Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict Oxford Handbooks Online Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict J. Christopher Cohrs The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict Edited by Linda R. Tropp Print Publication Date: Jul 2012 Online Publication Date: Nov 2012 Subject: Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199747672.013.0004 Abstract and Keywords This chapter first introduces the concept of ideology, how it is distinct from similar concepts, and how its content can be described. Ideologies are defined as socially shared systems of beliefs about the ideal arrangement of society. The chapter then reviews research on the relations between ideology and violent conflict at the individual, group, and societal levels of analysis. It suggests that: at the individual level, ideological beliefs of authoritarianism and social dominance are related to variables associated with violent conflict; at the group level, ideological groups (groups based on shared ideological beliefs) engage in collective action, which can spur violent conflict once a legitimate target of violence is identified; and at the societal level, particular ideological climates can make societies more prone to engage in violence. Finally, the chapter proposes an integrative multilevel framework for understanding the role of ideology for violent conflict, and identifies directions for future research. Keywords: Ideology, values, sociopolitical attitudes, conflict, violence, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, opinion-based groups, levels of analysis Introduction Ideologies are an important basis of conflict. As visions of the ideal arrangement of society, they provide individuals and groups with ideas about what political issues are worth fighting for—be it, for example, individual freedom, women's or minority rights, power, or ethnonational homogeneity and purity. Different ideologies emphasize different political causes to fight for. Ideologies provide a justification for political struggle and can propel people to political action. Ideologies, thus, are an important part of political and social life, and they inherently carry the potential for conflict. Although conflict is a necessary and potentially constructive feature of political and social life, in particular circumstances ideologies can take destructive forms and contribute to violent courses of conflict. Hence, ideologies have been identified as guiding forces for violent conflicts around the world and throughout history, including, for example, the wars of the Ottoman Empire (Guilmartin, 1988), the Holocaust and the Cambodian genocide (Staub, 1989), the Cold War (Graebner, 1976), the Northern Ireland conflict (Ruane & Todd, 1996), and the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s (Ugarriza, 2009). It is this destructive role of ideologies that is the main focus of the present chapter. Although ideology has been defined in different ways and examined by academics from a range of disciplines including political theory, philosophy, literature, sociology, and political science (e.g., Eagleton, 2007), the present chapter adopts a largely social psychological perspective. First, I will introduce the concept of ideology, its distinction from related concepts, its content, and its multilevel character. Then, in the main part of the chapter, I will present empirical research on ideology and (p. 54) violent conflict at three levels of analysis: individual, group, and societal. The individual level of analysis focuses on ideological beliefs of individuals, what the consequences of ideological beliefs are for individual behavior, and why different individuals hold different ideological beliefs. The group level of analysis focuses on socially shared ideological beliefs in social groups or Page 1 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict collectives of individuals, what the consequences of socially shared ideological beliefs are for collective behavior, and why different groups hold different ideological beliefs. The societal level of analysis focuses on the broader societal or cultural background in which ideologies are placed, what the consequences of ideological climates are for societal or cultural processes, and why different societies have different ideological climates. In the final part of the chapter, I will integrate insights from research at these three levels of analysis into a broader framework for understanding the role of ideologies as a basis and catalyst of violent conflict. When talking about violent conflict, the concept of violence is meant to include, following Galtung's (1969) distinction, both personal (direct) and structural (indirect) violence. In this way, violence exists wherever physical or psychological harm is done to human beings. Such harm can be caused directly, acutely, by the intentional use of force as well as indirectly, continuously, by the political, social, and economic structures that are in place in a society and globally (Christie, 1997; Wagner, 1988). Like other integrative approaches to ideology in social psychology, this framework has many gaps that can only be filled with the help of other academic disciplines. The Concept of Ideology and Its Multilevel Nature Since ancient times, going back as far as Plato's major treatise Politeia, political philosophers and theorists have debated how society should ideally be arranged. Different traditions of thought have developed in this debate, advancing different positions known as, for example, liberalism, conservatism, socialism, or fascism (e.g., Heywood, 1992). At their core, these terms refer to more or less coherent sets or systems of beliefs or visions about how society should ideally be organized or arranged. Accordingly, ideologies can be defined as systems of beliefs about the ideal arrangement of society. Ideologies as Systems of Beliefs In elaborating on the definition of ideology, it is important to distinguish it from similar concepts. Because different scholars have somewhat different understandings of ideology, this is a difficult task. There seems to be a consensus that ideologies consist of evaluative beliefs, which reflect positivity or negativity toward particular entities (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 2003). They subsume particular sets of attitudes (tendencies to evaluate an object positively or negatively) and values (ideals that guide thought and action). It also seems to be consensual that ideologies have a prescriptive character (Maio et al., 2003). They thus have considerable influence on feelings, goals, and actions. The prescriptive character is shared with the concept of injunctive norms (i.e., beliefs about what is commonly approved of in society; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Evaluative beliefs presuppose the existence of possible alternatives; they cannot be true or false. As such they can be distinguished from factual beliefs (i.e., knowledge), which can be judged against certain truth criteria or rules of evidence (van Dijk, 1998). And here dissent among scholars exists: do ideologies consist only of evaluative beliefs or do they also include factual beliefs? On first sight, ideologies as systems of beliefs about how society should be do not refer to beliefs about how matters factually are in society. However, the truth criteria or rules of evidence against which factual beliefs can be judged are socially constructed and thus subject to influences of ideology themselves (van Dijk, 1998). For example, the belief that there is gender discrimination may be considered true for proponents of one ideology (e.g., feminism), but false for proponents of another ideology (e.g., conservatism).1 Accordingly, ideologies can be defined more broadly as comprising both evaluative and factual beliefs (e.g., Eatwell, 1993). Such a broader definition of ideology comes very close to definitions of worldviews: coherent systems of beliefs about the social world that combine both factual and evaluative elements (Duckitt, 2001a). It also overlaps with definitions of societal beliefs or ethos: beliefs about topics and issues that are of special concern for the society (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Dgani-Hirsh, 2009). However, it may be argued that the prescriptive character of ideology is primary, whereas the prescriptive elements of worldviews and societal beliefs are derivatives of factual, descriptive, epistemic elements. Another similar concept, finally, is that of ideological narratives: stories that reconstruct the past, describe the present, and imagine the future of society or a particular segment of society (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Hammack, 2008). (p. 55) The Content of Ideologies Page 2 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict Ideologies focus on societal or sociopolitical issues. They are systems of beliefs about the ideal arrangement of society. In this sense they are more specific than, for example, attitudes, values, norms, or worldviews (Staerklé, 2009). The potential content of ideologies is defined by the universe of potential societal arrangements. How can we conceive of these alternative arrangements of societies? Cultural and cross-cultural research suggests that societies can differ on several fundamental dimensions. Cultural theory posits that societies differ in terms of “group” and “grid” (Douglas, 1978; Gross & Rayner, 1985). The “group” dimension refers to the degree to which individuals are incorporated into social groups. This dimension is characterized at one end by strong group boundaries, group influence on individual decisions, social pressure to conform to group norms, and frequent interaction in a wide range of activities (solidaristic or communitarian social order), and at the other by weak group boundaries, individual choice, freedom to deviate from group norms, and infrequent interaction (individualistic social order). The “grid” dimension refers to the absence or presence of social classifications that constrain people's behavior and prescribe rules. In high-grid societies classifications based on categories such as sex, race, class, family status, or age determine the types of activities that individuals are allowed to engage in (hierarchical social order), whereas in low-grid societies no such category-specific social norms constrain people's rights, duties, and opportunities to participate in different types of activities (egalitarian social order). Quite similarly, in his theory of cultural values, Schwartz (1999, 2006) assumes that societies face three fundamental questions and can differ in what responses they adopt: (1) how to organize the relationship and boundaries between individuals and groups (autonomy vs. embeddedness); (2) how to manage interdependence among individuals so that their welfare is considered and tasks necessary to maintain society are fulfilled (egalitarianism vs. hierarchy); and (3) how to manage the relationship of society with its social and natural environment (harmony vs. mastery or exploitation).2 The first dimension is similar to “group,” and the second dimension is similar to “grid”; the third dimension, concerning the relationship of society with its environment, is not covered by Douglas's (1978) model. If these broad conceptual dimensions cover the space of potential arrangements of society, and ideologies are about ideal arrangements of society, then the content of particular ideologies should relate to any (or any combination) of these dimensions. Indeed, researchers have identified ideological constructs that closely match the three dimensions: for the first dimension, social conformity versus individual autonomy as the core of authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003); for the second dimension, social dominance versus equality among groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994); and for the third dimension, international harmony versus national strength (Braithwaite, 1994). However, ideologies would typically combine content from more than one of these dimensions and thus be more holistic in nature. Ideologies further vary according to their generality. They can be universalistic (i.e., visions of the ideal society in general, termed “better world ideologies” by Staub, 1999) or particularistic (i.e., visions of the ideal arrangement of one's own society). Ideologies can also range from being more totalistic in focus (e.g., full-blown ideologies such as socialism or fascism) to more molecular or partial, focusing only on particular aspects of society (e.g., gender relations or environmental issues; Schwarzmantel, 2008). In general, more specific ideologies can derive from broader ideologies (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2008; Ugarriza, 2009). For instance, a broader ideology that represents a preference for social hierarchies among groups in general may pave the ground for the formation of a more specific ideology that represents preferences for particular positions within a social hierarchy for specific groups (e.g., particular gender role beliefs, or denial of particular rights for immigrants). As another example, consider the three main components of Nazi ideology: (1) the Führerprinzip (leadership principle), (2) the belief in Aryan superiority and anti-Semitism, and (3) the idea of Lebensraum (expansionism) (Staub, 1989). These components seem to be specific (and very extreme) exemplifications of broader, more general preferences about (1) social conformity and authoritarianism, (2) social hierarchies and dominance, and (3) mastery and exploitation of the social and natural environment. The distinction between broader and more specific ideologies is similar to Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway's (2003, Footnote 2) distinction between a relatively stable ideological core and its more malleable surface manifestation in peripheral ideological issues. However, the process of deriving more specific from more general ideologies, or the question of whether a more general ideology is (p. 56) applicable to a particular political issue, is subject to social negotiation (Billig et al., 1988). Page 3 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict The Multilevel Character of Ideologies The discussion of the concept of ideology so far has focused on the sorts of beliefs ideologies consist of as well as the content of those beliefs. However, there is one very important additional feature of ideologies: ideologies are belief systems that are socially shared. They are primarily the property of social groups, that is, the “product of collective thought” (Eatwell, 1993, p. 10). They “can act as a form of social cement, providing social groups, or indeed whole societies, with a set of unifying beliefs and values” (Heywood, 1992, p. 5). Thus, even though ideologies are held by individuals, there are no idiosyncratic individual or personal ideologies; rather, individuals hold personal versions of socially shared ideologies (van Dijk, 1998). With this feature of ideologies added, the working definition used in this chapter becomes complete: Ideologies are socially shared systems of beliefs about the ideal arrangement of society. To further illustrate the point that ideological belief systems are socially shared, consider the concept of opinionbased groups introduced by Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, and Muntele (2007; see also McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). These researchers argue that groups are not always defined by objective characteristics (e.g., class, gender, regional origin). Rather, it is usually groups based on particular beliefs that are shared among their members that become effective political actors; examples include opponents to the so-called war on terror (Musgrove & McGarty, 2008) or supporters of international development (Thomas & McGarty, 2009). Indeed, such groups that are defined around shared beliefs exert a particularly strong influence on their members' thoughts, feelings, goals, and actions (Bliuc et al., 2007; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). If ideologies are thus understood as belief systems that are shared among members of an ideological group, the aforementioned prescriptive character of ideologies becomes clear. In addition to the group level of analysis, which focuses on the socially shared ideological beliefs in groups and takes into account the primacy of collective processes, a more complete understanding of ideology requires that the individual and societal levels of analysis be incorporated (see also Doise, 1986; Pettigrew, 1998). The individual level is important because different individuals subscribe to different ideologies to different degrees. The ideological belief systems of individuals may thus not correspond perfectly to socially shared ideologies. In fact, the mainstream perspective in social and political psychology focuses on this individual level of analysis (e.g., Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). The societal level is important because groups exist in a particular society that provides a particular ideological climate. Differences in the ideological climate influence the content of ideologies, in particular the content about which ideologies compete in society. For example, beliefs that are consensually shared in society (e.g., in today's liberal democracies, that slavery is unacceptable) are not considered part of ideologies (Billig et al., 1988). However, it becomes clear that they may well be ideological if viewed from a crosscultural or diachronic perspective which reveals possible alternative beliefs (e.g., in preabolition United States, that slavery is acceptable). In line with this multilevel character of ideology, the following three parts of the chapter discuss research on ideology and the relationship between ideology and violent conflict at the individual level, the group level, and the societal level of analysis, respectively. The individual level of analysis focuses on the role of ideological beliefs, the group level on the role of ideological groups, and the societal level on the role of ideological climates. The final part discusses the interplay among the processes at these levels, providing an integrative framework for understanding the role of ideologies as a basis and catalyst of violent conflict. Ideologies and Violent Conflict: Individual Processes Research on ideologies at the individual level of analysis requires measuring individuals' ideological belief systems, and relating these belief systems to other variables in which individuals may differ. Within this body of literature, in line with the general inclination of psychologists to think in terms of quantitative dimensions, most research has examined dimensions rather than holistic systems of ideological beliefs in which individuals differ. Alternative conceptualizations of individuals' ideological beliefs are discussed in the next section, followed by a summary of their role for violent conflict, and a discussion of their determinants. Conceptualizations of Ideological Beliefs of Individuals Page 4 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict A question that has received much debate is how useful it is to describe the structure of individuals' ideological beliefs along one dimension (i.e., liberalism vs. conservatism, left vs. right). (p. 57) A one-dimensional view is simple and appealing (Jost et al., 2009). Political elites and commentators make relatively easy and regularly use of a liberalism versus conservatism (or left vs. right) dimension in political discourse and decision making. Lay people can also easily relate to this dimension. Most people have no problem placing themselves on such a continuum. This general dimension of ideological beliefs is typically defined as summarizing preferences for, on the one hand, a stable and nonegalitarian society where traditions, the status quo, and inequality are respected versus, on the other, social change toward a society characterized by greater equality (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). However, despite its appeal, a one-dimensional conceptualization might be too simple. The position of particular ideologies on this continuum is not always clear. Communism and socialism are not simply more extreme versions of liberalism, and fascism is not simply a more extreme version of conservatism (e.g., Van Hiel, 2012). For instance, even though conservatism is more right-wing than liberalism in its association with free-market capitalism, fascism, despite clearly being more right-wing than conservatism, is characterized by state control of the economy (Heywood, 1992). Moreover, the link between resistance to change and acceptance of inequality (or, at the other end of the continuum, between advocacy for change and support for equality) is due to the fact that most Western societies have historically become more equal over time (Jost et al., 2003, 2009). Thus, the link may not be universal, and the position toward social change should depend on the actual arrangement of society in a particular sociopolitical context. For example, in a highly egalitarian society conservatives may be for social change. Thus, both conservative and liberal ideologies (as well as others) can imply defense of the existing conditions or advocacy for social change (Eatwell, 1993; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Heywood, 1992). Accordingly, what ideological positions people associate with “liberal” and “conservative” or with “left” and “right” differs across contexts (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981; Evans & Whitefield, 1998; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Zechmeister, 2006). In contexts of threat and violent conflict, for example, the left versus right dimension seems to be heavily driven by people's “dovish” versus “hawkish” orientation toward a potential enemy (e.g., in Israel; Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Diskin, 1999). Because of these problems of the one-dimensional approach to ideological beliefs, various authors have proposed two-dimensional approaches. Such approaches are supported by findings that two dimensions of ideological beliefs can often be distinguished factor-analytically. The exact conceptualizations differ somewhat, but are highly similar to one another (for an overview, see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Among these are distinctions between a culturalsocial and an economic dimension of liberalism versus conservatism (e.g., Hughes, 1975; Middendorp, 1991), between a dimension of individual freedom versus moral regulation and a dimension of compassion versus competition (Ashton et al., 2005), and between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Altemeyer, 1998). Although these two dimensions of ideological beliefs are often not entirely uncorrelated and often associated with the same variables (e.g., generalized prejudice), they also have distinguishing correlates. They differ in their personality bases (e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) as well as in their consequences, such as prejudices toward different types of groups and in different contexts (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). The first dimension of ideological beliefs, exemplified by the construct of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), relates primarily to Schwartz's (2006) first fundamental question societies face: how to organize the relationship between individuals and groups. It describes a dimension of ideology indicating preferences for a society in which people subordinate their individuality to the collective as represented by social conventions and traditions, submit to established authorities and leaders, and are punished when they are socially deviant (Altemeyer, 1981). The core of this dimension is whether it is considered good for society if individuals are autonomous or if people conform to social norms (Feldman, 2003). The second dimension of ideological beliefs, exemplified by the construct of social dominance orientation (SDO), relates primarily to Schwartz's (2006) second fundamental question societies have to address: how to manage interdependence among people so that tasks necessary to maintain society are fulfilled. It refers to a dimension of ideology indicating preferences for a society with clear social hierarchies between groups as opposed to intergroup equality in terms of political and economic power, social status, and possession of material and symbolic social goods in general (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Although two-dimensional conceptualizations of ideological beliefs may be superior to a one-dimensional approach in several ways, they (p. 58) still fall short of representing the content of ideologies comprehensively. First, they do not address Schwartz's (2006) third fundamental question—how to manage the relationship of society with its Page 5 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict social and natural environment: in terms of harmony or mastery/exploitation. Both RWA and SDO have been shown to correlate positively with preferences for a nationalistic and militaristic stance toward other countries (i.e., the social environment) and to correlate negatively with concern for the natural environment and support for policies aiming to protect it (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; McCleary & Williams, 2009; Pratto et al., 1994; Schultz & Stone, 1994). However, such beliefs are not inherent to RWA or SDO. Second, any dimensional approach represents a simplification of the highly complex nature of ideologies as systems of beliefs (Heywood, 1992). Conceptualizations that do not reduce belief systems to underlying dimensions but treat them in a more holistic manner are therefore important alternatives. Conover and Feldman (1984), for example, used Q methodology to explore ideological belief systems among a sample of American students and identified three broad ideological stances (termed “neoconservatism,” “free-market conservatism,” and “democratic socialism”). Each of these stances was related systematically to particular constellations of beliefs in the economic, racial, social, and foreign-affairs domains. In a similar vein, Feldman and Johnston (2009) used latent class analysis to explore ideological belief systems in representative samples of adults in the United States and identified six ideological classes that were characterized by different combinations of particular economic and social beliefs. These are promising approaches that fit better with the idea of holistic ideological belief systems than dimensional approaches. However, there is a serious lack of research along these lines. The Role of Ideological Beliefs of Individuals for Violent Conflict Putting aside the issue of the structure and conceptualization of ideological belief systems of individuals, how do ideological beliefs contribute to violent conflict? To address this question, we have to look at studies that examine variables that are part of the “sociopsychological repertoire” which is involved in the formation, maintenance, and escalation of conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007; see also Bar-Tal & Hammack, this volume). The idea is that individuals who hold particular ideological beliefs are prone to also show beliefs, emotions, attitudes, goals, and behaviors that have a destructive role for violent conflict. In fact, a large body of research has revealed such associations (for an overview, see also Unger, 2002). Some studies suggest relations between the broad dimension of liberalism versus conservatism (or left vs. right) and variables associated with violent conflict. Liberalism versus conservatism has been shown to correlate with different causal attributions for social problems (e.g., Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). For example, among participants from the United States, conservatism was associated with reduced support for providing humanitarian aid for flood victims and communities that had not taken precautions against flood damage, presumably because the victims' fate could be attributed to their own negligence (Skitka, 1999). In other studies conducted with Western participants, conservatism has also been shown to predict explicit and implicit prejudice toward various social groups (e.g., Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Nosek et al., 2007; Weigel & Howes, 1985) and less positive attitudes toward human rights (e.g., Crowson, 2004). Furthermore, among Israeli Jews during the period of the Al Aqsa Intifada, conservatism was related to perceptions of threat from Palestinian citizens of Israel and, in turn, support for exclusionist political attitudes toward them (Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009). However, it is problematic that in most of these studies liberalism versus conservatism (or left vs. right) was measured via a self-identification scale. This is an indirect way of measuring ideological beliefs. Individuals may identify themselves as liberal or conservative for different reasons, based on political symbols or parties in addition to ideological beliefs (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Zechmeister, 2006). Also, different individuals who identify as conservative (or liberal) can in fact have different ideological belief systems. For example, in Feldman and Johnston's (2009) study, for some participants their position on the liberalism versus conservatism continuum was driven by economic beliefs, for others by social beliefs, and for even others by both types of beliefs. It is thus unclear from the studies reviewed above what content of ideological beliefs was driving the associations with variables related to violent conflict. The concepts of RWA and SDO, introduced above, tap ideological belief systems more directly, thus minimizing this problem. The next sections (p. 59) therefore review research on RWA, related to preferences for individual autonomy versus social conformity, and research on SDO, related to preferences for social hierarchies versus intergroup equality. Page 6 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict Right-Wing Authoritarianism A large number of studies, mostly conducted with Western participants, found that RWA correlated with variables associated with the formation, maintenance, or escalation of violent conflict (for a summary, see McFarland, in press). One such variable is prejudice. Although RWA has been shown to predict generalized prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; McFarland, 2010), prejudice based on RWA is primarily directed against groups perceived to be dangerous and threatening to society and groups perceived to be deviant and unwilling to assimilate to mainstream social norms (e.g., Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2010; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). This makes sense given that RWA reflects preferences for social conformity over individual autonomy. Other variables that RWA has been found to be associated with include uncritical and glorifying forms of group identification such as blind patriotism and nationalism (e.g., Blank, 2003; Spry & Hornsey, 2007; for the role of these forms of national identification for violent conflict, see Roccas & Elster, this volume) and religious fundamentalism (among Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Hindus; Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger, Owusu, & Duck, 1999), as well as support for right-wing extremist political beliefs, parties, and leaders (e.g., Canetti & Pedahzur, 2002; Meloen, 1993; Van Hiel, Cornelis, Roets, & De Clercq, 2007). RWA also correlated with tendencies to justify and support various forms of aggressive action, including police shootings of a terrorist suspect (White, Cohrs, & Göritz, 2008), ethnic persecution (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), corporal and capital punishment (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Benjamin, 2006), war and various military interventions (e.g., Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Jackson & Gaertner, 2010; McFarland, 2005), the “war on terror” (e.g., Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2005; Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2007), and more generally restrictions of human rights (e.g., Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). Further research found RWA to also correlate negatively with positive behavior such as engagement in resistance behavior against authorities (Meloen, 1991), providing postwar aid to Iraq (Skitka, McMurray, & Burroughs, 1991), and support for the Middle East peace process (Tibon & Blumberg, 1999). Social Dominance Orientation As with RWA, many studies, again mostly conducted with Western participants, document relations between SDO and variables associated with violent conflict. Again, one of these variables is prejudice. SDO has been shown to predict both generalized prejudice and prejudice toward particular social groups (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammar et al., 2004; McFarland, 2010; Pratto et al., 2000; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). In contrast to RWA, however, prejudice based on SDO is primarily directed against groups perceived to be derogated and subordinate in society and groups perceived to challenge the existing social hierarchy (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2010). This makes sense given that SDO reflects preferences for social hierarchies as opposed to egalitarianism. Other variables that SDO has been found to be associated with include blind patriotism and nationalism (e.g., McFarland, 2005) and tendencies to support aggressive action in various forms, including police behavior in the beating of Rodney King (Sidanius & Liu, 1992), ethnic persecution (Thomsen et al., 2008), capital punishment (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994), and military programs, war, and military interventions (e.g., Jackson & Gaertner, 2010; McFarland, 2005; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998). Further research found SDO to also correlate with general punitiveness (Capps, 2002) and reduced endorsement of civil liberties and human rights (e.g., Cohrs et al., 2007; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). Importantly, among subordinate group members SDO is often more weakly related to variables associated with violent conflict. This phenomenon of ideological asymmetry occurs because ideological beliefs of social dominance serve the interests of dominant groups better than the interests of subordinate groups, as they are more compatible with higher status positions than with lower status positions (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Exemplifying this, Van Hiel and Kossowska (2007) found that an ideological dimension strongly defined by SDO was related to support for the “war on terror” in a Flemish sample, but not in a Polish or a Ukrainian sample. SDO may thus be less consequential for violent conflict as far as members of low status groups are concerned. In some contexts the relations between SDO and variables associated with violent conflict have been (p. 60) found to even reverse. For example, Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) found in a Lebanese sample that SDO was a negative predictor of support for violence toward the West. This suggests that from different Page 7 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict perspectives support for violence can be legitimized by different, even opposite (social dominance oriented vs. egalitarian) ideological beliefs. If individuals perceive society to be highly hierarchical but desire more egalitarian social relations, they may be inclined toward social change and, under the “right” conditions, be in favor of violent means. Conclusion: The Role of Ideological Beliefs of Individuals for Violent Conflict Research on the correlates of ideological belief systems of individuals, reviewed above, has shown that preferences for an authoritarian society and for a hierarchical, nonegalitarian society are related to a wide array of beliefs and attitudes that can contribute to the formation, maintenance, and escalation of violent conflict. These relations may partly be due to different sensitivities to different types of threat associated with different ideologies (see also Staerklé, 2009). For example, RWA implies sensitivity to threats to social norms and cohesion, whereas SDO implies (especially for members of dominant groups) sensitivity to threats to the established hierarchy. However, there is a gap between perceiving threats or obstacles to a particular preferred social arrangement and support for violent conflict. Additional social psychological processes are necessary to bridge this gap. For example, against the background of historical memories and feelings of victimization (see Bilali & Ross, this volume; Vollhardt, this volume), processes such as moral disengagement, delegitimization, and justification of harm (see Bar-Tal & Hammack, this volume; Opotow, this volume) may transform general ideological beliefs into more specific, destructive ideological beliefs that define an enemy group that impedes the fulfillment of the ideal society and thus has to be fought, if necessary by violent means (Staub, 1989, 1999). Processes at the group level of analysis are particularly important for actually taking action on behalf of such ideological beliefs. If individuals perceive normative support (i.e., support by their fellow group members) for their beliefs, they are more likely to engage in behavior in line with their beliefs (Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000). Such group processes will be discussed in more detail further below. Determinants of Ideological Beliefs of Individuals Having established the role of ideological beliefs of individuals for violent conflict, what are their determinants at the individual level of analysis? Jost et al. (2009) suggest that existential, epistemic, and relational concerns influence whether individuals find certain ideologies appealing to them. For example, existential insecurity and epistemic uncertainty seem to drive individuals toward conservative ideologies (Jost et al., 2003; but see also Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). Ideologies can provide individuals with a sense of meaning and a framework for understanding the world. Similarly, Duckitt (2001a) posits that individuals develop certain worldviews and adopt certain ideologies in response to salient motivational goals. Motivational concerns are assumed to arise from personality dispositions in combination with factors of the actual social context. More specifically, a closed-minded and conformist personality disposition together with a dangerous, threatening social context lead to beliefs in a dangerous world and in turn right-wing authoritarian ideological beliefs, while a manipulative, tough-minded personality disposition together with a competitive social context lead to beliefs in a competitive, “dog-eat-dog” world and in turn social-dominance ideological beliefs (Jugert & Duckitt, 2009; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010; Sibley, Harding, Perry, Asbrock, & Duckitt, 2010). Motivational concerns can also derive from the particular position an individual occupies within a group (e.g., Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003). More directly related to conflict, Staub (1989) points to the role of frustrated basic human needs and goals such as for security, a coherent and positive self-concept, self-continuity, effectiveness and control, meaning, understanding of the world, and human connections. Consequentially individuals become attracted to ideologies that can provide hope for a better society and promise the fulfillment of these frustrated needs. In sum, ideological beliefs of individuals arise from particular motivational concerns that have become salient because of individual personality dispositions in combination with factors of the social and societal context. Conversely, the behavior of individuals on behalf of their ideological beliefs may also affect the social and societal context. The following sections, going beyond the individual level of analysis, examine these (inter)group and societal factors in more detail. (p. 61) Ideologies and Violent Conflict: Group Processes Page 8 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict Ideologies are, essentially, the property of social groups, the “product of collective thought” (Eatwell, 1993, p. 10). Although ideologies have traditionally been associated with the life experiences and interests of particular social classes such as the working class or landowners (e.g., Heywood, 1992; van Dijk, 1998), the groups that hold ideologies are not necessarily defined by objective characteristics. Rather, the most relevant groups for the analysis of ideology are groups that are defined by, or based on, shared ideological beliefs, as captured in the concept of opinion-based groups (Bliuc et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009). Such ideological groups are characterized by a sense of identification among their members with the group and with the group's core beliefs as well as some continuity over time. Ideological beliefs may be shared more readily among individuals who have objective characteristics in common (e.g., social class, ethnicity, religion). For example, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ideological beliefs obviously depend strongly on ethnicity and religion (i.e., whether someone is an Israeli Jew or a Palestinian). However, such shared objective characteristics are not always required for ideological groups to form and to exist. Not all socialists are recruited from the working class, and not all feminists are women. In the context of Northern Ireland, for example, going beyond simple “ethnic” or “religious” groups, Ruane and Todd (1996) have distinguished between different ideological groups according to their respective beliefs about society: loyalists, unionists, nationalists, republicans, bridge builders, and Catholic unionists. Even though the exact content of the respective ideologies has changed somewhat over time, these ideological groups have had some continuity and a sense of identification among their members. The Role of Ideological Groups for Violent Conflict Under particular conditions, ideological groups (i.e., groups defined around shared ideological beliefs) engage in action that may be violent or fuel violent conflict. The literature on social movements and collective action suggests that ideologies provide the background against which perceptions of injustice, feelings of anger, demands, and the motivation for collective action arise (e.g., Oliver & Johnston, 2000; van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2009; Zald, 2000). Ideologies thus define what political issues people consider problematic and worth fighting for. Whether ideologically inspired perceptions, demands, and goals, combined with feelings of anger, lead to effective collective action depends on several conditions. First, collective action becomes more likely if group members have a sense of collective efficacy (i.e., the expectation that the group will be successful in achieving its goals) and perceive the existing social conditions as unstable (e.g., that the status relations between groups might change; Kelly, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Second, collective action becomes more powerful with a greater degree of institutionalization. Ideological groups tend to create political parties, nongovernmental organizations, sects, committees, and so on, with leaders, officers, headquarters, a charter or constitution, general meetings, and so forth (van Dijk, 1998). Such formal institutional structures facilitate public relations and recruitment of new members, securing of resources, communication and increased cohesion, coordination, and effective execution of actions aimed at furthering the ideological goals (Oberschall, 1993; van Dijk, 1998). Third, collective action also depends on the opportunity structure in the political environment (including, in today's world, the virtual environment). The political environment can facilitate or restrict the influence of an ideological group. For example, if there is only a weak political opposition and if there is support for an ideological group from powerful allies, the group can more successfully pursue its goals, and the ideology becomes more impactful (Oberschall, 1993). Just as individual beliefs spur individual action the more there is perceived support by other group members (Terry et al., 2000), collective beliefs spur collective action the more there is support by society at large (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon & Oakes, 2006). Going beyond these general conditions and processes involved in collective action, whether ideologies contribute to violent conflict also depends on the content of the beliefs around which ideological groups are defined. One important aspect of the content is the development of adversarial attributions (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Adversarial attributions are beliefs that a particular enemy or opponent is to be blamed for the existing problems or injustices, for example a specific out-group, an authority, or the political or economic system as a whole. Once a particular enemy group is specified, ideologies can become destructive (Staub, 1996, 1999). (p. 62) As discussed so far, in general ideological groups become more influential the more their ideological beliefs are shared by society at large and the more the group's members share a sense of collective efficacy. The resulting collective action, although possibly contributing to violent conflict if the ideology includes adversarial Page 9 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict attributions, is necessarily normative (e.g., as in so-called humanitarian interventions, and many cases of structural violence that are difficult to recognize as violence). However, violence is often nonnormative (e.g., terrorist violence against civilians), and in these cases, the role of collective efficacy can actually be quite different. Research by Tausch et al. (2011) has shown that it may rather be a lack of collective efficacy, combined with feelings of contempt, that makes nonnormative collective action more likely. Engagement in nonnormative collective action, in turn, can increase tendencies in the ideological group to distance itself from the larger society, leading to further radicalization of the group (Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011). In sum, research on the group level of analysis suggests that ideologies provide the frame for socially shared perceptions of injustice and feelings of anger, which motivate collective action. Collective action can take violent forms and contribute to violent conflict especially if it is based on an ideology that identifies an enemy or opponent group that is to be blamed for the existing injustice. In general, collective action becomes more powerful with greater beliefs in collective efficacy, greater institutionalization, and greater support by society at large and by external allies. However, in contrast, nonnormative collective action may become more likely with lesser beliefs in collective efficacy and in the absence of support of the broader society. Determinants of Socially Shared Ideological Beliefs What are the determinants of ideologies at the group level of analysis? To answer this question, the functions of ideologies for groups have to be considered. Ideologies in general “are essentially conditions for the existence and reproduction of groups, or for the collective management of the relationships between groups” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 138). They serve to manage group goals, to protect or further group interests and access to resources. Ideologies can justify power and unequal access to resources of groups with an advantageous position in society. For example, social dominance theory (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) assumes that dominant groups propagate so-called hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths that justify the existing social hierarchy. Among these myths (which may be seen as specific ideologies or as specific elements of more general ideologies) are racism, nationalism, classism, cultural elitism, sexism, the Protestant work ethic, and meritocracy (Pratto et al., 1994). Ideologies can also justify resistance to inequality or oppression. They may “serve to empower dominated groups, to create solidarity, to organize struggle and to sustain opposition” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 138). So-called hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths challenge the existing social hierarchy; examples include, among others, socialism, feminism, universal human rights, noblesse oblige, and multiculturalism (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Groups thus adopt particular ideologies to regulate the pursuit of their goals as well as relationships to other groups. When there are changes in the social structure, in particular in basic living conditions, that render the usual ways for providing relief and dealing with problems ineffective, groups have to adapt and modulate their ideologies (Oberschall, 1993; Walder, 2009). The concept of difficult life conditions (Staub, 1989) summarizes severe social, economic, and political problems that threaten the ability of groups to provide their members with security, effectiveness and control, a positive self-concept, understanding of the world, human connections, and other resources (see also Correll & Park, 2005; Oberschall, 1993). Under such threatening conditions, groups only remain meaningful to their members if they can address the threats. This may be achieved either materially or through ideologies that promise hope and the fulfillment of the frustrated needs. Groups that promote such promising ideologies will be appealing and gain support. However, if the difficult life conditions remain and the fulfillment of the group's ideology proves difficult, ideologies may emerge that are more destructive. Destructive ideologies identify a scapegoat, an enemy group—often a devalued, vulnerable group or historical antagonist— which can be blamed for the continuing difficulties and need frustrations (Staub, 1996, 1999; see also Bar-Tal & Hammack, this volume). Because of their ability to create institutions and effectively propagate ideologies tailored to the frustrated needs of individuals through their access to public discourse, political elites (e.g., leaders, intellectuals) play an important role in the development of such ideologies (Staub, 1999; see also van Dijk, 1993, for an analysis of (p. 63) the role of elites for the reproduction of racist ideology). In sum, ideologies arise from the functions they fulfill for regulating group goals and relationships between groups. Changes in the social structure, in particular so-called difficult life conditions, represent challenges to the prevalent ideologies. If persistent, they can lead to the development of ideologies that are destructive in identifying enemies that are to be blamed for the continuing difficulties. Finally, processes of leadership, institutionalization, and Page 10 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict securing of broader support “can bring to power a violent group with a violent ideology” (Staub, 1989, p. 17). Ideologies and Violent Conflict: Societal Processes Not only groups within a given society or culture but also societies or cultures as a whole differ in their ideological beliefs, or ideological climate. The ideological climate refers to the culturally shared, consensual aspects of ideologies. Consider the example given earlier about whether slavery is considered acceptable or not. In today's society, it is part of the ideological climate that slavery is considered unacceptable. The ideological climate is taken for granted within a particular society (van Dijk, 1998). The idea in this section of the chapter is that particular ideological climates can make societies more prone to engage in violence. Research has not directly addressed ideologies at the societal level of analysis. However, regarding values, differences between societies can be described along the three dimensions introduced earlier (Schwartz, 1999, 2006): (1) intellectual and affective autonomy versus embeddedness, (2) hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and (3) mastery versus harmony. The first dimension defines whether societies put emphasis on individual autonomy and uniqueness or on embeddedness in groups and priority of collective over individual interests; the second dimension defines whether societies prefer ensuring socially responsible behavior through hierarchical systems of ascribed roles or through recognition of people as moral equals and commitment to cooperation; and the third dimension defines whether societies prefer control and exploitation of their social and natural environment to further their interests or rather harmoniously fitting into it. Because values and ideologies are closely interrelated (Maio et al., 2003; Staerklé, 2009), research on value differences among societies is informative for the relationship between ideologies and conflict at the societal level of analysis. The Role of Ideological Climates for Violent Conflict Two studies are particularly relevant to the analysis of the role of ideological climates for violent conflict. In the first study, Fischer and Hanke (2009) examined the relationship between societal values and the Global Peace Index across more than 50 countries. The Global Peace Index is composed of 23 indicators of societal safety and security, internal and external violent conflict, and level of militarization (see http://www.visionofhumanity.org/about/). It thus focuses more on direct violence (or negative peace) rather than structural violence (or positive peace; Christie, 1997; Wagner, 1988; see also Christie & Louis, this volume). Controlling for various indicators of economic, societal, or political development, hierarchy (denoting societies where people are expected to take unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources for granted and comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles; Fischer & Hanke, 2009; Schwartz, 2006) correlated with higher levels of violence, and intellectual autonomy (denoting societies where people are seen as autonomous entities and expected to express their own ideas and intellectual directions that make them unique) correlated with lower levels of violence. In addition, harmony (denoting societies where people are expected to understand, appreciate, and fit into the world as it is) also correlated with lower levels of violence, but only in more developed societies (as defined by the Human Development Index; see http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/). The level of human development moderated the relationships between two additional value dimensions and violence. Embeddedness (denoting societies where people are seen as entities embedded in social relationships and groups and expected to maintain the status quo and refrain from actions that might disrupt the traditional order) correlated with higher levels of violence in highly developed countries, but with lower levels of violence in less developed countries. Affective autonomy (denoting societies where people are seen as autonomous entities and expected to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves) correlated with lower levels of violence in highly developed countries and with higher levels of violence in less developed countries. Taken together, Fischer and Hanke's (2009) results suggest that the level of societal violence is higher in countries that prefer a hierarchical distribution of power, roles, and resources and lower in countries that value individuality and tolerance of diverse ideas and opinions. In addition, they suggest (p. 64) that if the objective living conditions are good, the level of societal violence is lower in countries that prefer a harmonious relationship with their social and natural environment. The role of preferences for embeddedness and affective autonomy for societal violence also seems to depend on the objective living conditions in society. Fischer and Hanke (2009) speculate that under difficult living conditions, a strong emphasis on social embeddedness rather than on affective expression of Page 11 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict individual desires might act as a buffer constraining violence in response to frustrated needs, whereas in more developed societies where individuals have more resources at their disposal embeddedness is needed less as a buffer and constraining the expression of individual desires might contribute to violence. A second study on values that informs the role of ideological climates for violent conflict was conducted by Basabe and Valencia (2007). Across 27 countries, these authors examined the relationship between Schwartz's (2006) societal values and a culture of peace, which can be understood as an indicator of (lack of) societal violence. The concept of a culture of peace has been defined by De Rivera (2004) along four dimensions: liberal development (socioeconomic development, indicators of democracy; representing conflict between government and people), violent inequality (homicide, income inequality, human rights violations; representing conflict between haves and have-nots), state use of violent means (military expenditure, military acts; representing conflict between societies), and nurturance (education expenditure, acceptance of refugees; representing conflict between groups in society). The first three dimensions of a culture of peace, but not the fourth, correlate substantially with the Global Peace Index (de Rivera, 2008; Fischer & Hanke, 2009) and thus measure societal violence in a similar way. Basabe and Valencia (2007) found that hierarchy (see above), embeddedness (see above), and mastery (denoting societies where people are expected to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment to attain group or personal goals; Fischer & Hanke, 2009; Schwartz, 2006) were related to lower scores on liberal development, whereas egalitarianism (denoting societies where people are expected to recognize others as moral equals, feel concern for everyone's welfare, and cooperate with others) as well as intellectual and affective autonomy (see above) were related to higher scores on liberal development. Further, intellectual autonomy was related to lower scores on violent inequality. In addition, harmony was related to lower scores on violent inequality and on state use of violent means. There were no significant relations between any of Schwartz's (2006) societal values and nurturance (the fourth dimension of a culture of peace). As a limitation of Basabe and Valencia's (2007) study, indicators of economic, societal, or political development were not incorporated into the analyses. However, Fischer and Hanke (2009) showed that such indicators of objective living conditions can be quite consequential for the associations between societal values and violence. The causal processes underlying the correlations between value dimensions and violence at the societal level are unclear. For example, societal violence may be due to external actors (e.g., in cases like Afghanistan or Iraq, where destruction has been caused by war from outside) as much as (or more so than) to the internal ideological climate. However, the results by Fischer and Hanke (2009) and Basabe and Valencia (2007) are quite consistent with theoretical assumptions by other researchers. For instance, Duckitt (2004) posited that “threat-cohesion” cultures that emphasize social cohesion and do not tolerate deviations from common social norms as well as “competitive-dominance” cultures that accept inequality between groups and put strong emphasis on competition are particularly likely to be ethnocentric. Similarly, Staub (1989, 1996) suggested several cultural predispositions for violence: a strong authority orientation, a monolithic and hierarchical (as opposed to pluralistic) society, a strong but vulnerable sense of collective superiority, and aggressiveness. Preferences for social cohesion and a strong authority orientation correspond closely to the concept of embeddedness on Schwartz's (2006) first dimension. These factors may make violence more likely because leaders can more easily exert influence and people may be less able to stand on their own in difficult times and to speak out against initial harmful acts. Fischer and Hanke's (2009) results, however, seem to suggest that under some conditions societal preferences for embeddedness in groups may act as a buffer rendering the outbreak of violence less likely. A strong emphasis on competition and a monolithic, hierarchical structure of society, with a limited set of acceptable values and lifestyles, a fixed conception of social reality, and unequal access of different groups to public life, correspond to the concept of hierarchy on Schwartz's second dimension, perhaps blended with embeddedness. These factors may make violence more (p. 65) likely because societal changes may be perceived as more disturbing and unconventional and devalued groups can more easily be defined as enemy groups. A strong sense of collective superiority and aggressiveness correspond to mastery on Schwartz's third dimension; these factors may make violence more likely because violence may be more readily perceived as morally justified and an acceptable or even desirable mode of dealing with conflict and furthering collective interests. The mastery theme also figures in Pilisuk and Zazzi's (2006) psychosocial theory of global violence, which posits that a worldview of legitimacy of power, domination, and material acquisition among powerful elites can explain engagement in violent conflict (see also Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). Page 12 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict Determinants of Ideological Climates at the Societal Level of Analysis How can the position a particular society holds on these value or ideology dimensions be explained? Some researchers have pointed to the stage of socioeconomic development in the process of industrialization, modernization, and postmodernization (e.g., Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003). With greater economic resources, traditional societies become more materialistic and focus more on secular-rational values, and with greater fulfillment of material needs, societies can focus more on self-expression and egalitarian values. Schwartz (2006) has provided further support for this assumption, and additionally pointed to the influence of family and household size. A related assumption is that the structural conditions of society, for example in terms of the group and grid dimensions identified by Douglas (1978), produce particular patterns of values and ideologies that are consistent with these conditions (Caulkins, 1999). The processes responsible for this seem to be related to the concept of system justification, the tendency to support the existing political, economic, and social system through legitimizing ideologies (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; see also Kay et al., 2009). An Integrative Framework for Understanding the Role of Ideologies for Violent Conflict Taking together insights from the research reviewed above, this final section proposes a multilevel framework for understanding the role of ideologies for violent conflict. In the realm of organizational behavior, the multilevel model proposed by Fischer, Ferreira, Assmar, Redford, and Harb (2005) assumes that factors of the national culture affect organizational work culture and practices, which in turn affect the behavior of individual employees. Similarly, the framework proposed here assumes that the ideological climate in society affects the formation and development of ideological groups, which in turn affect the behavior of group members. In addition to such top-down processes from the societal to the group and finally the individual level, the framework should also include assumptions about bottom-up processes from the individual to the group and finally the societal level. Regarding top-down processes, the process of socioeconomic development seems to generate a certain ideological climate (e.g., Welzel et al., 2003) that may predispose societies to be more or less violent (Fischer & Hanke, 2009; Basabe & Valencia, 2007). This ideological climate forms the background against which different ideologies can develop. Groups shape these ideologies and produce ideologically motivated collective action, including violent forms of action (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011; van Dijk, 1998). Individuals identify with different ideological groups to different degrees, depending at least partly on the degree to which the ideological beliefs represented by the respective groups are appealing to them. They choose from the “ideological menu” offered to them by different ideological groups (Jost et al., 2009; Sniderman & Bullock, 2004). Individuals thereby give support to particular ideologies but not to others, and they express beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors consistent with (or prescribed by) these ideologies, including violent behavior. Regarding bottom-up processes, individual attitudes and behavior influence groups because individuals (re)produce, reinforce, and shape group norms (e.g., Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005), and groups are the actors that have the agency to change the societal structure through collective action and forming social movements (see also Sherif, 1970). The causal processes through which the ideological climate at the societal level affects the formation of ideological groups, which in turn affect ideological beliefs at the individual level, are likely to be moderated by various factors. Fischer et al. (2005) assume that a greater degree of consensus or agreement about the culture will strengthen the effect of culture on group-level factors, and a higher level of consensus or agreement at the group level will strengthen the effect of group-level factors on individual attitudes and behavior. The idea of consensus or agreement bears similarity to Gramsci's concept of hegemony (see Adamson, 1983): the (p. 66) more hegemonic ideologies become, the greater their power to affect groups and individuals. In their discussion of moderators of the potency of an ideology, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have also pointed to consensuality in society, specifically defined as the degree to which an ideology is shared across different groups. However, they have identified three additional moderating variables: embeddedness, certainty, and mediational strength. Embeddedness refers to the degree to which an ideology is an integral part of the societal structure and culture; certainty refers to the degree of apparent moral, religious, or scientific truth of an ideology; and mediational strength refers to the importance of an ideology for actually driving attitudes and behavior. To understand the role of ideology for violent conflict, in addition to these general processes, the content of ideologies also needs to be taken into consideration. The content of ideologies refers to preferred responses to Page 13 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict three main questions societies face (Schwartz, 1999, 2006): how to organize the relationship and the boundaries between the individual and groups (autonomy vs. embeddedness); how to manage interdependence among people to ensure that tasks necessary to maintain society are fulfilled (egalitarianism vs. hierarchy); and how to manage the relationship of society with its social and natural environment (harmony vs. mastery). These broad dimensions form the basis on which more specific ideologies can be developed. Specific ideologies become destructive once they identify enemy groups that are blamed for existing injustices and standing in the way of the fulfillment of the ideology. The preceding review across the three levels of analysis suggests that ideologies that demand social conformity and strong respect for authority, ascribe fixed roles to groups in a hierarchical social structure, and claim the right to dominate and exploit the social (and natural) environment pave the ground for the formation of such destructive ideologies. Destructive ideologies then provide moral justification for, and even prescribe, hostility and violence toward those identified as enemies. Determinants of destructive ideologies can be identified at each of the three levels of analysis. At the societal level, ideologies are shaped by difficult life conditions (i.e., severe economic problems, political turmoil, threats to vital interests; Staub, 1999) and parameters of the social structure (e.g., group and grid; Douglas, 1978). At the group level, ideologies are influenced by group goals and intergroup processes related to power and domination, resistance, and competition (van Dijk, 1998). At the individual level, people subscribe to ideologies that respond to salient motivational concerns, in particular frustrated basic needs. More constructive ideologies, thus, can be expected to become more likely if the societal conditions can provide comfortable living conditions, if group goals are aligned in such a way that intergroup cooperation is facilitated, and if individuals' social and psychological needs are satisfied. Conclusions and Future Directions This chapter has analyzed the concept of ideology, defined as socially shared beliefs about the ideal arrangement of society, and its role for violent conflict at three levels of analysis: individual, group, and societal. A large body of research at the individual level (albeit mostly conducted with Western participants) suggests that people who hold authoritarian and social-dominance ideological beliefs are likely to hold attitudes and show behaviors that contribute to the formation, maintenance, and escalation of conflict. These attitudes and behaviors develop, however, in the context of groups. Groups are the entities that primarily “possess” ideologies. They propagate, through leaders, through institutional and organizational structures, ideologies to justify their position, power, struggle, or related issues. They draw on particular contents of ideology prevalent in the ideological climate in the societal culture. The insights offered by the proposed multilevel model may be useful for people working to minimize and resolve violent conflict in various ways. In general, as has been argued with regard to interventions aimed to reduce prejudice (Duckitt, 2001b), the different levels of analysis suggest different interventions. An integrative view also offers a corrective against too high expectations as to the effectiveness for a particular intervention that targets only one level. In particular, the relevance of the societal level may be ignored all too often in interventions inspired by social psychological research (see Pettigrew, 1998). For example, the framework proposed in this chapter suggests that some ideological beliefs are taken for granted in a particular society. However, these beliefs may be consequential for violent conflict. Thus, drawing comparisons to violent conflicts in other contexts may be informative for generating new perspectives (Lustig, 2002, as cited in Salomon, 2004). Several methodological problems involved in the proposed multilevel model need to be addressed. These problems are related to the identification of central variables of interest, the definition of (p. 67) constructs at the appropriate level, the measurement of multilevel constructs (e.g., direct measurement at the respective level or aggregation across lower-level data), sampling, and data analysis (Fischer et al., 2005; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994). For example, if ideologies are socially shared and strongly influenced by group-level variables, the traditional way of analyzing correlations at the individual level may be inappropriate because the responses of individuals are not statistically independent. Even in the intergroup relations tradition in social psychology, where group-level rather than individual processes are primary theoretically, empirically the typical level of analysis is still the individual (see also Stangor & Jost, 1997). A particularly problematic issue is also that the group-level units are not clearly definable; there is “circularity of the definitions of ideology and groups” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 142). As argued above, ideological groups are not necessarily based on stable objective criteria but rather on socially Page 14 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict shared ideological beliefs which are constantly subject to social change (e.g., Heywood, 1992). A first important question to be addressed in future research, thus, is how the group level of analysis can be represented appropriately in empirical analyses. Methodological innovation is clearly needed to address this question. One possibility might be to build on the concept of opinion-based groups (Bliuc et al., 2007), but focus on multiple ideological groups at the same time and define the relevant ideological groups in a data-driven way that allows for changes in the composition of groups over time. Second, future research may also address the question of how the structure and content of ideological beliefs can be conceptualized appropriately, in a way that takes seriously the nature of ideologies as holistic systems (rather than dimensions) of beliefs. The existing attempts to operationalize ideologies as holistic, configurative variables (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1984; Feldman & Johnston, 2009) are promising, but further development is clearly needed. Q methodology may be a particularly useful approach here as it is well suited to identify socially shared belief systems (Conover & Feldman, 1984). Another question for future research related to the operationalization of ideologies is how ideological beliefs can be measured more directly. In most existing research, ideological beliefs are measured indirectly through questions about sociopolitical attitudes rather than directly through questions about the ideal arrangement of society. The new operationalization of “bedrock principles” of political ideology suggested by Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, and Hibbing (2011) may be a good start. Third, the proposed integrative framework needs further elaboration. Ideally, it should take into account both general and specific aspects of ideologies. A general view is necessary so that the framework is reasonably comprehensive in accounting for possible alternative arrangements of society, and a specific view is necessary so that it is reasonably precise in accounting for the role of ideology for violence. 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A Q-method study of individual and contextual influences on the meaning of ideological labels. Political Behavior, 28, 151–173. Notes: (1.) The social construal of truth criteria reflects another meaning of ideology, related to Marx's notion that the dominant ideas in society are those of the ruling classes (e.g., Eagleton, 2007). Here ideology denotes the process through which evaluative beliefs are transformed into factual beliefs, thereby producing “false consciousness.” (2.) Although both “grid” and “hierarchy vs. egalitarianism” include aspects of hierarchy, constraining classifications may not necessarily imply hierarchies. Blau (1987), for example, characterizes social structures in terms of their heterogeneity (differentiation into unordered nominal groups), inequality (differentiation in terms of a status gradation), and intersection or consolidation of different distinctions. The model of lay conceptions of social order by Staerklé (2009) adds yet another layer of complexity. While one dimension of the model describes Page 22 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015 Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict whether a single normative reference exists against which individuals are judged (within-group categorization; normative differentiation) or whether there are different normative references for different social groups (betweengroup categorization; categorical differentiation), a second dimension describes whether social differentiations are based on identity-related symbolic criteria (e.g., morality, values) or positional, material criteria (e.g., success, power). According to Staerklé (2009), the combination of these two dimensions yields four prototypes of social order: moral order, free market, social diversity, and structural (in)equality. J. Christopher Cohrs J. Christopher Cohrs, School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK Page 23 of 23 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 15 May 2015