- University of Edinburgh, Philosophy, Alumnusadd
- I work primarily in epistemology, metaethics and their intersection (and sometimes also like to look into the history... moreI work primarily in epistemology, metaethics and their intersection (and sometimes also like to look into the history of ethics and epistemology). I did my graduate work in Edinburgh (PhD 2010) and I am now an assistant professor at the University of Cyprus, where I originally come from. I have been a Humboldt fellow at Humboldt University, Berlin (2021-2022).
I am interested in a bunch of different things, such as the semantics of knowledge attributions, epistemic rationality and reasons, moral rationality and reasons, evolutionary debunking arguments, rational intuitionism, conceptual competence, companions-in-guilt arguments, expressivism, virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, logical monism/pluralism and other related matters.
I have prepared with Robin McKenna an edited volume on metaepistemology (2018, Palgrave), an edited volume on skeptical invariantism with Kevin Wallbridge (2021, Routledge) and wrote an introduction to ethics ( forthcoming; in Greek, and with a metaethical bent). I also organize the annual Cyprus Metaethics Workshop.
Nonacademic interests include football, swimming, gardening and hiking. I enjoy reading Russian literature (Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky) and occasionally thinking about ancient military strategy (Alexander, Pyrrho, Hannibal, Scipio, Caesar). I am fascinated by how strategic/tactical mind can subdue brutal force (and sheer numbers).
You can find my Homepage here: https://ucyweb.ucy.ac.cy/dir/el/component/comprofiler/userprofile/kchris
and contact me at ckiriakou@gmail.com or kchris@ucy.ac.cyedit
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As I argue, roughly, AI systems solve problems based on mechanically computational, means-end reasoning. Call this mechanical instrumental rationality. Human intelligence (HI), however, to the extent that is rational, it is not... more
As I argue, roughly, AI systems solve problems based on mechanically computational, means-end reasoning. Call this mechanical instrumental rationality. Human intelligence (HI), however, to the extent that is rational, it is not mechanically computable, namely, it is not reducible to mechanical computations for at least four basic reasons I expound.
First, HI, to the extent that is rational, it is not just mechanical instrumental rationality, it is categorically normative: we don’t just find ourselves with contingent ends, we can choose stance-independent ends on the basis of categorical reasons (or at least we should). Even if HI is not categorically normative, as some philosophers contend, it is embodied, Humean instrumental rationality. Second, AI lacks autonomous reasons-responsiveness, which is a constitutive condition of rational HI. Third, rational HI necessarily involves indispensable affective experience, and we currently have no clue how to build AI systems with subjective, phenomenal life. Fourth, rational HI is not codifiable and computable in absolute moral principles. It relies on virtue-based, moral intuition (and practical wisdom) to discern what is morally right/wrong in a context. I conclude that current AI systems lack the basic cognitive prerequisites for being (virtuous) moral agents in any robust sense and, therefore, they require constant normative guidance and surveillance by virtuous HI.
First, HI, to the extent that is rational, it is not just mechanical instrumental rationality, it is categorically normative: we don’t just find ourselves with contingent ends, we can choose stance-independent ends on the basis of categorical reasons (or at least we should). Even if HI is not categorically normative, as some philosophers contend, it is embodied, Humean instrumental rationality. Second, AI lacks autonomous reasons-responsiveness, which is a constitutive condition of rational HI. Third, rational HI necessarily involves indispensable affective experience, and we currently have no clue how to build AI systems with subjective, phenomenal life. Fourth, rational HI is not codifiable and computable in absolute moral principles. It relies on virtue-based, moral intuition (and practical wisdom) to discern what is morally right/wrong in a context. I conclude that current AI systems lack the basic cognitive prerequisites for being (virtuous) moral agents in any robust sense and, therefore, they require constant normative guidance and surveillance by virtuous HI.
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Pinillos (2023) provides a cognitive psychological explanation of our skeptical inclinations and utilizes this explanation for a rational explanation of various epistemic phenomena, such as skepticism in its various manifestations,... more
Pinillos (2023) provides a cognitive psychological explanation of our skeptical inclinations and utilizes this explanation for a rational explanation of various epistemic phenomena, such as skepticism in its various manifestations, obsessive compulsive disorder, conspiracy theories, relevant alternatives and more. In this paper, I raise concerns about his putatively rational, debunking explanation of radical skepticism. I conclude with some methodological worries about the dialectical transition from a cognitive explanation to a rational explanation.
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I argue that, monarchies, in any possible form (absolute or constitutional), should be abolished once and for all. This is because of the deeply immoral presuppositions such a system of government upholds (implicitly or explicitly). Call... more
I argue that, monarchies, in any possible form (absolute or constitutional), should be abolished once and for all. This is because of the deeply immoral presuppositions such a system of government upholds (implicitly or explicitly). Call this 'the moral argument against monarchy'. I identify three basic moral principles that monarchy by definition breaches: 'the basic moral equality principle', 'the basic dignity principle' and 'the basic moral desert principle'. Finally, I examine and reply to three objections, including the common objection that constitutional monarchy should not be abolished because it is pragmatically useful.
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I develop one partial explanation of the origins of our fallibilist intuitions about knowledge in ordinary language fallibillism and argue that this explanation indicates that our epistemic methodology should be more impartial and... more
I develop one partial explanation of the origins of our fallibilist intuitions about knowledge in ordinary language fallibillism and argue that this explanation indicates that our epistemic methodology should be more impartial and theory-neutral. First, I explain why the so-called Moorean constraint (cf. Hawthorne 2005:111) that encapsulates fallibilist intuitions is fallibilism's cornerstone. Second, I describe a pattern of fallibilist reasoning in light of the influential dual processing and heuristics and biases approach to cognition (cf. Kahneman 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Evans 2017). I suggest that this pattern of reasoning involves the question substitution heuristic, the availability and representativeness heuristics, the focusing bias as well as framing effects, priming and the anchoring and adjusting heuristic. Third, I argue that this fallibilist pattern of reasoning is methodologically dubious because it involves a vicious circularity and briefly outline an alternative, more impartial and theory-neutral abductive methodology for the theory of knowledge. Finally, I briefly explain how this analysis sheds light on the ordinary language fallibilism of Moore (1939), Austin (1961), Wittgenstein (1969) and Chisholm (1982).
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We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinformation helps foster collective... more
We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinformation helps foster collective irrationalities (e.g. Covid-19 underestimation and vaccination hesitancy), with detrimental effect for society. Such probability mistakes betray that at least some of us often do not grasp necessary conditions on the concept of probability, what we call probability fixed points. Our case study that illustrates this phenomenon in action is the recent Covid-19 pandemic. We present paradigmatic examples of probability mistakes during the Covid-19 pandemic and explain how such mistakes are especially prone to help create digital epistemic bubbles and echo chambers (cf. Nguyen (2020)) that foster collective irrationalities, such as Covid-19 underestimation and skepticism and vaccination hesitancy. We demur from making any exact empirical assertion about the extent various probability fixed points are missed. Further empirical work is required for such an assertion.
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Ingram (2015) has argued that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau's (2014) 'moral fixed points' theory entails that error theorists are conceptually deficient with moral concepts. They are conceptually deficient with moral concepts because they do... more
Ingram (2015) has argued that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau's (2014) 'moral fixed points' theory entails that error theorists are conceptually deficient with moral concepts. They are conceptually deficient with moral concepts because they do not grasp moral fixed points (e.g. 'Torture for fun is pro tanto wrong'). Ingram (2015) concluded that moral fixed points theory cannot substantiate the conceptual deficiency charge and, therefore, the theory is defeated. In defense of moral fixed points theory, Kyriacou (2017a) argued that the theory is coherent with the error theorists being conceptually competent with moral concepts, while reflectively denying moral fixed points theory. This is because error theorists could be conceptually competent with moral concepts but, due to intellectual vices, be swayed by unsound arguments against moral fixed points theory. Ingram (2018) replied to Kyriacou (2017a) that the intellectual vice charge against error theorists cannot be substantiated and, therefore, the moral fixed points theory is still defeated. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of intellectual vice is independently plausible and sufficient to undermine Ingram's argument against the moral fixed points theory.
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I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g. that they have hands, or that... more
I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g. that they have hands, or that killing for fun is morally wrong). Call this 'the demarcation problem'. In response to the demarcation problem, I develop a novel way to demarcate between mentally disordered persons and radical skeptics in an extensionally adequate way that saves the appearance that radical skeptics are not mentally disordered persons (at least not typically). First, I argue for a simple reflection and argument demarcation criterion that is grounded in the different mode of production and cognitive processing of ordinary Moorean propositions by radical skeptics and mentally disordered persons. In response to an objection from extensional inadequacy, I then tweak the demarcation criterion to be reflection and rational argument and briefly reply to objections. As it turns out, even this criterion is not as clear-cut and neat as one would hope for because the social categories of philosophers and the mentally disordered can, in principle, overlap. Finally, I examine how a Moorean, non-skeptical epistemologist would compare radical skeptics with the mentally disordered in terms of what Plantinga (2000) calls internal and external rationality. Perhaps surprisingly, by Moorean lights, the mentally disordered fare better than the radical skeptic in terms of (internal) rationality. The upshot is that for Mooreans skeptical philosophy is more of an epistemic evil than mental disorder.
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Monarchy is a form of government that, roughly, dictates that the right to rule is inherited by birth to a single ruler. But monarchy (absolute or constitutional) breaches fundamental moral principles that undergird representative... more
Monarchy is a form of government that, roughly, dictates that the right to rule is inherited by birth to a single ruler. But monarchy (absolute or constitutional) breaches fundamental moral principles that undergird representative democracy, such as basic moral equality, dignity and desert. Simply put, the monarchs (and their family) are treated as morally superior to ordinary citizens and as a result ordinary citizens are treated in an unfair and undignified manner. For example, monarchs are respected, enjoy dignity, income, opportunity, public office and exalted social status just because of their inherited office, which is due to the mere historical accident of family lineage. Hence, we have good moral reason to abolish monarchy. Finally, I briefly reply to the pragmatic argument for constitutional monarchy, namely, the argument that monarchy can be allowed to play a largely ceremonial role in the context of democracy because it is beneficial for the function of society. As I argue, societies run by presidential democracies can function equally well and, what is more, no matter what the pragmatic reasons for constitutional monarchy are, we still have stronger moral reasons against it. Therefore, it should be abolished.
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Jarrett (2014) and Zuk (2015) have argued on independent grounds that Spinoza’s Ethics delineates a moral antirealist/constructivist position. I reconstruct their basic arguments, present the textual evidence they rely on and suggest that... more
Jarrett (2014) and Zuk (2015) have argued on independent grounds that Spinoza’s Ethics delineates a moral antirealist/constructivist position. I reconstruct their basic arguments, present the textual evidence they rely on and suggest that the evidence they rely on is, in principle, compatible with moral realism. As I argue, Jarrett (2014) and Zuk (2015) have opted for an antirealist/constructivist interpretation of the adduced textual evidence because they tacitly rely on a mistaken metaethical assumption, namely, that relational normativity entails moral antirealism/constructivism. I explain why this is not the case by reference to Aristotle’s virtue ethics as well as by reference to various contemporary metaethical positions that conjoin relational normativity and moral realism. I conclude that the textual evidence Jarrett (2014) and Zuk (2015) rely on does not suffice to render Spinoza’s Ethics unequivocally morally antirealist/constructivist and that the morally realist interpretation remains defensible.
Research Interests: Metaethics and Spinoza
I argue by means of -what I coin- conceptual excavation that debunking arguments tacitly rely on certain basic norms of epistemic rationality that are prima facie theoretically indispensable for any rational argument. I explain what I... more
I argue by means of -what I coin- conceptual excavation that debunking arguments tacitly rely on certain basic norms of epistemic rationality that are prima facie theoretically indispensable for any rational argument. I explain what I mean by theoretical indispensability and argue that theoretical indispensability makes for a stronger indispensability argument than both the Quine-Putnam scientific indispensability argument for mathematical entities and Enoch’s (2011) practical indispensability argument for moral facts.
I then briefly argue that basic epistemic rationality norms are irreducible to descriptive-natural norms (social, biological and psychological) in virtue of an epistemic version of Hume’s law. I conclude that debunking arguments go too far when they imply (or even explicitly deny) that we have good reason to debunk basic epistemic rationality norms.
I then briefly argue that basic epistemic rationality norms are irreducible to descriptive-natural norms (social, biological and psychological) in virtue of an epistemic version of Hume’s law. I conclude that debunking arguments go too far when they imply (or even explicitly deny) that we have good reason to debunk basic epistemic rationality norms.
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I argue that one form of deism, what I shall call 'moderate non-teleological deism', seems prima facie incoherent (at least on the assumption of the intuitive Anselmian conception of God). I offer two arguments in support of the prima... more
I argue that one form of deism, what I shall call 'moderate non-teleological deism', seems prima facie incoherent (at least on the assumption of the intuitive Anselmian conception of God). I offer two arguments in support of the prima facie incoherence view: the moral irresponsibility argument and the practical irrationality argument. On the one
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I sketch and briefly motivate a refined version of skeptical invariantism about knowledge, namely, moderate pragmatic skepticism, and argue that, were it to be true, it would explain attributions of basic intellectual virtue(s)/ vice(s).... more
I sketch and briefly motivate a refined version of skeptical invariantism about knowledge, namely, moderate pragmatic skepticism, and argue that, were it to be true, it would explain attributions of basic intellectual virtue(s)/ vice(s). To support the assertion, I present four intuitive cases (loosely inspired from history of science, classic literature and everyday life) where basic intellectual virtue (s)/vice(s) would be standardly attributed and argue that moderate pragmatic skepticism can adequately explain the attribution. I then examine how the contender of Moorean invariantism fares with regard to the presented cases and argue that it runs into difficulties that reveal three inherent epistemological problems with the modal condition of safety: 'the problem of elusive safety', 'the meta-relevance problem' and 'the problem of the circularity of safety knowledge'. Finally, I very briefly reply to three objections and conclude that moderate pragmatic skepticism could, in principle, account for an important facet of epistemic discourse, namely, attributions of basic intellectual virtue (s)/vice(s).
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Richard Rowland's book fills an important lacuna in the literature concerning value theory. It offers the first comprehensive exposition, development and defense of a buckpassing account of value (BPA), which is a prominent theory of... more
Richard Rowland's book fills an important lacuna in the literature concerning value theory. It offers the first comprehensive exposition, development and defense of a buckpassing account of value (BPA), which is a prominent theory of value in recent debates. BPA is, roughly, the account of value that suggests that something is good (or valuable) if there are reasons for us to have pro-attitudes (e.g. approval, admiration) towards that thing. The buck about what is valuable is passed to what reasons for proattitudes we have towards the thing, institution, event, act etc. For example, if giving for charity is good, this is because we have (good) reasons to approve, desire and respect such acts (because they bear properties such as the alleviation of suffering, for instance). Accordingly, Rowland argues at length that a certain fundamental normative property, namely, the property of normative reason can help us adequately analyze and explain the evaluative (e.g. 'good'), the deontic (e.g. 'ought'), 'thin' moral properties (e.g. 'right'), other normative properties (e.g. 'fittingness'), and offer us an attractive account of morality and practical normativity. Hence, we should accept a buckpassing\'reasons-first' approach to value theory.
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An argument often leveled against skeptical invariantism (SI) is -what we may call- ‘the argument from semantic awareness’ (cf. Hawthorne (2004:104), MacFarlane (2005:206, 2014:179), Blome-Tillman (2013:4298-4305), Dinges... more
An argument often leveled against skeptical invariantism (SI) is -what we may call- ‘the argument from semantic awareness’ (cf. Hawthorne (2004:104), MacFarlane (2005:206, 2014:179), Blome-Tillman (2013:4298-4305), Dinges (2015:2588-2592). Roughly, the argument suggests that ordinary agents are not aware of the meaning of ‘know’ that SI proposes. Given that the semantic intuitions of ordinary agents are generally reliable, this implies that SI is implausible as a theory of ‘know’. Therefore, SI should be rejected.
In this paper, I focus on the stronger extant formulation of the argument (by Dinges (2015)) and explore how SI could, in principle, be rendered coherent with the argument (even if SI is not to be considered overall plausible). To this effect, I suggest an overlooked semantically externalist model of meaning and semantic awareness of ‘know’ (in the spirit of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979) and Kripke (1981)) that renders SI coherent with ‘the argument from semantic awareness’. The goal of the paper is modest. It is not to defend, let alone vindicate SI, but to indicate that SI is coherent with ‘the argument from semantic awareness’ in light of an externalist account of meaning and semantic awareness. I demur about the matter of the overall plausibility of SI.
In this paper, I focus on the stronger extant formulation of the argument (by Dinges (2015)) and explore how SI could, in principle, be rendered coherent with the argument (even if SI is not to be considered overall plausible). To this effect, I suggest an overlooked semantically externalist model of meaning and semantic awareness of ‘know’ (in the spirit of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979) and Kripke (1981)) that renders SI coherent with ‘the argument from semantic awareness’. The goal of the paper is modest. It is not to defend, let alone vindicate SI, but to indicate that SI is coherent with ‘the argument from semantic awareness’ in light of an externalist account of meaning and semantic awareness. I demur about the matter of the overall plausibility of SI.
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Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) have argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. If the moral proposition ‘torturing kids for fun is pro tanto wrong’... more
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) have argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. If the moral proposition ‘torturing kids for fun is pro tanto wrong’ is such a conceptual truth, it is because the essence of ‘wrong’ necessarily satisfies and applies to the substantive content of ‘torturing kids for fun’. In critique, Killoren (2016) has revisited the old skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question and argued that the moral fixed points give us no reason to care about morality (and the right thing to do) and, therefore, they are normatively irrelevant. He concluded that this is a counterintuitive implication that undermines the proposal.
In this paper, I develop a rejoinder to Killoren’s (2016) argument that explains why, at least from the perspective of the moral fixed points framework, if the moral fixed points exist, they are necessarily normatively relevant for rational agents. I supplement this explanation with an explanation of why it might prima facie appear that moral fixed points are not normatively relevant, although ultima facie they are relevant. The supplementary explanation explains prima facie normative irrelevance as the upshot of failures of rational agency (of various aetiologies). I conclude that the moral fixed points, can, in principle, offer an interesting response to the skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question’.
In this paper, I develop a rejoinder to Killoren’s (2016) argument that explains why, at least from the perspective of the moral fixed points framework, if the moral fixed points exist, they are necessarily normatively relevant for rational agents. I supplement this explanation with an explanation of why it might prima facie appear that moral fixed points are not normatively relevant, although ultima facie they are relevant. The supplementary explanation explains prima facie normative irrelevance as the upshot of failures of rational agency (of various aetiologies). I conclude that the moral fixed points, can, in principle, offer an interesting response to the skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question’.
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Recent literature has paid considerable attention to evolutionary debunking arguments. But the cogency of evolutionary debunking arguments is compromised by a problem for such arguments that has been somewhat overlooked, namely, what we... more
Recent literature has paid considerable attention to evolutionary debunking arguments. But the cogency of evolutionary debunking arguments is compromised by a problem for such arguments that has been somewhat overlooked, namely, what we may call ‘the demarcation problem’. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. In this paper I present and explain why in the absence of such a regulative norm any appeal to evolutionary considerations (in order to justify or debunk a belief) is bound to be ad hoc and question-begging.
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Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive in content, what they called 'moral fixed points'. I argue that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have... more
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive in content, what they called 'moral fixed points'. I argue that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points (e.g. the factivity condition). To this effect, I show that the two basic reasons Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) offer in support of moral fixed points naturally carry over to epistemic fixed points. In particular, epistemic fixed points exhibit the four 'marks' of conceptual truths that they identify and can be utilized to address important challenges to epistemic realism. I conclude that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points.
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Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief... more
Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. I examine the so-called ‘Milvian Bridge principle’ (cf. Griffiths and Wilkins (2012, 2015)), which offers exactly such a called for regulative metaepistemic norm.
The Milvian Bridge principle suggests that the metaepistemic norm is: adaptive reliability for truth of cognitive processes that the existence of corresponding truth-making facts evolutionary theory justifies. I argue that the Milvian Bridge principle is problematic on a number of counts, something that is shown via spiraling ‘companions in guilt arguments’. Finally, I consider ‘the core reductionist objection’ to the critique of the Milvian Bridge principle and offer a brief response. I conclude that the Milvian Bridge principle is destabilized.
The Milvian Bridge principle suggests that the metaepistemic norm is: adaptive reliability for truth of cognitive processes that the existence of corresponding truth-making facts evolutionary theory justifies. I argue that the Milvian Bridge principle is problematic on a number of counts, something that is shown via spiraling ‘companions in guilt arguments’. Finally, I consider ‘the core reductionist objection’ to the critique of the Milvian Bridge principle and offer a brief response. I conclude that the Milvian Bridge principle is destabilized.
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Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on-what Carter and Chrisman (2012:323) call-'the core expressivist maneuver'. That is, that instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value that we... more
Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on-what Carter and Chrisman (2012:323) call-'the core expressivist maneuver'. That is, that instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value that we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work from cognitive psychology can shed light on how the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: (a) raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and (b) supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism over-generalizes and, therefore, should be rejected.
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Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. According to their broadly essentialist theory of concepts, the moral... more
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. According to their broadly essentialist theory of concepts, the moral fixed points are conceptual truths in virtue of the semantic relation of satisfaction necessarily obtaining among the essences of the involved constituent concepts. If the moral proposition ‘torturing kids for fun is pro tanto wrong’ is such a conceptual truth, it is because the essence of ‘wrong’ necessarily satisfies and applies to the substantive content of ‘torturing kids for fun’. If some fail to acknowledge this much, they are somehow conceptually deficient with ‘wrong’.
However, Ingram (2015) argued that the moral fixed points proposal fails because error theorists are evidently not conceptually deficient. Their philosophical methodology is standard philosophical methodology where arguments (for and against) are evaluated for a position and they do have sophisticated arguments of some plausibility in support of error theory. In this paper, I offer the rudiments of a virtue-theoretic account of moral conceptual deficiency that could rescue the moral fixed points proposal and bolster the charge of (meta-)conceptual deficiency for error theorists.
However, Ingram (2015) argued that the moral fixed points proposal fails because error theorists are evidently not conceptually deficient. Their philosophical methodology is standard philosophical methodology where arguments (for and against) are evaluated for a position and they do have sophisticated arguments of some plausibility in support of error theory. In this paper, I offer the rudiments of a virtue-theoretic account of moral conceptual deficiency that could rescue the moral fixed points proposal and bolster the charge of (meta-)conceptual deficiency for error theorists.
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I argue that, at least on the assumption that if there are epistemic facts they are irreducible, the evolutionary debunking maneuver is prima facie self-debunking because it seems to debunk a certain class of facts, namely, epistemic... more
I argue that, at least on the assumption that if there are epistemic facts they are irreducible, the evolutionary debunking maneuver is prima facie self-debunking because it seems to debunk a certain class of facts, namely, epistemic facts that prima facie it needs to rely on in order to launch its debunking arguments. I then appeal to two recent reconstructions of the evolutionary debunking maneuver (Kahane (2011), Griffiths and Wilkins (2015)) and find them wanting. Along the way I set aside two ways (one envisaged, the other by Sterpetti (2015)) to avoid the self-debunking problem that I find unpromising. I conclude that the evolutionary debunking maneuver needs to clarify the meta-epistemological commitments upon which it is supposed to operate.
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I sketch an interpretation of Tolstoy's implicit moral theory on the basis of his masterpieces War and Peace and Anna Karenina. I suggest that Tolstoy is a theistic moral realist who believes that God's will identifies the... more
I sketch an interpretation of Tolstoy's implicit moral theory on the basis of his masterpieces War and Peace and Anna Karenina. I suggest that Tolstoy is a theistic moral realist who believes that God's will identifies the mind-independent truths of morality. He also thinks that, roughly, it suffices to heed natural moral emotions (like love and compassion) to know the right thing to do, that is, God's will. In appraisal of Tolstoy's interesting and original theory that I dub 'theistic populist sentimentalism', I argue that it prima facie runs into a string of fallacies and undertakes dubious assumptions that render it open to question.
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I present an argument for a sophisticated version of skeptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Skeptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the... more
I present an argument for a sophisticated version of skeptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Skeptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of 'saving epistemic appearances'. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can achieve this much because it distinguishes between two distinct but closely interrelated (sub)concepts of (propositional) knowledge, fallible-but-safe knowledge and infallible-and-sensitive knowledge, and explains how the pragmatics and the semantics of knowledge discourse operate at the interface of these two (sub)concepts of knowledge. I conclude that BSI is a novel theory of knowledge discourse that merits serious investigation.