MICHELE MANGINI

Reasonableness is a complex notion recently developed by legal and political theorists. John Rawls’s famous proposal of ‘reasonableness as reciprocity’ requires careful testing in the light of several criteria arising from legal doctrine and adjudication. I enquire into this variety of concepts in search of a common thread that makes sense of the use of the same concept in diverse contexts. I assume the normative thrust of reasonableness as an institutional and an individual virtue the basic core of which derives from Aristotelian phronesis. However, this double aspect of reasonableness betrays its major complexity that I try to shape through the help of two categories: subjective agency and objective context. The upshot of my enquiry will be that of showing that we can use another model, alternative to Rawls’s and better able to make sense of the variety of legal and ethical uses: Von Wright’s reasonableness as ‘the right way of living’.

Introduction Recent case-law of European and member states highest courts has often been focussed on problems deriving from the encounter/conflict of cultures. The massive immigration from underdeveloped countries toward more affluent European countries generates problems of cultural, socioeconomic and political kind. On the background I would locate a growing general fear of radical Islamic groups and terrorist attacks [1]. The institutional response to attacks that want to destabilize the foundations of liberal democratic societies has been so far mainly on the level of criminal legislation. I believe that a correct understanding of and the possible solution to the harsh threat to the values and principles of liberal democracy requires an analysis of the two main terms of the challenge: the Islamic culture and what we generally refer to as “Western values”. Of course these two fields cannot be enquired at large without employing at least the space of a book. Much more modestly in ...

The debate between liberals and communitarians has still left liberalism without a plausible ethics. The ethics of character wants to offer a solid connection between political theory and personal identity, stressing the ethical role of the invariables of character against modern subjectivist competitors, such as authenticity. At a political level the ethics of character leads us beyond resourcist conceptions of justice.

El Derecho natural en el mundo de las nuevas tecnologias ha sufrido una cierta conmocion como de todos es sabido y podemos constatar dia a dia en nuestro operativo cientifico cotidiano. La aparicion de internet hace que tengan que definirse de nuevo las categorias eticas, legales y morales, aunque sea solo matizando lo que siempre han sido. La relacion entre Etica y Derecho tambien presenta facetas nuevas. Villey no sabemos de que forma habria reaccionado ante internet, lo que si esta claro es que hay un referente que no se puede modificar y este es el de la «obligacion de respetar la grandeza de la persona humana y su libertad moral». La idea de bien comun resulta igualmente paradigmatica en el planteamiento de la filosofia de Michel Villey, quien la toma de Santo Tomas de Aquino. En una segunda parte del trabajo se abordan las tesis tomistas sobre el Derecho e internet. Continua el articulo explicando los argumentos liberales en favor de la libertad en internet y, por otro lado, l...

In the contemporary legal and political debate a large space is taken by the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as a multifaceted notion. Its plasticity makes it very adaptable to the variety of problems that is called on to solve. Its philosophical underpinnings are located in the tradition of Western thought. On the one hand, we have the modern tradition, including the Kantian and the Humean views and, on the other, the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition, proposing a different and competing conception of reasonableness. Insofar as the latter tradition proposes an idea relying on perfectionist considerations, I want to inquire into the Islamic tradition of reason and rationality in order to find whether it is closer to the first or to the second model. Concepts such as ‘ijitihad’, ‘maqasid’ and ‘maslaha’, I shall argue, find their better explanation if interpreted along the Aristotelian perfectionist tradition rather than along its competitor. If this move is well-founded, some important co...

Papers invoking a revival of the virtues are by now quite common. What seems completely missing, however, is a perspective which puts virtue ethics in context with other important theories which bring conceptions of the good back to the ethical (and political) discussion, such as natural law theory and perfectionism. In this paper I argue for a common core that runs through virtue ethics, (a certain) liberal perfectionism and natural law theory: the claim is that we can find much more similarity and shared ethical views than what is usually assumed between liberalism and natural law theory, if we go beyond ‘rights talk’ and focus on the virtues. Against this claim we hypothesize and discuss two general problems: (1) what virtue ethics should we consider in the large variety on offer? (2) why not taking seriously also theories, such as objective list theories and new natural law theory, which also propose alternative conceptions of the good? Our conclusions are inclined to favour an inclusive (perfectionist) view of human flourishing as excellences of character (or virtues) which may sound acceptable for liberal and natural law theorists.

CONTENTS

1. Virtue Ethics and Its Legacy.
2. Liberal ‘Rights Talk’.
3. Different Brands of Perfectionism.
4. Objective List Theories.
4.1 Sher’s Argument for Objective List Theory.
5. Traces of a Different Perfectionism.
5.1 Agency Goods Perfectionism.
5.2 The Place of Virtues in Agency Goods Perfectionism.
6. The Idea of Nature.
7. Virtues in Natural Law Theory.
7.1 New Natural Law Fundamental Goods.
8. Conclusions.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

First degree in Law at the University of Bari, Master degree of Law at New York University, Ph.d. in Political Philosophy at Sussex University (thesis on liberal perfectionism). Visiting scholar at Oxford and Harvard University. Working on liberal theories of justice, virtue ethics and perfectionism, with a recent bent toward natural law theory and its relationships with liberalism. Currently teaching 'Philosophy of Law' and 'Ethics and the Law' as associate professor at the University of Bari.