address the scourge that is terrorism. Since the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, terrorism has became the new global enemy, to be eradicated no matter the cost to domestic civil liberties. States are under pressure to conform to the international thrust of counter terrorism, and have little discomfort in lengthening detention of suspects, blocking the right to legal access, removing the right of appeal, limiting free speech, and seizing property. The events of 11 September have set in motion a significant loosening of the legal constraints on the use of force, and this in turn will lead to changes across the international legal system. Michael Byers, “Terrorism, the use of force and international law after 11 September”, 2002 Vol. 16(2) International Relations p155-170. The international counter-terrorism regime has been imposed by powerful states that use various strategies to induce cooperation among the less powerful. Through a range of international agreements, governments were pressed to join the ‘War on Terror’1 by adopting domestic legislation, sharing intelligence, and cracking down on target groups. Despite heavy pressure, most obviously from the US, levels of compliance with the regime have varied. Some countries have jumped on board and seized the anti-terrorism rhetoric, others have been reluctant partners, and several have resisted the imposition of the regime. There are some 19 international and regional conventions relating to combating terrorism today, yet none start from a consensual definition. 2002 Report of UN Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism. UN Security Council resolution 1373 Adopted 28 September 2001 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement has formed much of the basis of the fight against terrorism condemning the 11 September attacks and permitting states to “take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts…” including suppressing the recruitment of members of terrorist groups, preventing those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories, preventing the movement of terrorists, and measures to prevent counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents. Proviso The scope and implications of the act and Bill are so extensive that it cannot be, and is not, the purpose of this memorandum to itemize every problem with the bill. Rather, the discussion below is an effort to reflect a basic consensus over some (and only some) of the leading concerns, all the while noting that any given signatory’s degree of concern may vary item by item. Also, the absence of a given matter from this letter is not meant to suggest it is not also a concern. Islam & Terrorism Islam is the face of terrorism, and as much as the religion, and its believers, stress the narrative of peace and philosophy of salaam, which is the basis of the religion, there are countless forces that seek to entrench this notion through such acts as sensetionalisation of the news about terrorism, government selective prosecution and policing actions, and private sector selective discrimination in dealing with Muslims, to name but a few. Consequently, it behooves the government to have in place special measures to protect the Muslims from stereotyping, while at the same time, to work with Muslims in community policing, and not, policing the communities. Anti Terrorism Legislation Is Not New The introduction of anti terrorism legislation, especially after the 2011 attacks in the United States, is the norm, rather than the exception, in most jurisdictions, especially following intense pressure from the US and Europe. The legislations have been used to right money laundering, organism crime, human trafficking, and those whose territories are used as harbour for terrorists. However, such legislation have also been used to suppress dissent and opposition groups in Africa and Asia, while being used to promote interventionism by the western nations under the banner ranging from financing to national security threats, boosting their own alleged need for state intervention. The countries which do not tow the line have their designations being described as ‘bad for business’ as did the US Treasury for Nauru in 2002, or get travel advisory as did UK to Kenya in 2008. When MPs in Tong objected to broad definition of terrorism as it threatens their campaign to change the parliamentary representation in the Kingdom to a fully elected parliamentary system, they had the Ships flying the Tongan flag investigated by the US after alleged links to Al- Queda. Despite these few setbacks of arm twisting of a few to follow agenda fo the EU and US, all commonwealth countries have anti-terrorist legislations, and or provisions of the law proscribing acts of terrorism and related illegal activities. Response to Terrorism In East Africa Response to terrorism has been various and broad. In Uganda, the government readily signed on to the ‘War on Terror’, partly to gain international support for its struggle against rebels in the north. Tanzania’s government has passed domestic counter-terrorism laws to honour international commitments, but has done little to implement their provisions. In Kenya, members of parliament have refused to pass anti-terrorism legislation, mainly because it is backed by the US, while security personnel cooperate with their American counterparts behind the scenes. Objectives of the Bill & Act The Objective of the Act The objective of the act, An Act to suppress acts of terrorism, to provide for the punishment of persons who plan, instigate, support, finance or execute acts of terrorism; to prescribe terrorist organisations and to provide for the punishment of persons who are members of, or who profess in public to be members of, or who convene or attend meetings of, or who support or finance or facilitate the activities of terrorist organisations; to provide for investigation of acts of terrorism and obtaining information in respect of such acts including the authorising of the interception of the correspondence of and the surveillance of persons suspected to be planning or to be involved in acts of terrorism; and to provide for other connected matters. The Objective of the Bill The Bill seeks to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 to harmonise the definition of “funds” with that in the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999; to amend the definitions of “terrorism” and “acts of terrorism” to include the international aspects envisaged by the convention; and for related purposes. The Bill seeks to provide a suite of measures which are specifically designed to strengthen and improve Uganda’s counter-terrorism legislative framework to comply with Uganda’s international obligations and respond to terrorism threats. Specific Objects The following resources are intended to aid journalists’ in depth reporting on Uganda’s proposed new terrorism legislation. The Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill presented to the Parliament of Uganda seeks to do the following things and more: expand the definition of an ‘act of terrorism’ to accommodate international organisations; penalise indirect involvement in acts of terrorism; criminalise the providing of weapons to terrorist organisations; create the offense of terrorist financing and to prescribe appropriate penalties; provide for the freezing, seizure and forfeiture of funds or property reasonably lined or intended to be used for terrorist activities; and empower the Minister to make regulations for the better carrying out of the purposes and provisions of the Act. Provisions Analysis & Proposed Amendments of Act and Bill Expanded Police Powers Drafted in response to two attacks by lone terrorists, the Act, and the bill, significantly loosens current restrictions on police and spies seeking to disrupt terrorist activity. In so doing, however, like a double edged sword, it also opens the way for the security and intelligence services to target legitimate dissent, making criminals of environmentalists, native people and other protesters hostile to the government. In essence, those who we once called ‘freedom fighters’ can easily be de-legitimized and may now carry the label of ‘terrorist’. Regulation of Firearms The Firearms Act 1970 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 section 7 aim to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons within or outside its territory, in particular small arms or light weapons. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 also addresses this in sections 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Section 9 specifically caters for offences relating to the supply of weapons to terrorists, while Section 10 tackles those who support and abet terrorism. Section 11 addresses the recruitment of terrorists and the establishment of terrorist organisations, with Section 12 devoted to the offence of misprision of terrorism. The sentence prescribed for supply of weaponry or explosives is death on conviction. So is the sentence for recruiting, financing, and harbouring terrorists. Misprision of terrorism carries a life sentence. Terrorist Activities The Anti-Terrorism Act addresses this in Section 9, 10, 11 and 12. Section 7, 8 and 9 specifically handles offences relating to the supply of weapons to terrorists, while Section 10 tackles those who support and abet terrorism. The bill further introduces new offences under Clause 9A, terrorism financing. Section 11 addresses the recruitment of terrorists and the establishment of terrorist organisations, with section 12 is devoted to the offence of misprision of terrorism. The sentence prescribed for supply of weaponry or explosives is death on conviction. So is the sentence for recruiting, financing, and harbouring terrorists. Misprision of terrorism carries a life sentence under the Act. The law further in the Second Schedule contains a list of terrorist organisations, which the Minister for Internal Affairs may update from time to time. This updated list must include those that have been adopted under various UNSC resolutions. Financing Of Terrorism These issues are dealt with under PART V of the law, sections 12-16, and in the bill, with creation of new offence, financing of terrorism, under Clause 9A, and freezing of assets acquired or to be used to support terrorism, under Clause 17A and 17B. Sections 12 (1) (a) states: “A person who – (a) solicits or invites any other person to give, lend or otherwise make available, whether for consideration or not, any money or other property; or (b) receives accepts from any other person, whether for consideration or not, any money or other property, intending that is shall be applied or used for the commission of or in furtherance of or in connection with acts of terrorism, or having reasonable cause to suspect that is may be so used or applied, commits an offence. The same provision applies to people who lend help to terrorists (section 12(2) knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be applied or used for terrorism. The act also criminalized contribution, as well as managing funds or resources of terrorist organisations. While the Act confers no specific powers or obligations on supervisory and other financial sector authorities to combat the financing of terrorism in Uganda, the Act criminalises the financing of terrorism. In December 2002 the Bank of Uganda, as an interim measure, issued anti-money laundering guidelines to financial institutions. These guidelines require financial institutions to implement a number of anti-money laundering policies and measures at least to comply with the minimum requirements, including: – The “know your customer/client” principle; and to – Report suspicious transactions and financial activities to the authorities In complying, financial institutions are required to adhere to and follow anti-money laundering guidelines aimed at combating financing of terrorism. However, there have been cases, reported and unreported, of banks summarily closing clients’ accounts based on names which are not indigenous to Ugandans, so long as they are of Muslim, or Arabic descent, such as Ahmed, Muhammed, or Mahmoud. In Australia, the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002 inserts a new offence into the Criminal Code act aimed at financiers who are reckless as to whether those funds will be used to facilitate a terrorist act and carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Entered into force 29 January 2003. Prohibition Against Torture The act, in section 21(e) proscribes torture and cruel treatment by providing that an officer who engages in torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, illegal detention or intentionally causes harm or loss to property, commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty currency points, or both. This is very good for protection of human rights. Broadening the Definition of Terrorism and Terrorism Offences Section 7, 8 and 9 of the Act define terrorism and terrorism offences. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 makes "terrorism," and supporting or promoting terrorism, crimes punishable by capital punishment. It defines terrorism as, "the use of violence or threat of violence with intent to promote or achieve religious, economic and cultural or social ends in an unlawful manner, and includes the use, or threat to use, violence to put the public in fear or alarm." The bill amends various sub sections to include international organizations as well as governments as susceptible to terrorism events. There are broad definitions which have affected other countries, as well as Uganda. Granted, the only agreement is that the result of terrorism leads to harm, and destruction of property. New Zealand has a definition in the Terrorism Suppression Act which significantly incorporates a broad meaning of terrorist (“intention to induce terror in a civilian population; or unduly compel or to force a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act”) and was seen as potentially threatening legitimate protesters. Australia introduced The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 [no.2] which defines a terrorist act as ‘an act, or threat of action (which causes serious physical harm or death or threatens public health or safety, or damage to property), that is done or made with the intention of advancing a political, ideological or religious cause; and done or made with the intention of either coercing or influencing by intimidation the Government of Australia or of another country; or intimidating the public or a section of the public’. Industrial action is not prohibited but the terrorist definition has been criticised as being too broad. The bill further amends by adding new offence, that is, under proposed section 9A, to be financing of terrorism. Uganda’s, just like Kenya’s and Canada’s definition of terrorist activity, includes actions that are an offence under the UN anti terrorism conventions or are taken for political, religious, or ideological purposes that threatens the public or national security by killing, seriously harming or endangering a person, causing substantial property damage that is likely to seriously harm people, or by interfering with or disrupting an essential service, facility or system. It is not intended to apply if essential services are disrupted during a lawful or illegal strike. The Anti-Terrorism Act allows for the designation of terrorist groups. Suspects could be brought before a judge to give information as part of ‘investigative hearings’. Knowingly participating in a terrorist act carries a penalty of 10 years imprisonment whilst the leader in a terrorist activity would be liable to life imprisonment. Potential for Abuse of Legislation Perhaps one of the more extreme examples of the abuse of anti-terror legislation has been in Zimbabwe. In 2001, six foreign journalists were accused of terrorism for writing on political violence in the country. A spokesman for the government said: “…we agree with U.S. President Bush that anyone who in any way finances, harbors or defends terrorists is himself a terrorist. We, too, will not make any difference between terrorists and their friends and supporters". Punishment Provisions The law provides for punishment and penalties in the same range as other jurisdictions. South Africa’s Anti terrorism laws post September 11th, makes the commission of a terrorist act punishable by life in prison, and criminalizes membership in a designated terrorist group. A terrorist act is defined as an unlawful act committed in or outside of South Africa. Providing support to a terrorist group is also an offence. Like Uganda, South African police cannot detain a suspect without consent from a judge. Further, journalists are also obliged to provide required information to the police, failure of which could lead to up to five years imprisonment. (See Sec 7(2)(e) of the act.) This is in contrast to other jurisdictions like Bangladesh where the Special Powers Act 1974 gives the Bangladesh government a wide range of powers to detain suspected persons without any express reasons and has been used against political opponents. So far, unlike Kenya, Uganda has not extradited any suspected individual to a foreign country for trial. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has constantly lobbied for an end to illegal detentions and cases where suspects have been extradited to the US without due process. Ugandan government has always insisted that there are no safe houses for harboring suspected terrorists. Rights of Refugees Repressive anti-terror legislation has been used as a pretext by governments to suppress minority groups and to curtail their international responsibilities in accepting asylum seekers and refugees. Part 4 of the United Kingdom’s Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act provides for the Home Secretary to certify an individual as an international terrorist on reasonable suspicion. Non UK nationals can be detained indefinitely without charge. This is not the case in Uganda. If any detention is taking place, it is para statutory, unconstitutional and extra judicial. This is unlike the case in Kenya where the government introduced a law for detention for upto one year without trial. In many countries, including Kenya and Tanzania, opposition to anti-terrorism measures has been especially strong among civil society organisations, human rights activists, and Muslim leaders. Similar patterns exist in Uganda, but the lack of political opening there has prevented these groups from mobilising effectively against the policies. With Muslims representing just roughly 15 per cent of the population, their political importance to the leadership is limited, particularly in comparison to military and security interests that favour the enhanced powers that come with greater cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’. Detention/Access to Legal Counsel Fundamental legal rights of an accused person includes the right to be informed of the reason for detention, and the right to consult legal advice. Anti terror legislation often removes these basic rights under the guise of needing increased detention times in order to carry out investigations, or to only allow contact with approved lawyers. Neither the bill, nor the law, prevent the access to lawyer by accused persons. In other jurisdictions, the situation is different. In Mauritius, for instance, under The Prevention of Terrorism (Special Measures) Regulations, a person who is suspected of engaging in terrorist acts can be detained for up to 36 hours without access to any person other than a police officer or a government medical officer on request. The bill was only enacted after two Presidents stepped down rather than give their assent to the bill. The United Kingdom’s draconian Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act entered into force in December 2001 with a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights. The Act allows the Secretary of State to certify someone (non UK nationals who cannot be returned to another country) as a suspected terrorist or national security risk and they can be detained indefinitely. The process in making this determination is secret and can only be appealed on a point of law to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. There is no right to legal representation. The Emergency Powers Act in Zambia allows for indefinite detention without trial under a Presidential Detention Order. Amnesty International reports incidents of abuses of the Act in the case of a freelance journalist and opposition supporter who was detained without charge for more than three months. Privacy In the fight against terrorism, privacy rights are among the first to go as governments justify their ‘Big Brother’ activities on pre-emptive grounds. Freedom of Association and Access to Information In the war against terrorism, governments have seized the opportunity to outlaw demonstrations in the name of national security, thus undermining a basic civil right. There are also restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, and expression, freedom of movement, residence and employment. Schools could be closed if they are used as a meeting place for an unlawful organization or for any other reason deemed detrimental to the interests of the government or the public. Members of an opposition group have been detained under the Act. The government only need allege that they were plotting to overthrow the government through militant means. Uganda’s Anti Terrorism Act 2002 prohibits media houses from giving publicity to terrorists thus strictly limiting the right to freedom of expression. This is especially in situaions where the government, through provisions of the law, section 10, list an orgnaisation as terrorist. The government has the authority to list an organisation as banned. This particular section is further infringing on the rights because the only oversight before listing as terrorist organization is cabinet, which is government and political party run. Further, after listing an organization as terrorist, the minister can go ahead and freeze its assets, and arrest its leaders, while waiting for upto 14 days for parliament to approve the Gazette notice, and even when annulled, the annulment under this subsection shall not affect the previous operation of the instrument. Security officials are also given powers to intercept bank accounts, emails, telephone calls, and faxes of suspects. Employers are also under a duty to report absences if they suspect any involvement in terrorism. Zimbabwe’s Public Order and Security Act 2002 enabled the government to suppress political opposition in the run up to the national election. Sections 15 and 16 make it an offence to publish statements that promote public disorder or undermine public confidence in the police or to insult the office of the President. However, just like in Zimbabwe, any alleged governmental criticisms in Uganda could result in de- registration and thus criminalization of the organization. This is particularly threatening to independent human rights NGO’s who may be critical of governmental actions. Privacy and Access to Information Under Part IV and Part V of the Act, sections 17-22, the law provides for a wide range of access to information powers by the policing agencies. These provisions are further expounded by the amendment sections 17A and 17B, which relate to information about financial resources. The act and the bill enact a new security-intelligence information-sharing statute of vast scope with no enhanced protections for privacy and from abuse. The law defines “activities that undermine the security” in such an exceptionally broad way that “terrorism” is simply one example of many examples, and only “lawful advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression” is excluded. Apart from all the civil-disobedience activities and illegal protests or strikes that will be covered (e.g. in relation to “interference with critical infrastructure”), this deep and broad intrusion into privacy is made worse by the fact there are no corresponding oversight or review mechanisms adequate to this expansion of the state’s new levels of information awareness. It is overbroad, unnecessary in view of current criminal law, and potentially counter-productive. But, perhaps most worrying is how counter-productive this new crime could be. De-radicalization outreach programs could be negatively affected. Much anti-radicalization work depends on frank engagement of authorities, alongside communities and parents, with youth who hold extreme views, including some views that, if expressed (including in private), would contravene this new prohibition. Such outreach may require “extreme dialogue” in order to work through the misconceptions, anger, hatred and other emotions that lead to radicalization. If is enacted, these efforts could find themselves stymied as local communities and parents receive advice that, if youth participating in these efforts say what they think, they could be charged with a crime. And the counter-productive impact could go further. From information Gathering to Disruptive Activities Both the act, and the bill, transform security agencies from central current function – information-gathering and associated surveillance with respect to a broad area of “national security” matters – to being a totally different kind of agencies actively intervening to disrupt activities by a potentially infinite range of unspecified measures, as long as a given measure falls shy of causing bodily harm, infringements on sexual integrity or obstructions of justice. (Section 18) One only has to imagine that under Part VII, the minister can give officers power to monitor someone for upto 90 days, without court oversight or warrant. Now, a judge ought to be asked (indeed, required) to say yes in advance to measures that could range from wiping a target’s computer clear of all information to fabricating materials (or playing agent-provocateur roles) that discredit a target in ways that cause others no longer to trust him, her or it: and these examples are possibly at the mild end of what the law and the bill may well judge as useful “disruption” measures to employ. Due procedure with regards to warrant proceedings will not even be brought before courts. This means the agents can intercept, and plant their own evidence, as part of disrupting terrorist acts. Lack of Oversight Finally, the defects in information-sharing, criminalizing expression, and disruption are magnified by the overarching lack of anything approaching adequate oversight and review functions, at the same time as existing accountability mechanisms have been weakened and in some cases eliminated in recent years. Quite simply, the act, and now the bill, continues the government’s resolute expansion of powers of the police. The Inspector General of Police can cause surveillance to be done (PART VII), can cause freezing of funds or property by mere letter to a financial institution without any oversight (The Bill, Clause 17A(1)), and can seize funds and property not in financial institutions (the Bill, Clause 17A(2)). The court is brought in only after the seizing the assets. Apportioning Responsibility and (Potential) Liability Further, both the law and the bill ought to clearly use the words “shall”, and “will” to apportion responsibility, and limit the word “may” as it gives broad discretion which is risky in areas of detention and denial of right to speech, movement, and expression. For instance, under section 18 of the Act, the minister should be obliged to designate all officers through writing, and not, just some, through the word, “may”. Further, the IGP’s powers should be limited by stating that all actions should be based on a reasonable basis for believing a person “will” commit a terrorist offence, and not, “may” commit a crime. Other Issues There are other issues which, though not deserving of legislation, are needed to be put in a policy, and or other such document, like a guideline, to provide for effective address of the scourge of terrorism on one hand, and the cruel suffering caused by the policing agents and communities, to the innocent Muslims who have become synonymized with terrorism. Policy Statement The origin of law ought to be a policy, so that matters that are not able to be legislated in terms of creating duties and rights, can be given a parallel strength through a policy directive. For instance, there is need for the policy statement to indicate that the fight against terrorism is not a fight against the religion of Islam, and neither are the instant cheques, searches, and reporting by media meant to be disadvantageous to the Muslims, or to paint them as terrorists. Further, such policy should address such issues as: Victim support; Sensationalisation of news reporting; Partnerships between the police and communities; New model of community policing where the police do not use community policing as a smoke screen for community investigation, but work with communities. Clear statements that anti-terrorist strategies ought not be use dto further local political power agenda by branding political dissidents or opposition groups terrorist The need and commitment to apply soft options, including, but not limited to robust poverty eradication programs, as opposed to the present military-heavy counter-terrorist strategies Partnerships with CSOs The policing community should not see the civil society as working against them in the anti-terrorism work. The civil society practitioners are neither ‘extremists’ nor dismissive of the real threats to Uganda’s security that government and Parliament have a duty to protect. However, information sharing, basic civility in dealings, and less name calling is needed to ensure that all work as corporate citizens to further the goals of peace and development and to deny the extremists opportunity to recruit. The civil society believes that believe that terrorism must be countered in ways that are fully consistent with core values (that include liberty, non-discrimination, and the rule of law), that are evidence-based, and that are likely to be effective. Support to Victims Organizations In the book, “Why did Hitler Kill The Jews”, Ojijo writes that “those to whom evil is done, do evil in return.” When terrorism strikes, it leads to loss of lives, limb, and property. It is the contractual duty of the government to offer support and help those who cannot help themselves. However, in cases where the government has no institutionalized support mechanism, anchored in the law, then the victims of the acts of terrorism are likely to become terrorists themselves. There is need to cordon off this population from radicalisation, recruitment and or sympathy. Criminalizing Sensationalism and Reckless Stereotyping The world over, terrorism has been equated with Islam, with the religion being used as the face of terrorism. This narrative is propagated partly by ignorant misstatements, and largely by sensational reporting by the media, reckless statements by senior government officials and agencies, and such other actions which lead to marginalizing, stereotyping, balkanisation and generally defeat the efforts of harmony, communalism, and peaceful co-existence, and hence, create a rift, which make it possible for recruiters to operate without notice. The standard for reckless reporting and statements should be as that for other crimes related to inciting crimes, and hate speech. Conclusion Protecting human rights and protecting public safety are complementary objectives, but experience has shown that serious human rights abuses can occur in the name of maintaining national security,” the former prime ministers and supreme court jurists wrote. “Given the secrecy around national security activities, abuses can go undetected and without remedy. This results not only in devastating personal consequences for the individuals, but a profoundly negative impact on Canada’s reputation as a rights-respecting nation. The bill’s alleged defects will not only do little to fight terrorism, it could actually set back the cause, radicalize otherwise pensive sectors of the target groups, and generally be a claw back on progress being made elsewhere. The actions of powerful nations such as the US, Canada, UK and Australia in limiting the civil liberties of the population serve as an impetus to other, less economically powerful states, that their restrictive laws are necessary in today’s society. It is precisely against this sort of ideology that human rights violations are allowed to continue unabated. When the large movers and shakers on the international stage encourage the limitations of human rights of their own populations, they lose any moral ground in criticizing other nations. As the war on terror continues, it is important that the violations that take place in all countries of the countries do not escape unchecked. The heightened security measures that are introduced to combat terror need not supersede the rights of the population. Indeed, it is when tackling the horror of terrorist attacks that the fundamental freedoms that define civil society need to be most treasured and respected. A Human Rights Analysis of (Amendments To) The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2012-By Ojijo Pascal Al Amin Page 2 of 11