Pick Your Poison: Beg the Question or Embrace Circularity Abstract: According to Roderick Chisholm (1973, 1983, 1989), there are three ways to respond to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul (1988), Paul Moser (1989), and Earl Conee (2004) have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problem that rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm describes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg the question or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity. Keywords: Chisholm, Circularity, Problem of the Criterion, Question-Begging, Reflective Equilibrium Roderick Chisholm claims of the Problem of the Criterion, or the “Wheel”, that “one has not begun to philosophize until one has faced this problem and has recognized how unappealing, in the end, each of the possible solutions is.” Chisholm (1983) pg. 63 See also Chisholm (1973) pg. 1 Perhaps Chisholm overstates the problem; after all, it seems that one can begin to philosophize without considering this problem at all (at least if we understand ‘philosophize’ to mean simply think about or work through philosophical issues). However, he is correct to note its importance and the fact that the various responses to the problem are unappealing. Chisholm contends that the responses are unappealing because “we can deal with the problem only by begging the question.” Chisholm (1973) pg. 37 Although Chisholm is correct that the kinds of responses he considers: particularism, methodism, and skepticism, each beg the question; his general claim that all responses to the problem beg the question is false. We will argue that the method of reflective equilibrium provides a fourth way of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and it can be developed so that it does not beg the question. Despite the fact that this fourth way of responding to the problem does not beg the question, it has an unappealing feature of its own. Responding to the Problem of the Criterion by using reflective equilibrium commits one to embracing certain forms of circular reasoning as epistemically acceptable. So, responding to the Problem of the Criterion forces us to pick a poison: either beg the question or embrace circular reasoning. 1. The Problem of the Criterion Before exploring the difficulties arising from the various ways of trying to solve the Problem of the Criterion (POC), it is worth pausing briefly to get clear about the nature of the problem. Roderick Chisholm often introduces the POC by posing two pairs of general questions: What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge? How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge? Chisholm (1973) pg. 12 See Chisholm (1989) for a similar expression of the problem in terms of these general questions. Although Chisholm often expresses the POC in terms of knowledge, the problem is not merely a problem about knowledge. This is something that Chisholm seems to recognize because, as Amico (1993) notes, Chisholm expresses the POC in a variety of different ways in his writings, not all of which are in terms of knowledge. It is plausible that a better pair of questions for expressing the POC in its most general form would be the following: (A’) Which propositions are true? (B’) How can we tell which propositions are true? This is very similar to the way that Cling (1994) expresses the questions. The primary difference is that we put the questions in terms of propositions whereas Cling puts the questions in terms of statements., It is important to keep in mind that A’ and B’ are not questions about the nature of truth itself. Rather, these are epistemological questions concerning what propositions we should think are true and what the correct criteria are for determining whether a proposition should be accepted as true or false. Perhaps the most straightforward way of understanding the POC is in the form of a single question: “how is it possible to theorize in epistemology without taking anything epistemic for granted?” Conee (2004) pg. 17. Of course, one must keep in mind that it may be that the answer to this question is negative. That is, it may turn out that the correct answer to this question is that it is impossible to theorize in epistemology without taking anything epistemic for granted. Whichever questions best express the POC, the problem seems to be one of trying to determine how we get our epistemological theorizing off on the right foot. Most would admit that it is important to start our epistemological theorizing in an appropriate way by not taking anything epistemic for granted, if we can. However, simply noting the questions of the POC and our desire to start theorizing in the right way does not yield a problem. The POC is problematic because it is often thought to lead to skepticism. The skeptic claims that we cannot answer A’ until we have an answer for B’, but we cannot answer B’ until we have an answer to A’. So, the skeptic claims that we cannot answer either question. If this is correct, it seems that epistemology cannot get off the ground. Of course, there are anti-skeptical ways to respond to the POC. According to Chisholm, there are two: particularism and methodism. The particularist assumes an answer to A’ and then uses that to answer B’, whereas the methodist assumes an answer to B’ and then uses that to answer A’. Although he advocates particularism, Chisholm notes that this is not a happy situation because whether we are particularists or methodists we must beg the question (more about this below). These considerations might lead one to think that skepticism is correct. However, concluding this would be moving too quickly. Skepticism itself seems guilty of question-begging. The skeptic assumes that we cannot answer either A’ or B’ independently, but assuming this begs the question against particularists and methodists. So, skepticism does not seem any better off than particularism or methodism with respect to begging the question. Thus, Chisholm claims “we can deal with the problem only by begging the question.” Chisholm (1973) pg. 37 Chisholm is mistaken in claiming that all responses to the POC must beg the question, but he is not far from the truth. We will argue that non-question-begging solutions have their own problems. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of responding to the POC that seems to be able to avoid begging the question, but it does so by embracing a kind of circularity. So, as we will make clear below, it seems that when dealing with the POC we have two broad options: beg the question or accept circularity. Thus, while his claim that all responses to the POC beg the question is incorrect, perhaps Chisholm’s claim that each possible solution to the POC is unappealing is spot on. 2. Begging the Question Now that the POC has been clarified we will turn toward an examination of why the three options that Chisholm considers, particularism, methodism, and skepticism, each beg the question against the others. We leave the precise nature of the fallacy of “begging the question” at an intuitive level. However, we do assume that begging the question in answering the POC is not merely a conversational fault. It is not as though one has merely violated a conversational norm when as particularist she begs the question against the methodist and the skeptic. When one solves the POC by begging the question, the fault is epistemic in nature, though we do not here take a stand on how serious it is – i.e., whether one’s solution to the POC can be justified and question-begging or known and question-begging, and so on. Let us begin with particularism. The particularist starts with an answer to A’ that does not epistemically depend on an answer to B’ and uses his answer to A’ to answer B’. More precisely, the particularist response to the POC is as follows: PR Assume an answer to A’ (we take some set of propositions p1, p2, … pn to be true) that does not depend on an answer to B’ and use our answer to A’ to answer B’. What is the epistemic status of the particularist’s answer to A’? Chisholm seems to take it that its status is weak, being nothing more than an assumption: But in all of this I have presupposed the approach I have called “particularism.” The “methodist” and the “skeptic” will tell us that we have started in the wrong place. If now we try to reason with them, then, I am afraid, we will be back on the wheel. Chisholm (1983) pg. 75. See also Chisholm (1973) pg. 37 It may be that Chisholm thinks the question-begging only occurs when the particularist tries to reason with her opponents.  So, the problem for particularism would lie in the particularist’s lacking reasons in support of particularism that advocates of methodism or skepticism would accept. Thanks to Michael DePaul for suggesting that this is where Chisholm locates the question-begging. But, things are worse than this, whether Chisholm recognized it or not. We are not convinced that Chisholm failed to recognize this point. But, to argue that Chisholm recognized both the question-begging that DePaul suggests and the more problematic question-begging that we describe would take us too far into Chisholm exegesis for our current purposes. It is not merely that the particularist cannot defend her position using propositions that her opponents would accept, but that the particularist’s starting point is an unfounded assumption. The particularist must start with a set of particular propositions and work from there. If she goes outside that set of particular propositions to provide reasons for them, she abandons that particularist response and either picks a new set of particular propositions to assume (a new particularist response) or picks something other than simply a new set of only particular propositions to assume and ceases to be a particularist. This shows how deep the problem for the particularist response is: the particularist cannot offer reasons for particularism beyond the unfounded assumption of a set of particular propositions. By simply assuming an answer to A’, the particularist begs the question against the alternative responses to the POC. The problem of question-begging is not unique to particularism. The methodist faces a similar problem. We may render the methodist response as follows: MR Assume an answer to B’ (we take some criterion C to be a correct criterion of truth – C successfully discriminates which propositions are true and which are false) that does not depend on an answer to A’ and use our answer to B’ to answer A’. The methodist too begs the question against the other solutions by simply assuming that some criterion is a correct criterion of truth without having any epistemic reason to prefer her response to the alternatives. The skeptical response Chisholm considers responds to the POC by assuming that PR and MR are both false: there is no answer to A’ that does not depend on an answer to B’ and there is no answer to B’ that does not depend on an answer to A’. As Chisholm explains the response: And so we can formulate the position of the skeptic on these matters. He will say: ‘You cannot answer question A until you answer question B. And you cannot answer question B until you answer question A. Therefore, you cannot answer either question. You cannot know what, if anything, you know, and there is no possible way for you to decide in any particular case.’ (1973: 14) So, we have a third response, SR Assume that there is no independent answer to A’ or B’. According to Chisholm, SR “is only one of the three possibilities and in itself has nothing more to recommend it than the others do.” (1973: 38) Why does it have nothing more to recommend it that the others do? It begs the question against PR and MR. As Chisholm explains, “the “skeptic” will tell us that we have started in the wrong place. If we try now to reason with them, then, I am afraid, we will be back on the wheel.” (1973: 37) The reason that we end up back on the wheel is that the skeptic simply assumes that there is no independent answer to A’ or B’ and though both the particularist and the methodist deny this assumption, they can only respond by appealing to assumptions of their own. The conflict between these three responses amounts to a battle of ungrounded assumptions. It is because of the fact that all three responses beg the question against one another that Chisholm claims “What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the question.” (1973: 37) Since all three responses are question-begging, SR is on no better epistemic footing than PR or MR. One might worry that calling SR the “skeptical response” may be a bit of a misnomer; it might better be called the “non-independence response.” A further reason to worry about calling this the “skeptical response” is that particularism and methodism do not ensure that one does not eventually end up a skeptic. The POC concerns how one starts doing epistemology, not how a completed epistemology will look. One might start as a methodist, for example, and find out that one’s assumption of a criterion C does not satisfy C, for example. It is somewhat harder to imagine how a particularist might end up a skeptic, but imagine a particularist who starts by assuming p and ~p as his starting place. It seems open to the particularist to eventually notice the contradiction and suspend judgment when he realizes he has no better reason for believing p than ~p and vice versa. However, since it is fairly standard to refer to the sort of response offered by SR as the “skeptical response”, we will do so. To draw a skeptical conclusion a further assumption is necessary. In order to get skepticism from SR one must also assume that if A’ and B’ cannot be answered independently, they cannot be answered at all. Given that this further assumption is required to get from SR to a skeptical conclusion, it is possible to accept SR without endorsing skepticism. Andrew Cling has suggested a response to the POC of this sort, which he terms “coherentism.” Cling notes that his terminology is borrowed from Michael DePaul (1988), though it is not clear that Cling’s coherentism is the same as DePaul’s. We will say more about DePaul’s coherentism below. The coherentist starts with SR, but proceeds non-skeptically: To be a coherentist is to reject the epistemic priority of beliefs and criteria of truth. Instead, coherentists recommend balancing beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs until they all form a consistent, mutually supporting system. Cling (1994) pg. 274. Cling takes coherentism to be an alternative to methodism and particularism, so the coherentist should not be understood to be simply assuming that the criterion of truth is to balance “beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs.” To understand coherentism in this way would simply make it a variety of methodism. Instead, the coherentist response should be understood as assuming SR and adding to it three further assumptions: that a particular criterion is correct, that a set of particular propositions are true, and that the criterion and the set of propositions are not independent of each other. However, the coherentist’s assumption of SR begs the question against PR and MR. Since SR begs the question against PR and MR, the coherentist position, which includes SR without eliminating the question-begging, begs the question against PR and MR. Thus, whether one adopts a skeptical version or a coherentist version of SR, one is stuck begging the question: the starting point remains simply an assumption as groundless as the assumption made by the methodist or the particularist. At this point one might worry that this mischaracterizes the skeptical response. The reason for this is that one might think that the skeptical response does not merely assume that there is no independent answer to A’ or B’; but rather, the skeptical response simply emerges from consideration of the problems facing both PR and MR. If this is so, one might think that the skeptical response is not really SR and that it does not beg the question at all. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry. Although the skeptical response may arise from consideration of the problems facing PR and MR, it does not mean that this skeptical response is not question-begging. The reason for this is that, as Chisholm notes, the skeptical response has nothing in itself that makes it better than PR or MR. This skeptical resolution cannot appeal to anything other than an unfounded assumption, and therefore has not generated the needed asymmetry to give us reason to prefer the skeptic’s response. Given this fact, accepting the skeptical response because there are problems with PR and MR is question-begging. The reason the skeptical response would still beg the question if it is understood in this way is that there is no more reason to accept it than there is to accept any of the other positions. Since the skeptical response has nothing more to recommend it in itself than the other responses, there is no more reason to accept the skeptical response because of the problems for PR and MR than there is to accept PR because of problems with the skeptical response and MR, or to accept MR because of problems with the skeptical response and PR. All three options PR, MR, and skepticism seem to be on equal footing. Thus, starting by favoring one over the others amounts to begging the question. Each response to the POC just considered proceeds by making an assumption and thereby begging the question against all other responses to the POC. It is worth noting that the problem here is not simply that advocates of these responses cannot mount defenses of their position that advocates of the other responses will accept. This is true, but the real problem is the fact that each of these responses rests on an ungrounded assumption. However, our choice among these responses need not be entirely arbitrary. We may have pragmatic reasons for preferring one solution to the others. Since all of these responses to the POC beg the question, it seems that no response is on better epistemic footing than any other. However, one might think that the non-skeptical responses, particularism and methodism, are in a better position, pragmatically speaking. After all, if the world is more or less the way common sense tells us that it is, being a non-skeptic has practical value – if I believe that there is food at the grocery store, I am more likely to go to the store to get food than if I withhold judgment about whether or not there is food at the grocery store. Thus, assuming that common sense is more or less right about such things, adopting a non-skeptical response to the POC is pragmatically, though not epistemically, reasonable. Unfortunately, even if there are pragmatic reasons for preferring one of the responses to the POC over the others, that does not seem to give us epistemic reasons to prefer one response over the others. Without epistemic reasons to prefer one response to the others our choice of any of the responses Chisholm offers is epistemically arbitrary. Thus, adopting any of these responses forces us to beg the question. 3. Embracing Circularity Although we have argued that all three responses to the POC that Chisholm considers as well as the coherentist version of SR beg the question, Chisholm’s claim that “we can deal with the problem only by begging the question” is mistaken. Chisholm (1973) pg. 37 The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of responding to the POC that does not beg the question. Roughly, reflective equilibrium involves starting with a set of data (beliefs, intuitions, etc.) and making revisions to that set—giving up some of the data, adding new data to the set, giving more/less weight to some of the data, and so on—so as to create the most agreement among the members of the resulting set. Of course, our rough formulation of reflective equilibrium ignores various complications. For instance, a full description of reflective equilibrium would explain how levels of credence, strength of seemings, etc. affect the overall coherence of the data set. However, for our purposes this and other complications can be set aside. Reaching this equilibrium state of maximized coherence of one’s data is thought to make accepting whatever data remains, whether this includes any of one’s initial data or not, reasonable. For seminal presentations of this method see Goodman (1953) and Rawls (1971). Of course, there have been criticisms of the viability of this method; however, for current purposes these can be set aside because the ultimate concern here is simply whether reflective equilibrium offers the possibility of a non-question-begging response to the POC. See Kelly and McGrath (2010) for recent criticism of the method of reflective equilibrium. There are a variety of ways that one might attempt to respond to the POC by using the method of reflective equilibrium. The variation in these responses is a result of what one includes in the set of data that will form the basis for one’s reflection. For instance, Michael DePaul (1988) suggests a response to the POC that starts with both beliefs about which propositions are true and beliefs about the correct method(s) for telling which beliefs are true and uses these to attempt to answer both A’ and B’ at the same time. DePaul frames his discussion of the POC in terms of knowledge, but we think that his response can be readily applied to A’ and B’. Further, the question-begging nature of DePaul’s suggested response is not mitigated by restricting it to the POC that is put in terms of knowledge. Given this set of beliefs one might begin to make adjustments to one’s beliefs in an attempt to reach reflective equilibrium and then use the equilibrium state that results to complete one’s answers A’ and B’. On one understanding of this approach it is simply the coherentist version of SR mentioned above. If one begins with beliefs about which propositions are true and about the correct method(s) for telling which beliefs are true along with the assumption that there is no independent answer to A’ or B’, this use of reflective equilibrium amounts to a variation of the coherentist version of SR; and thus begs the question for the reasons outlined above. This is not DePaul’s way of understanding the approach, but it is worth considering here because it is a possible way of fleshing out the details of the response. Another way of understanding this approach is as DePaul depicts it. According to this way of understanding the approach, one starts with beliefs about which propositions are true and about the correct method(s) for telling which beliefs are true, but one does not assume SR. This way of construing the approach seems to avoid begging the question against both particularists and methodists because it does not assume that we can answer A’ prior to B’ or that we can answer B’ prior to A’ nor does it assume that they cannot be answered independently. Instead, this response merely applies reflective equilibrium to these beliefs without taking a stand on SR at all. Now it might turn out that after the application of reflective equilibrium one would be committed to a particular position with respect to SR, but this approach does not have to take one from the start. So, in some respects this way of understanding the approach is superior to the responses considered in the previous section. However, its use of beliefs in the relevant data set seems to beg the question against the skeptic because starting with beliefs about which propositions are true assumes that we can answer and in fact already have an answer to A’. Likewise, a belief about which method(s) are successful for telling which beliefs are true assumes that we can answer and have an answer to B’. Thus, applying reflective equilibrium to a set of beliefs without assuming SR begs the question by assuming that skepticism is false from the outset. Fortunately for those seeking a fourth kind of response to the POC, reflective equilibrium does not have to be applied to a set of beliefs. Another way to apply reflective equilibrium when responding to the POC has been suggested by both Earl Conee (2004) and Paul Moser (1989). Conee recognizes his “Applied Evidentialism” as a fourth way of responding to the POC, but it is unclear if Moser does so, since he refers to his version of this response as “Explanatory Particularism”. Regardless, both of these responses involve applying reflective equilibrium in the way that we describe. The sort of response that Conee and Moser each suggest, which we will call the “Seeming Intuition Response (SIR)”, differs from the previous ways of using reflective equilibrium to respond to the POC in that the set of data that it starts with is not a set of beliefs. Rather, this way of responding to the POC begins with our set of intuitions or what seems true to us. Conee explains his response in terms of starting with what seems true to one, whereas Moser puts things in terms of intuitions., We understand intuitions/seemings in roughly the way that George Bealer (2000:3) describes “For you to have an intuition that A is just for it to seem to you that A. Here ‘seems’ is understood, not as a cautionary or “hedging” term, but in its use as a term for a genuine kind of conscious episode.” We also agree with Bealer (2000:4) that intuitions/seemings are not beliefs for the sort of reasons that he provides: “Conversely, I have an intuition – it still seems to me – that the naive truth schema holds; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe that it holds (because I know of the Liar Paradox). There is a rather similar phenomenon in sensory (vs. intellectual) seeming. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, it still seems to me that one of the arrows is longer than the other; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe that it is (because I have measured them). In each case, the seeming (intellectual or sensory) persists in spite of the countervailing belief.” For additional reasons for thinking that intuitions/seemings are not beliefs see Cullison (2010) and McCain (2012). That is to say, SIR starts with what seems true to us both with respect to particulars and with respect to methods for determining when propositions are true. According to SIR, we begin with our intuitions and then make modifications—give up some intuitions, come to have new intuitions, give more/less weight to some intuitions, and so on— based on our reflections in order to bring the set into a state of equilibrium. Although it is consistent with what we are saying here that our intuitions are under our direct, voluntary control, we are not endorsing such a view. It is more plausible that we lack this sort of control over our intuitions. So, the claim that we make modifications to our intuitions should not be taken to imply that these modifications are something other than simply results of our reflections, which are out of our direct, voluntary control. Once the equilibrium state has been reached the data from that state can be used to answer questions A’ and B’. Like the previous way of using reflective equilibrium, SIR does not seem to beg the question against particularists or methodists. Additionally, SIR does not beg the question against the skeptic. SIR does not presuppose that we have an answer to either A’ or B’ before we complete our process of reflection nor does it assume, like SR, that there is no independent answer to A’ or B’. Further, SIR does not even guarantee that the equilibrium state that we end up with will be anti-skeptical. It is consistent with SIR that reflection on our initial intuitions ultimately leads us to the conclusion that we are not aware of which propositions are true and that we lack a method for discovering this information. In other words, it is consistent with SIR that our data in the equilibrium state leaves us without answers to either A’ or B’. So, SIR does not beg any questions against skeptics. At this point one might question whether SIR really is a fourth option for responding to the POC. One might think that SIR is simply a disguised version of particularism or methodism. Close inspection reveals that SIR is neither of these. It is apparent that SIR is not a form of particularism. SIR does not start with a set of propositions that are believed or known or taken to be true like particularism. Instead, SIR begins with our intuitions about which propositions seem to us to be true. One might worry that this merely pushes the POC back a level. That is, one might worry that we will be faced with the questions: “what are our intuitions?” and “how can we tell an intuition from a non-intuition?” The answer is that we go with our intuitions concerning the items relative to these questions and employ reflective equilibrium. In other words SIR offers the same sort of response at this level as at the original level of the POC. Does this open the way for a regress? Perhaps, but the regress does not seem troubling. SIR can simply be reapplied at each level where a version of the POC arises. These intuitions are not themselves beliefs, so SIR is clearly not a form of particularism. Things are not as obvious with respect to methodism. At first blush one might think that SIR is a form of methodism. After all, reflective equilibrium is a method for modifying one’s commitments (beliefs or intuitions) and SIR suggests that using this method can provide a response to the POC. So, one might be inclined to think that SIR is really a form of methodism, and as such, is susceptible to the same charge of question-begging as methodism. Despite initial appearances to the contrary, SIR is not a form of methodism. In order to see this point it is important to recognize a fact about employing methods. One can employ a method without believing the method is good or even being conscious of the method at all. The situation with methods is analogous to that of rule following. S might behave in accordance with the rule not to walk on the grass without intending to obey the rule and without even being aware that there is such a rule. S’s ignorance does not make it incorrect to say that S is acting in accordance with a rule. Likewise, one might employ the method of reflective equilibrium without being aware of the method at all. SIR does not require that one accept or even be aware of the method being used. So, SIR does not beg the question by assuming that one is aware that the method of reflective equilibrium is the correct method for distinguishing true propositions from those that are false. It is important to note that this is not to say that one cannot be aware that reflective equilibrium is a good method of reasoning when one starts the epistemological project. Rather, the idea is that SIR does not take this on board as a starting assumption—perhaps one has the intuition/seeming that reflective equilibrium is a good method to employ, perhaps not. Either way is fine according to SIR. The key is that unlike methodism SIR does not require one to have a belief about, or even be aware of, the quality of the method being used in order to begin the epistemological project. One further point of distinction between methodism and SIR should be noted. Methodism makes the assumption that the method employed is known to be correct, or at least that one is assuming that it is correct. SIR makes no such assumptions. SIR starts with our intuitions about various epistemic principles; perhaps reflective equilibrium is among these, perhaps not. If reflective equilibrium is not among the epistemic principles that seem true at the outset of our investigation, it is clear that SIR does not involve assuming that reflective equilibrium is a correct method for sorting true propositions from false propositions. If reflective equilibrium is among the epistemic principles that seem true at the outset of our investigation, it still does not follow that SIR assumes that it is true nor does it follow that SIR will guarantee that we will accept reflective equilibrium as a true epistemic principle once our reflection is completed. SIR is simply committed to the idea that we can use reflective equilibrium to answer the questions of the POC and if reflective equilibrium is a good method for distinguishing true propositions from false propositions, then its results will give us good guidance concerning truth and falsity throughout our investigation. However, this does not imply that SIR assumes from the start that reflective equilibrium is the correct method for determining which propositions are true. One might worry that any theorist who employs SIR must, or at least will, believe that reflective equilibrium is a good method to use. In light of this one might worry that theorists who employ SIR will end up methodists and so end up begging the question. While it is true that theorists might have such a belief in the appropriateness of reflective equilibrium, it does not follow that SIR will end up question-begging in these cases. The reason for this is that belief in the appropriateness of reflective equilibrium is not a necessary feature of SIR. That is to say, the theorist does not have to have a belief about reflective equilibrium at all in order to employ SIR. This is not true of methodist positions. Methodism begs the question precisely because it requires believing that a particular method is correct. Thus, there is a key difference between SIR and methodism, which allows the former, but not the latter, to avoid begging the question. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this worry). So, SIR is not a form of methodism. And thus, SIR is not susceptible to the charge of begging the question in the way that methodism is. At this point one might object that the results of employing SIR will only be ultimately acceptable if reflective equilibrium is in fact a correct method for sorting true propositions from false. This is correct, but in itself this is not an objection to SIR. If reflective equilibrium is a correct method for sorting true propositions from false, then the propositions that seem true to us after we have reached equilibrium will be likely to be true. This is the fact whether or not we have thought at all about reflective equilibrium. In spite of this, one might worry that we will not have good reasons for believing these propositions to be true without having reasons to believe that reflective equilibrium is a good method. This worry seems to be an instance of a more general claim: in order for S to have good reasons to believe that p S needs to have good reasons to think that the method by which she arrived at p is likely to yield truth. One might plausibly doubt this. Take perception for instance. S can have good reason to believe that p because she has a perceptual experience as of p. Does S need to have good reasons to think that her perceptual faculties are likely to produce true beliefs in order for her perceptual experience as of p to give her good reason to believe that p? It is not obviously unreasonable to think that she does not. It is plausible that ordinary people have good reasons to believe things on the basis of perception, even though many have never considered whether perception is likely to produce true beliefs. So, one might think that there is no need to have reasons for thinking that the method by which one arrived at p is likely to yield truth in order to have good reasons to believe that p. Thus, one might dismiss this worry for SIR. Although this seems to be a plausible response to this worry for SIR, responding in this way comes with a cost. Accepting that one might use SIR as a response to the POC without having reasons to accept that reflective equilibrium is a good method seems to commit one to accepting that certain kinds of circular reasoning can provide one with good reasons. More precisely, the problem is this: if SIR is to avoid being a form of methodism, and hence avoid being susceptible to the charge of begging the question, then SIR has to accept that one can have good reasons to believe the results of employing reflective equilibrium without first having good reasons to accept reflective equilibrium as a good method. However, if SIR allows one to have good reasons to believe the results of employing reflective equilibrium without first having good reasons to accept reflective equilibrium as a good method, then SIR allows for circularity because it can be the case that the claim that reflective equilibrium is a good method is itself one of the results that is yielded by reflective equilibrium. The gist of the worry is that SIR will allow it to be reasonable for someone to come to believe that reflective equilibrium is a good method for determining true propositions by using reflective equilibrium to support that belief. This is a kind of circular reasoning has been termed “rule-circularity”. Rule-circularity occurs when a rule or method is employed to establish that that very rule or method is acceptable. Some have argued that rule-circularity is unproblematic; while others argue that it is problematic. See Braithwaite (1953) and Van Cleve (1984) for the former view and Cling (2003) and Vogel (2008) for the latter. Given that the status of rule-circularity is contentious, SIR comes at a cost. Of course, SIR could avoid the cost of rule-circularity by denying that one can have good reasons to believe the results of employing reflective equilibrium without first having good reasons to accept reflective equilibrium as a good method. However, denying this would either turn SIR into methodism by including from the start the assumption that reflective equilibrium is a good method or it would turn SIR into skepticism because we would never be in a position to gain good reasons to believe the results of employing reflective equilibrium because we would first need to have reasons for thinking that reflective equilibrium is a good method. As we argued in the previous section, both methodism and skepticism beg the question when responding to the POC. So, understanding SIR in this way would render it question-begging as a response to the POC. Thus, it seems that we can either accept a form of SIR that renders it a fourth option for responding to the POC or accept a form of SIR that renders it one of the familiar three. So, we can embrace rule-circularity or beg the question. 4. Concluding Remarks The POC remains a serious challenge. The three kinds of responses that Chisholm considered are all problematic because they beg the question against each other. Although reflective equilibrium offers a fourth option, which can avoid begging the question, it does so only by embracing rule-circularity. So, all four options come with a price. Barring some as yet elusive fifth option for responding to the POC, we seem to be stuck with a problematic choice when responding to the POC: either beg the question or embrace rule-circularity. In both cases we seem to face a similar problem of starting our inquiry on an unjustified basis—in the former case we rest on an unjustified assumption, in the latter case on an unjustified rule. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this general lesson that can be drawn from our discussion. Given our choice of what appear to be bad options, it seems that further research into both question-begging and rule-circularity is warranted. This further research is especially warranted when we recognize that the considerations presented here may very well reveal a deep truth about all of our philosophical enquiries—they all must begin with some unjustified basis or other. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this much wider implication of our discussion of the POC. Perhaps such research will reveal that one of these options is clearly best or that each is epistemically innocent. Until one of these options can be shown to be superior to the other it seems that when responding to the POC we have an unpalatable pick of poisons. We are grateful to John G. Bennett, Michael DePaul, Matt Frise, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. References Amico, Robert (1993). The Problem of the Criterion. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Braithwaite, Richard B. (1953). Scientific Explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chisholm, Roderick (1973). 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