Plato's Rhetorical Technique in Republic I

165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 165 Anna TATSI PLATO’S RHETORICAL TECHNIQUE IN REPUBLIC I * ABSTRACT This paper explores aspects of “Socratic” rhetoric, which appear alongside “Sophistic” 1 rhetoric in the Platonic dialogues, and focuses on Plato’s rhetorical technique in Book I of the Republic, which is a fine example of the way Plato dramatises the rejection of Sophistic rhetoric. In particular, Plato portrays Socrates in Republic I in the guise of his main interlocutor, the Sophist Thrasymachus, by attributing to Socrates the features and rhetorical skills which are elsewhere recognised as typical of Thrasymachus himself (cf. Phaedrus, 267 c-d). This choice explains why the conversation in Book I ends in aporia, leaving open the question of what ensues from it in the rest of the dialogue, namely what Socratic rhetoric, or dialectic (as Socrates calls it), consists in. This question is briefly dealt with at the end of the paper. Plato’s rhetorical techniques have been a subject of increasing scholarly interest 2. Edward Schiappa’s influential work (1990, 1999, listed in n. 2) has * I would like to thank Academician Prof. E. Moutsopoulos and Dr. Maria ProtopapasMarneli, for giving me the opportunity to participate in the conference, and the audience in Sparta for their questions and remarks which helped me shape my argument. Some ideas were prompted by my involvement in a study on the uses of laughter in selected passages from the Platonic dialogues, which is to be included in a general volume on Greek laughter entitled \EÍ·›ÛÈÔÈ Á¤ÏˆÙ˜. \∞Ó·ÁÓÒÛÂȘ ÙÔÜ Á¤ÏÈÔ˘ ÛÙcÓ ëÏÏËÓÈÎc ÁÚ·ÌÌ·Ù›· (Exaisioi Gelοtes. Approaches to Laughter in the Ancient Greek Texts), M. YOSSI, A. MELISTA, S. CHRONOPOULOS (eds), Athens, Editions Smili (forthcoming). I am also grateful to Professor R. W. Wallace for his helpful comments. 1. The terms “Socratic” and “Sophistic” imply Plato’s depiction of both Socrates and the Sophists in his dialogues. 2. A list of books and articles on the subject includes: K. SEESKIN, Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method, Albany, SUNY Press, 1987; L. ROSSETTI, The Rhetoric of Socrates, Philosophy and Rhetoric, 22, 1989, pp. 225-238; E. SCHIAPPA, Did Plato Coin Rhetorike?, AJPh, 111, 1990, pp. 457-470; T. COLE, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins U.P., 1991; R. WARDY, The Birth of Rhetoric. Gorgias, Plato and their Successors, London–New York, Routledge, 1996; C. BALLA, ¶Ï·ÙˆÓÈÎc ÂÈıÒ. \∞e Ùc ÚËÙÔÚÈÎc ÛÙcÓ ÔÏÈÙÈÎc (Platonic Persuasion. From Rhetoric to Politics), Athens, Editions Polis, 1997; E. SCHIAPPA, The Beginnings of 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 166 166 A. TATSI put forward a persuasive argument which attributes, with much likelihood, the very coinage of the term ®ËÙÔÚÈÎc to Plato, based on two main observations: first, that the term itself does not appear in any text prior to Plato, not even in Aristophanes who would surely have not missed the chance to make fun of such a key-term – had it existed in the Sophistic terminology –, a practice he otherwise amply makes use of in his comedies 3; second, that although the Sophists were involved in the development of rhetoric, they were more concerned with the theory of ÏfiÁÔ˜, i.e. the opposition of arguments and a theory of language concerning the proper use and diction of words, than with advancing a theory of rhetoric as such. In fact, the Sophists’ interests and their teachings were so diverse that it seems difficult to identify them with the teaching of ®ËÙÔÚÈÎc as a discipline 4. Aristotle, in the Sophistical Refutations (183 b 26 - 184 a 8), describes the work of all those who discovered the beginnings of rhetoric and the ones who followed them (like Tisias, Gorgias, Thrasymachus and Theodorus) as rather unsystematic: Ôé ÁaÚ Ù¤¯ÓËÓ àÏÏa Ùa àe Ùɘ Ù¤¯Ó˘ ‰È‰fiÓÙ˜ ·È‰Â‡ÂÈÓ ñÂÏ¿Ì‚·ÓÔÓ (184 a 2 f.) 5. And, although Aristotle seems to be the first Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece, New Haven & London, Yale U.P., 1999; J. BEVERSLUIS, Cross-examining Socrates. A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early Dialogues, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2000; A. N. MICHELINI (ed.), Plato as Author. The Rhetoric of Philosophy, Leiden – Boston, Brill, 2003; C. C. W. TAYLOR, Socrates the Sophist, in L. JUDSON and V. KARASMANIS (eds), Remembering Socrates. Philosophical Essays, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006, pp. 157-168; H. YUNIS, Plato’s Rhetoric, A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, I. WORTHINGTON (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, pp. 7589; ID., Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in Plato, Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac, and Arabic Worlds, F. WOERTHER (ed.), Hildesheim– Zürich–New York, Georg Olms, 2009, pp. 17-26; C. W. TINDALE, Reason’s Dark Champions. Constructive Strategies of Sophistic Argument, Columbia, Univ. of South Carolina Press, 2010. On the Republic in particular, cf. H. W. AUSLAND, Socrates’ Argumentative Burden in the Republic, A. N. MICHELINI (ed.), supra, pp. 123-143; J. HOWLAND, Plato’s Reply to Lysias: Republic 1 and 2 and Against Eratosthenes, AJPh, 125, 2004, pp. 179-208; H. YUNIS, The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic, The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, G. R. F. FERRARI (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2007, pp. 1-26 [greek transl. ^∏ ÚÔÙÚÂÙÈÎc ÚËÙÔÚÈÎc ÛÙcÓ ¶ÔÏÈÙ›· ÙÔÜ ¶Ï¿ÙˆÓ·, ºÈÏÔÛÔÊ›· ηd ÚËÙÔÚÈÎc ÛÙcÓ ÎÏ·ÛÈÎc \Aı‹Ó· (Philosophy and Rhetoric in Classical Athens), C. BALLA (ed.), Herakleion, Univ. of Crete Press, 2008, pp. 1-35]. 3. The other possible candidate for the coinage of the word is Alcidamas who uses the term twice in the extant passages of his eristic work On the Sophists (fr. 15, 1-2). Whoever might have been the originator of the term, still the word seems to come to use no earlier than the 4th century B.C. (SCHIAPPA, 1999, pp. 16-20). 4. Schiappa calls their contribution «predisciplinary» (1999, p. 28); cf. TINDALE, pp. 63-64. 5. «For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products» (transl. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge). 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 167 PLATO’S RHETORICAL TECHNIQUE IN REPUBLIC I 167 to give a systematic account of rhetoric as a discipline, it is clear that he puts forward theories already latent in the Platonic dialogues (e.g. in the Phaedrus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist and the Statesman), which most likely reflect similar discussions held in the Academy. Plato seems to be fully aware of the various techniques used by the Sophists in their rhetorical speeches and does not hesitate to use them, sometimes against the Sophists themselves, in many of his dialogues. This does not run against the philosophical aims of Plato’s works; it is rather that Plato acknowledges the power of rhetorical speech and uses it to serve his own purposes. It is rhetoric with a philosophical end, or philosophy using rhetorical means 6. Therefore, a distinction should be made between Socratic rhetoric and Sophistic rhetoric, which are both present in the Platonic dialogues. Here are a few examples: The Apology, which can be read as a Platonic defence of Socrates and his teachings, demonstrates all the typical parts and features of a forensic speech with a high artistry of style and content. Seeskin compared the work to Gorgias’ Apology of Palamedes, and argued that Plato made use of the same «devices for winning acquittal» that Gorgias had used in his speech; throughout the Apology, Plato has Socrates claim that his life’s sole task is to «persuade» (›ıˆÓ) other people not to look after their body or their property, but to look after their soul, and how it can become excellent (30 a-b; 30 e) 7. In the Phaedrus (270 b 1-9), Socrates gives a much clearer description of what he conceives as true rhetoric, when he compares it to medicine; he argues that, as medicine is concerned with the health of the body, so rhetoric as an art (Ù¤¯ÓË), and not merely as practice (Ìc ÙÚÈ‚FÉ ÌfiÓÔÓ Î·d âÌÂÈÚ›÷·), focuses on the virtue and well-being of the soul, by giving proper arguments and pursuits (ÏfiÁÔ˘˜ Ù ηd âÈÙˉ‡ÛÂȘ ÓÔÌ›ÌÔ˘˜). Socrates’ own rhetoric is a true art which leads to true knowledge (âÈÛÙ‹ÌË), thus it is distinct from Sophistic rhetoric 8. In the Gorgias, for example, the art Gorgias professes to possess is called merely âÌÂÈÚ›·, because it «creates persuasion which produces conviction, not the persuasion which teaches» (transl. T. Griffith). 6. Cf. YUNIS, 2009. 7. Cf. SEESKIN, 1987, pp. 58 ff. Similarly, it has been argued that the structure of the Crito follows the pattern of a legal procedure known as ÁÚ·Êc ·Ú·ÓfiÌˆÓ («a written indictment against an illegal appeal»), where Socrates holds the role of the juror who has to choose between the arguments of Crito, on the one hand, introducing the indictment, and those of the Laws of Athens, on the other, as legal persecutors. Cf. STEADMAN, 2006. 8. Cf. H.YUNIS, Plato. Phaedrus (introduction, text, commentary), Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2011, pp. 210-211. In the course of the dialogue Socrates denies this intent from all those who «pretend to possess the art of speech» (trans. Fowler; Ôî ÂÚd ÙÔf˜ ÏfiÁÔ˘˜ Ù¯ÓÈÎÔd ÚÔÛÔÈÔ‡ÌÂÓÔÈ ÂrÓ·È, 273 a) who include the likes of Tisias, Gorgias, Prodicus, 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 168 168 A. TATSI Socrates explains that it is impossible to teach matters of great importance to a large crowd of people in a short time: ™ø. ^H ®ËÙÔÚÈÎc ôÚ·, ó˜ öÔÈÎÂÓ, ÂÈıÔܘ ‰ËÌÈÔ˘ÚÁfi˜ âÛÙÈÓ ÈÛÙ¢ÙÈÎɘ àÏÏ’ Ôé ‰È‰·ÛηÏÈÎɘ ÂÚd Ùe ‰›Î·ÈfiÓ Ù ηd ô‰ÈÎÔÓ. °√ƒ. ¡·›. ™ø. √鉒 ôÚ· ‰È‰·ÛηÏÈÎe˜ ï ®‹ÙˆÚ âÛÙdÓ ‰ÈηÛÙËÚ›ˆÓ Ù ηd ÙáÓ ôÏÏˆÓ ù¯ÏˆÓ ‰Èη›ˆÓ Ù ¤ÚÈ Î·d à‰›ÎˆÓ, àÏÏa ÂÈÛÙÈÎe˜ ÌfiÓÔÓØ Ôé ÁaÚ ‰‹Ô˘ ù¯ÏÔÓ Á’ iÓ ‰‡Ó·ÈÙÔ ÙÔÛÔÜÙÔÓ âÓ çÏ›Áˇˆ ¯ÚfiÓˇˆ ‰È‰¿Í·È Ô≈Ùˆ ÌÂÁ¿Ï· Ú¿ÁÌ·Ù·. °√ƒ. √é ‰ÉÙ·. (Gorg., 454 e - 455 a) SOC. In which case, it seems, rhetoric is the creator of the persuasion which produces conviction, not the persuasion which teaches, on the subject of justice and injustice 9. GORG. Yes. SOC. And the orator is not someone capable of teaching juries and other gatherings, on the subject of justice and injustice, but only of persuading them. Presumably he wouldn’t be able to teach matters of such importance to a gathering that size in a short time. GORG. No, he wouldn’t. (transl. T. Griffith) Later, in the conversation with Polus and Callicles, Socrates calls their own rhetoric ÎÔϷΛ·, a flattery which contributes nothing to the truth, but simply aims to be crowd-pleasing (Úe˜ ì‰ÔÓ‹Ó) and, therefore, morally base (·åÛ¯Ú¿). It is this kind of rhetoric that Socrates attacks, because it can mesmerise crowds in a short time without teaching them anything good. The road to knowledge and virtue is long; it requires time and thorough examination. In the Apology (37 a-b) Socrates complains that he cannot convince the jury he hasn’t intentionally wronged anyone, because of the limited time he has at his disposal; if decisions didn’t have to be made the same day and had he had several days to converse with them, they would be persuaded. Hippias, Polus, Protagoras, Thrasymachus, Lysias and Isocrates. Contra B. MCADON, Plato’s Denunciation of Rhetoric in the Phaedrus, Rhetoric Review, 23, 2004, pp. 21-39, who ignores this distinction, and falsely – in my view – concludes that the Platonic approach is altogether negative. 9. M. SCHOFIELD (ed., Plato. Gorgias, Menexenus, Protagoras, transl. by T. Griffith, Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 2010, p. 18 n. 14) notices that Plato here echoes Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, 13. 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 169 PLATO’S RHETORICAL TECHNIQUE IN REPUBLIC I 169 Socratic rhetoric is praised by the two major Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, in the respective dialogues, which coheres with the respect Plato shows in his treatment of the two men; Protagoras expresses his «admiration for (Socrates’) enthusiasm, and the thoroughness of (his) arguments» (Prot., 361 d-e, transl. Griffith), whereas Gorgias comments on how skillfully Socrates has shown the way the conversation needs to take (Gorg., 455 d) 10. However, other Socratic interlocutors – often Sophists – complain about the Socratic methods of argumentation, as they find themselves perplexed by the refutation of their own ideas. Their reactions range from uneasy and annoyed to furious and vary according to their socio-political status, their rhetorical skills, and/or the firmness of their beliefs. In this case, Plato often makes Socrates speak in the guise of a Sophist, contesting every word his interlocutors say and, thus, leading the conversation to aporia, simply to prove that this kind of rhetoric, which is not supported by true knowledge of the issue under discussion, leads to an impasse 11. This practice, which was known as âÚÈÛÙÈÎc Ù¤¯ÓË, «eristics» (cf. Soph., 231 e), refers to the common Sophistic practice of proving two mutually contradictory tenets as equally valid 12. This kind of argumentation progresses mainly through division (‰È·›ÚÂÛȘ) and analogy, which are often employed by Plato in his attempts to reach a definition (a full blown presentation of this method is given in the Sophist). Republic I offers a good example of this so-called “Socratic sophistry” and I will attempt to show the purposes it serves. The structure and the subject of the discussion in the first book of the Republic bear much resemblance to the Platonic Gorgias, as can easily be noticed; both texts deal with the question of justice, which is examined by Socrates and three interlocutors in a set of three conversations. The fact that the first book of the Republic is – in Plato’s own words – a ÚÔÔ›ÌÈÔÓ (357 a) to the entire dialogue presents 10. Cf. SEESKIN, p. 58. Similarly, in the Phaedrus at the end of Socrates’ recantation and the mythical narrative (257 b), Socrates puts the blame on Lysias, who made him stray from the philosophical discourses, expressing the wish that he, like his brother Polemarchus, be turned towards philosophy. He, then, receives Phaedrus’ praise for uttering a speech far better than the former and far superior to Lysias’ (257 c). 11. Cf. R. W. WALLACE, Plato’s Sophists, Intellectual History After 450, and Sokrates, The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Pericles, L. J. SAMONS II (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2007, pp. 215-237, esp. 216-218, 231 ff., where he argues that the pejorative use of the word “Sophist”, is a platonic fabrication to distinguish Socrates from other intellectuals of his time, although he himself possesses many of their characteristics. 12. For eristics, cf. ARIST., Rhet., II, 1402 a. The treatise known as Dissoi Logoi (¢ÈÛÛÔd §fiÁÔÈ) is the only extant example of eristical argumentation (D.-K. 90). Also, Ù¤¯ÓË âÚÈÛÙÈÎáÓ is listed by Diogenes Laertius among the treatises written by Protagoras (9, 55). In the Sophistical Refutations (171 b 23), Aristotle refers to eristics as à‰ÈÎÔÌ·¯›· («foul fighting», transl. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge). 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 170 170 A. TATSI the advantage of discovering what ensues from an aporia 13. The conversation in the first book of the Republic begins with the elderly Cephalus, a rich metic, therefore not an Athenian, who is the father of Polemarchus and Lysias. Plato treats him with respect, despite much scholarly debate to the contrary 14. He is a pious and temperate man, a model of the ethos of the older generation. His temperate attitude towards old age and death and his awareness that the attitude of different people varies according to whether they have been just or unjust in the course of their life (330 d - 331 b) sets the main topic of the entire dialogue, namely justice, and anticipates the moral ideas expressed in the myth of Er in Book X 15. He also expresses an indifference towards his own wealth (329 d - 331 b), admits that it cannot determine people’s attitude, but can only contribute significantly to paying what is due to gods and men (331 a-b). His ideas may be presented as reflections of his own personal morality, but they are praised by Socrates (329 d-e; 331 c 1) and are accepted as components of the public morality within the state by the end of the dialogue. Cephalus’ last remark of «paying to each what is due» prompts Socrates to ask whether he thinks that justice is to return what one has received (331 b). This retributive concept of justice, which is also the topic of the conversation with Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias, was an idea which had become widely popular in the end of 13. C. H. KAHN, Proleptic Composition in the Republic, or Why Book 1 Was Never a Separate Dialogue, CQ, 43, 1993, pp. 131-142, argues for the seminal role of Book I in the structure and composition of the Republic as a whole, and observes that the rest of the dialogue «offers solutions to many of the problems raised, but not resolved, in the earlier dialogues» (p. 135). 14. Cf. esp. J. ANNAS, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1981, pp. 18-21, who believes that Plato portrays Cephalus in a “malicious” manner, as an intellectually «limited and complacent man»; M. GIFFORD, Dramatic Dialectic in Republic Book 1, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 20, 2001, pp. 35-106, who explores the historical background of all the Socratic interlocutors in Book I, presents Cephalus as philosophically inept and morally failing, a businessman who «attaches great importance to wealth» which he accumulated especially during the Peloponnesian War as an owner of a shield-making factory (pp. 63 ff.). Although Gifford is right at pointing to the tragic irony of Cephalus’ figure, who owed his prosperity to the War, the aftermath of which found his son Polemarchus killed by the Thirty Tyrants and the family property gone, I believe all we can accuse Cephalus of is that he could not argue for his own personal morality (cf. following note). Contra C. D. C. REEVE, Philosopher-Kings: the Argument of Plato’s Republic, Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1988, pp. 6-7. 15. Cf. KAHN, p. 137, who also observes that Cephalus’ idea that a man’s happiness is based on his character (ÙÚfiÔ˜, 329 d) is the main idea behind the argument of Socrates in his conversation with Glaucon later in the dialogue. Cephalus’ answer resembles the answer given by Gorgias, in the dialogue of the same name, that rhetoric is neither good nor bad, but can become wicked if it is used for wicked purposes (Gorg., 457 a). In fact, 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 171 PLATO’S RHETORICAL TECHNIQUE IN REPUBLIC I 171 the 5th century B.C., as is well attested in tragedy 16, probably triggered by the social and political upheaval during and after the Peloponnesian War, as can be clearly seen in speeches like Lysias’ Against Eratosthenes 17. Since Cephalus represents old traditions and beliefs, he is inadequate to discuss this modern idea with Socrates, therefore his son Polemarchus, who jokingly calls himself the heir of his father’s discourse (331 d-e), takes over. Polemarchus cites a verse from the poet Simonides, suggesting that justice is to give back to each what is owed (Ùe Ùa çÊÂÈÏfiÌÂÓ· ëοÛÙˇˆ àԉȉfiÓ·È, 331 e), to friends that which is good and to foes that which is harmful (332 a-b). Socrates begins to test the accuracy and truth of this concept using the methods of art-analogy and division18. In the manner of eristical argumentation, he seeks similarities between justice, medicine, cooking, and other arts or practices, to define the essence of the concept. Polemarchus seems at first hesitant before the absurdity of this analogy, but he does not contest it, thus conceding to Socrates the right to attribute to justice a quality that it does not possess (332 d). From then on, he is forced to follow the Socratic line of thought, only to find his answers or concessions twisted by Socrates, who – by further employing the art-analogy – literally picks on each phrase or word Polemarchus utters, in order to jump into general conclusions about the nature of justice, which inevitably lead to perplexity 19. With this eristical technique Socrates leads his interlocutor to a series of outrageous conclusions, which the latter is ultimately forced to abandon as paradoxical or absurd: (a) that justice is useful only in times of war, as it is the time one would chiefly wish to help friends and harm enemies (332 e - 333 a); (b) that the just are only useful for safekeeping money and valuables, thus when money is not used, therefore justice is something more or less useless (333 d-e). This preposterous argument leads to an even more outrageous conclusion that, since he who is able to keep something safe is also in position to steal it, then justice might be thievish (ÎÏÂÙÈ΋) after all (334 a-b). Polemarchus, totally the way Cephalus and Gorgias are portrayed is very similar; Gorgias is an old, wellrespected Sophist, who seems to have a clear idea about what is just and unjust, but he is unable to guarantee as a teacher of rhetoric that it will be used for just purposes only. Likewise, Cephalus is able to make the distinction between justice and injustice, but perhaps unable to argue for his just beliefs, or influence his sons. 16. Cf. M. W. BLUNDELL, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1989, pp. 7-11, 26-59. 17. Cf. K. J. DOVER, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974, pp. 180 ff. 18. Cf. BEVERSLUIS, pp. 56-59, 206-220. 19. IDEM, pp. 206-211. 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 172 172 A. TATSI baffled by these untenable Socratic conclusions, is left wondering how on earth the discussion reached that point and declares that he does not even know any more what he was talking about (334 b). Socrates persists obliging him to be accurate in his choice of words, and insists that Polemarchus makes the distinction between people who are seemingly friends or enemies, and those who truly are. He, then, concludes that someone who is truly just is unable to harm another man in any way (335 b). With the use of new analogies and examples he goes on to show that when you harm someone you make them worse, therefore this cannot be the doing of a just man (335 c-e) 20. At this point Thrasymachus, who had been long impatient to speak, interrupts the conversation infuriated at the way the argument has evolved and at the Socratic elenchus. Plato sketches Thrasymachus’ reaction masterfully, comparing him to a wild beast that jumps to kill Socrates and Polemarchus, while they shudder with fear (Û˘ÛÙÚ¤„·˜ ë·˘ÙeÓ œÛÂÚ ıËÚ›ÔÓ wÎÂÓ âÊ’ ìÌĘ ó˜ ‰È·Ú·ÛfiÌÂÓÔ˜ – ‰Â›Û·ÓÙ˜ ‰ÈÂÙÔ‹ıËÌÂÓ, 336 b). He accuses Socrates of talking nonsense, of pretending to be unable to approach the subject properly and also of not expressing his own opinion, merely bantering poor Polemarchus with his absurd arguments (336 c - d). Thrasymachus’ reaction is absolutely justified and his remarks – had it not been for his infuriating manner – could perfectly be Socrates’ remarks to a nonsensical argument 21. Plato, having sketched the previous, almost hilarious, conversation which presented Socrates in the manner of a Sophist, now has Thrasymachus take the part of Socrates, thus exerting his elenchus 20. Cf. KAHN, 1993, p. 137, who acutely observes that this argument is the only element in the – otherwise barren – conversation with Polemarchus which proves of use later in the dialogue (379 b) «as a basic principle in Plato’s theology and a rule for censoring the poets». 21. Cf. e.g. Socrates’ responses to Ion, especially in the last section of the dialogue (Ion, 539 e - 542 b), or his remarks to Polus that he tries to escape his dialectical elenchus by trying to refute him in a rhetorical fashion, which nonetheless contributes nothing to the truth (Gorg., 471 e2 - 472 a2): oø ̷οÚÈÂ, ®ËÙÔÚÈÎᘠÁ¿Ú Ì âȯÂÈÚÂÖ˜ âϤÁ¯ÂÈÓ, œÛÂÚ Ôî âÓ ÙÔÖ˜ ‰ÈηÛÙËÚ›ÔȘ ìÁÔ‡ÌÂÓÔÈ âϤÁ¯ÂÈÓ. ∫·d ÁaÚ âÎÂÖ Ôî ≤ÙÂÚÔÈ ÙÔf˜ ëÙ¤ÚÔ˘˜ ‰ÔÎÔÜÛÈÓ âϤÁ¯ÂÈÓ, âÂȉaÓ ÙáÓ ÏfiÁˆÓ zÓ iÓ Ï¤ÁˆÛÈ Ì¿ÚÙ˘Ú·˜ ÔÏÏÔf˜ ·Ú¤¯ˆÓÙ·È Î·d Âé‰ÔΛÌÔ˘˜, ï ‰b ÙàÓ·ÓÙ›· ϤÁˆÓ ≤Ó· ÙÈÓa ·Ú¤¯ËÙ·È j Ìˉ¤Ó·. √yÙÔ˜ ‰b ï öÏÂÁ¯Ô˜ Ôé‰ÂÓe˜ ôÍÈfi˜ âÛÙÈÓ Úe˜ ÙcÓ àÏ‹ıÂÈ·ÓØ âÓ›ÔÙ ÁaÚ iÓ Î·d ηٷ„¢‰ÔÌ·ÚÙ˘ÚËıÂ›Ë ÙȘ ñe ÔÏÏáÓ Î·d ‰ÔÎÔ‡ÓÙˆÓ ÂrÓ·› ÙÈ (my emphasis). One can easily notice the repetition of words and phrases which was a typical feature of Polus’ own style, as it is mentioned in the Phaedrus (267 c), where he is said to have been fond of duplication in phrasing (‰ÈÏ·ÛÈÔÏÔÁ›·). 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 173 PLATO’S RHETORICAL TECHNIQUE IN REPUBLIC I 173 on him. Socrates tries to explain that to define justice is a very difficult task, which requires skilled thinkers. He actually believes the whole task to be more important than searching for gold 22. This could be read as feigned modesty on Socrates’ part, but the rest of the dialogue, in its entirety of ten books, shows that he is not exaggerating about taking the matter very seriously. He complains to Thrasymachus that he cannot dictate to him the way in which he may reply, which is ironic since Socrates has done this very thing to Polemarchus, and he is about to do it to Thrasymachus 23. A marked feature of Socrates’ conversation with Thrasymachus is Socrates’ insistence on accuracy in words (àÎÚÈ‚ÔÏÔÁ›·, 339 e - 340 c; 340 e; 341 b-c; 342 b). Ironically enough, this was a trait of Thrasymachus, who was known for his insistence on the use of proper words 24; Socrates’ portrayal in the guise of Thrasymachus is already under way. Thrasymachus gives his definition of justice, which echoes the notion expressed by Callicles in the Gorgias; he thinks that justice is the benefit of the strongest (Ùe ÙÔÜ ÎÚ›ÙÙÔÓÔ˜ Û˘ÌʤÚÔÓ, 338 c), namely of those who rule in each society (Ùe Ùɘ ηıÂÛÙË΢›·˜ àگɘ Û˘ÌʤÚÔÓ, 338 e - 339 a), whether it be a democracy, a monarchy, or a tyranny. At first, Socrates asks his unsuspicious interlocutor whether he believes that rulers can make mistakes (339 c), and thus he immediately leads him to a dead-end by simply pointing out that, if rulers can be mistaken, then they surely do not always act or legislate according to their own benefit (339 d). Thrasymachus, realising that he has fallen into a pitfall, angrily accuses Socrates as a slanderer for laying verbal traps to his interlocutors (Û˘ÎÔÊ¿ÓÙËÓ, 340 d; cf. LSJ sv. Û˘ÎÔÊ·ÓÙ¤ˆ 2), and then proceeds to take back his earlier concession by introducing the notion of the ruler’s infallibility on account of his knowledge (340 e) 25. Socrates, through the method of analogy, begins to explore the function and purpose of every art, 22. Cf. Rep., V, 450 b, where Thrasymachus ironically alludes to Socrates’ metaphor with the remark that Socrates should not think his interlocutors are satisfied by his analysis of the subject to that point, because they have come to hear arguments and not in search of gold. Cf. also Gorg., 486 d, in which Socrates creates a simile of his soul being put to the touchstone as if to test whether it is truly made of gold, so as to make sure that it is well taken care for. Justice is even more valuable since it will be shown to be the force which brings balance to the soul and the state. 23. Cf. Gorg., 461 d-e, where Socrates forbids Polus from digressing into long speeches, thus narrowing his interlocutor’s part of the conversation into short answers, nevertheless retaining for himself the right to explain at length his own ideas. 24. Cf. D. H., De Isaeo, 20 (= D.-K. 85 A 13), in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus lists Thrasymachus among those practicing rhetoric with a preference on the use of precise words (ÙáÓ ‰b ÙÔf˜ àÎÚÈ‚ÂÖ˜ ÚÔ·ÈÚÔ˘Ì¤ÓˆÓ ÏfiÁÔ˘˜). 25. This notion will later reappear as a component of the philosopher-ruler (Books V and VI). Cf. KAHN, 1993, p. 137. 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 174 174 A. TATSI which consists in the benefit not of the art itself, but of that which is its subject; medicine considers the advantage of the body, horsemanship that of horses, etc. (341 e - 342 c). Since each art rules that which is its subject, then knowledge does not aim at the benefit of the stronger, but at the advantage of the weaker (342 c-d). Thrasymachus only now begins to realise that Socrates is leading him to another refutation of his original definition and reacts once more rather indignantly, comparing Socrates to a toddler who still needs to be nursed for being naïve enough to think there is one leader who does not believe he can benefit from the ones he rules (343 a) 26. He will reiterate his initial tenet that the unjust have advantage against the just (343 c - 345 b), using himself the art-analogy technique against Socrates, with the example of a shepherd who tends and fattens his flock for his own benefit (343 b). This is an ingenious retort on Thrasymachus’ part, one which very few Socratic interlocutors manage to come up with 27, which Socrates manages to escape finding yet another refuge at àÎÚÈ‚ÔÏÔÁ›·; the work of a true shepherd is simply to tend and fatten his flock – selling sheep or cattle is the work of a businessman, which is another practice (345 c-d) 28. Socrates, exploiting further the “accuracy” technique, reiterates on the benefits of being just, and manages to silence Thrasymachus. I have already noted that Socrates’ portrayal in Book I of the Republic is similar to the way Thrasymachus is presented elsewhere and it is striking that this similarity extends through the whole conversation in the first book. A passage in the Phaedrus (267 c-d), which has so far remained unnoticed, presents particular interest in reference to the first book of the Republic. 26. Thrasymachus’ reactions resemble those of both Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias, who express their own indignation against the Socratic arguments and methods (461 c; 467 b; 473 a; 481 b; 482 c; 494 a-b; d), until Callicles ultimately refuses to take part in the discussion (505 c-d; 506 c; 507 a; 510 a, etc.), since Socrates keeps twisting the argument (511 a). 27. Cf. Gorg., 492 e, where Callicles – one of the most competent of Socrates’ interlocutors – employs the art-analogy technique against Socrates, ultimately forcing him to turn to similes and metaphors (492 e - 494 a), repeating that he cannot be convinced (494 a-b). 28. The image of the shepherd and the sheep or cattle is used by Plato usually with a negative undertone, often associated with tyranny and its subjects (cf. Crit., 109 b-c; Polit., 276 e). In the Republic (586 a-b) the imagery is used with reference to the people who have no experience of wisdom and virtue, and have never turned their eyes to see the truth, but they are avid for false delights; cf. the story of the shepherd Gyges in Book II, who commits injustice because he is given the chance to. Aristotle uses the same metaphor in his Nicomachean Ethics, where he describes the life of most people who mistake the Good with pleasure as the slavish life of cattle (·ÓÙÂÏᘠàÓ‰Ú·Ô‰Ò‰ÂȘ Ê·›ÓÔÓÙ·È ‚ÔÛÎËÌ¿ÙˆÓ ‚›ÔÓ ÚÔ·ÈÚÔ‡ÌÂÓÔÈ, NE, I, 1095 b 19-20). 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 175 PLATO’S RHETORICAL TECHNIQUE IN REPUBLIC I 175 In it Socrates presents Thrasymachus as one of the Sophists with a fondness for tearful speeches on old age and poverty and the ability to rouse a mass of people to anger and then to appease them: ™ø. \OÚıÔ¤ÂÈ¿ Á¤ ÙȘ, t ·Ö, ηd ôÏÏ· ÔÏÏa ηd ηϿ. ÙáÓ Á ÌcÓ ÔåÎÙÚÔÁfiˆÓ âd ÁÉÚ·˜ ηd ÂÓ›·Ó ëÏÎÔÌ¤ÓˆÓ ÏfiÁˆÓ ÎÂÎÚ·ÙËÎ¤Ó·È Ù¤¯ÓFË ÌÔÈ Ê·›ÓÂÙ·È Ùe ÙÔÜ Ã·ÏÎˉÔÓ›Ô˘ Ûı¤ÓÔ˜, çÚÁ›Û·È Ù ·s ÔÏÏÔf˜ ±Ì· ‰ÂÈÓe˜ êÓcÚ Á¤ÁÔÓÂÓ, ηd ¿ÏÈÓ èÚÁÈṲ̂ÓÔȘ â÷¿‰ˆÓ ÎËÏÂÖÓ, ó˜ öÊËØ ‰È·‚¿ÏÏÂÈÓ Ù ηd àÔχ۷Ûı·È ‰È·‚ÔÏa˜ ïıÂÓ‰c ÎÚ¿ÙÈÛÙÔ˜. (Phaedr., 267 c-d) SOC. Yes, my boy, correctness of diction, and many other fine things. For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chalcedonian [i.e. Thrasymachus] hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever. (transl. H. N. Fowler) The similarities with Republic I now become clear; old age and wealth were the very topics on which Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus was focused. Thrasymachus’ interaction with his audience, his ability to provoke anger and again soothe the feelings of the people with his speeches, is exactly what Socrates managed to do with him in their conversation. Thrasymachus, who was likened to a wild beast at the beginning, was appeased by Socrates’ argument on justice, as Socrates himself remarks at the end of Book I (âÂȉ‹ ÌÔÈ Ú÷ÄÔ˜ âÁ¤ÓÔ˘ ηd ¯·ÏÂ·›ÓˆÓ â·‡Ûˆ, 354 a). Later in the Republic, the examination will prove justice to be a cardinal virtue for the well-being and prosperity of both people and the state, which brings harmony and leads to the Good. Thrasymachus’ depiction in Book I is a sketch of a soul which lacks harmony but is appeased once he listens to the Socratic discourses 29. However successful Socrates’ rhetoric may have proven to be, the task for the search of the true meaning of justice failed, as Socrates himself admits (354 b-c). It has been suggested that Plato here realises the limits of Socratic rhetoric, which is why he regards the first book as a mere “prelude” to the whole dialogue and expands the conversation in nine more books 30. However, as I hope to have shown, it is rather “Sophistic” rhetoric that is driven to its limits, with the exposure of all its shortcomings and deficiencies. 29. Cf. Rep., VI, 486 b, where Socrates points out that the philosopher’s soul is just and calm, and not wild and unsociable. 30. Cf. REEVE , 1988, pp. 22-24. 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 176 176 A. TATSI The zeal for sophistical refutations does not bring to solution; it rather leads to aporia (354 b-c). Therefore, it is not tenable in a philosophical discourse. * * * If then sophistry is abandoned, what is the means of reaching truth and virtue that Socrates has much sought after? What does this so called “Socratic” rhetoric (or dialectic, as Socrates himself calls it in the Republic) consist in and what solution does it offer? The opening of Book II marks the beginning of a new attempt at reaching a definition of justice, in which Glaucon and Adeimantus (Plato’s brothers) renew Thrasymachus’ principle arguing that justice is a compromise, pursued not for itself, but for its rewards. Socrates attempts to defend justice as something desirable in its own right and begins to explore its function in a city and in the human soul, since the virtues of the individual correspond to those of the city. He concludes in Book IV that justice within the city and the soul is a balance of the elements which constitute either one of them (444 e). He devotes the entire Book V and most of Book VI to explain the feasibility of such an ideal city, only to realise at the end of Book VI (504 a-b) that the examination of the subject is not satisfying and that they need to follow a “longer path” to analyse the true essence of virtues. It has been suggested that the image of the longer path is a lift-off from the traditional Socratic dialectic to a deeper philosophical analysis of the true essence of the virtues 31. In a way, this is true; Plato’s Socrates will proceed to demonstrate the core of his ideas. However, it is interesting to notice that the way he chooses to do it is through a complex series of similes, allegorical narrations, reiterations of the original argument or principle and, finally, with the use of a myth 32: the allegories of the sun (507 a ff.), the line (509 d ff.) and the cave (514 a ff.) are summoned to argue for the importance of true knowledge and the Good, which is what a philosopherruler must aim for (end of Book VI to VII). After explaining how these virtues are to be achieved, Socrates resumes the conclusions reached (Book VIII) and goes back to his initial argument that he had abandoned since the beginning of Book V; he explains the different types of unjust regimes and the corresponding types of unjust individuals, concluding that the tyrannical individual, and the tyrant himself in particular, is utterly unhappy, because utterly unjust (Book IX). Then he argues for the balancing force of justice once more, using yet another simile which compares the soul to a creature of many forms, to show how essential justice is for the welfare 31. ROWE, 2007, p. 167. 32. All these are common features of Socratic dialectics, which we find in many dialogues. 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 177 PLATO’S RHETORICAL TECHNIQUE IN REPUBLIC I 177 of the individual (588 c ff.). Finally, at the end of the Republic, he narrates the elaborate myth of Er to explain the rewards of justice and the penalties of injustice after death (614 a ff.), which was his initial topic. This complex method of reaching the truth through analogies, similes, allegories and mythical examples seems to be an indigenous part of Socratic rhetoric, or “dialectic”. As Socrates explains in Book VII, dialectic makes people capable of understanding and explaining (‰ÔÜÓ·› Ù ηd àÔ‰¤Í·Ûı·È ÏfiÁÔÓ, 531 e) the essence of each thing (cf. 534 b) 33: ™ø. Ô≈Ùˆ ηd ¬Ù·Ó ÙȘ Ùˇá ‰È·Ï¤ÁÂÛı·È âȯÂÈÚFÉ ôÓ¢ ·ÛáÓ ÙáÓ ·åÛı‹ÛÂˆÓ ‰Èa ÙÔÜ ÏfiÁÔ˘ â’ ·éÙe ¬ âÛÙÈÓ ≤ηÛÙÔÓ ïÚÌÄÓ, ηd Ìc àÔÛÙFÉ ÚdÓ iÓ ·éÙe n öÛÙÈÓ àÁ·ıeÓ ·éÙFÉ ÓÔ‹ÛÂÈ Ï¿‚FË, â’ ·éÙˇá Á›ÁÓÂÙ·È Ùˇá ÙÔÜ ÓÔËÙÔÜ Ù¤ÏÂÈ, œÛÂÚ âÎÂÖÓÔ˜ ÙfiÙ âd Ùˇá ÙÔÜ ïÚ·ÙÔÜ. °§∞À. ¶·ÓÙ¿·ÛÈ ÌbÓ ÔsÓ, öÊË. ™ø. ∆› ÔsÓ; Ôé ‰È·ÏÂÎÙÈÎcÓ Ù·‡ÙËÓ ÙcÓ ÔÚ›·Ó ηÏÂÖ˜; °§∞À. ∆› Ì‹Ó; (Rep., 532 a-b) SOC. In the same way, when someone tries to use dialectic to arrive at what each thing itself is, by means of reason, without using any of the senses, and does not give up the attempt until he grasps what good itself is, by means of thought itself, then he has come to the true end or goal of the intelligible, just as the man in the cave, in our earlier example, came to the true end or goal of the visible. GLAUC. Exactly, he said. SOC. Very well. Isn’t “dialectic” the name you give to this journey? GLAUC. Of course. (transl. T. Griffith) Socrates’ dialectical methods seem to be the various attempts he makes towards understanding the Good. Through the similes, the allegories and the mythical narratives, Socrates creates images to help those who hear him visualise the principles to which he urges them. Whether this method is convincing seems to be something that Socrates cannot argue for; Glaucon expresses doubts as to whether he should accept the role of dialectic towards grasping the truth. However, Socrates insists on following this method of thorough, repeated examination and comparison of the different sciences (532 b - 533 d). Similarly, in the Phaedo Socrates remarks that he may not be able to prove the immortality of the soul, however he feels it is 33. ÏfiÁÔÓ ‰ÔÜÓ·È and ÏfiÁÔÓ Ï·‚ÂÖÓ are standard phrases Plato uses to explain the function of dialectic: cf. Prot., 336 c-d; Phaed., 78 c-d, 95 d; Polit., 286 a, where we have a similar idea as the one expressed in the Republic. 165-180 TATSI 17-04-13 21:43 ™ÂÏ›‰· 178 178 A. TATSI an idea worth to be ventured (114 d-e), that one needs to repeat over and over again like a magic enchantment. Socratic rhetoric, or dialectic, proves quite similar to Sophistic rhetoric in means, yet quite opposite in intentions 34. Anna TATSI Teacher, PhD in Classics Athens BIBLIOGRAPHY ANNAS, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1981. AUSLAND, H. W., Socrates’ Argumentative Burden in the Republic, Plato as Author. The Rhetoric of Philosophy, A. N. MICHELINI (ed.), Leiden – Boston, Brill, 2003, pp. 123-143. BALLA, C., ¶Ï·ÙˆÓÈÎc ÂÈıÒ. \∞e Ùc ÚËÙÔÚÈÎc ÛÙcÓ ÔÏÈÙÈÎc (Platonic Persuasion. From Rhetoric to Politics), Athens, Editions Polis, 1997. BEVERSLUIS, J., Cross-examining Socrates. A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early Dialogues, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2000. BLUNDELL, M. 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