Archaeological Periods and their Purpose CHRISTOPHER PARE The epoch, period or Age is for any archaeologist one of the most basic tools of his trade, in fact so commonly used that it is often taken for granted. The following thoughts on the matter of periodization – the structuration of time – have been influenced mainly by recent discussions among historians and philosophers of history. In contrast to archaeology, the historical discipline has in recent years given more systematic attention to the questions discussed here.1 It is worth making a clear distinction between the terms ‘phase’ and ‘period’. In archaeological practice,there is a permanent endeavour to improve and refine chronological schemes by defining everfiner phases to describe changes in material culture. The methodology is well established, involving techniques such as horizontal stratigraphy and seriation using modern statistical software. The purpose of this work is to produce a sequence of phases to describe change in material culture, the phases then being used for the relative and absolute dating of archaeological finds and their contexts. There is no reason to think that these phases have any particular historical relevance: the transition from one phase to the next can be defined, for example, by changes in fashion, for example in fibula construction and style of pottery decoration. By contrast, archaeological periods are used to designate fundamental historical structuration; the transition from one period to the next is characterised by transformation in all aspects of life – not just change in fashion and ornamentation. So on the one hand, the archaeologist’s work is concerned with minutae such as post-holes or ceramic typology. But on the other hand, archaeologists attempt to understand historical change in vast geographical areas over hundreds, thousands or even hundreds of thousands of years. In the words of Charles Tilly, archaeology deals with “big structures, large processes, huge comparisons” (Tilly 1984). Periodization, since the birth of archaeology as an academic discipline, has always been fundamental for this endeavour. The constitution of history as memoria rerum gestarum (how the events were remembered), as opposed to res gestae (a chronicle of events), has always been appreciated by historians. To write history is to narrate history, whereby to be coherent the reader or listener must be provided with a clear structure. In novels, for example, a new theme or sub-plot can be indicated by a new chapter, in academic articles headings and sub-headings signal to the reader that a new subject or a new argument is being introduced. Whether or not this kind of structure is necessary to narrate a good story,or to explain a complex argument, in historical writing the structuration of time is so ubiquitous that the important – possibly essential – role of periodization is sufficiently clear. Not only in history and archaeology, but also in other disciplines and sub-disciplines, periodization is an unceasing preoccupation; consider for example the terms Palaeolithic, Dark Age, Orientalizing, Hellenistic, Medieval, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Fin-de-Siècle,“The Long Nineteenth LEHOËRFF (A.) dir. — Construire le temps. Histoire et méthodes des chronologies et calendriers des derniers millénaires avant notre ère en Europe occidentale. Actes du XXXe colloque international de Halma-Ipel, UMR 8164 (CNRS, Lille 3, MCC), 7-9 décembre 2006, Lille. Glux-en-Glenne : Bibracte, 2008, p. 69-84 (Bibracte ; 16). CHRISTOPHER PARE Century”, Fordism/Post-Fordism, Modern/PostModern, “The Age of Globalisation” etc. Even in journalism, it is surprising how often we read of epochs and epoch-making events. In the Ancient world the word epoch (epoch) was used to express a halt or interruption; in chronology, the term was used for a moment when time ‘stood still’, and could therefore be used as a point of reference to mark the start of a new way of reckoning time (e.g. the creation of the world, the start of Christain time-reckoning, the foundation of Rome; Riedel 1972). However, the term ‘epoch’ was not used in the modern sense as a span of historical time, because of the common belief that history repeats itself in recurring periods (from periodo~, cycle or regular recurrence). The modern usage of epoch began in the Enlightenment. At that time, the previously different meanings of the terms epoch, period and Age converged and coalesced to have the same modern meaning, familiar to us today. Despite this conventional usage, the term can be defined in a wide variety of ways. A period can be regarded merely as the span of time between two distinct events (e.g. natural disasters, invasions, revolutions, innovations), as a ‘structure’ with its own essential character (e.g. a system, a Weberian ‘ideal type’) or a combination of structure and process (e.g. Marxist modes of production). Niklas Luhman suggested the principle that, as a bare minimum, the narration of history as evolutionary process requires at least two pivotal events and three epochs (Luhmann 1985; 1987). With only two epochs and one event, only the event is given importance (‘before and after the event’). One further fundamental aspect of periodization requires emphasis. Along with their temporal function, the elements discussed above have a spatial relevance.Thus periods not only play a chronological role, but also always possess a geographical component: so, for example, Enlightenment in one part of the world may be contemporary with Darkness in the next geographical zone. The epochal relevance of an event should also be viewed in spatial terms: the huge impact of Christ, for example, would have been unlikely without the context of the Roman Empire, which provided the communication network necessary for the spread of his message. Without being able to pursue these questions, it is worth summarizing the components of the concept which we have encountered: these include not only the three elements event/structure/process, but also the aspect of space or geography. Furthermore, the relationship of temporal structuration to nar70 ration is close. It need hardly be stressed that the periods in use today, and even more so those used by earlier generations of thinkers,have been defined and understood in very different ways. Nevertheless, the function of periodization is clear: periods are constructed to render history coherent, to signalize meaning in history, and to emphasize important events, structures and processes. It is worth emphasizing the purpose of periodization as signalizing meaning in history, compared to the aim of finding the meaning of history (or History with a capital ‘H’). Today there is a general consensus in the recognition of the problematic nature of instilling the whole of human history with meaning. This conclusion has been reached by many authors, in more or less amusing ways. Max Weber spoke of “der ungeheuere chaotische Strom der Geschichte”and the“sinnlose Unendlichkeit des Weltgeschehens“ (Weber 1973, p. 214, 180). Similar sentiments have been expressed for example by Immanuel Kant, Bertrand Russell, Herbert Fisher and, more recently, Michael Oakeshott: Kant: “Since men in their endeavors behave, on the whole, not just instinctively, like the brutes, nor yet like rational citizens of the world according to some agreed-on plan, no history of man conceived according to a plan seems to be possible, as it might be possible to have such a history of bees or beavers. One cannot suppress a certain indignation when one sees men’s actions on the great world-stage and finds, beside the wisdom that appears here and there among individuals, everything in the large woven together from folly, childish vanity, even from childish malice and destructiveness. In the end, one does not know what to think of the human race, so conceited with its gifts.” (Kant 1963). Russell:“The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that the idea that the world is a unity is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, and without continuity, without coherence or orderliness,or any of the other properties governesses love.” (Russell 1931, p. 98). Fisher:“Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern.These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave.” (Fisher 1939, p. lX). Oakeshott: [the historical past] “... is a complicated world, without unity of feeling or clear outline: in it events have no over-all pattern or purpose, lead nowhere, point to no favoured condition of the world and support no practical conclusions. It is a world ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERIODS AND THEIR PURPOSE composed wholly of contingencies.” (Oakeshott 1983, p. 182). If these opinions are accepted, it is clear that today periodization should be aimed at explaining restricted processes in history, without requiring the adoption of a period-system for the whole of the human experience. But this has not always been the view of historians and philosphers of history, and in the following, methods of periodization in various styles of history-writing will be discussed.2 An explicit philosophy of history was absent among the Greeks and Romans. Historical thought was dominated by beliefs derived from nature and the cosmos, for example the concept of periodic or cyclical recurrence in the writings of the Pythagoreans and Stoics. Parmenides, by contrast, believed in eternal, unchanging being, just as Plato (and neo-Platonists such as Proklos) emphasized the importance of eternal, unchanging ideas. In contrast to modern times, the idea of historical progress was underdeveloped, at best progress was something which had happened in the past, or it was only relevant to individual areas such as technology or knowledge. Even the modern-sounding idea of a succession of hunter-gatherers, pastoralists and farmers, proposed by Dicaearchus of Messena in the 4th century BC, expressed a pessimistic rather than a progressive world-view. Similarly, a Near Eastern idea relating historical periods to metals (gold, silver, bronze, iron) was adopted by Hesiod (Works and Days, 106-201) to express a belief in the general decline of humanity through history, rather than being a model of technological progress. The Judaic comparison of the ages of man (aetates) with the Creation Week was adopted by St. Augustine to describe six periods of salvational history (represented by Adam, Noah, Abraham, David, the Babylonian captivity, and Christ), and could be paralleled with stages in human development (infantia, pueritia, adolescentia, iuventus, gravitas,senectus). 3 Further spiritual and salvational histories with roots in Judaism and Zoroastrianism resurfaced in the Middle Ages, for example the millenialism of Joachim of Fiore, involving Ages of the Father/Old Testament, the Son/New Testament and the Holy Ghost.4 Another kind of periodization is found not only in Judaic, but also in Greek, Roman and Christian teaching, in the idea of a succession of World Kingdoms (best known from the dream of Daniel: Dan. 2, 31-45). Depending on the author this could involve four or five Kingdoms: Babylon/Chaldaea/ Assyria, Medes/Persians, Greeks/Macedonians, and finally Rome. In the Bible, this took an apocalyptic turn, with the fourth Kingdom ending in the Final Judgement, followed by a fifth universal Kingdom ‘under the hand of God’. Later, particularly after the inauguration of Charles the Great, this transfer of power between successive World Kingdoms (‘translatio imperii’) was continued from the Roman to the Frankish and German Empires.This idea of continuity between the Classical world and Modern Europe corresponds with the renaissance of Antique teachings and traditions, and the concept of an intervening ‘Middle Age’. This periodization of history into Ancient, Medieval and Modern ages became fixed in textbooks since the 17th century.5 The Enlightenment introduced massive changes to historical thinking. Although the idea of progress had been becoming more popular since the 17th century, for example in view of the advances of modern natural science since Francis Bacon, the 18th century represented an outburst of optimism about the general trend of history. Alongside natural science, numerous authors (among many others: de Condorcet, Ferguson, Turgot, Voltaire) emphasized progress throughout history in reason, technology, freedom, rights, political systems, morals and arts. At the same time, speculative schemes were conceived to mark the main stages in human progress. Idealist versions proposed the succession from dogmatic to skeptical and finally critical thought (Kant), from sensual, to aesthetic and rational stages (Schiller), or from theological (periods of fetishism, polytheism and monotheism) to metaphysical and positivist thought (Turgot). Materialist or economic schemes included stages of hunting/savagery, pastoralism, farming/barbarism, and industry/commerce (Ferguson, Montesquieu, Turgot, Smith). A technological periodization into Stone, Copper/Bronze and Iron Ages6 was proposed by a number of Danish speculative historians starting with P. F. Suhm (1776). The most complex periodization was put forward by de Condorcet, with in all ten epochs from the first hunters and fishers down to the French Revolution. Typically, these epochs were conceived as universal stages of human development: all human groups would pass through the same sequence of development, but at different speeds. In this way, non-European peoples could reflect different stages of development in Old World or European history. In the first half of the 18th century the concept of ‘consensus’ was introduced by Vico and Montesquieu. This idea proposed that progress (or decline) did not take place autonomously in indi71 CHRISTOPHER PARE vidual aspects of life (religion, art, customs, law, politics, commerce, industry etc.), but rather in concert or ‘consensus’. This was the special meaning of the term ‘spirit of the time’ (esprit du temps, Zeitgeist), or ‘spirit of the nation’ as used by authors such as Montesquieu, Voltaire or Hegel.7 With this idea, the old tradition of ‘translatio imperii’ could be transformed into a Torch-Bearer model of history, meaning that historical progress (or History with a capital ‘H’) was the work of specific nations or peoples; after one nation’s contribution to human progress, the baton was passed to the next ‘historical nation’ in a sort of relay-race.8 Using this model, the course of history became canonised, starting in the Ancient Near East, and passing through Greek and Roman Antiquity, and finally ending up in European Modernity. This belief was shared by Johann Gottfried Herder, for example in the following quotation (Herder 1827-1830, p. 398) : “Nur ein kleiner Strich der Erde hat nach unserm Begriffe Kultur ... Der größte Theil der Völker sind sogenannte Wilde... So schlingt sich eine Kette der Uebergabe von Asien über Griechenland und Rom nach Europa hinüber – und das Uebrige ausser dieser Kette bleibt in Dämmerung.” The importance of Enlightenment philosophy of history, and its many speculative periodizations, can hardly be over-emphasized, and these ideas formed a rich fund of inspiration for subsequent conjectural philosophies and evolutionary schemes. In the early 19th century, the crucial influence of the Enlightenment, with its speculative philosophy and periodizations of history, continued in vogue, particularly in the traditions of Hegelian idealism and in positivism. Three diverging traditions were particularly important. HEGELIAN IDEALISM AND MARXIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM Once again, the principle of progress is at the core of Hegel’s philosophy of history, in this case slowly leading humanity towards greater freedom or, more precisely, towards greater ‘consciousness of the spirit of its freedom’. According to Hegel, the principle assumes form in concrete ideas, meaning the spirit of individual peoples (‘Völkergeister’). Reflecting the influence of Herder, Hegel argued that each of these peoples had an essence or ‘Zeitgeist’, which determined all fields of life, such as religion, art, customs, sociation, commerce and industry (Hegel 1917; 1923). In the words of Hegel: „Dem Volk, dem solches Moment als 72 natürliches Prinzip zukommt, ist die Vollstreckung desselben in dem Fortgange des sich entwickelnden Selbstbewußtseins desWeltgeistes übertragen.Dieses Volk ist in der Weltgeschichte, für diese Epoche... das Herrschende. Gegen dies sein absolutes Recht, Träger der gegenwärtigen Entwickelungsstufe des Weltgeistes zu sein, sind die Geister der anderen Völker rechtlos, und sie, wie die, deren Epoche vorbei ist, zählen nicht mehr in der Weltgeschichte“ (Hegel 1821, § 347)..In other words, the course of history is ‘unfolded’ (in an East-West direction) by particular world-historical peoples, who dominated four world-historical epochs: Oriental/Asiatic, Greek, Roman and Germanic/European (Hegel 1821, § 341-360). This is what I have termed the TorchBearer model of historical periodization, a style of history which has been particularly influential, and is still important today. In contrast to the idealist positions of Hegel or Kant, Marx clearly stated that for him, history is not “a person apart, using man to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims” (Marx 1975b, p. 110). But humans do not enjoy complete freedom in their actions, indeed the ways people relate to the physical world and to each other socially are bound together in specific and necessary conditions, which Marx analysed using the well known categories of forces and relations of production.The over-arching system of base (forces and relations) and superstructure itself is referred to as a mode of production. The correlation of the concepts of the mode of production and the epoch is a particularly interesting and original feature of Marxist thought, although we have already encountered rather similar ideas among Enlightenment thinkers, in particular Adam Ferguson (see above). In Marxist thought, time is divided into dominant modes of production, which condition or constrain the superstructures and ideologies of the cultures involved. Clearly rooted in Hegelian tradition, Marx identified the Asiatic, Antique, Feudal, and Capitalist or modern bourgeois modes or epochs (Marx 1993; 1994, p. 209-213). As mentioned above, each mode of production is characterised by certain basic relations and forces of production; Marx himself often emphasized the essential importance of the dominant method of extraction of economic surplus, which in turn conditions the praxis of distribution, circulation and consumption within a mode of production. For example: “It is always the direct relations of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers… which reveals the innermost secret, the ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERIODS AND THEIR PURPOSE hidden basis of the entire social structure” (Marx 1962, p. 772).But the mode of production described in this way is not static, there is always an element of ‘contradiction’, signifying the uneven development of means, forces and relations of production. In his writings, for example in volume 1 of Kapital, Marx sometimes assigns a dominant role in these contradictions to the relations of production, and sometimes to the productive forces. This inconsistancy has given rise to a long-running debate. Some authors, most emminently G. A. Cohen (Cohen 1978), have found support in Marx’s writings for the position that progress in the means and forces of production, such as technological innovation, had a primary role in historical and social development. For example: “Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.” (Marx 1975b, p. 166). But after a certain length of time the continued development of the forces of production becomes impossible: the dominant relations of production impede further progress; the relations of production turn into fetters, progress stagnates, leading to recession, collapse or crisis. Most authors, however, have argued strongly against such monocausal interpretations, and allow a prominent (dialectical) role both to aspects of the relations, such as class struggle, and to aspects of the forces of production, such as technological progress. This, in fact, is clearly the purpose of Marx, for example in the following passage, which is important despite its mixed metaphors: “…in all forms of society it is a determinate production and its relations which assign every other production and its relations their rank and influence. It is a general illumination in which all other colours are plunged and which modifies their specific tonalities. It is a special ether which defines the specific gravity of everything found in it” (Marx 1993, Introduction, part 3,“The method of political economy”). With his concept of mode of production, Marx was the first to attempt a systematic analysis of historical periodization. Understandably, his own historical interpretations are today often obselete; nevertheless subsequent generations have continued to develop his ideas, and some results will be mentioned below. Marx’s own periodization was heavily influenced by the Torch-Bearer models of Hegel and Herder. However, the ‘critical’ character of Marxist history, with its focus on contradiction and exploitation, has resulted in an independent tradition of thought which became extremely influential in the 20th century. POSITIVISM AND CULTURAL EVOLUTIONISM The influence and authority of the methods of the natural sciences increased greatly during the 19th century, leading among other things to the wide acceptance of the positivist epistemology expoused by Auguste Comte (Comte 1851-1894,vol.1-6).Comte himself,clearly continuing Enlightenment traditions, believed in universal historical progress, involving a scheme with three stages: a theological stage (with periods of fetishism, polytheism and monotheism), a metaphysical stage, and a scientific/industrial stage. In general, the positivist tradition emphasizes rationality and scientific and technical progress. The principle of technological progress, for example, became of crucial importance to archaeology after the empirical demonstration of the succession of Stone, Bronze and Iron Ages by the Dane Christian Jürgenssen Thomsen (1836). With the further distinction between the Palaeolithic and Neolithic by John Lubbock in 1865, the so-called Three Age System of economic and technical progress became the most importance scheme for classifying and dating in archaeology. In the second half of the century, the universalistpositivist tradition produced most influential results in the Historical Evolutionary School of ethnology, exemplified by the writings of Edward Burnett Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan. Both Tylor and Morgan believed in the parallel development of all cultures and peoples through a series of universal stages. This viewpoint presupposed that human nature is basically uniform in all historical periods and regions of the world. Both authors emphasized the primary importance of economic and technological progress, which was now expressed in terms of evolution. In the words of Tylor: “Human life may be roughly classed into three great stages, Savage, Barbaric, Civilized, which may be defined as follows. The lowest or savage state is that in which man subsists on wild plants and animals, neither tilling the soil nor domesticating creatures for his food… In making their rude implements, the materials used by savages are what they find ready to hand, such as wood, stone and bone, but they cannot extract metal from the ore, and therefore belong to the Stone Age. 73 CHRISTOPHER PARE Men may be considered to have risen into the next or barbaric state when they take to agriculture… Lastly, civilized life may be taken as beginning with the art of writing, which by recording history, law, knowledge, and religion for the service of ages to come, binds together the past and the future in an unbroken chain of intellectual and moral progress” (Tylor 1881). Morgan distinguished in all seven stages of cultural evolution, all except the last beginning with a technological innovation (Morgan 1877). 1. Lower Savagery 2. Middle Savagery: use of fire, fish subsistence etc. 3. Upper Savagery: bow and arrow 4. Lower Barbarism: pottery 5. Middle Barbarism: domestication of animals, mud-brick architecture, irrigation agriculture 6. Upper Barbarism: smelting iron 7. Civilization: phonetic alphabet The debt of both authors to Enlightenment thought is evident, in the model of economic and technical progress inherent in the progress from savagery to barbarism and civilization, already proposed in the theories of Ferguson, Montesquieu, Turgot and Smith. And the concept of culture, for example used by Tylor,9 was rooted in the ‘consensus’ model mentioned above. HISTORICISM The tradition of historicism developed alongside and in oposition to positivism and Marxism. Herder’s polemic against Enlightenment or rationalist philosophy of history, published in 1774, proved to be extremely influential for the further development of historical thought in Germany, and in particular for the foundation of the historicist paradigm.10 Herder criticized Enlightenment philosophers for projecting their own sets of values on the past. So, for example, he rejected the conception of unilinear development of human civilization, and indeed viewed any attempt to use abstract tools of analysis to understand individual national cultures as mechanistic and unhistorical. For Herder, human nature was not universal or constant: humankind can only be understood in its historical manifestations and diversity. Theoretically, this meant that all cultures, European and non-European, primitive and civilized, are equally worthy of study. The theoretical foundations of the historicist methodology were first formulated by Leopold von Ranke. He stressed the importance of a rigorous examination of the primary empirical evidence and 74 emphasized the historical character of all human existence: all human ideas and creations – meanings, values, language, institutions, culture – are historically conditioned and subject to change. The past is comprehended as unique and fundamentally different from the present.11 For Ranke, nations and states had the property of historical individuals, and he sought to understand his subjects as they understood themselves. No theory was necessary; what was needed was total immersion in the mental world of the agents of history, history could only be grasped through empathy. Historicism was understood to be a specifically German perspective, superior to that of the West, which was supposedly committed to (positivist or ‘scientist’) concepts of natural law and to analytical forms of social science. In contrast, historicists were concerned with thought and meanings, and favoured a form of epistemological idealism (see also: Collingwood 1946); to emphasize the autonomous character of historical research, history was described as a hermeneutic science. In the later 19th century, German thought on the nature of historical knowledge and the logic of historical enquiry was dominated by the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, and the neo-Kantianist schools of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. According to these thinkers, the ‘two cultures’ of human and natural science had distinct logical characters, each with a different methodology (idiographic and nomothetic; compare the German terms ‘verstehen’ and ‘erklären’).12 In the decades around the First World War, the recognition of the historicity of all human life and thought led to a radical skepticism regarding the possibility of objective historical knowledge and the meaning of the historical process (Troeltsch 1922). According to this line of reasoning, as all historical knowledge is relative to the standpoint of the historian, objective historical cognition is impossible. As Paul Ricœur put it: “If all is historical, how could truth itself not be so?” (Ricœur 2003, quote on p. x). The problem is known as the ‘Crisis of Historicism’ or ‘Krise der Kulturgeschichte’: the relativism inherent in this position caused a loss of faith in the value of Western historical traditions and modern Western culture. Martin Heidegger, for example, also came to the conclusion that “The grand narrative of unity, meaning, and totality in a reality conceived as history is now replaced by the awareness of fragmentation, crisis and rupture” (see: Iggers 1995, p. 142). Accordingly, grand schemes of speculative periodization are impossible. ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERIODS AND THEIR PURPOSE These three styles of thought which developed during the 19th century are crucial for the understanding of the human sciences in the 20th century (particularly history, sociology, ethnology and archaeology).The mounting influence of positivism, evolutionism and Marxism was vehemently resisted in Germany, not only in the historical sciences, but also in ethnology and archaeology. The German Franz Boas, the dominant figure in American ethnology in the first half of the 20th century, founded the influential anti-evolutionist school, variously termed ‘Historical Particularist’ or ‘Ethnological Historicist’, rooted in German neo-Kantianism and historicism (Boas 1896).His work was characterised by an inductive approach, and a general suspicion of explicit theory and methodology. The contrast to developments in Britain and France is radical. In these countries, the works of Émile Durkheim played a decisive role in sociology and ethnology; the British functionalism of Bronislaw Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown is an important example of Durkheim’s influence. It is obviously significant that Durkheim was influenced by the arch-enemies of the German historicists, the Leipzig circle around Wilhelm Wundt and Karl Lamprecht (for Lamprecht, see for example: Chickering 2001). In contrast to Britain and France, the role of universalist and evolutionist thought in the human sciences in Germany declined in the early 20th century. Ethnology came under the influence of the ‘Kulturkreislehre’, developed by Leo Frobenius and the Vienna School (Müller 1993). Analogous changes in archaeology are reflected in the eclipse of the empiricist-anthropological school headed by Rudolf Virchow,13 and the rise to dominance of Gustaf Kossinna and the paradigm of ethnic or nationalist prehistory (for Kossinna, see: Grünert 2002). Kossinna is famous for his definition of the archaeological culture, and particularly the identification of the archaeological culture with the ethnic group (Veit 2005). This formed the foundation for the Culture-History paradigm in German archaeology, which remained dominant for most of the rest of the century. In this school of thought, the culture represents the historical individual, or agent of history; the archaeological culture provided the basic unit to divide time and space. In view of its intellectual foundations, this form of periodization is clearly historicist. Gordon Childe’s debt to Kossinna is well known: Childe not only adopted Kossinna’s definition of the archaeological culture, but also practised a form of Culture-History. However, Childe was quick to distance himself from the chauvinist and racist tendencies in German archaeology, and instead developed a distinctly Marxist periodization, as the following two quotations indicate: “The archaeologist’s ages correspond roughly to economic stages. Each new ‘age’ is ushered in by an economic revolution of the same kind and having the same effect as the ‘Industrial Revolution’ of the eighteenth century” (Childe 1936, p. 39). “I have spent twenty years trying to give [economic and social] values ... to the traditional ‘Ages’ and to make these archaeological stages coincide with what sociologists and comparative ethnographers recognised as the main stages in cultural evolution” (Childe 1951, p. 22). For Childe, the Three Age System was not just a chronological framework for Culture-Historical classification, but rather a socio-economic model of the past based on techno-economic criteria, which described the evolution of society as a whole. He introduced the terms Neolithic and Urban revolution, each understood as inaugurating new modes of production, and also briefly argued for an Iron Age revolution, which would correspond to the transition from the Asiatic to the Ancient modes in Marxist terminology. After the Second World War,the West experienced a marked resurgence of empiricist and positivist thought in most fields of social and academic life. The fundamental principles were outlined in the Analytical Philosophy of, among others, Ernest Nagel and Carl G. Hempel; the principles, based on deduction and Covering Laws, were adapted to the human sciences by William Dray, Arthur Danto and Patrick Gardiner in the Analytical Philosophy of History. The effects of these developments were felt in German history, where historicism was branded a reactionary ideology. The 1960s saw the rise of the influential Bielefeld school of Historical Social Science, in which historians favoured a sociological or structural approach, particularly influenced by Marx, Weber and Durkheim. The French Annales school of history, with its concern with long-enduring historical structures, also gained in importance. Influenced by Annales, there was a broadening of historical research, no longer confined to nations, state institutions and ‘great men’, but now encompassing all aspects of human life, including the material and biological, and the integration of methods from other discplines, such as cultural anthropology, psychology, linguistics, economics and sociology. The rise of New or Processual Archaeology in America and Great 75 CHRISTOPHER PARE Britain is obviously another example of the postwar authority and influence of the natural sciences. Associated with the necessity to generate explicit theoretical models, required by a ‘nomothetic’ or deductive methodology,New Archaeology made use of theories derived from neighbouring disciplines, such as evolutionism, functionalism, structuralism, and structural Marxism. The post-war period also experienced pronounced changes in American ethnology, with the decline of Boas’ Ethnological Historicism and a turn to structural functionalism and evolutionism. For archaeology, the evolutionary sequences of increasing social integration developed by Elman Service (band, tribe, chiefdom, state: Service 1962; 1975) and Morton Fried (egalitarian, rank, stratified, state: Fried 1967) have been and still are widely used to provide a general periodization of prehistory. Whereas the American neo-evolutionists’ periodizations have a speculative character akin to earlier Enlightenment schemes, more recent work in evolutionary theory, derived from theoretical advances in biology, promise to have a more profound impact on future archaeological thought (see for example: Mayr 1988; also: Shennan 2002) (Trigger 1998). Starting in the 1970s, reaction to post-war positivism and structuralism became increasingly pronounced. Under the influence of continental (French) hermeneutic philosophy and literary theory, there was a devastating criticism of universalist narratives of Meta-History (see for example: White 1973; Mink et al. 1987). Instead, historicist concerns, and aspects of subjectivity and multiple interpretations were emphasized. Attention concentrated on the historian’s text, and the analysis of the narrative structure (in German, ‘erzählen’), instead of the earlier positivist emphasis on explanation (‘erklären’) or the hermeneutic approach of historicism (‘verstehen’). Jean-François Lyotard proclaimed the collapse of the ‘Grand Narrative’; in the post-modern world, periodization as a technique to signalize meaning in history is redundant (for a good introduction, see: Jenkins 1997). In parallel with the rise of ‘postmodern history’, it became increasingly apparent in ethnology that various classificatory categories often used in research, such as culture, race and language, do not necessarily overlap and coincide with dinstinct and clearly defined social or ethnic groups. Till then, the tribe, culture or society had been the basic element of research; it was now realised that reality is often much more complex. In particular, the concept of the ethnological culture came under 76 attack as being a creation of modern researchers or colonial administrators. Instead, focus shifted to the individual’s subjective ethnicity, which was found to be dynamic, and to vary according to situation (for example in mediating social relations and negotiating access to economic and political resources).14 As a corollary, it is clear that the culture concept has become just as problematical in archaeology: there is no reason to think that the archaeological culture necessarily corresponds to any other category, such as the social, racial, ethnic or linguistic group. If the findings of ethnology are not discounted,it becomes questionable to what extent ‘culture’ can be used as the basic unit of archaeological research. The paradigm of Culture-History as a means of temporal and spatial classification, and as a method of narrating history, has therefore become difficult to defend. By the 1920s and 1930s, the four main methods of historical periodization identified above were all being used in archaeology: 1. The Torch-Bearer model of increasing world power (‘translatio imperii’) 2. The Three Age System of technological progress 3. The Marxist theory of modes of production 4. Culture-History The essential importance of these theories for Central European archaeology is reflected by the idea that Prehistoric Archaeology as an academic subject in Central Europe was founded either by Christian Jürgenssen Thomsen (Eggert 2006, p. 39) or by Gustaf Kossinna (Smolla 1979/80, especially p. 8; Eggert 2006, p. 44 ff). This shows that the Three Age System and Culture-History were far more than just methods of classification, but acted as paradigms giving meaning to the historical process, and to the archaeologist’s work. The institutionalisation of archaeology in German universities, with the installation of professorships and departments for Near Eastern and Classical Archaeology,15 reflects the continuing relevance of the older version of historical periodization, with its concern for the roots of European culture in the Greek and Roman Mediterranean and the Ancient Near East. A single course of history running from the first civilisations of the Ancient Orient via Classical Greece and Rome and – following the Medieval interlude – to the bourgeois-industrial society of modern western Europe is the fundamental idea behind this institutional structure, comprising West European Modern History; West European Medieval History;16 Greek and Roman Ancient History and Classical Archaeology; Biblical and Near Eastern Archaeology. ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERIODS AND THEIR PURPOSE It is surely relevant that Prehistoric Archaeology is the only discipline without its own distinct regional specialisation: in principle, and in practice, prehistoric archaeologists can work anywhere in the world.This can be explained by the fact that outside the canonical course of History, the world is fundamentally ‘pre-Historic’ or ahistorical. It is for precisely this reason that the mechanisms of diffusion and migration have traditionally been so important for explaining change in prehistory. Lying outside the terrain of canonical History, prehistoric peoples are ahistorical or ‘static’: according to this view, change must always be generated by external contact. The combination of the methods of periodization described above resulted in a dominant academic discourse, the ‘Rise of the West’ (McNeill 1963). The continuity of the Western European with the Classical (Greek and Roman), Biblical and Near Eastern civilisations (Mesopotamia,to a lesser extent Egypt) had been an article of faith long before the Enlightenment. Underlying the principle of successive world kingdoms or empires is the aspect of power: each epoch has a dominant world civilisation, in Modernity of course Western Europe. It is easy to understand how this Torch-Bearer conception of historical periodization could be combined with the principle of technological progress to form a unified, dominant discourse. The deep problems inherent in this world-view are easy to demonstrate, for example by discussing two recent exponents of the ideology. The first example is provided by Michael Mann, one of the most famous practitioners of macrosociology. In Mann’s account, society is defined as multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power (Mann 1986, p. 1). Despite his multi-causal, Weberian theoretical background, he arrives at an extreme view, with World History defined by the leading edge of power.17 “The most appropriate history is that of the most powerful human society ... [Mann’s account] centers on the ancient Near East, then gradually moves west and north through Anatolia, Asia Minor, and the Levant to the eastern Mediterranean.Then it moves into Europe, ending in the eighteenth century in Europe’s westernmost state, Great Britain” (ibid. p. 31). According to Mann,World Historical development is characterised by “geographical shiftiness”, and “... the leading edge of power has migrated throughout much of history” (ibid. p. 538). Mann’s narrative concentrates on particular peoples and places, leaving the rest of the world basically irrelevant and ahistorical (ibid. p. 40). The second example is the well-known and influential book by Francis Fukuyama,“The End of History and the Last Man” (Fukuyama 1992). Again this is World History, in this case based on Hegelian philosophy of history as reinterpreted by the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève. Fukuyama understands World History as a single, coherent and directional process; in his words, there has been “only one journey and one destination” (ibid. p. xii, 339). In fact, the common evolutionary pattern for all human societies is in the direction of liberal democracy (ibid. p. 48). The flavour of Fukuyama’s argument is evident from the following quotation: “... ‘history’ is not a given, not merely a catalogue of everything that happened in the past, but a deliberate effort of abstraction in which we separate out important from unimportant events. … (The historian) cannot evade the choice between important and unimportant, and hence reference to a standard that exists somewhere ‘outside’ of history… The Universal Historian must be ready to discard entire peoples and times as essentially pre- or nonhistorical, because they do not bear on the central ‘plot’of his or her story”(ibid.p.130,138 f).Fukuyama’s argument is that with the establishment of political freedom (democracy) and economic liberalism (the free market, i.e. capitalism) history’s aim has been achieved. To paraphrase the later part of his argument, Christianity,“the last great slave ideology”, with the ideal of freedom and universal human equality, was the logical and necessary prerequisite for the emergence of liberal democratic societies in Western Europe and North America, the final destination of his ‘History’ (ibid. p. 196 ff., 198). As extreme exponents of the Torch-Bearer model of history, Fukuyama’s and Mann’s narratives make most of past and present humanity (pagans, orientals etc.) completely irrelevant to the ‘plot’ of history.18 These speculative histories are grotesque and easy to parody, but they do illustrate the danger of the Torch-Bearer model, as a triumphalist account of the Rise of the West. This world-view has obvious relevance for modern politics, and the relationship of Western countries to the rest of the world. A concrete example is in post-war Modernization Theory and Development Theory, which have provided a theoretical basis for imposing Western economic and political models on the Third World since the 2nd World War. The debate on post-modernity, particularly since Lyotard’s criticism of ‘Meta-History’, has raised the level of consciousness of the problems associated with this ideological usage of the concepts of modernity and progress, and their 77 CHRISTOPHER PARE relationship with the exercise of power. Similar conclusions had been highlighted after the First World War by the ‘Crisis of Historicism’, although this failed to have a comparable intellectual impact outside Germany. It is important to emphasize the other main tradition critical of the triumphalist ideology of the Rise of the West. In opposition to Modernization Theory, western neo-Marxists developed theories critical of the spread of capitalism to the developing countries of the Third World. On a more general level, these thinkers were concerned with themes such as slavery and colonial exploitation, and emphasized the dark side of European expansion, in which the native inhabitants of the Third World were relegated to an ‘ahistorical’ role as spectators or victims. Among the more important works are Paul Baran’s political economy of growth, Andre Gunder Frank’s Dependency Theory, Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems approach and Samir Amin’s treatment of accumulation and unequal development (Baran 1957; Frank 1967; 1979; Wallerstein 1974; 1979; Amin 1974; 1976; 1977). Alongside these works, which might be subsumed under the heading ‘Radical Political Economy’, the 1960s and 70s also saw the rise of a structural Marxist school, influenced by the interpretation of Marx by Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar (see particularly Althusser, Balibar 1970), which placed particular emphasis on analysis of the mode of production and the concept of articulation (see for example: Foster-Carter 1978; Wolpe 1980). The latter approach fundamentally revised earlier conceptions of the mode of production. As this has very important repercussions for Marxist systems of periodization, it deserves more detailed attention. During the 1960s, a group of anthropologists in France, especially Claude Meillassoux, Maurice Godelier, Emmanuel Terray and Pierre-Philippe Rey, began to apply a structuralist approach to the mode of production. In contrast to previous structuralist and functionalist work, the Marxist approach, with the element of contradiction (i.e. the uneven development of the means, forces and relations of production), can generate dynamic explanations of structural change. In general, these authors consider concrete social formations to contain several different modes of production; so social formations are always unevenly developed structures. Pierre-Philippe Rey introduced the term ‘articulation’ to describe the process of interaction between modes of production within a specific historical conjuncture. As articulation always 78 involves uneven development, the concept of contradiction plays a crucial role. In the articulation of two modes of production, one mode establishes its domination over the other. This involves a process of competition between the two modes of production, with the confrontations and alliances which this implies: essentially, confrontations and alliances are generated between the classes which the modes of production define.19 Among other important developments in this field, the work of Harold Wolpe deserves special mention, in particular his distinction between restricted and extended concepts of the mode of production (Wolpe 1980).Allied with the work on Dependency Theory and World Systems, exemplified by Frank and Wallerstein, neo-Marxism developed a range of new methods and terminologies for historical analysis.20 These advances in the 1960s and 70s can be illustrated by comparison with Childe’s earlier efforts to develop a Marxist periodization of history (see above). As an example, I will take his brief discussion of the Bronze Age/Iron Age transition. This relates to the collapse of Bronze Age palace civilizations in the Near East and Aegean, and the rise of new urban centres in the Mediterranean Iron Age, associated with the spread of the alphabet, the great wave of Greek colonisation between 750 and 550 BC etc. The situation at the end of the Bronze Age can be briefly characterised by citing two quotations by Carlo Zaccagnini and Mario Liverani, which emphasize the idea of ‘systems collapse’: Zaccagnini: “There is now a general consensus linking the collapse of many Near Eastern palace organizations (notably in Anatolia and Syria-Palestine) and the substantial decline of other political entities (primarily Egypt) with a change in long established trade networks and patterns of production, a change that both caused the crisis, and eventually the end of the bronze industry, and at the same time fostered the introduction of iron as an alternative metal.” (Zaccagnini 1990, p. 496 f ). Liverani: “In general, I belong to that group of scholars who consider (both on a theoretical level, and in the case of the Late Bronze Age crisis) internal factors of socio-economic dynamics to be pre-eminent, and the external (migratory) factors to be rather limited from a quantitative point of view. They represent the result more than the cause of the crisis…” (Liverani 1987, p. 69). Let us now see how Gordon Childe sought to explain these developments: ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERIODS AND THEIR PURPOSE “Provided they would take the trouble – generally a lot of trouble – amost any community could provide itself with metal from local materials and forge therefrom tools that, however inferior to the best bronze ware, were still a good deal more efficient than stone ones. ... Iron was therefore obtainable without the large capital accumulation indispensable for the regular use of copper or bronze. It was in fact obtained by people independent of kings or chieftains concentrating the social surplus, and used in production more freely and widely than bronze had ever been. ... A technology based upon metal so easily available could work under relations of production different from those indispensable when copper or bronze was the basis, such extreme concentration was no longer necessary. Now, while monarchies of the Bronze Age type persisted in Egypt, Mesopotamia and, for that matter, China, it is a truism of ancient history that many Iron Age societies in Italy, Greece, Syria and Palestine ... were organised as republics.” (Childe 1946, p. 30 f.). Childe is concerned with an interpretation in terms of modes of production, in which a change in the means of production (in this case technological innovation with the spread of iron) required different forces and relations of production, involving new forms of social organisation, which ‘in the last instance’ accounts for the formation of ‘republican’ Mediterranean city-states. With all respect for Childe’s great contributions to our understanding of prehistory, in this case his conclusions are obviously simplistic and unsatisfactory.Much of his work shows his concern with explaining geographical shifts, basically the same East-West scheme of development identified by Hegel and Marx. But, in contrast to his success in interpreting the Neolithic Revolution, his simple ‘technological’ conception of the mode of production could not account for the evident heterogeneity of Bronze Age and Iron Age societies (Childe 1944). Whereas Childe’s analysis seems to be based on a simple (‘stagist’) periodization with Asiatic (Bronze Age) and Ancient Mediterranean (Iron Age) epochs, a neo-Marxist approach could result in a much more complex and dynamic historical account. Now each epoch is not just represented by a technological stage and a single ‘paradigmatic’ mode of production, but instead in terms of conjunctures involving characteristic (coreperiphery) relationships among heterogeneous modes of production. Central to this approach are questions of uneven development, contradiction and competition, and the emergence of regional or super-regional relationships of dominance, analysed in terms of models of articulation. As explained above, the structural Marxist approach makes possible a sophisticated analysis of these relations. A combination of neo-Marxist theoretical approaches, and their application to concrete historical situations and geographical contexts, clearly promises a more satisfying methodology than had been available to Childe. In the context of our example, at the end of the Bronze Age some of the regional core-periphery systems of articulation became unstable and led to a general collapse. From this point of view, neo-Marxist periodization would concentrate not on individual modes of production, but on the geographical structuration generated by a specific social formation, and particularly the characteristic historical forms of (core-periphery) relations of dominance. In summary, the methodology and terminology developed in this tradition of thought provides a sophisticated approach to the question of periodization, without promising simplistic or ‘easy’ answers. Above all, these neo-Marxist approaches render the TorchBearer model of Hegelianism and the ‘stagism’ of palaeo-Marxism redundant. Periodization is brought back to earth: each social formation or ‘conjuncture’ is rooted in a particular geographic context. And in the neo-Marxist approach there are no longer ‘people without history’ (see: Wolf 1982). The aim of our discussion has been to draw attention to similar problems faced both by history and archaeology. It is suggested that the discussion among historians can shed light on the position of archaeology today, most clearly in the question of periodization treated here. Also, it seems that the philosophical and political relevance of academic discussions is often more clearly understood in historical research than in archaeology. Furthermore the problems of dealing with “big structures, large processes, huge comparisons” in history, the field of Historical Sociology, are comparable with the problems encountered in large-scale archaeological interpretation. For example, the problematic nature of the dominant discourse of the Rise of the West (in history especially the meaning of ‘Modernity’; in archaeology the Torch-Bearer narrative described above) has long been the subject of heated controversy in historical research. Apart from the critical approach of Marxism, the most important responses have been developed by the Annales school, and later the insights of Postmodern History. These approaches have encouraged a radical broadening and fragmentation of historical discourse, involving discussion of alternative perio79 CHRISTOPHER PARE dizations, multiple histories and the consideration of new factors such as geographical context, epidemics, biological migration etc. There is one other development in historical research which deserves mention: the great increase in recent years of work on universal approaches to history, variously termed ‘World History’ or ‘Global History’.21 Against the background of the massive transformations in the last decades, with the revolutionary changes in global communication, this development need come as no surprise. To an increasing extent we understand ourselves to be world citizens, and the traditional euro-centric view of the world is gradually, but noticeably, becoming obselete. A new question has suddenly become important: how should World History be studied and narrated ? This question requires an even more radical broadening and fragmentation of history, whereby the problems of historical research become ever closer to those of archaeology. As a ‘young’ discipline,World History has not yet developed a sophisticated theory or methodology. However, Jürgen Osterhammel, one of the most authoritative specialists in the field, has sketched a range of approaches to World History in the 20th century and in contemporary thought (Osterhammel 2001, p. 151 ff., 178 ff). Some of these, such as the Cyclical Models of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, can today be regarded as obselete. In other cases, Osterhammel suggests that the aims are so ambitious that only rare individuals have been able to produce successful results. This is the case for Speculative or Philosophical Histories, for which Ernest Gellner (Gellner 1988) provides a good example. The same applies to the ConvergentDivergent Perspective (Osterhammel 2001, p. 31, 61 f., 180 f). This approach adresses the question whether historical developments in different parts of the world resulted in similar (convergent) results, or whether truly different trajectories (divergent) can be discerned. Is human history universal, based on constant human nature? Or is it possible to distinguish ‘otherness’, understood as truly alternative historical potentialities? As examples of this style of history, Osterhammel cites the work of Felipe Fernández-Armesto (Fernández-Armesto 1995) and William McNeill (McNeill 1963). The so-called Structural-Typological Comparison is not truly universal in nature, but compares par- ticular structures in a number of world civilisations. Examples include Max Weber’s work on the economic ethics of world religions (Kalberg 1994), or Marc Bloch and Otto Hintze on feudalism in Europe, Turkey, India, China and Japan (for example: Bloch 1940; Hintze 1970, p. 84-119). Jürgen Osterhammel himself argues for a Spatial-Relational Perspective,22 in which geographical space, rather than individual cultures,nations or civilisations,is given an important role in the process of historical analysis. In Global History (Eric Wolf is a well-known proponent – Wolf 1982), the process of globalization forms the focus of research. Trade, migration, transport, communication and cultural transfer are important fields of study, with the aim of tracing the development of networks of diffusion, exchange and influences between civilisations. However, perhaps the most important new developments are associated with Scientific Evolutionism (e.g. Jared Diamond, Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza23) and Social Evolutionism (e.g. Sanderson 1990; 1995; for an archaeological application, see: Trigger 1998). Clearly, these different approaches to history on a world scale will each produce a different narrative, with importance given to different events, structures and processes. With these multiple histories come multiple periodizations and the process of fragmentation will continue. But there will always be a need for a meta-narrative, requiring a uniform approach to both archaeology and history. Alongside the neo-Marxist methodologies discussed above, evolutionary work, both scientific and socio-cultural, will doubtless play a very important role in the next decades. As the examples discussed in this article have shown, styles of narrative, with their specific forms of periodization, imbue history with meaning, and are rooted in a particular philosophical viewpoint. Associated with the broadening and fragmentation of archaeology and history in the last decades, most thinkers today would agree that systematic Philosophy of History, in the sense that Kant or Hegel understood the term, has become untenable. On the other hand, historical narrative on the large scale, either in archaeology or in World History, can hardly avoid results which have political and ideological repercussions, and so the aims and methods of archaeological and historical research will continue to be the object of fundamental philosophical analysis. v 80 ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERIODS AND THEIR PURPOSE NOTES 1. Examples in German include: Gumbrecht, Link-Heer 1985; Herzog, Koselleck 1987. 2. For a systematic review of this subject, see: Van Der Pot 1999. 3. Compare also: Ammianus Marcellinus, Roman History 14, 6, 3-6. 4. Compare: Revelations 20, 1-7. 5. Conrad Cellarius is normally credited with the introduction of the canonical periodization of Ancient, Medieval, Modern for European history. But, already in the 14th century, Petrarch could write the following verse:“Long before my birth, time smiled and may again/ for once there were, and yet will be, more joyful days./ But in this middle age time’s dregs/ sweep around us ...” (Epistolae metricae 3.33) 6. But first Lucretius (De rerum Natura 1241-1297). 7. Interestingly, the word Zeitgeist was first used by Herder. 8. In German, known as the Relay-Race (Staffellauf) model of history. 9. Tylor 1871:“Culture, or civilization, ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” 10. Iggers 1997; for a summary in English, see: idem 1995. 11. Meyerhoff 1959 recognized that “the special quality of history does not consist in the statement of general laws or principles”, but in the grasp, so far as possible, of the “infinite variety of particular historical forms immersed in the passage of time.” 12. Against Karl Lamprecht, who attempted to introduce generalizations and social analysis into historical writing. 13. For Virchow’s influence on German prehistoric archaeology, see: Andree 1976. 14. Jones 1997, 56-83. See the following seminal publications: Barth 1969, p. 9-38; Cohen 1974, p. ix-xxiv. 15. Two further subjects,‘Biblical Archaeology’ and ‘Christian Archaeology and Byzantine Art History’ are also represented in German universities, and reflect a parallel interest in Europe’s Christian heritage. For the institutionalisation of German archaeology, see: Eggert 2006, p. 37-169. 16. In German universities, Medieval and Christian Archaeology are also represented as academic specialities. 17. Ibid. p. 524: history as “a process of continuous invention, where little is lost, must result in a broadly one-dirctional, one-dimensional development of power.” 18. For criticism of this sort of eurocentric ideology, see for example: Said 1979; Wolf 1982. 19. See: Resch 1992, chapter 2. The concept of Articulation includes the idea of uneven development, a term used by Leon Trotsky, who described the economic development of the world as a process of uneven and combined development of different co-existing societies and modes of production. 20. In his later work, Fernand Braudel uses formal spatial models which are similar to the ‘World System’ developed by Wallerstein, see: Braudel 1984. 21.The increasing importance of universal history is shown by the founding of new scientific journals: the Journal of World History in 1990 and the Journal of Global History in 2006. For a discussion of the terms ‘Global’ and ‘World History’, see: Mazlish 1993; 1998. 22. Osterhammel 2001, p. 51-169. Osterhammel traces the roots of this perspective back to the positivist circle of Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Lamprecht in Leipzig.The influence of the Leipzig school can be felt in the works of Immanuel Wallerstein and, via Paul Vidal de Blache, in the Annales school (Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel). 23. Diamond 1997; Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994. For an archaeological application, see: Shennan 2002. v 81 CHRISTOPHER PARE BIBLIOGRAPHY Althusser, Balibar 1970 : ALTHUSSER (L.), BALIBAR (E.). — Reading Capital. London: New Left Books, 1970. Amin 1974: AMIN (S.). — Accumulation on a world scale: a critique of the theory of underdevelopment. New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 1974. Cohen 1978 : COHEN (G. A.). — Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Collingwood 1946 : COLLINGWOOD (R. G.). — The Idea of History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946. 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