Nour Kteily

Physical cues influence social judgments of others. For example, shorter individuals are evaluated less positively than taller individuals. Here, we demonstrate that height also impacts one of the most consequential intergroup judgments—attributions of humanity—and explore whether this effect is modulated by the tendency to value hierarchy maintenance. In Study 1, the shorter participants perceived a range of out-groups to be, the more they dehumanized them, and this tended to be particularly pronounced among those scoring high on social dominance orientation (SDO). In Study 2, participants dehumanized an out-group more when they were led to believe that it was relatively short. Finally, Study 3 applied a reverse correlation approach, demonstrating that participants in general, and especially those scoring high on SDO, represented shorter groups in ways less consistent with full humanity than they represented taller groups. Together, this research demonstrates that basic physical height cues shape the perceived humanity of out-groups.

Blatant dehumanization has recently been demonstrated to predict negative outgroup attitudes and behaviors. Here, we examined blatant dehumanization of Muslim refugees during the ‘Refugee Crisis’ among large samples in four European countries: The Czech Republic (N=1,307), Hungary (N=502), Spain (N=1,049), and Greece (N=934). Our results suggest that blatant dehumanization of Muslim refugees is (a) prevalent among Europeans, and (b) uniquely associated with anti-refugee attitudes and behavior, beyond political ideology, prejudice, and— of particular relevance to the refugee crisis— empathy. We also find that blatant dehumanization of Muslim refugees is significantly higher and more strongly associated with intergroup behavior in the Eastern European countries (especially the Czech Republic) than in Spain and Greece. Examining a range of outgroup targets beyond refugees, our results further illustrate that blatant dehumanization is not purely an ethnocentric bias: whereas individuals across contexts feel warmer towards their group than all others, they rate several high-status outgroups as equally or more fully ‘evolved and civilized’ than the ingroup. Our research extends theoretical understanding of blatant dehumanization, and suggests that blatant dehumanization plays an important and independent role in the rejection of Muslim refugees throughout Europe.

Collectively blaming groups for the actions of individuals can license vicarious retribution. Acts of terrorism by Muslim extremists against innocents, and the spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes against innocent Muslims that follow, suggest that reciprocal bouts of collective blame can spark cycles of violence. How can this cycle be short-circuited? After establishing a link between collective blame of Muslims and anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior, we used an ‘interventions tournament’ to identify a successful intervention (among many that failed). The ‘winning’ intervention reduced collective blame of Muslims by highlighting hypocrisy in the ways individuals collectively blame Muslims – but not other groups (White Americans, Christians) – for individual group members’ actions. After replicating the effect in an independent sample, we demonstrate that a novel interactive activity that isolates the psychological mechanism amplifies the effectiveness of the collective blame hypocrisy intervention and results in downstream reductions in anti-Muslim attitudes and anti-Muslim behavior.

Although dehumanization research first emerged following the overt and conscious denials of humanity present during war and genocide, modern dehumanization research largely examines more subtle and implicit forms of dehumanization in more everyday settings. We argue for the need to re-orient the research agenda towards understanding when and why individuals blatantly dehumanize others. We review recent research in a range of contexts suggesting that blatant dehumanization is surprisingly prevalent and potent, uniquely predicting aggressive intergroup attitudes and behavior beyond subtle forms of dehumanization and outgroup dislike, and promoting vicious cycles of conflict.

Debate surrounding the issue of inequality and hierarchy between social groups has become increasingly prominent in recent years. At the same time, individuals disagree about the extent to which inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged groups exists. Whereas prior work has examined the ways in which individuals legitimize (or delegitimize) inequality as a function of their motivations, we consider whether individuals’ orientation toward group-based hierarchy motivates the extent to which they perceive inequality between social groups in the first place. Across 8 studies in both real-world (race, gender, and class) and artificial contexts, and involving members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, we show that the more individuals endorse hierarchy between groups, the less they perceive inequality between groups at the top and groups at the bottom. Perceiving less inequality is associated with rejecting egalitarian social policies aimed at reducing it. We show that these differences in hierarchy perception as a function of individuals’ motivational orientation hold even when inequality is depicted abstractly using images, and even when individuals are financially incentivized to accurately report their true perceptions. Using a novel methodology to assess accurate memory of hierarchy, we find that differences may be driven by both antiegalitarians underestimating inequality, and egalitarians overestimating it. In sum, our results identify a novel perceptual bias rooted in individuals’ chronic motivations toward hierarchy-maintenance, with the potential to influence their policy attitudes.

Although the act of dehumanizing an outgroup is a pervasive and potent intergroup process that drives discrimination and conflict, no formal research has examined the consequences of being dehumanized by an outgroup—that is, " metadehumanization. " Across 10 studies (N 3,440) involving several real-world conflicts spanning 3 continents, we provide the first empirical evidence that metadehumanization (a) plays a central role in outgroup aggression that is (b) mediated by outgroup dehumanization, and (c) distinct from metaprejudice. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate experimentally that Americans who learn that Arabs (Study 1a) or Muslims (Study 1b) blatantly dehumanize Americans are more likely to dehumanize that outgroup in return; by contrast, experimentally increasing outgroup dehumanization did not increase metadehumanization (Study 1c). Using correlational data, Study 2 documents indirect effects of meta-dehumanization on Americans' support for aggressive policies toward Arabs (e.g., torture) via Arab dehumanization. In the context of Hungarians and ethnic minority Roma, Study 3 shows that the pathway for Hungarians from metadehumanization to aggression through outgroup dehumanization holds controlling for outgroup prejudice. Study 4 examines Israelis' metaperceptions with respect to Palestinians, showing that: (a) feeling dehumanized (i.e., metadehumanization) is distinct from feeling disliked (i.e., metaprejudice), and (b) metadehumanization uniquely influences aggression through outgroup dehuman-ization, controlling for metaprejudice. Studies 5a and 5b explore Americans' metaperceptions regarding ISIS and Iran. We document a dehumanization-specific pathway from metadehumanization to aggressive attitudes and behavior that is distinct from the path from metaprejudice through prejudice to aggression. In Study 6, American participants learning that Muslims humanize Americans (i.e., metahumanization) humanize Muslims in turn. Finally, Study 7 experimentally contrasts metadehumanization and metahu-manization primes, and shows that resulting differences in outgroup dehumanization are mediated by (a) perceived identity threat, and (b) a general desire to reciprocate the outgroup's perceptions of the ingroup. In summary, our research outlines how and why metadehumanization contributes to cycles of ongoing violence and animosity, providing direction for future research and policy.

Dehumanization is a central concept in the study of intergroup relations. Yet while theoretical and methodological advances in subtle, ‘everyday’ dehumanization have progressed rapidly, blatant dehumanization remains understudied. The present research attempts to re-focus theoretical and empirical attention on blatant dehumanization, examining when and why it provides explanatory power beyond subtle dehumanization. To accomplish this, we introduce and validate a blatant measure of dehumanization based on the popular depiction of evolutionary progress in the ‘Ascent of Man.’ We compare blatant dehumanization to established conceptualizations of subtle and implicit dehumanization, including infrahumanization, perceptions of human nature (HN) and human uniqueness (UH), and implicit associations between ingroup/outgroup and human/animal concepts. Across seven studies conducted in three countries, we demonstrate that blatant dehumanization is: (a) more strongly associated with individual...

Although the act of dehumanizing an outgroup is a pervasive and potent intergroup process that drives discrimination and conflict, no formal research has examined the consequences of being dehumanized by an outgroup – i.e. ‘meta-dehumanization’. Across ten studies (N = 3,440) involving several real-world conflicts spanning three continents, we provide the first empirical evidence that meta-dehumanization (a) plays a central role in outgroup aggression that is (b) mediated by outgroup dehumanization, and (c) distinct from meta-prejudice. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate experimentally that Americans receiving information that Arabs (Study 1a) or Muslims (Study 1b) blatantly dehumanize Americans are more likely to dehumanize that outgroup in return; by contrast, experimentally increasing outgroup dehumanization did not increase meta- dehumanization (Study 1c). Using correlational data, Study 2 documents indirect effects of meta-dehumanization on Americans’ support for aggressive policies towards Arabs (e.g., torture) via Arab dehumanization. In the context of Hungarians and ethnic minority Roma, Study 3 shows that the pathway for Hungarians from meta-dehumanization to aggression through outgroup dehumanization holds controlling for outgroup prejudice. Study 4 examines Israelis’ meta-perceptions with respect to Palestinians, showing that: (a) feeling dehumanized (i.e., meta-dehumanization) is distinct from feeling disliked (i.e., meta-prejudice), and (b) meta-dehumanization uniquely influences aggression through outgroup dehumanization, controlling for meta-prejudice. Studies 5a and 5b explore Americans’ meta-perceptions regarding ISIS and Iran. We document a dehumanization- specific pathway from meta-dehumanization to aggressive attitudes and behavior that is distinct from the path from meta-prejudice through prejudice to aggression. In Study 6, American participants learning that Muslims humanize Americans (i.e., meta- humanization) humanize Muslims in turn. Finally, Study 7 experimentally contrasts meta-dehumanization and meta-humanization primes, and shows that resulting differences in outgroup dehumanization are mediated by (1) a general desire to reciprocate the outgroup’s perceptions of the ingroup, and (2) perceived identity threat. In sum, our research outlines how and why meta-dehumanization contributes to cycles of ongoing violence and animosity, thus providing direction for future research and policy.

Objective:This project was directed at examination of the potential reciprocal relationship between empathy and social
dominance orientation (SDO), with the purpose of testing the predictions from Duckitt’s highly influential dual process model
of prejudice, and further examining the validity of the mere effect view of social dominance orientation.

Method:To examine this relationship, the authors employed cross-lagged structural equation modeling with manifest variables across two studies using large samples from different parts of the world. Study 1 consisted of data from two waves of 389 (83% female) Belgian university students, with each wave separated by 6 months. Study 2 consisted of two waves of data from a national probability sample of 4,466 New Zealand adults (63% female), with each wave separated by a 1-year interval.

Results:Results supported our expectation of a reciprocal longitudinal relationship between empathy and SDO. Moreover, the results also revealed that SDO’s effect on empathy over time tended to be stronger than empathy’s effect on SDO over time,
countering the predictions derived from the dual process model.

Conclusions:These results represent the first time the possible reciprocal effects of empathy and SDO on one another have
been examined using panel data rather than less appropriate cross-sectional analysis.They suggest the need to reexamine some key assumptions of the dual process model and further question the mere effect view of SDO.""

Dehumanization is a central concept in the study of intergroup relations. Yet although theoretical and methodological advances in subtle, “everyday” dehumanization have progressed rapidly, blatant dehu- manization remains understudied. The present research attempts to refocus theoretical and empirical attention on blatant dehumanization, examining when and why it provides explanatory power beyond subtle dehumanization. To accomplish this, we introduce and validate a blatant measure of dehuman- ization based on the popular depiction of evolutionary progress in the “Ascent of Man.” We compare blatant dehumanization to established conceptualizations of subtle and implicit dehumanization, includ- ing infrahumanization, perceptions of human nature and human uniqueness, and implicit associations between ingroup–outgroup and human–animal concepts. Across 7 studies conducted in 3 countries, we demonstrate that blatant dehumanization is (a) more strongly associated with individual differences in support for hierarchy than subtle or implicit dehumanization, (b) uniquely predictive of numerous consequential attitudes and behaviors toward multiple outgroup targets, (c) predictive above prejudice, and (d) reliable over time. Finally, we show that blatant—but not subtle—dehumanization spikes immedi- ately after incidents of real intergroup violence and strongly predicts support for aggressive actions like torture and retaliatory violence (after the Boston Marathon bombings and Woolwich attacks in England). This research extends theory on the role of dehumanization in intergroup relations and intergroup conflict and provides an intuitive, validated empirical tool to reliably measure blatant dehumanization.

A new conceptualization and measurement of social dominance orientation—individual
differences in the preference for group based hierarchy and inequality—is introduced. In contrast to previous measures of social dominance orientation that were designed to be unidimensional, the new measure (SDO7) embeds two theoretically-grounded subdimensions of SDO – SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E). SDO-D constitutes a preference for systems of group-based dominance in which high status groups forcefully oppress lower status groups. SDO-E constitutes a preference for systems of group-based inequality that are maintained by an interrelated network of subtle hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and social policies. Confirmatory factor and criterion validity analyses confirmed that SDO-D and SDO-E are theoretically distinct and dissociate in terms of the intergroup outcomes they best predict. For the first time, distinct personality and individual difference bases of SDO-D and SDO-E are outlined. We clarify the construct validity of SDO by strictly assessing a preference for dominance hierarchies in general, removing a possible confound relating to support for hierarchy benefitting the ingroup. Consistent with this, results show that among members of a disadvantaged ethnic minority group (African Americans), endorsement of SDO7 is inversely related to ingroup identity. We further demonstrate these effects using nationally representative samples of U.S. Blacks and Whites, documenting the generalizability of these findings. Finally, we introduce and validate a brief four-item measure of each dimension. This paper importantly extends our theoretical understanding of one of the most generative constructs in social psychology, and introduces powerful new tools for its measurement.

Using a random sample of 243 Muslims in Lebanon and Syria, we examined whether support for Hezbollah or for Al Qaeda is predicted by functionally-relevant emotional responses to specific threats perceived to be posed by Americans.  In line with the sociofunctional approach, perceived resource domination threat from Americans elicited anger, and perceived value contamination threat elicited disgust/contempt toward Americans. Importantly, these intergroup emotions in turn differentially predicted support for Hezbollah and Al Qaeda through desires for the organizations to accomplish different goals to address the threat perceptions. Specifically, anger toward Americans predicted support for Hezbollah through desires for the organization to restore threatened symbolic resources by bringing pride and respect to Arabs.  In contrast, disgust/contempt toward Americans predicted support for Al Qaeda through desires for the organization to protect threatened ingroup values by de-contaminating Islam from Western cultural influence. Theoretical explanations and implications for addressing and mitigating hostilities between the groups are discussed.

Using a random sample of 383 Muslims and Christians in Lebanon and Syria, we explored the degree of public support for two distinct kinds of asymmetric violence—“fundamentalist violence” and “resistance violence”—against the United States as a function of three explanatory narratives: a clash of cultures narrative, social identity/self-categorization theory, and a counterdominance perspective. Multiple regression analyses showed that the factors most closely associated with support of asymmetric violence among Arab populations was very much dependent upon the type of asymmetric violence. Among both Christians and Muslims, the results showed that perceived incompatibility between Arab and American cultures was the best predictor of support for fundamentalist violence, while perceived American domination of the Arab world was the distinctly strongest predictor of support for resistance violence. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

In this research we investigated how group power influences the way members of groups in asymmetrical conflict approach intergroup negotiations. Drawing on theories of negotiations and of intergroup power, we predicted that group power would interact with features of the proposed negotiating agenda to influence willingness to ‘come to the table’. Based on the negotiation literature, we focused on two types of ‘sequential’ negotiation agendas: one beginning with the discussion of consequential issues before less consequential issues ('consequential first'), and one leaving the discussion of consequential issues until after less consequential issues are discussed ('consequential later'). B¬¬¬¬¬ecause they are motivated to advance changes to their disadvantaged status quo, we expected low power group members to favor ‘consequential first’ over ‘consequential later’ invitations to negotiate. High power group members, motivated to protect their advantage, were expected to show the reverse preference. Converging evidence from five experiments involving real-world and experimental groups supported these predictions. Across studies participants received an invitation to negotiate from the other group involving either a 'consequential first' or 'consequential later' agenda.  Low power group members preferred ‘consequential first’ invitations because these implied less stalling of change to the status quo, and high power group members preferred 'consequential later' invitations because these invitations seemed to pose less threat to their position. Theoretical and practical implications for negotiations research and conflict resolution are discussed. 

Keywords: Negotiations; Conflict Resolution; Intergroup Relations; Power; Asymmetrical Conflict

The question of whether social dominance orientation represents a generalized orientation towards group-based hierarchies continues to arouse heated debate. Some researchers maintain that rather than indexing support for hierarchy across a variety of situations and social contexts, social dominance orientation scores simply reflect individuals’ attitudes towards whatever specific context individuals had in mind while completing the scale. We systematically examine the generality of SDO by investigating its pattern of relationships with a very wide range of variables across a variety of disparate contexts, exploring inequality both as an ideal and as manifested in specific policies towards particular groups. We also experimentally test an important question raised by Sibley and Liu (2010) about whether administration of modified instructions to think only of “groups in general” is required to ensure SDO's generality. Evidence that SDO functions as a generalized orientation only when administered with instructions to think of groups in general would be cause for much concern among the many researchers who have used the unmodified scale to index such an orientation. As expected, our results are clear in suggesting (a) that SDO represents a generalized orientation towards group-based hierarchy, and (b) that this property is not dependent on specific instructions to participants to think only of groups in general. Theoretical and practical implications for the status of SDO are discussed.

Abstract
Objective: This project was directed at examination of the potential reciprocal relationship between Empathy and Social Dominance Orientation, with the purpose of testing the predictions from Duckitt’s highly influential Dual Process Model of prejudice, and further examining the validity of the “mere effect” view of social dominance orientation. Method: In order to examine this relationship, we employed cross-lagged structural equation modeling with manifest variables, across two studies using large samples from different parts of the world.  Study 1 consisted of data from two waves of 389 (83% female) Belgium university students, with each wave separated by six months. Study 2 consisted of two waves of data from a national probability sample of 4,466 New Zealand adults (63% female), with each wave separated by a one year interval. Results: The results supported our expectation of a reciprocal longitudinal relationship between Empathy and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Moreover, the results also revealed that SDO’s effect on empathy over time tended to be stronger than empathy’s effect on SDO over time, countering the predictions derived from the Dual Process Model. Conclusions: These results represent the first time the possible reciprocal effects of empathy and SDO on one another have been examined using panel data rather than less appropriate cross-sectional analysis. They suggest the need to reexamine some key assumptions of the Dual Process Model and further question the “mere effect” view of SDO.

Using a stratified random sampling procedure, we interviewed 200 residents of Beirut, Lebanon and surrounding areas in order to test predictions of a dual process model of prejudice. We examined the role of social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) in predicting prejudice toward Americans, mediating the relationships between personality dimensions and prejudice, and predicting intergroup emotions indirectly through intergroup threat perceptions. Three main findings emerged. First, whereas RWA was a positive predictor of prejudice toward Americans, SDO was a negative predictor. Second, RWA mediated a positive relationship between a social conforming personality and prejudice toward Americans; SDO mediated a negative relationship between a tough-minded personality and prejudice. Third, value threat perceptions mediated a positive relationship between RWA and feelings of disgust toward Americans; economic threat perceptions mediated a negative relationship between SDO and anger toward Americans. Applications and extensions of the dual process model in non-Western populations are discussed.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is one of the most powerful predictors of intergroup attitudes and behavior. Although SDO works well as a unitary construct, some analyses suggest it might consist of two complementary dimensions—SDO-Dominance (SDO-D), or the preference for some groups to dominate others, and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E), a preference for nonegalitarian intergroup relations. Using seven samples from the United States and Israel, the authors confirm factor-analytic evidence and show predictive validity for both dimensions. In the United States, SDO-D was theorized and found to be more related to old-fashioned racism, zero-sum competition, and aggressive intergroup phenomena than SDO-E; SDO-E better predicted more subtle legitimizing ideologies, conservatism, and opposition to redistributive social policies. In a contentious hierarchical intergroup context (the Israeli–Palestinian context), SDO-D better predicted both conservatism and aggressive intergroup attitudes. Fundamentally, these analyses begin to establish the existence of complementary psychological orientations underlying the preference for group-based dominance and inequality.

Using correlational and experimental data, we examined the degree to which personal and perceived normative support for the acculturation ideologies of assimilation, multiculturalism, and colorblindness mediated and moderated the relationship between social dominance orientation (SDO) and prejudice among 299 White students at three American colleges. Correlational results indicated that personal support for the acculturation ideologies mediated the SDO-prejudice relationship. Personal support for assimilation (a hierarchy-enhancing ideology) positively related to SDO; multiculturalism and colorblindness (hierarchy-attenuating ideologies) negatively related to SDO. An experimental manipulation varied whether assimilation, multiculturalism, or colorblindness was considered normative in the United States. In addition to a control, a fifth condition primed the Obama presidency. SDO related most strongly to prejudice toward American immigrants and ethnic minorities when assimilation norms and the Obama presidency were primed. Efforts to reduce the associations between SDO and prejudice are discussed in terms of highlighting hierarchy-attenuating national norms of multiculturalism and colorblindness.

The psychology of suicide terrorism involves more than simply the
psychology of suicide. Individual differences in social dominance orientation (SDO) interact with the socio-structural, political context to produce support for group-based dominance among members of both dominant and subordinate groups. This may help explain why, in one specific context, some people commit and endorse terrorism, whereas others do not.