Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Plato’s Gorgias and the Power of Λόγος Keywords: Plato, Gorgias, Rhetoric, Power, Sophistry Introduction Recent interpretations of the opening exchange between Socrates and Gorgias in Plato s Gorgias have tended to focus on whether the rhetorician believes that justice and injustice are the subject matter of rhetoric.1 These interpretations risk missing the point that the just and the unjust are simply not the main game for Gorgias. In the current paper I argue that Gorgias is interested in the just and the unjust only insofar as being a persuasive speaker on these topics is a prerequisite for the successful exercise of power in the political domain. Although Gorgias orientation by power and overestimation of the power of speech have been noted by many interpreters, my intention is to clarify Gorgias claims for the power of rhetoric and explain the significance of these claims for one important aspect of Plato s broader condemnation of sophistry. I demonstrate that the power of rhetorical speech for Gorgias is embodied not only in its capacity to allow its exponent to persuade, and hence rule over, their fellow citizens, but also the freedom it provides to realise one s desires, whatever they may be. The capacity to rule others and the freedom to realise desires, I suggest, are both conceived by Gorgias as forms of power that justify his claim to be the exponent of an art that enables humans to attain the greatest good. My interpretation thus seeks to illuminate the commitments of Gorgias, as presented by Plato, through an analysis of the different forms of power – rule over others and freedom – that rhetoric purportedly provides its skilful exponent. In section one I argue that although Plato 1 Perhaps the most prominent debate is that concerning whether Gorgias’ claim that justice and injustice are rhetoric’s subject matter is motivated primarily by shame or a position honestly held. For the former view see C. Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias in J. Annas (ed.) Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 75-121. For the latter view, see J. M. Cooper, Socrates and Plato in Plato’s Gorgias, in Reason and Emotion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 29–75. More recently, James Doyle has argued that Gorgias has no beliefs, strictly-speaking, at all about the issue. See J. Doyle, Socrates and Gorgias, Phronesis 55 (2010), 1-25. _________________________________________ George Duke: Deakin University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, 3125, Melbourne, Australia: georged@deakin.edu.au 1|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. intends to expose Gorgias confusion regarding the precise nature of his expertise and its relationship with justice and human agency, it is nonetheless possible to derive from Gorgias statements an implicit view of the power of rhetorical speech. Section two then considers, in light of this analysis, the need to qualify Terence )rwin s thesis that the sophists are better regarded as mouthpieces for common sense beliefs than radical critics of conventional morality. § 1. Rhetoric and Power My aim in this first section is to demonstrate that the real concern of Gorgias, as presented by Plato, is with the power of rhetorical speech. I argue that this power needs to be understood not only as domination – or rule over others – but also freedom to realise whatever desires an agent happens to possess. Although Plato presents Gorgias as confused with respect to the precise implications of his purported expertise for justice and human agency, an intelligible view of power as the greatest good nonetheless emerges from his responses to Socratic questioning. One implication of this is that Gorgias attitude towards rhetoric s subject matter and its purported justice or injustice are best understood in light of his commitment to the view that rhetoric enables one to attain the greatest good of power. It follows from Gorgias prioritisation of power, that is to say, that questions of justice and injustice have for him a distinctly subordinate status to domination over others and the purported freedom to act as one desires. Interpreting the exchange between Socrates and Gorgias in these terms can help clarify, as I demonstrate in section two, an important strand of Plato s critique of sophistry.2 Socrates initial cross-examination of Gorgias rests on the distinction between a skilful capacity and what that capacity allows one to exert mastery over or create. Socrates thus characterises his intention in pursuing a conversation with the rhetorician in the following terms: I wish to learn from him what the power ( ύ α ις of the man s expertise έχ ης) is, and what it is that he professes and teaches (447c). These two questions are subsequently narrowed down to the following: 2 My argument assumes that it is correct to characterise Gorgias as a sophist. The classic case for this conclusion is presented in E.L. (arrison, Was Gorgias a Sophist?, Phoenix 18:3 (1964): 183-92. For further arguments against the minority view that Gorgias was not a sophist, defended most notably by E.R. Dodds, Plato’s Gorgias (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 7, see G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 45. 2|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. About what, of the things that are ( ὶ ὶ ῶ ὄ ω χά ι οὖσα), is rhetoric the science (449d)? In his first set of questions, Socrates asks Gorgias what he professes and teaches and what the power of his expertise is. Socrates second formulation apparently presupposes that each area of expertise possesses a single exclusive subject matter. Plato, that is to say, seems to present Socrates as asserting that it is not possible to characterise a capacity as an expertise ( έχ η) unless it embodies a rigorous procedure, one with generally predictable outcomes, and which holds sway over a particular domain or range of objects (462b-c; 465a; cf. Ion 537d-538a).3 But this is a counter-intuitive way to think of the rhetorical skill of persuasion. It seems more plausible to say that rhetoric produces speeches rather than that it has a particular object-domain. On this view, the right question to ask is how rhetoric accomplishes its ends, or by what means it accomplishes its ends, rather than what rhetoric is about. Gorgias soon enough identifies rhetoric with its putative α ις: the power to persuade. It is unlikely, however, that the correct understanding of α ις is that they are about subject matters, even if it is the case that they are differentiated by what they apply to or act upon, and by their distinctive effects or ἔ α. )t is thus significant that it is Gorgias attempt to respond to the second formulation, one which embodies the claim that rhetoric is a έχ η in Socrates’ sense, and one that given his other commitments he has reason to reject in the form in which it is stated, which allows him to be construed as asserting that rhetoric is concerned with justice and injustice. This in turn leads to Gorgias subsequent concession – which ultimately leads to his refutation – that he would teach a prospective pupil about the just and the unjust if they were ignorant of such matters. The point is neither that Gorgias has a clear understanding of the necessary relationship of his expertise with justice nor that justice and injustice are irrelevant considerations for the rhetorician. Plato seeks to expose inconsistencies in Gorgias attitude towards justice and obviously being persuasive about justice and injustice in large public gatherings is an essential part of the rhetorician s trade (454b). The claim is rather that, from Gorgias point of view, justice and injustice are relevant primarily because of their importance to the rhetorician s primary concern of power and that Socrates line of questioning tends to obscure this prioritisation of power. 3 For this reading, which is supported by Ion (537d-538a), see Kahn, ( Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias ) 77. In the Ion Socrates argues directly for the principles that i one τέχ η differs from another τέχ η when it is the knowledge of a different subject matter (ii) if one τέχ η differs from another τέχ η then it cannot know the same subject matter (iii) if X is the τέχ η of subject matter Y, no one can know, or be a competent judge of, matters Y unless he possesses X. 3|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Having noted the way in which Socrates line of questioning constrains Gorgias capacity to define rhetoric in his own terms, it is also worth examining how Socrates imposes his intellectualist identification of excellence (ἀ ή) and knowledge upon the exchange. Gorgias initial response to the second formulation is that rhetoric is about or pertains to ὶ ό ο ς) (459e) i.e. in the same way that musical expertise is about or pertains to speeches ( musical compositions. Medicine and gymnastics also accomplish their respective ends through speech, Socrates insists, so it cannot be the case that rhetoric is about speeches of all kinds. Gorgias replies that rhetoric is the expertise ( έχ η) that accomplishes all of its activity ( ᾶ ις) and possesses all of its authority ( ύ ωσις) through speech (450b). Socrates then demands to know what differentiates rhetoric from arithmetic, calculation, geometry and draughts, which also accomplish their decisive effects through ό ος. Gorgias responds that rhetoric is concerned with the greatest and the best of human affairs ( ὰ έ ισ α ῶ ἀ θ ώ ίω … αὶ ἄ ισ α) (451d). Unsatisfied, Socrates asserts that the doctor, trainer and money maker would also make this claim for their crafts, to which Gorgias provides the following characterisation of rhetoric: It is the cause of freedom (ἐ others ( οῦ ἄ χ ι θ ίας) for both humans themselves and at the same time of the rule over in each man s own city d .4 This cause, Gorgias says, is the ability (οἷό ᾽ ἶ αι) to persuade through speeches judges, councillors, assemblymen, and all political gatherings whatsoever (452e). Moreover, if one is skilful in the expertise of persuasive speech, then it is possible to make other practitioners (e.g. the doctor, trainer and money-maker) do your bidding. The real end of Gorgias rhetoric comes to light here at 452d-e. Gorgias asserts that rhetoric is concerned with the greatest good for humans, because its speeches allow one to attain rule over others and freedom. Although it is uncontroversial that, in the context of Athenian public life, the capacity to persuade the ῆ ς was a precondition of political success, it might seem that Gorgias is promising too much. It is difficult to see how rhetoric can be the source of freedom to all, given 4 Cf. Thucydides 3.45.6. Cooper argues that the phrase ἐ ίας αὐ ῖς ῖς ἀ ώ ις refers to free citizens generally, rather than being restricted to the singular i.e. the rhetorician. See Cooper Socrates and Plato in Plato s Gorgias , 33-4. Weiss contrary interpretation, which is grounded in the claim that, for Gorgias, freedom is identified with the power to dominate others and avoid being dominated oneself, is that ἐ ίας αὐ ῖς ῖς ἀ ώ ις refers to people take individually and pre-eminently the rhetorician. See R. Weiss, Oh Brother! The Fraternity of Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato s Gorgias, Interpretation 30 (2003): 195-206. These two interpretations are not strictly exclusive, however. My own interpretation suggests that Gorgias is referring pre-eminently to the freedom of the exponent of rhetorical speech but is deliberately implying that such power is available to those who acquire his έχ η. 4|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. that rule over others presupposes constraints on the freedom of those subject to such rule. Yet Gorgias is best understood in this passage as asserting that rhetoric provides its exponent with rule over others, which entails freedom from control, and also the freedom to realise desires. Even assuming that the freedom referred to in this passage is to be construed as primarily political, both rule over others (and the correlative freedom from control) and freedom to act as one wishes are forms of power: power in the sense of dominion over others and power as liberty or capacity to act as one wishes. Acting as one wishes is in turn identifiable, from the sophistic perspective (as I will explain in more detail in section two), with the freedom to fulfil desires. Gorgias claim that rhetoric enables one to make other practitioners do your bidding links these senses of freedom. In making this claim Gorgias suggests that rhetoric is the source of power in a quite comprehensive sense that traverses rule over others, freedom from control and the capacity to realise one s desires. The implication is that power is the greatest good.5 The term ύ α ις and its cognates occur times during Socrates conversation with Gorgias.6 It is true that these uses of the term ύ α ις occur within a discussion of the point or function of rhetoric. Yet it is nonetheless highly probable that Plato also intends the usual associations of ύ α ις with power to be communicated in these passages concerned with the scope, or subject matter, of rhetoric.7 Murray rightly observes in this context that power is the whole purpose of Gorgias expertise, but then defines this too narrowly in terms of political domination.8 Gorgias is not only claiming that his expertise provides power in the sense of domination over others, but also – somewhat implausibly – implying that it provides, or is even in part identifiable with, the capacity (freedom) to be able to do as one wishes (452e).9 Rhetorical 5 The view that the greatest good is power has deep-seated Greek sources. The Homeric hero and the post Homeric aristocrat are assumed to have the qualities needed to be powerful and this is constitutive of their possession of ἀ ή: it is what makes them good men. See T. Irwin, Plato Gorgias (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 116. 6 See J. S. Murray, Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias Art of Rhetoric (Gorgias 456c-457b), Philosophy and Rhetoric 34 (2001) 357. 7 T. Penner, Socrates on the Impossibility of Belief-Relative Sciences, in J.J. Cleary (ed.) Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1988), 321. The position I attribute to Gorgias resembles the first horn of the dilemma that, according to Penner, Socrates presents to Gorgias: either rhetoric is a practice of conviction-persuasion which aims at power and fulfilment of desires, or it is a science with a distinct object. 8 Murray ( Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias’ Art of Rhetoric ), 359. 9 This reading is consistent with the etymology of the Greek δύ α ις which means both power in the sense of political strength and authority and the capacity or ability to do be able to do something) and the Latin potere from which the English word power is derived. 5|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. speech is thus, according to Gorgias, omnipotent, and in a sense which, at least implicitly, extends beyond that identified by Fussi, because it suggests an association of power with the freedom or capacity to get what one wants or desires, in addition to the exercise of power over others and freedom from control in narrowly political contexts.10 Indeed, as I will suggest in section two, this claim is fundamental to understanding not only the subsequent development of the dialogue, in particular the association of rhetoric, tyranny and sensual hedonism evident in the exchanges with Polus and Callicles, but also Plato s critique of sophistry more generally. An understanding of this dual aspect of power – and the concomitant implication that power allows one to access all the other goods and is hence the greatest good – is the key to grasping Gorgias suggestion that rhetoric is concerned with the greatest and best of human affairs. The claim that Gorgias position implies that power is the greatest good should not be taken to entail that Gorgias himself prioritises political power over, say, the material rewards that accrue from the teaching of rhetoric. It should also not be taken to suggest that Gorgias offers a clearly determined and cogent eudaemonist position on human goods comparable to that developed in the Socratic or Aristotelian traditions. As I will explore in more detail below, Plato ultimately presents Gorgias as confused on the precise nature of rhetoric and his limited participation subsequent to his refutation suggest Plato s concern to expose the consequences of this confusion from both a pedagogical and ethical perspective. In particular, the thesis that power is the greatest good is dubious on the assumption that the purpose of its possession and application is to secure or attain other goods; viewed in such a light power is instrumental to attaining other goods rather than itself intelligible as an end or normative reason for action. The claim I am defending is that Gorgias rhetorical art is advertised as an all-ruling form of expertise – hence a capacity or power – that allows a skilful practitioner to attain all other goods. If power is regarded not simply in terms of political domination, but also, as Gorgias statements suggest, in terms of the capacity to be able to secure and attain all other goods, then the sense in which it may be regarded as the greatest good becomes more intelligible, even if ultimately indefensible. The Socratic position, the later discussion with Polus (466d-e) suggests, is either that power without knowledge of the good is not a genuine good or, alternatively, that without knowledge of the good, no one can have (real) power in the first place, even though they might 10 A. Fussi, Socrates’ Refutation of Gorgias, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 17 (2001), 138. On Plato’s association of pleasure with illusion and the relevance of this point to the critique of sophistic rhetoric, see J. Moss, Pleasure and Illusion in Plato, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72:3 (2006) 503-535. 6|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. enjoy the outward appearance of power.11 From a Socratic perspective, a pedagogy that is unclear about power in this way necessarily leads to confusion about the nature of justice and its relationship with human agency and the good.12 Without knowledge, not only external goods, such as wealth and health, not only the areas of expertise that enable one to attain such so-called goods, but the very capacity to attain them is either of no value or harmful. This view of external goods, not to mention the intellectualist identification of knowledge and ἀ ή, is in the background of Socrates subsequent introduction of the distinction between (defeasible) conviction case (454c- ίσ ις that something is the case and knowledge ἐ ισ ή that something is the a . Socrates employs this distinction to place in question Gorgias advocacy of rhetoric by suggesting that persuasive speech produces the former without the latter. Yet Socrates argument indirectly supports Gorgias account of the power of rhetoric on one level. This is because Socrates argument indicates why it is misleading to suggest that rhetoric has a specific subject matter, a domain of objects, about which it convinces or teaches. Rhetoric is in fact presented by Gorgias, as suggested above, as a capacity for persuasion in relation to such specific subject matters. If rhetoric is such a capacity, then it can intelligibly be regarded as a ruling ability which endows one with the power to exercise power over all other capacities. At this point one might object that if Plato's Gorgias clear-headedly endorses the view that I here attribute to him, he should be reluctant both to agree that there is a distinct subjectmatter on which orators are wise (449c-e) and to distinguish teaching-persuasion from conviction-persuasion (454c-e). Throughout the discussion Socrates is vigilant in ensuring that Gorgias genuinely agrees with the propositions that are put to him (450e; 453a; 454b-c; 457c458b) and the subsequent focus upon the views of Polus and Callicles suggest an intention on Plato s part to represent both the inchoate and even confused character of the famous 11 12 Cf. Meno (88c-d) and Euthydemus (281d-e). This confusion is not so great, however, as to justify Doyle’s argument that Gorgias is so confused about rhetoric that it would be a mistake to attribute any coherent set of beliefs to him at all. See Doyle Socrates and Gorgias , 8-21. The assumption underpinning Doyle’s claim that Gorgias has no coherent beliefs in relation to the subject matter of rhetoric is the Davidsonian thesis that the holding of a belief with a given content is a significant epistemic achievement and requires an underlying intelligible structure of other beliefs that are inferentially linked in a way that is both minimally consistent and coherent. Yet Doyle’s claim that Gorgias holds no beliefs at all about the justice and injustice of rhetoric seems to fall too quickly out of the (plausible) assumption that Plato is concerned to demonstrate the incoherence of the positions held by Socrates’ sophistic interlocutors. While it is likely that Plato’s intention, facilitated by the dialogue form, is to demonstrate that Gorgias’ beliefs about rhetoric as stated are confused and do not form a consistent set, this does not entail that an intelligible position is not recoverable from a subset of those beliefs. 7|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. rhetorician s beliefs and the practical and ethical consequences of this confusion. The dramatic structure of the dialogue, indeed, strongly suggests that Plato intends to portray Gorgias as lacking a clear understanding of the nature of his expertise and its relationship with justice and human agency.13 None of this is inconsistent, however, with the claim that Gorgias remarks reveal an implicit commitment to a view of the power of rhetoric. Before I return to this point, it is first instructive briefly to outline Gorgias refutation by Socrates. In his early responses, Gorgias describes rhetoric as if it was a value-free and objectneutral instrument of persuasion, albeit one that enables its practitioner to obtain the greatest good of power. Socrates, however, continues to demand that Gorgias nominate a subject matter or domain over which rhetorical persuasion holds sway. Gorgias response is as follows: Persuasion in law courts and in other mobs, as I was saying just a moment ago, and about those things that are just and unjust ( ί αιά αὶ ἄ ι α) (454b). This statement is consistent with the earlier suggestion that it is in the political realm that rhetoric is most effective in obtaining power, but misleadingly gives the impression that rhetoric has a subject matter in the sense of a particular domain of objects rather than being concerned with the most effective method of obtaining and exercising power. Once Gorgias has admitted that it is possible to have convictions without knowledge and that rhetoric is concerned with the just and the unjust as its subject matter, he is on the way to refutation. These two admissions set up Socrates question as to whether Gorgias would teach a prospective pupil about the just and the unjust if he did not have knowledge of them. It is accordingly the passage immediately preceding Gorgias defence speech that reveals his true convictions: Gorgias: I shall indeed try, Socrates, clearly to uncover for you the whole power ( ύ α ι ) of rhetoric ... for you know, I suppose, that these dockyards and the Athenians walls and the preparation of the harbours came into being from Themistocles counsel, and others from Pericles , but not from the craftsmen ... and whenever there is a choice involving the things you were just now speaking of, Socrates, you see that the rhetors are the ones who give counsel and victoriously carry their resolutions about these things. Socrates: And it is in amazement at these things, Gorgias, that I have long been asking what in the world the power ( ύ α ίς) of rhetoric is. For it manifestly appears to me as demonic in greatness, when I consider it in this way. Gorgias: If only you knew the whole of it, Socrates – that it gathers together and holds under itself all the powers ( ύ ά 13 ις), so to speak ... on many occasions now I have gone in with my brother and with other Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. 8|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. doctors to one of the sick who was unwilling either to drink a drug or submit himself to the doctor for surgery or cautery; the doctor being unable (οὐ α έ ο ) to persuade him, I persuaded him, by no other expertise than rhetoric (455d-456b). This speech is, as Barney says, Gorgias advertisement of rhetoric to prospective students.14 Yet the passage also offers strong evidence that Gorgias main concern is with the power that can be wielded by the skilful exponent of rhetoric. Rhetoric is presented as an expertise that endows one with power over all the specific domains, pre-eminently, but not exclusively, the domain of political and judicial decision-making. There is no explicit mention of the just and the unjust in this advertisement of rhetoric (which, again, is not to deny the importance of the concepts of justice and injustice in the political and legal domains for the success of the rhetorician) and this fits with what is said about Gorgias in the Meno (96c); namely that, unlike the other sophists, he did not claim to teach virtue (ἀ ή and even ridiculed those who did so claim. Gorgias primary focus is upon the fact that one who is able to speak well ( ὸ ἰ ῖ α ό , 456c) is also able to exercise power over all other domains of human life, including the political and legal domains. )nstructive in this context is Gorgias claim that rhetoric gathers and under itself all other areas of expertise.15 If one assumes that all areas of expertise hold sway over a particular domain of objects (e.g. arithmetic holds sway over numbers and flute-making over flutes), then what rhetoric seems to hold sway over in Gorgias account, if anything, are the souls of its listeners. Gorgias indeed assents to Socrates contention that rhetoric exercises its persuasion on the souls of its listeners (453a). On the assumption that for the rhetorician power, in the sense of both power over domination and power to freedom , is the greatest good, then influence over human souls may be regarded as such an all-embracing form of power. Rhetoric thus claims to provide one with the capacity to attain what one wishes – generally what is considered to be pleasant – whether this is genuinely good or not in the Socratic sense. The way that rhetoric promotes this end is by allowing its exponent to exercise power over souls through persuasion. Viewed from this perspective, then, Gorgianic rhetoric is not just the skill of persuasive speeches, but implicitly embodies an alternative account of the good as power over others and freedom to fulfil one s desires. This, as I suggest below, is an important source of Plato s animus against the sophists that is not reducible to the fact that they are manipulative or deceptive. 14 R. Barney, Gorgias’ Defence: Plato and his Opponents on Rhetoric and the Good, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 88:1 (2010), 95-121. 15 Cf. G.R. Carone, Socratic Rhetoric in the Gorgias , Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2005), 221-242. 9|P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. The argument Gorgias presents in defence of rhetoric, which follows his advertisement, is generally regarded by modern commentators as fallacious, despite the use of a similar argument by Socrates in the Apology (33a-b) and its appropriation in modified forms by Isocrates, Aristotle and Quintilian.16 Gorgias claim that rhetoric is analogous to agonistic skills such as pancration and boxing, insofar as we should blame and execute students who use the relevant skills unjustly, rather than their teachers, who do not intend the skill to be used unjustly, fails primarily for the reason identified by Murray: Gorgias claim that he does not tell students to use rhetoric unjustly is quite empty, insofar as he advertises his expertise based on its capacity to bring power to those who possess it.17 In addition, it is plausible that Plato is placing in question the status of rhetoric, of the kind advertised by Gorgias, to be a morally neutral instrument; it is rather inherently morally questionable because it encourages its practitioners to value power over knowledge of the good. The parallel with more explicitly agonistic pursuits thus fails from the Platonic perspective, insofar as it is misleading to say that students can pervert the expertise of rhetoric (unlike, say, learning how to fight so as to participate in harmless competition or for self-defence) when it has no defined end, except power, which is not defined in moral terms. Rhetoric, according to Gorgias presentation of it, endows one with the power to dominate others and do what one wants, in political contexts, but also by promoting the fulfilment of desires. Gorgias is unconcerned with justice in the Socratic sense until he is forced to narrow his definition of the subject matter of rhetoric and subsequently refuted. Moreover, the tone of Gorgias subsequent admission a that he would teach justice to a prospective student who came to him ignorant of such matters suggests disinterested complaisance and ambivalence regarding Socrates intellectualist equation of knowledge of justice and consequent just action. It would be too strong a conclusion to draw that Gorgias is simply disinterested in the question of justice in conventional or Socratic terms. Plato depicts Gorgias confusion about the precise nature of the relationship between his expertise and justice as genuine. It would therefore be more accurate to say that Gorgias is interested in the just and the unjust only insofar as such notions are instrumental to the successful exercise of power through persuasive speech. 16 See Barney ( Gorgias’ Defence ), 109-113. It is important to note that at Apology (33a-b) Socrates denies being a teacher, while Gorgias does not deny being able to teach his students how to speak persuasively about justice and injustice. This is again consistent with my argument that the claim to be able to teach prospective students about justice and injustice is not an empty concession by Gorgias, but rather only makes sense in the broader context of the subordination of the just and the unjust to power for the rhetorician. 17 Murray ( Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias’ Art of Rhetoric ), 359. 10 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Section 2: Sophistry and the Demos In the first section I argued for two claims. The first was that Gorgias primary concern is with the power of rhetoric and that his statements on its just and unjust use should be understood in this context. The second was that Gorgias responses to Socrates, although they certainly reveal a deep and underlying confusion as to the nature of his expertise and its ethical consequences from a Platonic perspective, demonstrate a commitment to the view that persuasive speech is the means to the greatest good of power. Rhetoric endows one with the power to dominate others, but it also offers the freedom to further one s own interests and actualise one s desires, whatever these might be. In the current section I examine the implications of these claims for )rwin s thesis that the sophists are not so much radical critics of conventional morality, as mouthpieces for common sense beliefs. I suggest that )rwin s characterisation of Plato s view of the sophists needs to be qualified by recognition of the sense in which the beliefs of the sophists are, because situated within a pedagogy that seeks to profit from commonly-held views on power and pleasure, both more self-conscious and more dangerous than those of the many. Irwin rejects the widely-held view that Plato was critical of the sophists because of their role in the decline of conventional Athenian morality.18 The centrepiece of this interpretation of Plato s view of the sophists is the following passage from the Republic vi: Or do you think, as the many do, that some of the young men are corrupted by sophists, and that some private individuals who are sophists corrupt them, to any extent worth speaking of? Aren t the many who say these things the greatest sophists themselves? Don t they educate people most completely? Don t they form the sorts of characters they want in young people and old, in men and women alike (492a-b; )rwin s translation). On Plato s view, )rwin contends, the sophists are not radical critics of conventional morality, but rather, in presenting their so-called wisdom, they simply follow the preferences of the many, without having independent knowledge of their own (493b-c . 19 This does not entail that everything the sophists say is false; it is rather the case that the sophists, from Plato s 18 T. Irwin, Plato's Objections to the Sophists, in C.A. Powell (ed.) The Greek World (London: Routledge, 1995), 577. Irwin sides with Dodds in the debate as to whether Gorgias’ was a sophist. Nothing decisive hangs on this for my argument; on the assumption that Gorgias was a sophist, then )rwin’s claims regarding Plato’s view of the sophists would apply to him. 19 )rwin Plato's Objections to the Sophists , 5 . 11 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. perspective, lack the critical capacity to distinguish the true and the reasonable from the false and unjustified. 20 Irwin links the Republic passage just cited with the claim in the Sophist that sophists deal solely in appearances (236b-c and Protagoras conflation of the thesis that virtue is teachable with the Athenian belief that members of the Athenian polis teach the younger generation virtue collectively (Protagoras, 328a-c). The upshot, Irwin contends, is that for Plato the sophists are, if anything, too accepting of conventional beliefs and common sense. )rwin s thesis rests on the plausible assumption that the common sense moral outlook is deeply flawed from Plato s perspective.21 In particular, the common sense moral outlook promotes the belief that acting justly serves the interests of other people and acting unjustly one s own self-interest.22 As a result, our ethical and political obligations with respect to justice are grounded in an instrumentalist concern for the external consequences of just and unjust acts rather than an apprehension of the benefits of justice from the perspective of human flourishing. The conjunction of the views of Irwin just outlined with the argument regarding power in the first section suggests the following picture of Plato s presentation of Gorgias. Gorgias advocacy of rhetoric represents a claim to be able to impart an expertise, persuasive speech, which enables one to attain power. As Irwin suggests, this view on the power of rhetoric is not as radical as it might first appear. At 456c-457c, Gorgias operates with a Simonidean conception of justice as helping friends and harming enemies, which may indeed be regarded, in the Athenian context, as a commitment of common sense. Of course, as suggested in section one, Gorgias claims for rhetoric s power seem confused and often overblown. )n particular, Gorgias advertisement for rhetoric s omnipotence is contradicted by his concession that teachers of rhetoric are subject to hatred, exile or even death (457b). Yet Gorgias exaggerated claims for rhetoric s influence can be understood to reflect an underlying tension in the common sense perspective, which regards power over others and freedom to do as one wishes to be the greatest good, but also recognises the importance of paying heed to a less selfish conception of justice in the political domain. The tension between these perspectives might indeed lead one to conclude, with Doyle, that Gorgias commitments are insufficiently coherent to allow us to say that he qualifies as having any genuine beliefs about justice at all. This would simply reflect an incoherence in the common sense view of justice held by both the many and sophists. Plausible as this picture is, the analysis in the previous section suggests that it is incorrect to identify Gorgias views with those of the many without qualification. Common sense 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid, 379. 12 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. conventional morality reflects, from the Platonic perspective presented in the Republic, an apparent tension between recognition of the external benefits that can flow from the appearance of justice and commitment to the view that significant advantages can be gained from acting unjustly when this is either undetected or does not attract the sanction of the political community. In Book ii, Glaucon and Adeimantos suggest that this tension is present in Homer, traditional myths about the gods, tragic playwrights and everyday maxims regarding morality (362e-365c). Perhaps the most explicit expression of the aforementioned tension in the common sense view of justice is found in Glaucon s discussion of the Ring of Gyges (360b-d). In this passage, Glaucon suggests that injustice is in reality more beneficial than justice, and that someone who wore the ring of Gyges, but who nonetheless acted justly, would be considered a fool by his fellow citizens. The underlying thesis is that justice is a virtue that is only beneficial when it brings rewards in the form of external approval or reward. The identification of this tension in the common sense view of justice, however, follows the explicit assertion by Thrasymachus in Book i (338c) that justice, properly understood, is the interest of the stronger (insofar as political regimes call just those norms that suit their own sectional interests). Thrasymachus claim, however, is not simply that one would be foolish to act justly in the absence of external social pressures and constraints. In his exchange with Socrates, Thrasymachus implies that many members of political communities accept the views on justice and injustice promulgated by those in power either because of gullibility or weak acquiescence in the self-interested polices and decisions of the established regime. In particular, the suggestion by Thrasymachus that justice is a form of high-minded simplicity c-e) criticises the common sense perspective on justice insofar as that perspective implies that justice in a conventional sense can in fact lead to beneficial consequences for citizens in a political context. Thrasymachus claim that justice is in the interest of the stronger, by contrast, does not simply point to the tension between the virtue of justice and its external benefits. It rather debunks the claims of justice as an other-directed virtue altogether by suggesting that to act justly is to serve the interests of those in power. Implicit in this debunking of justice as a virtue is, as Barney says, an alternative conception of the good based on wealth and power, and the pleasures they can afford, insofar as these are the goods in relation to which our advantage must be assessed. 23 Gorgias advertisement of the power of rhetoric is similar in its structure and implications. As argued in the previous section, Gorgias implicitly presents a conception of the good as power. Like Thrasymachus, Gorgias seeks to make money and achieve fame through propagating a 23 R. Barney, Callicles and Thrasymachus Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/callicles-thrasymachus/ (last accessed 21 July 2015.) 13 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. teaching regarding rhetoric s capacity to provide power over others and the freedom to realise whatever desires one might wish. And, as I also demonstrated in section 1, the apparent confusion in Gorgias beliefs regarding justice is best understood as a reflection of a lack of commitment to the importance of such categories except insofar as they are an essential part of the arsenal of the rhetorician who wishes to promote their own interests in the public domain. What is distinctive of the sophistic education criticised by Plato is its tendency to subordinate concern for virtue to the putative goods of power and material gain (see, in particular, Apology 19d, Euthydemus 304b-c, Hippias Major 282b-e, Protagoras 312c-d and Sophist 222d-224d). Whilst this is not in itself sufficient to differentiate the views of the sophists from those of the many, the fact that the sophists make money on the basis of a teaching that promotes this subordination of virtue to worldly concerns distinguishes their position. Marina McCoy captures this point well when she notes that Socrates suggests that the sophists are different from ordinary members of the public, insofar as the former are quite self-conscious of what they are doing in feeding back to the many their own views. 24 There is an important distinction, from the Platonic perspective, between holding an arguably inconsistent set of beliefs and making a living through the exploitation of a subset of those beliefs. It would be incorrect, moreover, to infer from the undeniable fact that Gorgias articulates an inconsistent set of beliefs regarding the justice of rhetoric that he does not hold the belief that rhetoric is what allows one to attain the greatest good of power. This is something that Gorgias explicitly asserts and defends d . Gorgias position suggests not only a rejection of Socratic intellectualism, but also the view that one would be naive to be overly concerned with justice as an other-directed virtue. For Gorgias, I have suggested, rhetoric gives one comprehensive power in terms of the capacity to exercise domination over others and freedom to do as one desires. From this perspective the just and unjust and other related ethical and political concepts derive from, or need to be understood in terms of, a particular power claim that is best actualised through persuasive speech. Gorgias s statements about rhetoric can thus be taken to entail that it is not just a technique that enables one to exert influence and persuade in relation to preexisting conceptions of what is just and unjust, but rather a form of power which supports the free satisfaction of material desires.25 This last claim requires further elaboration. 24 M. McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 125. 25 Benardete’s emphasis upon the moralistic attitude of Gorgias appears, in this context at least, overstated. S. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), 5-30. 14 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. )n section one ) argued that Gorgias advertisement of the omnipotence of rhetoric is based on the claim that it endows one with the power to dominate others and the freedom to further one s own interests and actualise one s desires, whatever these might be. As Dodds in particular argues, the dramatic structure of the dialogue – in particular the deflection of the conversation away from Gorgias to the views of those influenced by his teaching – is strongly suggestive of the fact that Gorgias commitment to power as the greatest good reflects an underlying hedonism (483c-486d).26 Gorgias grandiose claim for the power of rhetoric anticipates Callicles equation of natural justice with the rule of the stronger and superior and of conventional justice with a form of slave morality imposed by the weak on the strong, insofar as it entails that the ultimate ends, for those sufficiently strong, are domination and desirefulfilment. The defences of the tyrannical life by Polus and Callicles (470d-471d; 491d-492c) are thus a natural extension from the position of Gorgias regarding the power of rhetorical speech to enable one to realise one s desires. )f one regards power to realise one s desires as the ultimate good this suggests a sensual hedonism without limit, precisely the target of Socrates in his exchange with Callicles (492d-494e). A key component of such a hedonistic view is that otherdirected virtues such as justice serve as conventional constraints on our desires and appetites. This interpretation of Plato s intentions in the Gorgias coheres well with the broader condemnation of sophistry in the Platonic dialogues. Although it is obviously not possible to explore all the implications of this point here, I will briefly discuss one instructive example. The most obvious characterisation of the distinction between philosophy and sophistry from an epistemic perspective is that the sophist's stock-in-trade is false belief whereas by contrast the philosopher aims at knowledge or at least true belief (Sophist, 264d and Meno, 86c). Equally significant, however, is Plato s suggestion in the Phaedrus and the Symposium that the philosopher s orientation by the forms has an irreducible erotic aspect of striving after wisdom that contrasts with sophistic subordination of knowledge to worldly success.27 Plato s presentation of the sophist Protagoras is illustrative of this aspect of his critique of sophistry. In the Theaetetus, Plato presents Protagoras as saying that, whatever in any particular city is considered just and admirable, is in fact just and admirable in that city, for so long as the convention remains in place 26 c . Plato s suggestion in this passage is that Protagoras blurs the Dodds (Plato’s Gorgias), 15: Gorgias’ teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit. 27 See, in particular, D. Roochnik, The Erotics of Philosophical Discourse, History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987), 117-129; P.W. Ludwig, Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and McCoy (Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists), 118-123. 15 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. distinction between opinion and knowledge in a way intended to facilitate acceptance of the validity of the conventions, and material goods, of the city. Protagoras teaching, that is to say, does not simply repeat the views of the many (as Irwin s interpretation suggests), but rather points to the conventional character of the virtues and identifies the good with the pleasant (355b).28 As with Gorgias prioritisation of the omnipotence of rhetorical ς over justice, Protagoras account of virtue reflects its subordination, on the sophistic view, to power and desire-fulfilment. Gorgias promise to allow his students to attain whatever they desire through the power of rhetoric is obviously the more extravagant claim. Ultimately, however, both the Protagoras and the Gorgias explore the implications of subordinating concern for the virtues to a hedonistic conception of the good.29 Accordingly, the Platonic critique of sophistry rests not only on the claim that the sophist rests content with common sense views, but that he exploits the confused moral perception of the many due to his own desire for worldly success and power. From the perspective of their underlying ethical commitments and values, certainly, the sophists and the many share a common viewpoint. Although the sophists may pride themselves on their intellectually radical awareness of the nature of conventional morality, Plato seeks to represent this understanding as ultimately informed by a confused commitment to power and pleasure as the greatest goods. As the Gorgias and the opening two books of the Republic in particular suggest, moreover, the sophists articulate, consistent with )rwin s interpretation, a commonly held view of the nature of justice and human agency that is guided by external benefits rather than the genuine flourishing of the individual and community. The sophists nonetheless differ from the many by virtue of their exploitation of what is, from Plato s perspective, a confused ethical understanding. By incorporating this confused ethical understanding within a pedagogical framework, the sophist not only possesses a greater level of self-consciousness regarding the status of power and pleasure as the ultimate objectives, but also has the capacity to exert an especially corruptive moral influence. Significant in this regard is Socrates characterisation of sophistry and rhetoric in the Gorgias as defective forms of legislation and justice respectively (464b-466a). This is suggestive of the fact that for Plato sophists and rhetoricians do exercise a more pernicious influence than the many because they are capable of playing a formative role in the ethical and political life of the polis. In his closing discussion with Callicles, Socrates points out that well-reputed politicians 28 It is also significant in this context that Protagoras refers to goodness as something that is relative to the person and the situation (334a-c) and focusses in the same passage upon physical goods such as food, drink, drugs and cosmetics. 29 Cf. Xenophon, Cynēgeticus, 13.1-9. 16 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. such as Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles have erred in gratifying the desires of the many and are just as unreasonable as sophists when they complain that those they have educated turn out to be unjust towards them (517b-519d). Although sophists and the Athenian politicians mentioned above may ultimately share the same underlying concern as the many for power and pleasure as the greatest goods, Socrates suggests, those who are in a position to educate or shape political deliberation and its outcomes can be attributed with a higher level of culpability. )n light of the foregoing, )rwin s thesis regarding Plato s view of the sophists needs to be qualified as follows. Plato s critique of sophists such as Gorgias indeed relates their views regarding power and pleasure to the inchoate beliefs of the many. The sophists nonetheless both bring the fault lines of conventional morality into sharper view and promote what is, at least from the Platonic perspective, a fundamentally confused understanding of the human good. They do this insofar as they promulgate a teaching on the priority of power, in the senses of both domination over others and freedom to realise the desires one happens to have, over the virtues. Gorgias position suggests an alternative picture of the good as power. This conception of the good is reflected in the sophists own recommended way of life, or practical orientation by the goods of power and pleasure. Gorgias ambivalence and complacent acquiescence regarding whether he would teach a prospective student about the just and the unjust is thus best regarded as falling out of a set of inchoate beliefs about the omnipotence of speech and a commitment to the thesis that power is the greatest good. Gorgias can afford to assume a casual stance towards the just and unjust, in the sense of what is conventionally regarded as such within a particular political community, insofar as he implicitly regards such concepts as derivative from the power of speech to promote domination over others and the fulfilment of material desires. 17 | P a g e Please do not cite this preliminary version. The final version will appear in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 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