Metaepistemology

*For the Penultimate Draft see Oxford Bibliographies Online. Metaepistemology Christos Kyriacou University of Cyprus Introduction General Overviews Anthologies Historical Background Ancient Philosophy Modern Philosophy 20th Century Philosophy Normativity Metaphysics Analytic Reductionist Epistemic Realism Anti-Reductionist Epistemic Realism Natural Kinds-Style Epistemic Realism Epistemic Antirealism (Meta)Epistemology Epistemic Externalists Epistemic Internalists Semantics Value Theory Reasons for Belief and Epistemic Psychology Evidence and Probability Agency and Responsibility Introduction Metaepistemology is, roughly, the branch of epistemology that asks questions about epistemological questions and inquires into fundamental aspects of epistemic theorizing like metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, value theory, agency, psychology, responsibility, reasons for belief, evidence and probability. So, if as traditionally conceived epistemology is the theory of knowledge, metaepistemology is the theory of the theory of knowledge. It is currently an emerging and quickly developing branch of epistemology, partly because of the success of the more advanced ‘twin’ normative subject of metaethics. The success of metaethics and the structural similarities between metaethics and metaepistemology have inspired parallel conceptual forays in metaepistemology with far reaching implications for both subjects. The entry offers a survey of some core bibliography about basic metaepistemological themes. The bibliography aims neither at being exhaustive nor at presenting these basic themes in their full sophistication and complexity. Rather, given the very broad span of themes and problems that fall under the label of metaepistemology, the aim is to introduce some bibliography and overview some of the cutting edge research that is currently undertaken in metaepistemology debates. In what follows, I bracket ‘(meta)’epistemology to indicate that I mean the epistemology of epistemology. This is to be distinguished from non-bracketed ‘metaepistemology’, which is meant to refer to the whole domain of metaepistemological theorizing (metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, value theory, agency etc.). Henceforth, I will be assuming this convention of usage for the two concepts. General Overviews There is currently missing from the literature some definitive general overview of the field (or even a textbook). This is the case for at least two reasons. First, because the field of metaepistemology is just now emerging, partly because of the success of the more advanced ‘twin’ normative subject of metaethics. Second, because the field is so vast and with so diverse and complicated topics that makes a general overview, even a simple textbook, a difficult task for any epistemologist. Even the compilation of this mere bibliography entry is quite a challenge. However, there are important monographs that touch on various fundamental aspects of metaepistemological theorizing. Fumerton 1995 examines the epistemology of epistemology and its possible implications for skepticism. Williamson 2000 argues against the reductive conceptual analysis approach to knowledge and for the introduction of a non-reductive account of knowledge that reverses the traditional explanatory order in epistemology. Zagzebski 1996 suggests that a responsibilist, intellectual virtue theory could help us illuminate fundamental epistemic concepts like justification, knowledge and understanding. Cuneo 2007 brings out the normative structural similarities between ethics and epistemology and indicates that they support realism. Carter 2016 examines epistemic relativism as a metaepistemological project. Richard Fumerton. (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. London, Rowman and Littlefield. The book focuses on the epistemology of epistemology and its implications for a possible treatment of skepticism. It argues that externalist approaches aspire to naturalize epistemic normativity (through causality, reliability, tracking etc.) and that this begs the question against the puzzle of skepticism. Instead, it defends a broadly internalist account of justification that takes skepticism more seriously. Timothy Williamson. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford, Oxford University Press. This is a seminal book arguing that knowledge is not to be analyzed in any further constituents, like truth, justification and belief. Rather, the order of explanatory analysis should be reversed. Knowledge should be considered an unanalyzable conceptual primitive, the first building block for a theory of knowledge and then go on to explain other epistemic concepts\phenomena (evidence, skepticism, assertion etc.) through knowledge. Linda Zagzebski. (1996). Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. This is a landmark book for the development of Aristotelian\responsibilist virtue-theoretic approaches to epistemology. Building on the interesting but neglected normative analogues between ethics and epistemology, Zagzebski suggests that an intellectual virtue theory could help us illuminate fundamental epistemic concepts like justification, knowledge and understanding. Terence Cuneo. (2007). The Normative Web. Oxford, Oxford University Press. This monograph brings into view the normative structural similarities of ethics and epistemology (reasons, supervenience, objectivity, motivation etc.) and argues that the two domains stand ‘on a par’. That is, either both should be realistically construed or not. He goes on to argue that epistemology is more plausibly construed realistically and that this provides us with reason to believe that ethics are also more plausibly construed realistically. Carter, J. Adam. (2016). Metaepistemology and Relativism. London, Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 9781137336637 http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/metaepistemology-and-relativism-/?isb=9781137336637 A thorough study of epistemic relativism (and its recent developments) as a metaepistemological project. It questions whether the kind of anti-relativistic background that underlies most projects in mainstream epistemology can on closer inspection be vindicated. To this effect, dialectical strategies for epistemic relativism are considered and criticized. Anthologies Anthologies of metaepistemological interest tend to focus on various aspects of metaepistemological theorizing because of the sheer vastness and complexity of the field (semantics, normativity, reasons for belief etc.). Here we review some relevant anthologies with narrowed down metaepistemological focus. Pritchard and Brady 2003 focus on moral and epistemic virtues and Kornblith 2001 on the epistemic internalism\externalism distinction. Steup 2001 pays attention to the various normative facets of epistemology and Millar Haddock and Pritchard 2009 address puzzles that beset epistemic value. Reisner and Steglich-Petersen 2011 pay attention to reasons for belief and Littlejohn and Turri 2014 as well as Schmechtig and Grajner forthcoming on epistemic norms, reasons and goals. Alfano and Fairweather forthcoming take up epistemic situationism and Dole and Chignell 2009 the ethics of belief debate. Duncan Pritchard and Michael Brady (eds.). (2003). Moral and Epistemic Virtues. Oxford, Blackwell. Thirteen essays on moral and epistemic virtue theory as well as its application to particular problems (epistemic (in)justice, jurisprudence etc.). Andrew Reisner and Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen (eds.). (2011). Reasons for Belief. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Twelve essays on various aspects of reasons for belief, ranging from their relation to justification and knowledge to epistemic motivation, value theory and the epistemic realism\antirealism debate. Hilary Kornblith (ed.). (2001). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Oxford, Blackwell. Ten essays by leading epistemologists on one of the most fundamental and contentious distinctions in contemporary epistemology, namely, the epistemic internalism\externalism distinction. Martin Steup (ed.). (2001). Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford, Oxford University Press. This volume comprises of fourteen essays that bear on the various normative facets of epistemology: the normativity of justification, doxastic (in)voluntarism and deontologism, epistemic internalism\externalism, value theory, virtue theory etc. Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard (eds.). (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Eighteen essays on value-related themes in epistemology, ranging from problems about the value of knowledge to problems about the value of truth as well as a symposium appendix on Jonathan Kvanvig’s. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell (eds.). (2009). God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Eleven essays by leading epistemologists and philosophers of religion on the ethics of (religious) belief (existence of God, miracles etc.). Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri (eds.). (2014). Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion. Oxford, Oxford University Press. A series of essays on the epistemic requirements that constrain, respectively, action, belief and assertion. Mark Alfano and Abrol Fairweather (eds.). Forthcoming. Epistemic Situationism. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Essays on the recent application of the so-called ‘situationist challenge’ to responsibilist virtue-epistemology. Pedro Schmechtig and Martin Grajner (eds.). Forthcoming. Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Berlin\Boston, DeGruyter. Essays on epistemic error theory and epistemic realism\antirealism, epistemic consequentialism, epistemic goals and flourishing, the question why follow epistemic norms, the norm of belief and assertion etc. Historical Background Like the term ‘metaethics’, the term ‘metaepistemology’ is something of a recent invention, most likely a 20th century invention. This does not mean, of course, that metaepistemological theorizing is also of recent invention. Unsurprisingly, metaepistemological theorizing is as old as philosophy itself because of its grounding importance for theorizing\cognizing as such. But the relatively recent invention of the term does suggest that metaepistemology is becoming more systematic and organized as a distinct subfield of epistemology. I list below important historical works that involve at least some landmark metaepistemological theorizing. I begin with some classics of ancient philosophy and then move on to some classics of the modern and 20th century philosophy. In regard to ancient philosophy, Plato’s Meno, Theatetus and Republic have influenced epistemology pervasively, from the question of the analysis of knowledge to epistemic value, skepticism and relativism. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics sets out to explain knowledge in syllogistic terms and Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism is the definitive statement of ancient skepticism. Ancient Philosophy Plato. Meno, Theatetus, Republic. Multiple Editions but see LOEB Classical Library Volumes. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. These three dialogues include gems of metaepistemological discussion ranging from the source, nature and value of knowledge to the threat of skepticism and relativism about knowledge. All in Plato’s unsurpassed literary, dialogical way of doing philosophy. Aristotle. (1960). Posterior Analytics. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Translated by H.Tredennick and E.S.Forster. LOEB Classical Library. Aristotle sets out to describe what knowledge is and how is acquired through deductive inference, his famous syllogisms. Aristotle thinks that only deductive inference could qualify as knowledge and that for such deductive inference we ultimately have to rely on the self-evident ‘first principles’ of (classical) logic. It remains important as a historical text. Sextus Empiricus. (1933). Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Translated by R.G. Bury. LOEB Classical Library. It is the definitive statement of ancient skepticism. It distinguishes between Academic and Pyrrhonist skepticism and contains many staple arguments for skepticism like Agrippa’s trilemma, the problem of the criterion and the ten modes. It is valuable for anyone who wants to understand the skeptical tradition and its origins in classical thought. Modern Philosophy Descartes’ Meditations (1641) has probably influenced contemporary epistemology more than any other work. Spurred by the restless times of the rise of modern science, Descartes set out to defeat the skeptic by means of her very instrument, doubt. Hume’s Enquiry (1777) expounds his empiricist epistemology and endorses a form of Academic, ‘mitigated’ skepticism. Concerned about Hume’s skepticism, Reid’s Essays (1785) defended a broadly externalist, non-skeptical approach to epistemology, according to which our beliefs are in good epistemic standing because they are formed in the right way by faculties operating well in a hospitable environment. Kant was also disturbed by Hume’s skeptical empiricism, and in his renowned Critique of Pure Reason (1781) tried to show that we can accept the empiricist lesson that experience delimits human knowledge but also ‘transcendentally deduce’ what the operation of experience necessarily presupposes. Rene Descartes. (1641\2008). Meditations on First Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Translated by Michael Moriarty. Descartes sets out to defeat the skeptic by means of her very instrument, doubt. He argues that a priori reasoning from self-evident truths (i.e. ‘clear and distinct ideas’) can refute skepticism about mind, the external world and God. Few epistemologists have found his arguments cogent ever since, but virtually all concede that Descartes has bequeathed to us some of the most challenging epistemological questions. David Hume. (1777\2005). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge. 3rd Edition. For Hume, knowledge is either of a priori ‘relations of ideas’ or a posteriori ‘matters of fact’, the rest are to be cast to the flames in order to cleanse philosophy from idle metaphysical speculation. The Enquiry includes famous Humean arguments like his analysis of causation, his argument against miracles and his naturalist response to skepticism. Thomas Reid. (1785\2002). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. D. Brookes, (ed.). Introduction by K.Haakonssen. Penn State Press. Spurred by Hume’s skepticism, Reid defends a broadly externalist, non-skeptical approach to epistemology, according to which our beliefs are in good epistemic standing because they are formed in the right way by faculties operating well in a hospitable environment. This approach endorses a form of broad foundationalism according to which we are endowed with a broad range of native belief-forming faculties that generate trustworthy beliefs non-inferentially. (Thanks go to Terence Cuneo for this entry). Immanuel Kant. (1781\2003). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Revised 2nd edition. Harped on by Hume’s skeptical empiricism, Kant was eager to show that we can accept the empiricist lesson that experience delimits human knowledge but also ‘transcendentally deduce’ what the operation of experience necessarily presupposes, like what he called synthetic a priori truths (arithmetic, (Euclidean) geometry) and basic conceptual ‘categories’ (substance, causation, relation etc.). 20th Century Philosophy Bertrand’s Russell. (1912\2001). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Introduction by John Skorupski. Russell’s brief but pregnant book discusses the skeptical challenge, the nature of truth and knowledge, universals, the problem of induction, probability, the value of philosophy and more and even tries out novel solutions. It is remarkable for a number of claims like the defense of a correspondence theory of truth and the defense of the idea that knowledge is unanalyzable, an idea that Williamson (2000) would popularize a century later. G.E.Moore. (1939). ‘Proof of an External World’. Proceedings of the British Academy 25, pp. 273-300. Moore’s brief defense of our common sense knowledge of the external world against skeptical challenges is a classic. For Moore, there is sufficient proof for any reasonable agent that the external world exists, even if we cannot strictly demonstrate its reality. Others found Moore’s response a bit philosophically naïve and others that it has more ingenuity than it first meets the eye. Ludwig Wittgenstein. (1969\1993). On Certainty. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds.). Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe and D. Paul. Oxford, Blackwell. Stirred by Moore’s anti-skeptical knowledge exercises, later Wittgenstein turned his attention to the ‘language game’ of knowledge. In accordance with his later ‘meaning is use’ approach to semantics, Wittgenstein suggested that employing the concept ‘know’ is a language game with its own rules. For one thing, employing the concept of knowledge presupposes the fixity of some ‘hinge propositions’ and a doxastic ‘frame of reference’. Wilfrid Sellars. (1956\2003). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Introduction by R.Rorty and Study Guide by Robert Brandom. In Kantian style, Sellars attacks the broadly foundationalist ‘myth of the given’ about a posteriori, perceptual content. That is, the idea that perceptual content is simply given in experience unmediated by the perceiver’s conceptual schema. Rather, perception presupposes mediation by concepts. Together with Quine’s (1951) attack on foundationalist a priori content at about the same time, they comprise a duo that ushered towards more holistic, coherentist approaches in epistemology. W.V.O. Quine. (1990). Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. This is an epitome of the novel and radically empiricist thought of Quine- even more radical than Hume’s and his positivist descendants that Quine famously criticized for their commitment to their two foundationalist dogmas (in Humean terms, the a priori ‘relations of ideas and the a posteriori ‘matters of fact’). For the holistic coherentist Quine, all evidence is ultimately empirical, stimulation of the senses. 3. Normativity One of the most important aspects of cognizing is that it is inherently normative. That is, it is prima facie constrained by epistemic oughts and norms that rational cognizing should abide by. Clifford 1877 famously gave expression to this normative element and James 1896\1979 tried to come up with a response to Clifford’s position on epistemic normativity. Others like Quine 1969 and Rorty 1979 tried to naturalize epistemic normativity and others like Kim 1988 and Boghossian 2007 resisted the naturalization project. Yet others like Chisholm 1966 and Foley 1987 attempted to explicate epistemic normativity by analyzing epistemic concepts like knowledge and rationality. W.K. Clifford. (1877\1999). ‘The Ethics of Belief’ in T. Madigan, (ed.), The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, Amherst, MA: Prometheus, 70–96. A sharp restatement of the Cartesian, normative question ‘What one ought to believe?’ in its moral\responsibilist dimension. Clifford argued that as responsible agents we have a binding moral obligation to believe only what is supported by sufficient evidence. William James. (1896\1979), ‘The Will to Believe’, in F. Burkhardt et al. (eds.), The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, Cambridge: MA, Harvard, pp. 291–341. James was concerned about Clifford’s argument and came up with a response. He thought that Clifford went too far because we are not only obliged to avoid error, as Clifford’s normative incentive assumed, but also to acquire truth. Clifford, thought James, heeded only the first epistemic obligation and neglected the latter. For if we raise too much the standards of ‘sufficiency of evidence’ then we run the danger to miss the chance to acquire truth. Roderick Chisholm. (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. It presents a broadly internalist, foundationalist and deontological conception of epistemology and some of its basic concepts, like knowledge, evidence and justification. Epistemology is painted as a normative domain constrained by epistemic oughts. W.V.O. Quine. (1969). ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press. pp.68-90. Quine argues that epistemology needs to be reconceived as a chapter of cognitive psychology and the natural science more broadly. Traditional epistemology conceived in terms of the problem of skepticism and epistemic normativity is doomed to failure. All we can and should perform is the empirical study of our cognitive processes. Jaegwon Kim. (1988). ‘What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’? in J.Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 2. Epistemology. Atascadero, CA: Reidgeview Publishing. pp.381-405. Kim criticizes Quine’s project of the naturalization of epistemology. He points out that epistemic concepts that are central to scientific (and cognitive more generally) theorizing like belief, evidence and justification are inherently normative. He goes on to argue that epistemic supervenience exemplifies the normativity of epistemology (just like in ethics). Richard Rorty. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Rorty criticizes the ‘language-game’ of analytic philosophy as a culturally constructed game driven by the old Greek ocular metaphor of the mind as the mirror of reality. The concept of knowledge as representation\mirroring of an independent reality is bankrupt, claims Rorty, and we have to accept –in his own words- ‘the demise of epistemology’ as a discipline. Richard Foley (1987). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Foley argues, roughly, that a belief is epistemically rational if the agent, after careful reflection, has some uncontroversial premises that uncontroversially support the belief (from the epistemic point of view) and has no uncontroversial defeaters that undermine the overall argument. ‘Uncontroversiality’ is then explicated in terms of ‘sufficient likelihood’ and sufficient likelihood in terms of what is anticipated to happen in most relevant possible situations. A classic study of epistemic rationality. Paul Boghossian. (2007). Fear of Knowledge. Oxford, Oxford University Press. A critique of relativism about knowledge, justification and reasons for belief and, at the same time, an argument for realism about knowledge, justification and reasons for belief. According to Boghossian, postmodernism with its relativistic proclivities should not be let to inspire ‘fear of knowledge’. There is knowledge and we can have it on the basis of objectively rational epistemic reasons. Boghossian makes much of self-defeat worries against the antirealist\relativist position. 4. Metaphysics The metaphysical questions about the existence and nature of epistemic properties\values are as old as philosophy itself. Plato famously offered the tripartite analysis of knowledge that Gettier 1963 showed to be insufficient for knowledge. The discussion has continued with little abate in the contemporary scene and some summary of this discussion can be found in Shope 2002. Some have proposed safety-based approaches to knowledge (cf. Pritchard 2007, Sosa 2007), others responsibilist, virtue-theoretic approaches (cf. Zagzebski 1996), virtue-reliabilist (cf. Greco 2010) contextualist approaches (cf. Williams 1990), expressivist (cf. Chrisman 2007), while others have rejected wholesale the project of reductive conceptual analysis (cf. Williamson 2000, Craig 1990, Kornblith 2002). Analytic Reductionist, Epistemic Realism Plato. Meno, Theatetus. Multiple Editions but see LOEB Classical Library Volumes. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Plato introduces the classic tripartite analysis of knowledge, namely, the true justified belief analysis. The tripartite analysis suggests that knowledge is a priori conceptually reducible to more fundamental constituents. Edmund Gettier. (1963). ‘Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?’. Analysis, Vol. 23, pp.121-3. Famously, Gettier offered two counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge showing that is not sufficient for knowledge. It is not sufficient, partly at least, because justification does not lead to truth but due to favorable lucky circumstances we accidentally ‘hit the truth’. Intuitively, knowledge is not compatible with epistemic luck and therefore we don’t really know in such cases. The Gettier problem has so much influenced epistemology that nowadays we often talk of post-Gettier epistemology. Robert Shope. (2002). ‘Conditions and Analyses of Knowing’, in P.Moser (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford, Oxford University Press. pp.25-70. Gettier’s paper has evoked a real tsunami of articles (and ideas) on the stipulated problem without much of consensus about the solution. Shope reviews some of the main response lines that the Gettier problem has evoked. Duncan Pritchard. (2007). Epistemic Luck. Oxford, Oxford University Press. A thorough analysis of the post-Gettier central notion of epistemic luck, the skeptical problematic and a proposal for a NeoMoorean, safety-based account of knowledge. It is the first work that provides a sustained discussion of epistemic luck. Ernest Sosa. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Sosa is a realist and a conceptual reductionist about knowledge, namely, he thinks that there is real knowledge, that we often manage to have knowledge and that we can reductively analyze it. He goes on to propose a safety-based account of knowledge that builds on externalist, virtue-theoretic insights. Roughly, knowledge is true belief formed because of apt virtuous faculties. John Greco. (2010). Achieving Knowledge. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Like Sosa, Greco is a realist and a conceptual reductionist and proposes an account of knowledge that builds on externalist, virtue-theoretic insights. For Greco, knowledge is an intellectual achievement out of the operation of virtuous faculties like memory, perception and reasoning. In the process, Greco argues against the broadly internalist tradition in epistemology (deontological, evidentialist etc.) and also draws from the empirical literature (connectionism etc.) to support the plausibility of externalism. Duncan Pritchard. (2012). ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy 109, 247-79. Pritchard is a realist and a conceptual reductionist about knowledge as well. He proposes an analysis that comes as an improvement to various virtue-theoretic approaches, like Sosa’s and Greco’s. Pritchard argues that ‘two master intuitions’, the anti-luck intuition and the achievement intuition, must be reconciled in order to have a fully adequate analysis of knowledge. Accordingly, he proposes an anti-luck, virtue-theoretic analysis of knowledge that accommodates both intuitions. Linda Zagzebski. (1996). Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Zagzebski is also a realist, conceptual reductionist and virtue-theorist but of a more responsibilist persuasion. While others understand virtues as quasi-mechanical faculties or abilities, Zagzebski in true Aristotelian spirit understands virtues as deep-seated positive character traits that motivate right doxastic conduct. Drawing mainly from the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, she builds an account of knowledge in terms of virtuous character traits (open-mindedness, fairness, courage, respect, diligence, love of truth etc.). Anti-Reductionist Epistemic Realism Timothy Williamson. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Williamson is a realist but conceptual anti-reductionist about knowledge. He defends the irreducibility of knowledge to anything more basic and that knowledge is a conceptual primitive. He is careful, though, not to engage in any kind of metaphysical exploration about the nature of this irreducible knowledge (natural or nonnatural). Keith Hossack. (2007). The Metaphysics of Knowledge. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Hossack defends in Williamsonian spirit the unanalyzability of knowledge and proceeds to explore metaphysical questions on its basis: reference, truth, content, modality, consciousness, language etc. Edward Craig. (1990). Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Craig argues that instead of trying to conceptually analyze knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, which is exceedingly hard, we could in Hobbesian-contractarian style think of the function of knowledge in a social context. As Craig points out, one of the primary functions of knowledge is flagging reliable sources of true belief. A genealogical, social contract approach to knowledge inspired by parallel discussions in ethics and political philosophy. Natural Kinds-Style Epistemic Realism Hilary Kornblith. (2002). Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kornblith is a realist and naturalist about knowledge but a conceptual anti-reductionist. He argues that knowledge is itself a natural kind, a natural phenomenon that we can observe taking place in nature and the animal kingdom. Thus, we should first observe knowledge phenomena in nature and then theorize about knowledge and not simply engage ourselves in abstract conceptual theorizing of knowledge in blind trust of a priori intuitions. For intuitions may easily mislead us. Catherine Jenkins. (2007). ‘Epistemic Norms and Natural Facts’. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):259-272. Jenkins argues that epistemic justification is unanalyzable in terms of a priori conceptual analysis and that this is indicated by Moorean ‘open question’ style of arguments. She suggests that justification might still be a natural kind discoverable by a posteriori empirical means, although she concedes that it must be of evidential nature. A realist and synthetic\a posteriori reductionist to epistemic justification with an evidentialist twist. Contextualist Epistemic Realism Michael Williams. (2001). Problems of Knowledge. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Williams argues that the assumption of - what he calls- ‘epistemological realism’ is what gives skepticism its dialectical force. That is, the assumption that knowledge facts are mind-independent and invariant facts. Instead, he proposes that we could still have knowledge worthy of its name if we reject invariance. We could be contextualists about knowledge and grant that it varies with conversational context without stop being realists about it. Ralph Wedgwood. (2008). ‘Contextualism About Justified Belief’. Philosopher’s Imprint 8 (9):1-20. Wedgwood sketches a contextualist theory of justification, where the standards of justified belief are sensitive to the context of utterance and shift from low to high (and inversely). The standards of justification, however, are only sensitive to epistemic and not pragmatic considerations (like needs, interests, stakes etc.). Epistemic Antirealism Allan Gibbard. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Gibbard argues for norm-expressivism about rationality (primarily for moral, but also epistemic). Roughly, he suggests that our rationality talk does not really purport to describe rationality facts. Rather, our rationality talk expresses endorsement of relevant norms that license an act (or belief) as rational and involves relevant noncognitive attitudes (like resentment and guilt). Matthew Chrisman. (2007). ‘From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism’. Philosophical Studies 135(2):225-254. Drawing from Allan Gibbard’s influential norm-expressivism, Chrisman argues that the expressivist approach to knowledge bears important attractions over attributor contextualism. Roughly, knowledge statements express attitudes of approval for the epistemic norms that license true belief. An antirealist take on knowledge as for expressivism there are no independent knowledge facts. Christos Kyriacou. (2012). ‘Habits-expressivism About Epistemic Justification’. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):209 - 237. A putative improvement on Gibbard’s early norm-expressivism and more recent plan-expressivism. Justified belief attributions approve of certain doxastic habits, constrained by certain epistemic norms, in virtue of which the belief was formed. They also typically express attitudes like trust and reliance for the belief output of those habits and praise for the agent. An antirealist account of epistemic justification in an alternative expressivist framework. Stephen Stich. (1990). The Fragmentation of Reason. Cambridge MA, MIT Press. Drawing from various empirical studies, Stich argues against the existence of independent epistemic justification facts. For Stich, justification is a mere social construct that takes place in certain cultural conditions and is therefore of mere local validity. An antirealist, cultural relativist approach to justification. Sharon Street. (2006). ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’. Philosophical Studies 127 (1), pp. 109-166. Street poses a Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Either our moral and cognitive attitudes reliably track independent corresponding normative facts or they do not. Almost all normative realists think that they do and believe in normative knowledge. But if our attitudes have been shaped by our evolutionary past, as abundant empirical evidence suggests, then postulating the reality of moral and epistemic facts is redundant. Antirealism ensues. J. Adam Carter and Matthew Chrisman. (2012). ‘Is Epistemic Expressivism Incompatible with Inquiry?’. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):323-339. Carter and Chrisman respond to the objection -put forth by various realist-minded philosophers like Cuneo (2007)- that epistemic expressivism is incoherent or self-defeating. Epistemic expressivism is defensible once we grasp ‘the core expressivist maneuver’, that is, that instead of asking about the nature of the relevant values we should be asking about the nature of the relevant evaluations. 5. (Meta)epistemology Epistemology asks epistemological questions like ‘Are perceptual beliefs justified or knowledge?’. But we may also ask epistemological questions about epistemological questions like ‘Do we need to know that we know in order to know?’ or ‘Do we need to have cognitive access to reasons\facts\evidence in order to have justified belief?’. Epistemologists are divided on these issues. Some are epistemic internalists (cf. Fumerton (1995), Conee and Feldman (2004), Bonjour (2003)) and some are epistemic externalists (cf. Goldman (1979), Plantinga (1993), Williamson (2000), Sosa (2003)). Internalists tend to emphasize the internal aspect in cognition and therefore emphasize access to reasons, mental states, responsibility etc. while externalists tend to emphasize external success and friction with reality and therefore emphasize reliability, causality, tracking etc. Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa. (2003). Epistemic Justification. London, Blackwell Publishing. This book pits two prominent epistemologists against each other, one internalist, Lawrence Bonjour, and one externalist, Ernest Sosa. Bonjour defends a non-doxastic and foundational account of empirical justification and Sosa defends a virtue-theoretic form of externalism about justification. Epistemic Externalists Timothy Williamson. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Williamson argues against the KK-principle and delineates a broadly externalist approach to epistemological theorizing. For Williamson, knowledge is not reflexive and we can know without knowing. In his own terms, knowledge is not ‘luminous’. Alvin Goldman. (1979). ‘What is justified belief?’. In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston, D.Reidel. pp. 1-25. The classic exposition of his influential process reliabilism. Roughly, justified belief is belief that is produced by a reliable belief-forming process, where there is no other reliable belief-forming process defeating the belief. Alvin Plantinga. (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Plantinga argues for an externalist position according to which warrant is the product of proper functioning cognitive faculties in a hospitable mini-environment without relevant defeaters. Their ‘proper’ functioning is according to their designing plan, which according to Plantinga cannot be merely explained along ‘blind’ Darwinian evolutionary lines. Darwinian evolution should in some sense, then, have been divinely ‘orchestrated’. John Greco. (2010). Achieving Knowledge. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Greco builds an externalist, virtue-theoretic account of knowledge. For Greco, knowledge is an intellectual achievement out of the operation of virtuous faculties like memory, perception and reasoning. Greco argues against the broadly internalist tradition in epistemology (deontological, evidentialist etc.) and also draws from the empirical literature (connectionism etc.) to support the plausibility of externalism. Epistemic Internalists Richard Fumerton.(1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. London, Rowman and Littlefield. Fumerton argues that externalists have gone one step too far because they beg the philosophical question of skepticism from the outset. If we assume that our cognitive faculties are reliable, tracking etc. from the start, skepticism as a problematic is all but done in a question-begging way. He instead defends a direct acquaintance style of internalism. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. (2004.) Evidentialism. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Feldman and Conee argue for an evidentialist take on epistemology. Roughly, a doxastic attitude is correct if it fits the relevant evidence of the agent, where evidence is understood as supervening on the agent’s mental states (beliefs, sensations, memories etc.). This mentalist understanding of evidence rejects accessibility internalism, namely, the view that justification requires access to reasons. But it still takes evidence to consist in mental states and therefore counts as a broadly internalist theory. Jonathan Vogel. (2000). ‘Reliabilism Leveled’. Journal of Philosophy 97(11): 602-623. Vogel subjects a prominent version of externalism, namely, reliabilism to scathing critique. He especially presses the charge of vicious circularity against reliabilism (‘the bootstrapping problem’). Daniel Greco. (2014). ‘Could the KK be OK?’. Journal of Philosophy 111(4): 169-197. An argument for the rehabilitation of a qualified KK principle that with the recent advent of externalism has fallen to disrepute. Greco argues that it holds within contexts but fails across contexts. 6. Semantics There are competing theories about the meaning of epistemic declaratives. Some are expressivist (cf. Chrisman (2007), Kyriacou (2012)), others contextualist (cf. DeRose (1995, 2009), Lewis (1996)), others skeptical invariantist (cf. Unger (1971), Fogelin (1994)) or subject-sensitive invariantist (cf. Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005)) or moderate\nonskeptical invariantists (cf. Rysiew (2001). It is also interesting to note that the semantic challenge of the ‘open question argument’ that is typically applied to moral concepts has recently been applied to epistemic concepts (cf. Greco 2015). Matthew Chrisman. (2007). ‘From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism’. Philosophical Studies 135(2):225-254. Chrisman argues that a norm-expressivist approach to knowledge bears important advantages over truth-conditional attributor contextualism. Meaning of knowledge discourse should be understood as expressing the speaker’s states of mind in the familiar Lockean\Gricean way. Truth and truth-conditions need not be involved for fixation of meaning. David Lewis. (1996).‘Elusive Knowledge’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74\4, pp. 549-567. Lewis proposes a contextualist analysis of knowledge where the standards of knowledge are relatively mediocre and ignore all those possibilities of error that can be properly ignored. Lewis explains then what it means for a possibility of error to be ‘properly ignored’ in terms of some rules. Keith DeRose. (1995). ‘Solving the Skeptical Puzzle’. Philosophical Review 104, pp.1-52. A classic statement of an attributor contextualist solution to the skeptical puzzle. The skeptical puzzle is explained away as a problematic that comes up because of the surreptitious shift of knowledge standards from low to high. Upon understanding how the skeptic exploits this shift to press the skeptical challenge we can offer an adequate response to the skeptic. John Hawthorne. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Hawthorne takes as his starting point the lottery puzzle and sets out to subject all the major theories of knowledge to relentless critique (moderate and skeptical invariantism, attributor contextualism). In the end, he tries his own hand and sketches what he calls ‘subject-sensitive invariantism’. That is, an invariantism that takes into account the practical interests, needs, stakes etc. of the subject of evaluation and not the attributor. Jason Stanley. (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Stanley argues that knowledge attribution is not an entirely epistemic activity. It is partly sensitive to the subject’s practical interests and how much is at stake for that subject. Along the way Stanley examines alternative approaches to knowledge attribution like attributor contextualism and relativism. Peter Unger. (1971). ‘A Defense of Skepticism’. Philosophical Review, LXXX pp.198-219. A classic defense of skeptical invariantism about knowledge. For Unger, knowledge is an ‘absolute’ concept that requires absolute certainty and, hence, exclusion of all possibility of error. Given that this is rarely, if ever, satisfied we almost never have knowledge. Indeed, on pain of self-defeat we can’t even claim to know that we don’t really know. Robert Fogelin. (1994). Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Fogelin argues that we cannot analyze knowledge in a way that addresses the Gettier problem and that we cannot analyze justification in a way that addresses Agrippa’s trilemma. The upshot is a form of neo-pyrrhonism about knowledge and justification. At the theoretical level we should suspend belief, but at the practical level go on with our lives as usual. Rysiew Patrick. (2001). ‘ The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions’. Nous 35(4):477-514. Rysiew defends a moderate version of nonskeptical invariantism in the face of the obvious context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. He suggests that the context-sensitivity of knowledge discourse is explainable coherently with nonskeptical invariantism if we explain context-sensitivity as a merely pragmatic phenomenon. Keith DeRose. (2009). The Case for Contextualism. Oxford, Oxford University Perss. A sustained description and defense of attributor contextualism by one of its prominent advocates. Daniel Greco. (2015). ‘Epistemological Open Question Arguments’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(3):509-523. Greco argues that epistemological open question arguments seem to be as prima facie plausible as their counterpart moral open question arguments. Open question arguments are distinctive semantic challenges that rely on our ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions about property identity questions of the form ‘Is justification coherence?’. If such questions appear open, then prima facie the purported identity claim fails. 7. Value Theory Epistemic value theory asks questions about the relative value of epistemic properties\concepts and the role they should play in our cognitive economy. Such questions go back to Plato’s Meno, where Plato ponders why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief if they are both equally practically useful. Kvanvig 2003 and Pritchard 2010 suggest that we should reorient our epistemic axiology towards understanding, Zagzebski 2003 that the ultimate goal is eudaimonia, Greco 2010 that knowledge is valuable because it is an achievement out of cognitive ability and Kappel 2010 tries out an expressivist approach to epistemic value problems. Plato’s Meno. Multiple Editions but see LOEB Classical Library Volumes. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Plato introduces the general question of the value of knowledge by means of what has become known as ‘the Meno problem’. That is, the question whether knowledge has more value than true belief if both have the same practical utility. Plato (through the Socratic character) seems to suggest that knowledge is better (at least practically) from true belief because is ‘tethered’ by justification and is therefore safe. Jonathan Kvanvig. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kvanvig argues that the value of knowledge is irreducible to the value of any subset of its constituents (justification, truth, belief). He then proposes that the concept of knowledge has been a bit overrated in epistemology and that we should explore the possibility of understanding as an alternative valuable cognitive goal. Duncan Pritchard. (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pritchard offers a lucid taxonomy of epistemic value problems and also argues that the epistemic goal of understanding should occupy a more central role in our epistemic axiology. He explains how knowledge does not entail understanding (and vice versa) and that we could aspire to the goal of understanding rather than knowledge. Linda Zagzebski. (2003). ‘The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good’, Metaphilosophy 34, pp.12-28. Zagzebski argues that knowledge is valuable because it is an achievement that promotes the Aristotelian goal of eudaimonia. In the process, she argues against reliabilist accounts of knowledge on the basis of her ‘espresso machine thought experiment’. That is, whether an espresso is produced by a reliable or an unreliable coffee machine is irrelevant to the value of the coffee itself. Thus, reliabilism is in trouble. John Greco. (2010). ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Achieving Knowledge. Oxford, Oxford University Press. pp.91-101. Greco approaches questions of epistemic value through the lens of his intellectual virtue theory of knowledge. Knowledge is valuable because it is an intellectual achievement at least partly creditable to the cognitive virtue and ability of the agent. This is also what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. Knowledge is an achievement while mere true belief need not be. Klemens Kappel. (2010). ‘Expressivism about Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge’, Acta Analytica 25(2), pp.175-194. Kappel argues that norm-expressivism about knowledge can address the Meno problem and other related value questions. Roughly, for the expressivist, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because with knowledge judgments we express attitudes of approval for the epistemic norms that license true belief. Nothing of the sort need happen in the case of mere true belief and this pinpoints the difference in value. 8. Reasons for Belief and Epistemic Psychology It is a central question whether reasons for belief are merely instrumental or categorical. Some take the former position (cf. Kornblith (2002)) and some the latter (Kelly (2003)). It is also of interest to know the ontic nature of reasons for belief (cf. Boghossian (2007), Turri (2009)). Moreover, it is interesting to note that epistemic judgments motivate akin to practical judgments. It is a good question what sorts of motivations they provide and how the motivation link should be explained. Some are inclined towards judgment internalism (Kappel and Moeller (2014)) and some towards judgment externalism (cf. Grajner (2015)). Thomas Kelly. (2003). ‘Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3), pp. 612-640. Kelly argues against the instrumental conception of epistemic rationality and reasons for belief. Reasons for belief cannot be understood in terms of hypothetical imperatives like ‘if you desire the truth about p, then collect relevant evidence about p’. Rather they seem to be of categorical nature, namely, about goals that we ought to have and about reasons for belief we ought to have, independently of our desires, dispositions etc. Paul Boghossian. (2007). Fear of Knowledge. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Boghossian argues for the objectivity of reasons for belief and against relativism about reasons for belief. For Boghossian, if we are relativists about reasons for belief then the social practice of asking and giving reasons has little importance. John Turri. (2009). ‘The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons’. Nous 43:3, 490-512. Turri offers a taxonomy of theories of epistemic reasons and argues in favor of a psychological theory of reasons he calls ‘statism’. According to statism, reasons are mental states or events of the subject. Hilary Kornblith. (2002). Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kornblith defends the instrumental conception of epistemic rationality and reasons for belief. Our cognitive goals are conditional on our relevant desires, needs etc. and our reasons for belief are thereby determined by hypothetical imperatives of the form, ‘If you want to know p, then employ this reliable method’. Klemens Kappel and Emil Moeller. (2014). ‘Epistemic Expressivism and the Argument from Motivation’. Synthese, pp.1-19. Drawing from the parallel debate in metaethics, Kappel and Moeller argue that knowledge attributions express pro tanto motivation for termination of inquiry and that this is best explained in ecumenical epistemic expressivist terms. Hence, ‘the argument from motivation’ in the moral case carries over to the knowledge case and can support ecumenical epistemic expressivism. Martin Grajner. (2015). ‘Hybrid Expressivism and Epistemic Justification’. Philosophical Studies. 172 (9):2349-2369. Grajner argues that justification assertions and attributions express epistemic motivation and that this is best explained by recourse to a version of cognitivist hybrid expressivism. Justification judgments express cognitive states i.e. beliefs but also noncognitive content that can be pragmatically explained by means of generalized conversational implicatures. 9. Evidence and Probability Evidence is a prima facie normative concept in the sense that it should guide rational belief-fixation. Probability is also a prima facie normative concept because, intuitively, epistemic rationality obliges that we should believe propositions that are sufficiently likely. When this intuition is given formal expression in terms of the mathematically rigorous framework of Bayes’ theorem, it is an intuition that we should take very seriously (cf. Talbott (2008)). But it is very unclear what evidence is (cf. Kelly (2006), Williamson (2000)), whether it could be naturalized (cf. Quine (1976)) and how probability should be interpreted in order to be able to play a valuable role in our cognitive lives (cf. Mellor (2005), Hajek (2011), Talbott (2008), Plantinga (1993)). Indeed, some are skeptical about the value of probability in epistemology (cf. Pollock (1986)) while others are more optimistic (cf. Heathwood (2009)). W.V.O. Quine. (1976). ‘Posits and Reality’, in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. pp.246-254. All evidence is empirical, stimulation of the senses. We then posit theoretical entities to explain these empirical data in the best possible way in order to meet our practical and epistemic goals in accordance with pragmatic criteria like simplicity, economy, consilience, explanatory power etc. Thomas Kelly. (2006). ‘Evidence’[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Kelly offers an overview of the prominent views about evidence as well as prominent puzzles that the notion of evidence gives rise to. A valuable study guide for anyone interested in the notion of evidence. Timothy Williamson. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford, Oxford University Press. In line with his general ‘knowledge first’ stance in epistemology, Williamson articulates and defends the view that knowledge is basic, ‘the unexplained explainer’ and evidence explicable in terms of knowledge. Knowledge is evidence. D.H.Mellor. (2005). Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. New York, Routledge. A thorough introduction to the philosophical issues surrounding the concept of probability: the various interpretations of probability, their particular pros and cons, conditionalization and updating and more. Alan Hajek. (2011). ‘Interpretations of Probability’[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Hajek explains the basics of probability theory, offers criteria of adequacy for interpretations of probability and discusses some of the major lines of interpretation of probability, namely, classical, logical, subjective, frequency and propensity interpretations. John Pollock. (1986). Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield. Pollock is critical of the idea that the concept of probability (in its various interpretations) may help us analyze the concept of epistemic justification. ‘Probabilism’ is therefore to be rejected as a theory of justification. William Talbott. (2008). ‘Bayesian Epistemology’ [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Talbott offers a discussion of how the formal framework of the Baye’s theorem allows us to use probability ratios to quantify and measure confirmation of a hypothesis by a body of data. He mostly focuses on subjectivist interpretations of probability. Alvin Plantinga. (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Chs.8-9. Plantinga argues against a subjectivist interpretation of epistemic probability and suggests a broadly Reidian account. Roughly, the probability ratio of a belief should be fixed by proper functioning cognitive faculties of an agent in the relevant mini-environment (and according to the faculties’ design plan). Chris Heathwood. (2009). ‘Moral and Epistemic Open Question Arguments’, Philosophical Books 50, pp.83-98. Heathwood argues against Cuneo (2007) that the moral and the epistemic domain are not ‘on a par’ and hence, they need not have the same theoretical fate (realist or antirealist). To indicate this Heathwood uses two open questions arguments, one moral and one epistemic and points out that our intuitions in the two cases diverge. 10. Agency and Responsibility Empirical work seems to suggest that the notion of virtuous agency is a mere fiction of folk psychology and virtue theory. Agents’ conduct is not driven by deep-rooted character traits. This argument has been applied both to responsibilist, virtue theories in ethics (cf. Harman (1999)) and epistemology (cf. Alfano (2012)) and poses a serious challenge to virtue theory sympathizers (e.g. Baehr (2011)). It is also an obvious question how epistemic concepts that seem prima facie deontic (involve obligations, responsibility, praise and blame etc.) can be reconciled with the strong intuition that belief-fixation is not typically directly ‘up to us’ and voluntary. For responsibility requires control and control requires choice and the possibility of doing otherwise (cf. Alston 1988). Some like Chrisman (2008) have attempted to show that we can reconcile epistemic deontology with epistemic responsibility. Jason Baehr. (2011). The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Oxford, Oxford University Press. A thorough examination of responsibilist, character-based virtue epistemology and its proper place in epistemological inquiry. Baehr argues that although responsibilist virtue epistemology cannot aspire to replace more traditional epistemology, it can surely play a valuable role in epistemological inquiry. Gilbert Harman. (1999). ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, pp. 315-331. A classic statement of so-called situationism about character traits, namely, the idea that what drives our behavior is the current of the social situation and not character traits, as virtue theories and folk psychology tend to think. In fact, according to Harman, there is no positive empirical evidence in favor of character traits and there is much negative empirical evidence against them. Mark Alfano. (2012). ‘Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology’. Philosophical Quarterly 62(247), pp.223-249. Alfano transposes the situationist challenge from virtue ethics to responsibilist virtue epistemology. He appeals to abundant empirical work from cognitive and social psychology to rest his case. He indicates that intellectual virtues like curiosity, flexibility, creativity and courage are susceptible to the vagaries of non-intellectual factors of their situation like mood elevators, mood depressors, ambient sounds, ambient smells, and even the weather. William Alston. (1988). ‘The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justiifcation’. Philosophical Perspectives 2, pp. 257-299. The classic statement of the problem of doxastic (in)voluntarism for epistemic deontology. If deontology implies epistemic oughts and we can’t really choose what to believe then this implies that deontology is a mistaken theory because of the so-called ‘rational ought implies can’ principle. If we can’t satisfy a requirement, then we are under no rational obligation to do so. Matthew Chrisman. (2008). ‘Ought to Believe’. Journal of Philosophy, vol.105, no.7, pp. 346-370. Chrisman argues that doxastic involuntarism and epistemic deontology can be reconciled. He appeals to Wilfrid Sellars’ distinction between ‘rules of criticism’ and ‘rules of action’ and explains how doxastic oughts might be subject to rules of criticism that require no direct voluntary control but, nevertheless, do not compromise the categoricity of doxastic oughts (and responsibility). A novel, reconciliatory approach to the conflict of doxastic involuntarism with epistemic deontology. 18