Political Psychology

The Social Psychology of Neoliberalism.

For far too long psychology has ignored the tremendous influence of neoliberal ideology on virtually every facet of our lives.

You can find the special issue in the Journal of Social issues right here:

https://spssi.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/15404560/2019/75/1

Best regards,

Karim Bettache

Terrorism remains at the top of the news.  Each new day seems to bring word of attacks in different parts of the world. The Boston Marathon bombing is the latest example. Motivated by prior events, we ran a series of psychological laboratory experiments with university students as subjects, during a period spanning more than 25 years, examining how individuals reacted to simulated news reports of international conflict and terrorist attacks.  Our experimental studies are obviously not the real world, nor are the participants real victims.  At the same time, our subjects are now part of the mainstream electorate, and we believe that their reactions may illuminate more general human tendencies. Our experiments make it clear that responses to terrorist attacks are complex and highly variable. People react to terrorist attacks in diverse ways, depending on attacker identities, motives and targets as well as characteristics of those attacked—their  own personalities, genders, roles, prior relationships, and other attributes.

Humans are a coalitional, parochial species. Yet, extreme actions of solidarity are sometimes taken for distant or unrelated groups. What motivates people to become solidary with groups to which they do not belong originally? Here, we demonstrate that such distant solidarity can occur when the perceived treatment of an out-group clashes with one's political beliefs (e.g., for Leftists, oppressive occupation of the out-group) and that it is driven by fusion (or a feeling of oneness) with distant others with whom one does not share any common social category such as nationality, ethnicity or religion. In Study 1, being politically Left-ist predicted European-Americans' willingness to engage in extreme protest on behalf of Palestinians, which was mediated by fusion with the out-group. Next, in Study 2, we examined whether this pattern was moderated by out-group type. Here, Norwegian Leftists fused more with Palestinians (i.e., a group that, in the Norwegian context, is perceived to be occupied in an asymmetrical conflict) rather than Kurds (i.e., a group for which this perception is less salient). In Study 3, we experimentally tested the underlying mechanism by framing the Kurdish conflict in terms of an asymmetrical occupation (vs. symmetrical war or control conditions) and found that this increased Leftist European-Americans' fusion with Kurds. Finally, in Study 4, we used a unique sample of non-Kurdish aspiring foreign fighters who were in the process of joining the Kurdish militia YPG. Here, fusion with the out-group predicted a greater likelihood to join and support the Kurdish forces in their fight against ISIS, insofar as respondents experienced that their political orientation morally compelled them to do so (Study 4). Together, our findings suggest that politically motivated fusion with out-groups underpins the extreme solidary action people may take on behalf of distant out-groups. Implications for future theory and research are discussed.

Theoretically, populism has been conceptualized as a political ideology with three sub-dimensions: anti-elitism attitudes, a preference for popular sovereignty, and a belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people. However, empirical research to date has treated populist attitudes as a unidimensional construct. To address this issue, we propose to conceptualize populist attitudes as a latent higher-order construct with three distinct first-order dimensions. A 12-item inventory was developed using two survey studies conducted in Switzerland in 2014 and 2015. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were used to test the construct validity of this measure of populist attitudes. The measurement that is proposed allows for a fine-grained study of populist attitudes in the general public.

While popular legitimacy is central to international cooperation, existing research offers few insights into the process by which citizens come to perceive of international organizations (IOs) as legitimate or not. This paper offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of the role of elite communication in shaping the popular legitimacy of IOs. We build on framing theory to develop an argument about why citizens should be susceptible to elite communication about IOs, and when those effects should be particularly strong. We empirically evaluate the impact of elite communication through a survey experiment conducted among almost 10,000 residents of three countries in relation to five IOs. Four principal conclusions stand out. First, elite communication affects citizens' perceptions of IO legitimacy, irrespective of whether it invokes the procedures or the performances of IOs as grounds for criticism or endorsement. Second, communication by relatively more credible elites has stronger effects on the popular legitimacy of IOs. Third, negative messages are more effective than positive messages in shaping citizens' legitimacy perceptions. Fourth, elite communication is more effective when it targets IOs that citizens are relatively less familiar with.