The Problem of Slums: Shifting Methods of Neoliberal Urban Government in Morocco Koenraad Bogaert ABSTRACT This article puts forward two main arguments. First, it highlights the relationship between different phases of neoliberalism in Morocco together with the specific methods and techniques of urban government that were deployed in an effort to govern the slums and their populations. A period of ‘roll back neoliberalism’ during the 1980s generated reforms that tried to increase government control over the urban territory to compensate for the negative social outcomes of structural adjustment. The subsequent period of ‘roll out neoliberalism’ coincided with the attempt to manage and regulate the slum population through new modalities of state intervention. Second, while evolutions in neoliberal government reflected a gradual process, this transition in Morocco was accelerated by security concerns following two moments of serious urban violence: the 1981 riots and the 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca. Therefore, Morocco’s recent political transformations cannot be understood in terms provided by the mainstream narrative linking economic liberalization to democratization. Rather, they reflect a profound shift towards intrinsically authoritarian modalities of neoliberal government which are clearly revealed at the urban scale. The recent and ongoing popular uprisings in the Arab region are not just a revolt against authoritarian regimes. They are also an expression of a systemic crisis. The demands of protesters in Tunisia and Egypt —– together with others made in Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, Bahrain and Jordan — are formulated in clear political terms: remove the regime, install free and fair elections, pursue genuine democratic reforms, end corruption. But implicit in these demands is the desire for greater social and economic justice. In that sense, the uprisings can also be considered a ‘revolution against I would especially like to thank Christopher Parker and Sami Zemni for their insightful comments and their support. I thank also Montserrat Emperador, Alejandro Muchada, Stephanie Watt, André Bank, Béatrice Allain-El Mansouri, Salwa Ismail, Pascal Debruyne, Omar Jabary, Brecht De Smet, Siggie Vertommen, Marlies Casier and Piet Saey for their thoughtful comments. Finally I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive critiques. This research was made possible by a scholarship funded by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). Of course, the author remains solely responsible for the arguments presented here and any remaining errors of facts or reasoning. C 2011 International Institute of Social Studies. Development and Change 42(3): 709–731.  Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA 710 Koenraad Bogaert neoliberalism’.1 People were drawn to the streets by the pressing economic grievances and uneven development that are intrinsic to neoliberal policies. Today, everybody speculates about political change and democratic transition in the Arab region, but we must not forget that the current pressures for political change are rooted in the political changes of the last thirty years. Increasing global market integration has triggered radical reforms in many Arab countries. Since the end of the 1970s, several countries in the region have faced severe public deficit crises and been forced to adopt structural adjustment measures. These structural adjustments and the neoliberal reforms which followed marked a turning point in the processes of political change in the Arab World. There is of course no shortage of critiques of the ways in which neoliberal assumptions articulate with contemporary globalization (Parker, 2009: 113). Yet, in spite of the compelling nature of this broader critique (e.g. Harvey, 2006), there is still room for more explicit case studies, particularly in the Arab region, that explore the contingent formations of neoliberalism on the ground and the specific ways in which neoliberal agency has shaped the possibilities and constraints of political life. This article aims to contribute to debates on the impact of neoliberal politics and neoliberal reforms by focusing on Morocco and, more specifically, on the ways in which neoliberal government deals with the problematic of slums, poverty and urban security. As I argue in detail below, the nature of the political transformations discussed here cannot be understood in terms provided by the mainstream narrative linking economic liberalization and market reform to democratization (e.g. Storm, 2007). Rather, they reflect a profound shift towards intrinsically authoritarian modalities of neoliberal government. Capital shapes and determines urban (re-)development. The interests of ruling elites and (global) economic elites are increasingly intertwined, giving rise to situations where ‘market requirements’ justify authoritarian and securitized interventions at the expense of genuine democratic participation. Populations are being required to participate in the making of a new political world in which the ability to claim and articulate political rights is circumscribed not only by ‘the regime’, but by the sanctions and incentives of ‘the free market’, and by the inexorable myths of contemporary globalization (Parker, 2009; Parker and Debruyne, 2011). More specifically, with regard to (urban) poverty, contemporary analyses of Arab politics should pay close attention to the fact that the poor ‘are poor precisely because of their incorporation into the reality of the contemporary capitalist economies’ (Bush, 2004: 675). Poverty, as Ray Bush argues, does not emerge from the poor man’s exclusion but from his particular inclusion in the neoliberalized local economies. It concerns a ‘differential incorporation’, leading Bush to direct our focus to ‘the crucial issue of how poverty is created and reproduced’ (ibid.: 674). In that sense, political interventions 1. See Walter Armbrust’s excellent article of 24 February 2011 in Aljazeera (Armbrust, 2011). The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 711 in the slums should not only be understood as attempts to alleviate urban poverty, but also, and maybe even more so, as attempts to integrate places and populations into the market space. Furthermore, Bush argues that it would be wrong to assume that economic growth automatically leads to less poverty: it all depends on how that economic growth is (re-)distributed. Who benefits from capital accumulation, and who doesn’t? Despite improved macroeconomic performances after neoliberal global market integration during the 1980s and the 1990s, Arab societies were confronted with a decline in purchasing power of the average citizen, increasingly uneven development and social inequality (ibid.). This article situates itself within wider critical inquiries of neoliberal urban politics, slum upgrading policies and the government of urban poverty (such as Bayat and Denis, 2000; Davis, 2006; Huchzermeyer, 2008). The analysis testifies to a wider trend of the increasing ‘marketization of the social’ that has been observed in other parts of the region (Ismail, 2006). A TRANSITION IN NEOLIBERALISM It is on the urban scale that the scope and significance of neoliberal political transformations are most clearly revealed. Neoliberal policies have intensified urban disparities turning cities into spaces of extremes (Bayat and Biekart, 2009). While recent scholarship has highlighted the involvement of state agency in high-end urban development in Morocco (Barthel and Planel, 2010; Bogaert, 2011), this article focuses on the other end of the extreme, namely the specific problem of slums and slum clearance. Through an analysis of how slums in Morocco have been governed over the past thirty years, I will argue that we can distinguish a shift in urban government between the early 1980s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, and that this shift reflects a specific transition in neoliberal government. Two arguments are central to understanding this shift. First of all, since the beginning of the 1980s, Morocco has experienced a transition comparable to what Peck and Tickell (2002) have described as a transformation from a phase of ‘roll back neoliberalism’ to a phase of ‘roll out neoliberalism’. ‘Roll back neoliberalism’ refers to the destructive moment when state power was mobilized behind marketization and deregulation projects. This implied not so much the roll back of the state per se, but rather the roll back of particular (developmentalist) state functions.2 Through the 1960s and 1970s, the Moroccan political economy contained characteristics specific to a developmentalist state model (Catusse, 2009; Richards and Waterbury, 2008). But the severe state budget deficit and the implementation of an IMF-promoted structural adjustment programme in the early 1980s generated a radical turn. Fiscal discipline, market liberalization, the downsizing of the public sector 2. Peck and Tickell (2002) refer to the crisis of Keynesianism in Europe and the United States. 712 Koenraad Bogaert and the privatization of important public assets were some of the measures introduced to control budget deficits. These austerity measures, however, came with severe social costs and provoked a decade of violent urban street protests and nationwide social disturbances. Riots broke out in cities like Casablanca (1981), Marrakech (1984) and Fez (1990 and 1991). As a consequence, the limits of early neoliberal reform gave way to an important reconstitution of the neoliberal project with the elaboration of more socially inspired state interventionist policies which evolved during the Moroccan political reform process of the 1990s (Zemni and Bogaert, 2009). This phase can be compared with what Peck and Tickell portray as the ascending moment of ‘roll out neoliberalism’.3 This refers to a more creative phase of neoliberalism that is characterized by new forms of institution building and spatially differentiated government that transfer the ability to govern political and economic life from traditional to new governmental arrangements. As such, neoliberal reform did not result in the hollowing out of the state, but implied a particular kind of statecraft (Parker, 2009). Béatrice Hibou (1998) has called this process the ‘redeployment of the state’. New modalities of governmental agency facilitate and coordinate the various processes through which societal spaces are being produced and reproduced by capitalist strategies, with the intention of including those who were socially marginalized by earlier neoliberal restructurings. A salient example of roll out neoliberalism in Morocco is the Villes Sans Bidonvilles (Cities without Slums) programme (VSBP), which directly attempted to address pressing issues of urban poverty, inadequate housing and social marginalization. Secondly, the development of new forms of governmental agency was very much motivated and accelerated by security concerns. From the 1980s onwards, urban restructuring and the implementation of specific reforms dealing with the government of the urban poor followed particular moments of violence and political instability. This article engages with a discussion of the political reactions to two watershed moments of urban unrest that accelerated the elaboration of new governmental techniques during the periods of roll back and roll out neoliberalism. These were the bread riots of 1981 and the suicide bombings of 2003, both involving slum dwellers, and both occurring in Casablanca. Each of these moments of violence marked a turning point in terms of the changing methods and objectives of urban government. While the response after the 1981 riots was more focused on the control of the physical environment through which people move (the urban territory), the bombings of 2003 reinforced the objectification of the slum population itself as a calculable target for a general strategy of government, trying to convert the slum dweller into a responsible citizen. Casablanca, which is the economic hub of the country but also contains more than 3. Characteristic of this period in Europe and the US were the ‘Third-Way contortions of the Clinton and Blair administrations’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 388–9). The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 713 30 per cent of Morocco’s slum dwellers, has always been a ville laboratoire, a test-case and model for other Moroccan cities (Catusse et al., 2005). Its history of urban government offers valuable insights into the ways in which Morocco’s political elite sought to securitize the city through strategic and politically motivated planning and administration (Rachik, 2002). Immediately after the 1981 riots, urban planning in Morocco was oriented predominantly towards the expansion of territorial control to compensate for the negative outcomes of structural adjustment and the roll back of state developmentalism. These techniques of urban planning contrasted with the objectives of the VSBP which was launched directly after the suicide bombings of 2003, which attempted to regulate and manage the slum population as such, through new modalities of state intervention (i.e. the roll out of new state arrangements). Understanding the significance of these ensuing changes requires attention to the link between specific strategies of urban government and the modes of thought and practice that indicate the political rationality underpinning the technologies of power (Lemke, 2001). Thus, political power should also be understood in terms of its methods rather than focusing solely on its institutional forms (Mitchell, 2006: 179). Therefore, the distinction made by Mariana Valverde (2007) between ‘sovereign city planning’ and ‘cities of security’ can usefully illuminate the particular shift in urban governmental strategies during the consecutive periods of roll back and roll out neoliberalism in Morocco. Drawing on the Foucauldian notions of sovereignty and security, Valverde argues that sovereign city planning relies predominantly on techniques that capitalize a territory and emphasize monumental state architecture in order to incite loyalty to a sovereign. In contrast, the concept of cities of security involves planning which assembles techniques that are more concerned with the biopolitical management of the urban population (see also Foucault, 2007: 55–86). Sovereignty refers here to the legitimacy and power of the sovereign over a bounded territory, while biopower and concerns for security refer to the government of a ‘complex composed of men and things’ (RoseRedwood, 2006: 472). In this context, security should be understood in the Foucauldian conception of the word: i.e. ‘the future-oriented management of risks’ (Valverde, 2007: 172). Governmental methods of biopower therefore differ from methods of sovereignty in the sense that they do not so much seek the submission of subjects to a sovereign, but rather are concerned with the administration of life itself (Dean, 1999: 94). Consequently, different techniques related to the notions of sovereignty and biopower (or security) will approach and structure space differently. In short, whereas sovereign city planning deals with individuals as a set of legal subjects within the designated territory, technologies of security will precisely constitute and target a specific population — in this case, the slum population. I am aware that I risk overdrawing the distinction between a focus on urban territory in the 1980s, and one on population in the 2000s: in fact it is far from 714 Koenraad Bogaert absolute.4 What I want to highlight with Valverde’s distinction is the degree in which either sovereign power or biopower will be pre-eminently embedded within particular governmental strategies and techniques. As such, I want to highlight a shift of emphasis, the emergence of new objectives which ultimately result in the development of new problems and new technologies of power. In this case, the focus on sovereignty and biopower is part of a particular methodology to determine specific shifts and transformations in neoliberal urban government. The government of slums is just one example through which the proliferation and implementation of new technologies can be demonstrated. SOVEREIGN CITY PLANNING AFTER 1981 Slums, in Morocco as elsewhere, are situated both inside and outside the formal city (Zaki, 2005). Some of the oldest slums, especially in Casablanca, are located right in the centre of the city, yet paradoxically the slum space is characterized by an absence of the state and public facilities. This absence is typified by dilapidated housing, and a lack of paved roads, water, (legal) electricity networks and other public amenities. For a long time, slums (and other forms of informal housing) have been tolerated in Morocco. Although rapid urbanization constituted new developments and introduced new challenges for urban government, overall there was no coherent urban political vision at the national level until the 1980s (Kaioua, 1996: 615). Urban issues had started to receive some government attention towards the end of the 1960s: after the violent riots of 1965 in Casablanca, especially, the Moroccan regime became increasingly aware of the political importance of the city. But government ‘solutions’ were still based more on the principle that ‘a good repression [meant] ten years of social peace’, rather than on a profound strategy for city restructuring and planning (Clément, 1992: 402). The measures taken before the 1980s were ad hoc and insufficient to deal with the complexity of increasing urbanization, and failed to provide solutions for an emerging lower middle class looking for affordable housing outside the expensive city centre (Cattedra, 2001; Naciri, 1989; Rachik, 2002). Consequently, the state largely tolerated the disorganized, chaotic and impoverished informal expansion of its urban peripheries (Naciri, 1989). Nevertheless, although tolerated, the slums always maintained a temporary and informal status due to the fact that the inhabitants occupied the terrain illegally. This created a paradoxical standoff. As Lamia Zaki argues: ‘by maintaining the inhabitants on the legal margin, the state creates a latent 4. There is no such evolution as a transition from a ‘territorial state’ to a ‘population state’ because the pre-eminency of biopower does not involve ‘a substitution but rather a shift of emphasis and the appearance of new objectives, and of new problems and new techniques’ (Foucault, 2007: 363; see also Elden, 2007). The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 715 insecurity which sustains the shantytown dwellers’ fragility and limits the assertion of collective demands’ (Zaki, 2008: 118). This form of ‘management by absence’, as Zaki calls it, has resulted in the exclusion of slum dwellers from formal city life and the social norms that city life involves. It was generally believed that slum dwellers were excluded from modernity because their urbanization (mostly the result of a rural exodus) did not necessarily lead to a modern urban lifestyle (Ibrahim, 1975). From this perspective, slums were seen as the emblem of a ‘ruralization’ of the city, because their inhabitants maintained a so-called rural mentality and had not adapted to modern city life (Zaki, 2005: 67–9; see also Bayat and Denis, 2000). This particular spatial imaginary not only essentialized the slum as a homogeneous and coherent unity threatening the city and its public life, it also constituted the slum as a space to be governed separately from the spatial problematic of the city and its urbanization as a whole, thereby obfuscating its social complexity. The structural conditions at the beginning of the 1980s marked an end of the benign neglect of the urban periphery and its slums. The riots of 1981 put pressure on the ‘management by absence’ strategy, leading to tighter control over the urban territory. On 20 June 1981, the national trade union, Confédération Démocratique du Travaille, called for a nationwide strike to challenge the government’s decision to cut back food subsidies. This signalled the convergence of pressures for structural adjustment and the tensions that were emerging within the city. During the strike, riots broke out in the peripheries of Casablanca and quickly gravitated towards the city centre. The authorities reacted with severe repression, bringing in the army, arresting thousands of rioters, suspending party newspapers and jailing several leaders of the opposition (Lust-Okar, 2005). But the immediate use of physical violence was not the government’s only response. After 1981, the marginalized peripheral urban areas — the slums, the informal housing quarters and the working class areas — became a primary focus within urban planning strategies. The social disturbances had exposed the growing cleavage between an emerging urban entrepreneurial elite with considerable political influence, benefiting from economic liberalization, and the rest of the urban population bearing the costs of neoliberal reform and the roll back of welfare policies (Catusse, 2009; Clément, 1986). The events of 1981 thus provided a sense of urgency to the implementation of a general project of urban control (Rachik, 2002). The reforms implemented after 1981 implied above all a strengthening of central power, making security and development the two (complementary) core objectives of state intervention (Kaioua, 1996: 611). Only a month after the riots, the authorities divided the territory of Casablanca into five administrative prefectures that were accommodated within a newly established administrative superstructure: the Wilaya of Greater Casablanca.5 5. Before 1981, Casablanca counted as a single prefecture. 716 Koenraad Bogaert The Wilaya (Arabic for governorate) was the first of its kind and became the highest sub-national administrative division in Morocco. The Wali — head of the Wilaya — and the prefectural governors are appointed by the King and act as his representatives within the city. They dispose of considerably more power and competences than the locally elected councils. The Wali became responsible for the preservation of security and public order in the urban territory, accountable only to the Ministry of Interior.6 As such, the Wali became the most important political actor within the city and political control over the urban scale was located almost exclusively within the prefectural system.7 Over the years Casablanca expanded, to six prefectures in 1985, seven in 1990 and nine in 1997. Today, Greater Casablanca is divided into twelve prefectures. Following the perceived effectiveness of the reforms in Casablanca, the same administrative model was applied in other cities. The Wilaya of Rabat-Salé was created at the same time and, after the violent riots of December 1990, new Wilayas were established in the cities of Fez, Marrakech, Meknes, Tanger and Oujda (Catusse et al., 2005; Kaioua, 1996). Today, there are seventeen Wilayas in total. Besides the administrative division of Casablanca, the 1981 riots also triggered the creation of several governmental agencies and new urban planning instruments to enhance control over the urbanization process. Within a month after the riots, King Hassan II entrusted the French urbanist Michel Pinseau with the elaboration of a new Schéma Directeur de l’Aménagement du Territoire (SDAU) to plan Casablanca’s future for the next twenty years. This was the first master plan for the city since Morocco’s independence in 1956. Pinseau’s team was given the explicit mission to ‘securitize the city’ (Cattedra, 2001: 130–1). Following the SDAU, two agencies were created in 1984 to implement the new urban strategies. The first, the Agence Nationale pour l’Habitat Insalubre (ANHI), was charged with the eradication of slums. It was a financially autonomous public institution — the requirements of structural adjustment implied, after all, a radical decrease of state subsidies for social housing programmes. The establishment of the ANHI signalled a return to programmes of slum relocation which were popular during the final years of the Protectorate. During the 1970s, in contrast, preference had usually been given to restructuring in situ. However, with the new economic climate of the 1980s and the rapid expansion of Casablanca, absorbing many bidonvilles into the urban fabric, leading architects and urban planners saw restructuring as a permanent bidonvillization of the city centre 6. Institutionally, the Ministry of Interior is the central locus of the monarchy’s power. It is one of the so-called sovereign ministries and its head is appointed by the King regardless of the results of legislative elections and the political majority in parliament. 7. In 2002, the security tasks of the Wilaya were extended to include the promotion of economic development and industrialization. This resulted in the appointment of several ‘techno-Walis’ who were supposed to bring a new technocratic and management culture to the job (Catusse, 2009). The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 717 which would have a negative effect on its future economic development (Navez-Bouchanine and Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005: 66). The second agency, the Agence Urbaine de Casablanca (AUC), was of even greater significance. The AUC was Morocco’s first technocratic urban planning agency and its main task was the implementation and elaboration of the recommendations in the SDAU. The director of the AUC, who has the status of governor, is appointed by the King and directly accountable to the Ministry of Interior (Moujid, 1989). The AUC model was subsequently adopted in the other Moroccan cities. Nonetheless, the AUC remains distinctive. Unlike other urban agencies that are now placed under the political supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MHU), the AUC remains, to this day, accountable to the Ministry of Interior. It is also the only urban planning agency whose director has the status of governor. As such, the AUC remains the privileged instrument of the Ministry of Interior for controlling the increasing complexity of Casablanca’s urbanization. After the administrative division of the city and the establishment of the Wilaya, the AUC and ANHI, urban planning became an exercise of power to ensure spatial visibility and, consequently, political stability (Rachik, 1995).8 The specific reforms represented a clear centralization of political power in Casablanca, with the AUC and the Wilaya as the local representatives of the Ministry of Interior (Catusse et al., 2005). To quote Raffaele Cattedra, after 1981, the Ministry effectively succeeded in ‘territorializing its own power’ (Cattedra, 2001: 142). In 1985, authority over urban planning was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, at the expense of the Ministry of Housing. Despite a retransfer of the competence of urban planning to a renewed Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MHU) in 1998, the Moroccan urbanist Abdelghani Abouhani, currently the General Director of Urbanism and Architecture within the MHU, stressed that even now ‘it is the Ministry of Interior who really governs the cities . . . The Ministry of Urbanism has the possibility to define the norms, but nothing really more than that’ (interview, Rabat, 21 April 2009). In the end, the reforms of the 1980s had a primarily territorial focus and key political questions remained unaddressed. Both Kaioua and Cattedra emphasize the technocratic character of the SDAU, and the specific mission of the ANHI and the AUC made it clear that the Moroccan authorities would deal with the increased social tensions in a technical way (with administrative division, urban planning, etc.), rather than from a comprehensive social and political perspective. Little attention was paid to the root causes of social inequality which were the basis for the riots in the first place. 8. These three examples were some of the most obvious. However, there were other institutions and instruments that were created during the 1980s and the 1990s that further exemplify sovereign city planning such as the Regional Inspections, the prefectural departments of urbanism, etc. (see Catusse et al., 2005; Philifert and Jolé, 2005). 718 Koenraad Bogaert This increased territorial focus within sovereign city planning also had some significant spatial implications. In spite of the economic crisis at the time, authorities invested heavily in the spatial planning of Casablanca (Kaioua, 1996; Moujid, 1989; Rachik, 2002). New social housing projects, new roads, the installation of police stations in the periphery and above all the construction of the majestic prefectural headquarters gave a face to the state in neighbourhoods where it was previously absent (Naciri, 1989). Urban restructurings and renovations — especially the renovation of the Mohamed V and United Nations squares — were meant to testify to the greatness and richness of Casablanca (Rachik, 1995: 71–2). At the same time these spatial interventions turned the urban territory into a more calculable and governable space; as such, they sought to improve control over urban residents and their movement. Some specific elements of the urban restructuring disentangled the densely populated peripheries and drew new boundaries within the city in an attempt ‘to curb the habits of [the] unruly inhabitants’ (Ossman, 1994: 30). For example, the A3 highway between Rabat and Casablanca, finished in the mid-1980s, literally cleaves the city in two, forming a barrier between the predominantly working-class periphery and the city centre (ibid.; see also Cattedra, 2001: 143). Today, Casablanca is transected by several large boulevards. This has not only improved the mobility of the Moroccan labour force, it has also increased the velocity of urban life in general — with the boulevards as a symbolic pinnacle — leading to the constant circulation of goods, capital and people. This reduces people’s capacity to stand still, wonder, think and — if necessary — mobilize. The enlargement and renovation of the road network in Casablanca in the 1980s was aimed specifically at making urban circulation more fluid, ensuring spatial visibility and improving the physical integration of (and consequently the control over) the urban periphery (Rachik, 1995: 80–2). At the same time, large-scale ‘neo-Haussmanian’ projects introduced in the 1980s were built to represent the presence of the state and the symbolic power of the monarchy (or the sovereign) in the urban space (Catusse et al., 2005). Two particular projects — the building of an impressive mosque named after then-King Hassan II, and the plans for the construction of the prestigious Royal Avenue — embodied the symbiosis of an increasing territorial control with an authoritarian vision of urban renovation. The Mosque Hassan II, inaugurated in 1993, is now the second largest mosque in the world. Re-establishing the religious authority of the King as the ‘Commander of the Faithful’ (Waterbury, 1970), its architectural grandeur is in itself a reflection of the monarchy’s power. Cattedra (2001) details how the Mosque Hassan II plays an important symbolic role in the ‘reconfessionalization’ of the city as a way to reclaim the city centre by central power and counter the proliferation of new mosques and the emergence of Islamist movements.9 9. The recurrent stigmatization of the slum population played a crucial role in the decision to build the mosque. It is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on the complexity of the The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 719 The Royal Avenue — which is still not finished — is an axis of 1.5 km that connects the coastal area and the Mosque Hassan II with the inner city centre alongside the medina (the historical Arab city). The project involves the relocation of more than 12,000 families out of the historical city centre. The relocation programme was launched in 1989; since 1997 this has meant the removal of most of the families to the new site of Nassim, almost 10 km from the centre (Navez-Bouchanine and Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005). The project plans for the Royal Avenue include the construction of upperand middle-class apartments, a commercial centre, a conference centre and a theatre. Besides the obvious majestic appeal of monumental state architecture, projects like the Royal Avenue are often promoted as social and economic development projects that will attract tourists and investments to the city. The detailed study by Françoise Navez-Bouchanine and Isabelle Berry-Chikhaoui (2005) reveals the authoritarian character of this kind of development, with its attempt to remodel Casablanca’s city centre according to global market requirements. The original inhabitants of the site took no part whatever in the decision-making process. The project was a prelude to the current global context of rapidly changing competitive conditions, in which Moroccan cities — and particularly Casablanca — jostle to maintain a competitive position. The prestigious Casa-Marina project, launched in 2007 just on the other side of the medina to provide new high-end business, residential and leisure facilities in down-town Casablanca, is another example of neoliberal market-oriented urban development strategies and of the reliance on mega-projects to promote the city’s unique selling position (Barthel and Planel, 2010). Such urban development schemes fit in a wider project of capitalist restructuring and set the boundaries between those who can afford to invest, live and consume in these newly designed places of consumption and those who fall by the wayside.10 TECHNIQUES OF SECURITY AFTER 2003 The expansion of urban territorial control in the 1980s did not, in the end, provide a credible and sustainable solution for the slums in Casablanca and other major cities. In general, the relocation projects of the ANHI were relationship between slum populations, the proliferation of mosques in the city’s periphery and the emergence of Islamist opposition groups, but see Cattedra (2001). 10. This doesn’t mean that such projects remain uncontested. Several authors have documented the ways in which ordinary citizens appropriate urban spaces for their own benefit in everyday life, often at the cost of ruling elites (e.g. Ameur, 2000; Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; Zaki, 2008). Walking along the future Royal Avenue it is clear that the project has been delayed for years: only a wide dirt track and one rusty billboard stand as reminders. While the project is still in progress, local people have strongly opposed the conditions for their relocation and used a wide variety of tactics to delay the project (Navez-Bouchanine and Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005). 720 Koenraad Bogaert quite effective in smaller cities but less successful in bigger cities due to land scarcity and speculation, the reluctance of people to move from their original living place and the inability of slum dwellers to finance the move (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002a). Many eradication projects were postponed or delayed. The failure of slum resettlement in the 1980s can be explained in large part by the paradox of roll back neoliberalism. Despite the obvious efforts to reorganize the urban space after 1981, the structural adjustment policies of that period deprived the state of the necessary financial means to plan and fund heavy subsidized public housing programmes. On the one hand, the state strengthened its control over the urban territory (with the wilaya, the AUC, the ANHI, etc.) so that it became increasingly difficult to expand the city informally. On the other hand, this increasing administrative control coincided with a financial disengagement of the state in the provision of low-cost housing. One of the results of structural adjustment was the liberalization of the housing market and the emergence of private real estate and construction companies which controlled and even monopolized the housing market. The growth of the private sector in this market impacted on the supply of affordable, legal accommodation, especially in cities like Casablanca, as increasing speculation and laisser-faire policies caused the price of housing to skyrocket. This resulted in a failure to meet the original objectives of the housing projects that were launched in the 1980s and the early 1990s. It was not until the Casablanca suicide bombings in 2003 that the Moroccan government seriously renewed its efforts to eradicate all slums in the Moroccan cities. Two differences can be observed when we compare the new interventions with the policies of the 1980s. First, the state took on a more prominent role in the support of slum resettlement operations. In the big cities the resettlement operations had become a real obstacle (for speculative, financial and/or social reasons) and required more sustained state intervention (Navez-Bouchanine and Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005: 67). Consequently, new state arrangements were rolled out in order to manage operations on the ground and to coordinate cooperation with the private sector. Second, the participation of the slum population played a more central part in the new policies. Whereas ANHI had established little contact with the slum residents before 2003 and had pushed through many of its operations in a very top-down manner (Philifert and Jolé, 2005: 393), the new state arrangements and the increased cooperation with private partners involved new methods of intervention. These new methods not only increased contact with the slum population, but also implied, with the assistance of specific social intermediaries, the increasing administration of life in the slums. The methods of sovereign city planning that were implemented in the 1980s, which treated the urban poor as legal subjects within a bounded territory, were gradually supplanted or complemented with new methods and techniques of government which focused on the population itself as the ultimate end of government. The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 721 The new political context at the end of the 1990s — both internally with the arrival of a socialist prime Minister in the government of 1998 and the accession to the throne of King Mohammed VI in 1999, and externally with the appeal of the good governance discourse promoted by international institutions like the World Bank — prompted a reflection on the social dimension of slum clearance and generated fundamental changes in the public discourse. It ushered in a whole new dynamic and several initiatives and workshops were organized in 1999 and 2000 to discuss the social impact of all dimensions and aspects of slum clearance (Zaki, 2005: 90–1). This resulted in the elaboration of the concept of maı̂trise d’ouvrage social (MOS). MOS attempts to conceptualize an integrated approach in which the technical and social dimensions of slum relocation are equally valued, and which emphasizes the participation of the local population as a key for success (MHU, 2004; Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b). Furthermore, the King specifically called attention to the question of degraded housing in a speech in August 2001, and demanded that new measures be taken. These initiatives fit with the broader political tendency which Myriam Catusse has referred to as the ‘re-invention of the social’, meaning that more government attention was given to the negative social impact of market-oriented reforms (Catusse, 2005). Yet, this did not imply the restoration of the developmental state model, but rather the active involvement of the state (i.e. the roll out of the state) in institution building, regulatory rearrangement and rescaled intervention designed to consolidate economic reforms, engage with private actors and sustain the workings of a market environment. However, it was not until the suicide bombings of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca that things accelerated and the new political discourse was really put into practice. The perpetrators came from two large bidonvilles in Sidi Moumen, a district in the prefecture of Sidi Bernoussi in the eastern periphery. The bombings deepened the stigmatization of the slums as a breeding ground for radical Islamists (Zaki, 2005), and acted as a trigger for the launching of the ambitious Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme (VSBP). In this regard, the bombings of 2003 were the catalyst for a shift towards an active management of the slum population in an attempt to include them into formal city life. The new governmental methods focused on specific techniques to make the slum dweller more responsible and turn him into a ‘good citizen’ (Zemni, 2007). This strategy of rendering individuals more responsible entails a shift of responsibility of social risks such as appropriate housing and urban poverty from the public authorities to the individual slum dweller, thereby turning it into an issue of ‘self-care’ (Lemke, 2001: 201). The aim was to bring the slum dweller into the realm of the market where he would profit from its advantages and exploit its opportunities. The VSBP was the first nationwide slum programme which tried to deal with slums within a much broader urban perspective. The programme, which falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior and the MHU, seeks to upgrade all the slums in Morocco and prioritizes the relocation of their 722 Koenraad Bogaert inhabitants (Le Tellier, 2009). The VSBP involves more than 1.5 million inhabitants and approximately 1,000 slums scattered over eighty-three cities. Sixty-four cities work with a specific city contract bringing together the two ministries, local authorities and the technical operator within the VSBP (Toutain, 2009). The ANHI and other local public housing agencies have been merged into a new financially autonomous state agency, Al Omrane. This agency, as an official explained, is ‘the armed force of the Ministry [MHU]’ in the VSBP (interview, Rabat, 4 June 2010). Al Omrane is responsible for the coordination of more than 80 per cent of the slum-upgrading projects and works closely with the private sector. The systematic engagement of private actors distinguishes VSBP from former initiatives. The programme is also supported by various international agencies including USAID, the European Investment Bank, the French Development Agency and the World Bank. In Casablanca a specific organization, Idmaj Sakan, has been created under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior to coordinate the cooperation between the different public and private actors involved in the VSBP. In a few cases, projects are handled by Dyar al Mansour, a branch of the public investment bank Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG). According to Moroccan sociologist Abderrahmane Rachik, the VSBP can be compared with the urban restructurings after the 1981 riots to the extent that security and control are still the dominant strategic objectives (interview, Casablanca, 21 May 2008). But despite this apparent continuity, the methods used to achieve these objectives have changed. Due to the social complexity of relocation projects and the reluctance of inhabitants to cooperate, new governmental methods have been deployed which aim at encouraging cooperation at the level of the individual. These techniques involve both intervention and formation (Dikeç, 2007: 279), and thus reveal the productive side of biopower through the objective of integrating the slum dwellers into the formal market. To achieve this, two particular mechanisms of social engineering have been introduced in order to facilitate integration, enhance the ‘participation’ of the inhabitants and advance the (trans)formation of the slum dwellers into good citizens (Le Tellier, 2009; Toutain, 2009). The first of these is accompagnement social (social accompaniment) (AS) which grew out of debates on the social impact of slum clearance and the conceptualization of MOS (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b). AS is a specific methodology designed to accompany slum dwellers through the process of moving to their new apartment (ibid.). According to the methodological guide published by the MHU, AS refers to a social action that is ‘subordinated’ to the technical operation of the projects (MHU, 2004: 5). As I was told by the Director of Quality of Al Omrane: ‘AS is meant to accelerate the pace of social housing . . . , to put in place a measure to proceed more rapidly . . . , to put in place an arrangement to facilitate people to move’ (interview, Rabat, 8 June 2010). The objective of AS is above all to mediate between the technical operator and the local population. In reality this means that the social operator within the AS programme has to inform and The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 723 convince the slum dweller of the benefits of the project, make him willing to cooperate, and assist him through the administrative procedures (Le Tellier, 2009; Navez-Bouchanine, 2005). This contrasts with the objectives of MOS which aim at an equal valuation of both social and technical aspects of slum clearance. At the beginning of 2009, AS was implemented in twenty-three relocation programmes (representing 20 per cent of the VSBP), targeting approximately 50,000 households (55 per cent in Casablanca) (Le Tellier, 2009; Toutain, 2009). There are three sorts of social operators: the public Social Development Agency (ADS), NGOs and private consultants. Until 2010, the private consultants took on 45 per cent of all households in AS programmes but spent only 28 per cent of the total amount dedicated to AS. In contrast, ADS spends 60 per cent of the total AS budget while it is only responsible for 33 per cent of households (Le Tellier, 2009). Secondly, new mechanisms have been created to increase the slum dweller’s access to financial institutions, improve his solvency and facilitate the purchase of a new apartment. This is important as, despite subsidies from the government, the slum dwellers still bear most of the expenses for their own relocation. With the intention of promoting low-cost and social housing, the FOGARIM fund was established in 2004, specifically for those populations with modest or irregular revenues. This fund permits slum dwellers to obtain a bank loan thanks to a government guarantee on a maximum amount of 200,000 Dirham (DH).11 This guarantee fund permits the spread of risk between the commercial credit institutions and the state in order to break down the metaphorical walls between commercial banks and slum dwellers. FOGARIM guarantees a recovery of 70 per cent of commercially invested capital (World Bank, 2006: 16). In its first five years in operation, more than 50,000 loans, worth approximately 7.3 billion DH (almost 664 million EUR), were granted within the framework of FOGARIM. More than 250,000 persons in 147 cities and villages have benefited from this programme, with 38 per cent of the loans going to people living in Casablanca (Toutain, 2009). FOGARIM is not limited to the population of the slums. In fact, the number of slum households that have profited from FOGARIM remains relatively limited (at around 10 per cent) compared with other populations with limited revenues. Nevertheless, their number is increasing (ibid.). Micro-credit has also been on the rise since the end of the 1990s, and now plays a role in various VSBP projects. While the overall objective is to reach those people who do not constitute the normal clientele of the financial institutions, the success of these financial mechanisms is still limited and they are often too expensive for the poorest within the target population (Le Tellier, 2009: 206–10). The VSBP implies a political reorganization of the slum space. The new methods of social engineering facilitate the entrance of governmental actors into the slums and eventually pave the way for relocation. The bidonvilles 11. 11 DH = approximately 1 Euro. 724 Koenraad Bogaert have always been impenetrable spaces. The paths that divide the shelters are very narrow, often unpaved, and therefore inaccessible to fire engines, police cars, ambulances or army vehicles. The crisscross of alleys and shacks make the inhabitants almost invisible. ‘The bidonville is an uncontrollable site’, argues a Dyar Al Mansour official, ‘even the police couldn’t enter there’ (interview, Rabat, 27 October 2009). Promoted as a fight against poverty, the VSBP gives the authorities the legitimacy to finalize the deconstruction of these impenetrable spaces. In making these spaces more governable, the ‘social accompaniment cells’ (CAS) are important. These are teams of three to five persons who act as mediators on the ground, smoothing out difficulties. They are responsible for putting AS into practice. Proximity is essential and the daily presence of the CAS ensures the embeddedness of governmental structures in the slums (Toutain, 2009). They make inventories of the population, they explain to people how the project works and how it will proceed. The CAS teams are also asked to pay attention to the pedagogical role of their direct communication with slum dwellers, i.e. ‘the sensibilization and the responsibilization of the inhabitants’ (USAID, 2007: 87). The ultimate goal is to eradicate the slums and move their population. Before people are allowed to move to their new apartments, their former homes have to be destroyed to make sure that they will not be occupied again. The new housing blocks are carefully parcelled to fit as many people as possible. Virtually every family has the right to a subsidized apartment or building lot, but the apartments are frequently too small for the larger families. People are often relocated far from their former residence and detached from their original communities. This brings new social and economic implications because many are dependent on their original living place for petty trade activities and work in the informal sector. Moving to a formal apartment also implies new financial challenges for an already vulnerable population: water and electricity bills, new taxes, public transport (if available), finding another income source, etc. Those who move often have to find a temporary home to cover the time between the destruction of their slum home and the construction of their new apartment (Le Tellier, 2009). Moreover, many new social housing projects are transforming the urban periphery into a monotonous mass of low-cost apartments. A district like Sidi Moumen in Casablanca lacks public space and opportunities for leisure and gathering. According to the Moroccan economist Driss Ben Ali, Morocco is ‘making the same mistakes as the French: we are creating banlieues’ (interview, Rabat, 26 October 2009). Within the framework of the VSBP, the coordination of slum clearance is in the hands of technocratic state agencies or publicly owned institutions, but the private sector has become a privileged partner in the elaboration of projects. This raises two important issues. First, the slums are subjected to merely technical rather than political solutions: relocation is the obvious answer because it can be measured. As Olivier Toutain, a French The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 725 consultant for the VSBP, stresses: ‘They [Al Omrane] need to make numbers’ (interview, Rabat, 15 April 2009). Social operators like the public agency ADS are not supposed to critically assess the operation, only to support and facilitate the work of the technical operator. This is explicitly underlined in the methodological guideline (MHU, 2004: 11). Consequently, political questions related to social welfare are ignored while the challenges related to urban poverty are reduced to a housing question for which technical solutions should suffice. At the MHU they are open about this. One of the Minister’s staff members argued that ‘[the MHU] is a technical ministry, we deliver houses . . . we limit ourselves to houses’ (interview, Rabat, 9 June 2010). Second, according to the logic of the private sector, the market and not the public interest is the main motive for their involvement. The remuneration of private actors in, for example, AS programmes depends on results — in other words, on the amount of people they are able to transfer. Al Omrane tends to favour contracts with private consultants in AS programmes because they do it ‘faster and cheaper’ and can be held responsible for results (Le Tellier, 2009: 205). For years, even decades, many slum dwellers in Morocco have lived outside the formal market economy. Many of them had no property rights, no regular job, no legal water connection, etc. But if the poor were not finding their way to the market, the new methods of social engineering, although still not widely applied, are now helping to bring the market to the poor — and, if necessary, adapting the products to their possibilities (and not necessarily their needs). The price for a subsidized apartment of 100 m2 is normally set at 200,000 DH but recently the government has sought to recruit developers who can build smaller apartments of 60 m2 for only 140,000 DH.12 Visiting a new social housing project, it is immediately obvious that the houses have been constructed at minimum cost. After only a couple of years in use, some social housing projects already show damp stains and cracks in the walls. Furthermore, in a country where the majority of the poor population still doesn’t have a bank account, concepts like debt and credit are introduced amongst the lower classes with the FOGARIM fund, micro-credit and other forms of credit programmes. Every new apartment implies property rights, a legal connection to the electricity and water distribution network, and other official paperwork. Insofar as the slum is seen to represent the ruralization of the city, the problem is presented as one of shepherding its inhabitants towards market integration. A staff member of Lydec, a subsidiary of the multinational Suez in Casablanca, explained that delivering water and electricity to these people also requires education, teaching them how to use their new assets and how to pay for them (interview, 12. Oxford Business Group newsletter on Morocco (25/08/09). The Finance Act of 2010 has set the maximum price for a social apartment at 290,000 DH (for 100 m2 ). See also Magharebia news agency: http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/ xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2010/01/05/feature-01 (accessed 29 January 2011). 726 Koenraad Bogaert Casablanca, 13 May 2008).13 Generally, the idea is that once people are good consumers they will eventually become responsible citizens with a ‘proper’ job and a ‘proper’ lifestyle (interview with former ADS official, 16 April 2009). The productive power of biopolitics is reflected in the attempt to create the good citizen, and the market becomes the norm by which good citizenship is measured. It fits within the neoliberal dogma of ‘helping the poor help themselves’, creating an illusion of self-help (Davis, 2006: 72). The VSBP aims to include the slums into the formal urban space where the state can define, defend and regulate the norms and boundaries for social life. Lamia Zaki has shown that this kind of approach creates new forms of exclusion, transforming the slum dwellers ‘from citizens to consumers by replacing the notion of absolute (human) rights with that of a right to services’ (Zaki, 2008: 134). In slum relocation projects the participation of the inhabitants in the decision-making process is reduced to a minimum, despite the promises emerging from the discussions on MOS. The coordination of the VSBP is in the hands of the MHU and the Ministry of Interior. Locally the VSBP is coordinated by Walis and governors, while the contribution of local elected officials is minimal and often contradictory because they fear to lose part of their electorate once a slum population is relocated (Le Tellier, 2009; Zaki, 2005). Additionally, the patronizing attitude prevalent in the technical and public agencies reveals some of the specific rationalities behind the biopolitical techniques of government (Navez-Bouchanine and Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005). Public officials generally seem to believe that the slum dweller is not capable of engaging in public life, that he needs to be re-educated, and that he himself is responsible for his situation. As a Dyar el Masour official told me: ‘we have to guide them and be with them constantly. They are like babies’ (interview, Rabat, 28 May 2008). An official of Al Omrane complained that the inhabitants sometimes refuse to move to their new homes because living in a bidonville ‘[is] a way of life. It is a social and cultural problem. There are people who like living in the bidonvilles’ (interview, Rabat, 27 August 2007). Another Al Omrane official confirmed this, stating that ‘the [slum] population is culturally as well as traditionally difficult’ (interview, Rabat, 30 June 2008). One of the objectives of the AS programmes is to tackle and change the so-called problematic mentality of the slum dweller and teach him to adapt to a new mode of living. The individual slum dweller thus becomes a politicized subject through the VSBP, while his own claims, demands and desires are depoliticized and reduced to a question of housing and property right. As such, the right to the city is an enforced right for slum dwellers in which market-integration and responsibilization are considered crucial elements for success. The real problems — education, healthcare, employment, etc. — are still largely ignored. To conclude with the words of 13. Suez entered into a public–private partnership to deliver water and electivity to informal neighbourhoods. The Problem of Slums: Urban Government in Morocco 727 an inhabitant of Douar Al Kora (a slum on the coastline of Rabat): ‘In a society the problems are social. In the hospital there are no doctors, no nurses, there is a lack of medicines. . . . In education the teachers receive a very low salary. . . . The classrooms are too numerous, often with 50 pupils. . . . [But] we don’t have a choice. They decide. If they give you two rooms, you don’t argue, you take it’ (interview, Rabat, 15 October 2009). CONCLUSION This essay has discussed the changing methods of urban government since the 1980s with regard to the problematic of slums, with evidence drawn predominantly from the case of Casablanca. The city has always been a kind of governmental laboratory, with moments of violence and concerns for security acting as catalysts for the introduction of new governmental methods. These methods intended to open up the urban space and make it more transparent. As such, the contemporary urban restructurings reveal the unfolding of a nexus between neoliberal economic development, based on technocratic and market-oriented visions, and new governmental methods ensuring the security and control of the urban space. Insights from Peck and Tickell, on neoliberalism, together with the Foucauldian notions of sovereignty and security, help to explain the transition in neoliberal government since the 1980s. The specific impact of the transition from roll back to roll out neoliberalism and its translation into specific methods of urban planning and government can be best described using the distinction between sovereign city planning and techniques of security. The 1981 riots marked the end of a period of tolerance towards informal urban expansion and the beginning of expanded territorial control. The political reorganization of urban space after the riots was predominantly concerned with controlling the physical environment through which urban populations move. Cutbacks in welfare policies were compensated by the strengthening of state control over the urban territory, the introduction of monumental state architecture like the Mosque Hassan II, and the deconcentration of state power through, for example, the Wilaya and the AUC. This period of roll back neoliberalism was followed by a rolling out of state power that accelerated particularly after the suicide bombings in 2003. This entailed the exercise of government being channelled into a multiplicity of different arrangements, agencies and networks that intervened more specifically at the level of the individual and targeted the slum population as a whole within a general strategy of administering life to conform with market requirements. The state became more actively involved in the economic sphere to alleviate social inequality caused by earlier marketoriented restructuring. The VSBP is just one example that reveals the making of an increasingly marketized world being imposed on the poor. The programme focuses on the integration of the slum dweller into the formal market 728 Koenraad Bogaert economy by accompanying and responsibilizing him through specific methods of social engineering. The focus on ‘good’ citizenship implies substituting a moral question in the place of a political question. This distinction between good and bad — especially within the cultural stigmatization of the slum dweller who needs to be ‘re-educated’ — hides the underlying class differences and depoliticizes class struggle. Consequently, poverty and social inequality are seen as mere technical problems that can be resolved through marketoriented approaches that reflect the requirements of efficiency, expertise and the best cost–benefit analysis. The social problems of slum dwellers have been reduced to a housing problem that can be measured and calculated. 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