WITHIN THE REGION, BEYOND THE REGION: THE ROLE OF BRAZIL ACCORDING TO THE MASS PUBLIC This article presents the partial results from the research project Brazil, the Americas and the world, funded by FAPESP ( Thematic Research Project 2013/00495-4). The author is grateful to Matheus Rogatis for his dedication and efficient research assistance in organizing the data and in producing graphs and tables; to Camila Schipper, Mei Higa and Dan Novachi for organizing Table I´s information; about and to the colleagues Janina Onuki and Feliciano Sá Guimarães, who read the draft version and provided suggestions for its improvement. Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, CEBRAP & IRI-USP mhbtdalm@usp.br "I have always talked of South America, not because I think we should give up on our Latin American politics, but because we should be true and realist. South America is our Continent. Therefore, the flight deck is here”. (Azeredo da Silveira, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1974-1979) “For a long time our intervention in the Prata region is over. Brazil has nothing more to do regarding the domestic life of our neighbors. Our political interest is elsewhere. It is now attracted to a greater cycle. Uninterested in the barren rivalries of South American countries, sustaining a cordial sympathy towards those states, Brazil has entered resolutely in the realm of great international friendships, to which it is entitled to aspire due to its culture, the prestige of its territorial greatness, and the strength of its population. (Baron of Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1902-1910) If we are to assess the role that countries play in the world system, to consider their construed international identity is as important as to take into account their material resources and capabilities. Dominant perceptions of the world affairs, shared values and beliefs, and representations about its own interests frame and shape a country´s decisions and actions (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993; Wendt, 1999) As Weber argued a long time ago: “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern the conduct of men. Yet, very frequently the "world images" that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest” . Widespread beliefs and perceptions, which go beyond the circle of decision-makers and powerful stakeholders, are particularly important in democratic polities, helping to provide stability and predictability to foreign policies across time and different administrations. In this article, we use survey data on the perceptions of the Brazilian mass public to explore, at the level of ideas and beliefs, the ambiguities of the Brazilian relations to its regional surroundings. Several authors have previously pointed towards this and it certainly mirrors Brazil´s complex and elusive identity as an aspiring global power. In what follows, we will first further discuss such ambiguities and later show how they translate into public opinion perceptions and representations. We begin from two assumptions: one empirically grounded assumption and a purely theoretical one. Firstly, based on rich evidence demonstrated by Page & Shapiro (1988), Hurwitz & Peffley (1987), Jentleson (1992), Holsti (1992), and Witkopf (1996), we assume that there exists such a thing as a public opinion on foreign policy and international affairs and that it is quite rational, consistent, and relatively stable, even among ill-informed persons. Secondly, we assume that widespread and shared perceptions and beliefs concerning foreign affairs emerge and solidify by means of a twofold complex process. Governmental officials, high-level bureaucrats, public intellectuals, the media In agreement with Baum & Potter (2008), we believe that the media plays a crucial and independent role in shaping beliefs and perceptions of the mass public on foreign policy and international issues. , and other opinion makers are the sources of those representations and exert influence upon the public´s perceptions. They provide cognitive shortcuts that allow uninformed people to form their opinions (Hurwitz & Peffley (1987),Baum & Potter, 2008:46, Popkin, 1993). On the other hand, governmental officials are sensitive to the ways through which the public perceives, reinterprets and reacts to those ideas. This is especially true under democratic regimes, where public opinion polls are a current tool for governments as much as a source of public information. Brazil and the region Different authors (Bethell, 2009; Malamud, 2013; Burges, 2009; Fonseca, 2012; Flemes, 2010; Schenoni, 2015) have underlined Brazil’s complex and ambiguous relations towards its region, whether in terms of perceptions or actual foreign policy guidelines. Basically, there are four types of ambiguities. The first ambiguity relates to the perceived political borders of the region, at different moments. Across time, there have been three imagined borders, circumscribing what Brazilian foreign policymakers considered the meaningful region: Americas, Latin America, and South America. Pan-Americanism, implying a region stretching from North to South America --and therefore including the United States --, has guided Brazilian foreign policy at different times throughout its history. Belonging to the Americas, by contrast with Europe, has been a powerful flagship guiding the Brazilian transition from Monarchy to a Republic, in the late XIX Century. It continued to be an important idea during the first decades of the Republican period, and had a revival on the second half of the 1950s, when President Juscelino Kubischek (1955-1960) launched the Pan American Operation The Pan American Operation was a Brazilian diplomatic initiative launched in 1958, just after President Richard Nixon visited Venezuela under violent protests. The initiative sought to bring together all countries of the Americas for an agenda of economic development and moderate reform to tackle poverty, both seen as the only efficient way of fighting communism and promoting democracy. US investments were thought to be important and welcome to propel economic development. Although the US considered it to be a positive initiative, their diplomatic priorities would soon change after the Cuban Revolution, in 1959. Nevertheless, the Pan American Operation resulted in the foundation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (ALAC) both in 1960. (For more on the subject see Lessa, 2008). Alternatively, the awareness of being a part of such a geopolitical entity called Latin America, although previously existing, increased and solidified itself during the Cold War. A number of prominent Brazilian intellectuals associated with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) -- such as Celso Furtado, Helio Jaguaribe, Fernando Henrique Cardoso--, envisaged Brazil as part of Latin America, a region where countries, beyond their cultural and historical differences, shared the same (subordinate) place in the international economic system and could, therefore, attempt to establish some kind of political coordination to act together in the international arena. The perception of being part of Latin American did somehow shape the country´s foreign behavior at that period, for instance when it took part in the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) in 1960, and when it participated in the Contadora Goup in the 1970s and 1980s, and in the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) in 1980, and in the Rio Group in 1986. Lastly, since Brazil has physical borders with 10 out of 12 South American countries, this region has always being an important space where Brazilian foreign policy necessarily evolved. Nevertheless, only recently has South America become the region towards which the Brazilian “Latin American” policies and politics were actually fully deployed, after the establishment of Mercosur in 1991, and Unasur in 2007 Bethell (2009:314) argues that when Brazil hesitantly decides to play the regional leader role, the region is South America and not Latin America.. The second ambiguity relates to the question as to what extent Brazil wants to exert leadership in the region and which resources and tools it is willing to employ in order to attain recognition and allegiance. Bethell (2009) believes that under President Lula da Silva’s administration, maybe for the first time, Brazil thought itself as a regional leader, and the region being South America. Nevertheless, it is far from clear how this leadership aspiration would translate into actual behavior. During the Cardoso administration (1995-2002), strategies towards the region seemed to have two goals, both grounded on a deep-seated cooperation with Argentina within the Mercosur´s framework. The first was assuring stability and peaceful coexistence among South American countries, thus creating an adequate environment for consolidating the emerging democratic regimes. The second was increasing the political bargaining power, but especially in trade global fora, by means of a significant regional market. Under the Cardoso administration, foreign policy towards South America sought to create the steady regional foundations for the Brazilian aspirations to actively plug into the dynamic process of globalization Speaking during the commemorations of the 10th anniversary of the Asuncion Treaty, which created Mercosur (1991), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Lafer (2001), observed: "The founding of the integrationist project for Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay substantiates the need to overcome the prevailing logic in the economic and political spheres, namely, the autarchic pretense marked by the import substitution model and the geopolitical rationale of conforming to ' influence spheres ' in the perspective of a power balance in the relations between States. (...) In the case of Mercosur, this movement associates itself to the peculiar dynamics of a new international system established by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the East/West conflict. The occurrence of this new paradigm is reflected in the dilution of conception conflicts, understood here by their axiological heterogeneity of different views on the promotion of development and wellbeing, for conflicts of interest, as reflected in the analysis of the potential use by the productive forces of a country within a given market situation. ". Nevertheless, critics of Cardoso´s foreign strategies have emphasized that the project presented the country´s credentials as an emerging market rather than as an emerging power (Lima & Hirst, 2003). Closely related to the previous one, the third ambiguity touches upon the role Brazil should play regarding the region’s relations with the world. As Fonseca (2012) and others have pointed out, Brazil’s strategies regarding the region have oscillated across three possibilities: being a mediator between the Latin/South American countries and the United States, being a spokesperson on behalf of those countries in their relations with great powers and international institutions, or to merely act as one among many other countries in the region. The fourth ambiguity relates to how Brazilian foreign policy actually ranked and accommodated its South American foreign policy and its aspirations of being recognized as a meaningful global player. During the Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010), the importance given to South-South alignments emphasized both South America and those coalitions established inside the Global South, of which policies towards Africa, the G20-trade initiative at WTO, the IBSA treaty and, last but not least, the BRICS initiative are conspicuous examples. Nevertheless, at times rhetoric and actual behavior sharply diverged. For instance, while the South American partnership ranked high in the official discourse during Lula da Silva´s administration, coordination has been often poor and, at least once, Brazil disputed a high position in international organizations with its neighbors This was the case of the elections for WTO director-general in 2004, running against a Uruguayan candidate and the French Pascal Lamy.. On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil’s most important partner in the region, has always felt uncomfortable with the Brazilian pursuit of a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, an important goal of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2010. By playing within and beyond the region, Brazil created tensions and frictions that were not always easy to resolve. In the following sections, we will show how they translate into public opinion perceptions and representations. Our data comes from a national survey conducted in 2014, with 1,841 respondents, as part of the collaborative international project Las Americas y el Mundo. For more information on the project and access to the database go to http//lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu. By using two screening questions, we divided the public into two groups. Those who answered they were interested in international issues and could rightly identify the United Nations acronym were labeled Informed and Interested Public (IIP) and amounted to 464 individuals (23.2% of the sample). Conversely, those who claimed to have no interest in international issues and did not know what UN meant were labeled Uninformed and Uninterested Public (UUP) They were 74.8% of the sample, adding up to 1,377 people.. We will see that, while there are significant differences in the opinions and distribution of preferences between the two groups, especially in the percentage of respondents that did not answer or did not know how to answer, both groups´ responses show important levels of coherence and convergence. Regional identification and the region’s importance to Brazil Brazilians, whether more or less interested and informed on international issues, barely identify themselves as citizens of a region. They see themselves mainly as Brazilians and, in a very small proportion, citizens of the world. Graph I shows this indisputable reality. Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 Only 3% of the IIP and 1.5% of the UUP think of themselves as South Americans or Mercosur citizens, and less Brazilians in both groups feel they are Latin Americans than those who claim to be citizens of the world. Within the country, some kind of regional self-identification is more likely to be found among opinion makers than the public. Data from the 2010 survey with leaders showed that 26% considered themselves to be Latin Americans, 18.5% to be South Americans and only 1.5% to be Mercosur´s citizens (Almeida, Onuki & Carneiro, 2012) While we were writing this chapter, the 2014-15 survey with leaders is still in the field.. During 2014, Brazilian foreign policy towards the region has been an important topic addressed by public opinion makers who are active in the domestic public debate over the country´s international behavior. Table I shows the frequency of different topics dealt with in editorial pages and signed articles by journalists and specialists in Brazilian foreign policy, published in the four most important Brazilian newspapers. Mostly critical to the government’s foreign behavior, they were part of a lively debate on Brazil’s international priorities and strategies.  TABLE I OPINION MAKERS IN THE PRESS - MAIN TOPICS TOPICS AMOUNT % South America/Latin America 112 22,6 Brazil-Venezuela relations 33 6,7 Mercosur 29 5,8 Brazil-Argentina relations 15 3,0 Brazil-Cuba relations 14 2,8 Brazil and Latin America 8 1,6 Brazil-Bolivia relations 3 ,6 Brazil-Chile relations 2 ,4 Regionalism 2 ,4 Brasil-USA-Cuba relations 2 ,4 OAS and interamerican cooperation 1 ,2 Brazil-Colombia relations 1 ,2 Brazil-Mexico relations 1 ,2 UN Peacekeeping mission to Haiti 1 ,2 Brazilian foreign policy ( broad issues) 65 13,1 International trade 61 12,3 Brazil-USA relations 45 9,1 Brazilian Trade policies 42 8,5 BRICS 19 3,8 Environment/ Climate change 18 3,6 Brazil´s international role 15 3,0 Brazil-China relations 14 2,8 Presidential diplomacy 13 2,6 Brazilian presidential address to UN Assembly 13 2,6 Brazil and the crisis in Ucrania 12 2,4 Brazil-Israel relations 12 2,4 Ministry of Foreing Affairs 9 1,8 Foreig policy and presidential elections 8 1,6 Mercosur-European Union Agreement 7 1,2 Brazil-Middle East relations 4 ,8 Brazil-Africa relations 3 ,6 Brazil in the G-20 2 ,4 Internet governance 2 ,4 Brazilian extradiction policy 2 ,4 Brazil-Japan relations 2 ,4 Brazil-Russia relations 2 ,4 Diplomatic relations to other countries 2 ,4 Other* 12 2,4 Total 496 100,0 *Only one article published on the topic: Brazil at the United Nations; Human Rights; Drugs; Ebola; International Tourism in Brazil; International Rules and Domestic Change; WTO; Brazil-Germany Relations; Brazil-Angola Relations; Brazil-Congo Relations; Brazil-Portugal Relations and National Security. Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world - Foreign Policy and the Press database. More than one fifth of the articles addressed the Brazilian relations and initiatives regarding the region, predominantly South America. Mercosur and relations to Venezuela, Argentina and Cuba have been the main topics Emphasis on Brazil-Cuba relations happened because of a highly controversial domestic federal program “More doctors”, which brought foreign professional to work on the Brazilian public health care system. The majority of them were Cubans (circa 11.000 doctors). Before that, Cuba did not rank particularly high among foreign policy topics in the public debate. . The attention given by opinion makers to regional issues goes with the perceived importance attributed to Latin America by the mass public in comparison to other regions of the globe Contrary to the mass public, Even though opinion makers where not only critical of the actual government policies towards Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba and the Mercosur, they also regretted the “excessive” attention assigned to the South-South policies over North-South relations;, as shown in Graph II. Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 Preferences are actually dispersed. A plurality of the IIP believes that Brazil should pay attention, first of all, to Latin America and then to Africa, while Europe and North America are given much less importance. Latin America and Africa change positions when the answer comes from the UUP. Nevertheless, the number of UUP that could not or would not respond is roughly equal to the preference for both regions. On the other hand, even the informed and interested public seems to have scarce information about Latin American or even South American countries. The proportion of those who know the names of presidents from neighboring countries is very slim. When presented with a list of names, 80.5% could not recognize Mexico’s president; 64.5% did not know that José Mujica was Uruguay’s president; 50% could not identify Venezuela’s president Nicolas Maduro, and 44.6% did not know the Cuban Raul Castro. These proportions were significantly lower for Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner (27%) and Bolivia’s Evo Morales (29.5%) (Brazil, the Americas and the world Survey, 2014). The Brazilian public does not see the country´s relations to its neighbors – and to other significant foreign partners – in terms of rivalry or menace. After a century of peaceful coexistence and varying degrees of political and diplomatic proximity, both segments of the public consider South American countries either friends or partners -- more often partners for the informed public, and more often friends for those who have a remote relation to international affairs. The exception is Argentina, seen as a rival by around a quarter of the people in both groups of the mass public. It is possible that recent skirmishes around tariffs and international trade within Mercosur, traditional rivalry in football, and increased contact through tourism, in both directions, account for the way Brazilians perceive our closest neighbor Argentina is among Brazil´s 10 top trade partners and the first in terms of tourism flow. In 2012 and 2013, Argentinians tourists in Brazil ranked first and amounted to around 30% of total foreign tourists and 58%-59% of those coming from Latin America (Ministry of Tourism, 2015). The country is also the most frequent destiny of Brazilian tourists abroad. Brazilian lore has plenty of jokes about Argentinians, displaying a mixture of admiration and jaundice towards our neighbors.. In any case, opinions are split, showing some degree of ambiguity regarding all countries in the region with which Brazil has otherwise lasting and peaceful relations. Table II shows the full picture. Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world Survey, 2014 The reluctant leader 47% of the IIP and 27% of the UUP consider that Brazil is the most influent country in the region. Moreover when asked which country they rely on to be the region´s leader 70% of IIP and 59% of the UUP mention Brazil (Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014). Nevertheless, data from Graph III shows that both segments of the public sharply divide themselves when straightforwardly asked what the country´s role in South America should be. A thin plurality of IIP and UUP would rather have Brazil cooperating with other countries than making efforts to lead them. Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 When confronted with the different tasks the country should perform in the region, leading the neighbors in international fora receives approximately the same support from people from both groups of the public, as shown in Graphs V, while tackling international threats, such as drug trafficking, elicits much greater approval (Graph VI and VII). This is consistent with the answers given to a question concerning the most important goals for Brazil’s foreign policy: tackling drug trafficking and organized crime ranks first in a list of 13 possible goals, with a 30% preference rate among the IIP and 33.3% among UUP This is only too natural since Brazil is an important market for illegal drugs and the organized crime revolving around the drug business is thought to be related to the exceptionally high levels of violence in the country. (Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014). Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 The importance and forms of regional integration Until 1985, regional integration did not rank high in Brazil’s foreign policy priorities. The country had shown an ambiguous attitude towards previous proposals in this direction (Bueno, Ramanzini Jr & Vigevani, 2015). The same holds true, nowadays, for the Brazilian public opinion. The Brazilian public does not see regional integration as an important foreign policy goal. Only 2.6 % of IIP and 1% of UUP believe that promoting regional integration is Brazil´s most important goal in the international arena (Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014), despite the fact that 41% of the IIP and 18% of the UUP have a positive or very positive opinion about the Mercosur, by far the most appreciated and known regional mechanism (Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014). When asked about different forms of integration, a clear majority, in both groups of the public, agrees with the existence of joint military operations and joint embassies. While the IIP also agrees in developing a common foreign policy, the UUP is divided on this issue. Both groups have dubious attitudes regarding the possibility of having some kind of joint political deliberation mechanism, by means of a regional parliament, and of creating a common currency, while being clearly hostile towards liberating people´s movements across the region This is consistent with Meseguer & Maldonado (2012), who, by using data from the Americas and the world project, have found ambiguous attitudes among Mexican and Brazilian leaders towards immigrants. (Graphs VIII and IX). Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 Source: Brazil, the Americas and the world survey, 2014 In brief, although regional integration is not perceived as a priority, we do find support for actually ongoing initiatives, such as joint military operations and advancing the coordination of diplomatic initiatives, while currency and political decision-making are perceived as being national issues as well as borders to hinder the free circulation of people. Brief conclusions During the year of 2014, initiatives towards Latin America have been an important topic in the opinion makers´ public debate regarding Brazilian foreign policy. In fact, it has been the single most important topic. In the same vein, the region should be the focus of Brazil´s attention for a little more than one fifth of the interested and somehow informed public on international issues, well above North America, Europe, and Asia. Nevertheless, the majority of Brazilians do not consider themselves as Latin or South Americans and show ambivalence in their feelings towards Brazil´s regional neighbors. Although they do not see them as enemies or threats, Brazilians oscillate between considering them either friends or mere partners. Brazil´s foreign policy reluctance to try to play an actual regional leadership role is mirrored by the public opinion, which would rather see the country cooperating than leading South American nations. Moreover, what the public thinks should be the major Brazilian initiative in the region is tightly connected with the domestic urgency in fighting drug trafficking. Finally, the public -- whether interested and informed or otherwise -- does not rate highly the accomplishment of regional integration, but rather sponsor a very superficial and conventional idea of integration, in terms of military and diplomatic coordination. In brief, the public reverberates the ambiguities shown by the educated opinion makers and by foreign policy makers. Overcoming them will depend more on the determination of policy makers than on public opinion pressure. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bethell, L. (2009). “Brazil and the idea of Latin America in historical perspective”, Estudos Históricos 44 (22), julho-dezembro, Rio de Janeiro, p. 289-321. 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