Brentano and Fabro: A Fruitful Unity of Purposes Against Scepticism Antonio Russo -- Università di Trieste Abstract In celebration of the centenary of the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro’s birth (19111995), we are contributing a vast number of works that focus on various aspects of Fabro’s research. This paper investigates the essential theoretical traits that undergird the framework of Fabro’s 1941 texts, by comparing them with Franz Brentano’s (1838-1817) project of renewing Thomism through a new understanding of Aristotle. The secondary literature concerning the comparison of both these authors is almost nonexistent. Our goal is to clarify some of the central issues regarding the relation between Fabro and Brentano through direct textual analysis of unpublished letters exchanged between Fabro and Agostino Gemelli about Brentano and his pupil Carl Stumpf. For the centenary of the birth of the Italian philosopher, Cornelio Fabro (1911-1995), there is no shortage of miscellanea, essays, and commemorations that focus on one or another aspect of Fabro’s research. Our task here is to investigate and clarify the essential theoretical aspects that undergird much of Fabro’s work in 1941, which analyses the relation between perception and thought, by comparing them with the renewal project in Thomism headed by Franz Brentano (1838-1917) through a new interpretation of Aristotle. Spending energy on this task could seem, at best, a futile academic discussion, especially since it evidently appears from an analysis of secondary literature on these two writers, that there is no praiseworthy summary of the topic that we can recall. This comparison, however, should not alarm us since Fabro himself, in 1950, in a still unpublished curriculum vitae, speaks of the doctrinal orientation of the first twenty years of his academic formation, had explicitly said that he was “almost exclusively” committed to the systematic treatment of “two arguments”: i) the structure of entities, and ii) the structure of consciousness. The first theme belongs to the volume entitled The Metaphysical Notion of Participation according to St. Thomas Aquinas (1939), which sought to bring the thought of Thomas back to his own sources, to highlight the originality and fecundity of his Platonic and Aristotelian synthesis.2 Instead, to speak of the second theme it means to individuate the “manifestation of the modern theory of consciousness”, and the most important principle that, according to Fabro, “brought it to dissolution” and, then, to show how the Aristotelian demand about “knowing any form always presents itself with a corresponding structure to the noetic sphere of the represented 1 object” remains valid. And regarding this second aspect, for Fabro, there was nothing substantial other than the task, method, and result which Brentano “entrusted to his teaching in the second half of the nineteenth century.”3 But to illustrate some passages of this comparison, we must directly analyze the texts and examine their central points. Cornelio Fabro as an interpreter of Brentano To adequately understand Fabro’s interest in Franz Brentano and his thought, we should identify the beginning (or beginnings) of his intellectual journey which will then effectively give significance to the rest of the trajectory of his research; it is necessary, then, to retrace our steps by recollecting the Italian philosopher’s research which was conducted in the early years of his academic career. In particular, in 1931 he graduated in philosophy, with a thesis entitled The Objectivity of the Principle of Causality: A Critique of David Hume, an author who, according to Fabro, traced “the first form of associationism” which directly gave rise to, and at times in a harsh way, the opposing Gestaltpsychologie—an expression used by some of the best students of Brentano’s thought, like Ehrenfels, Stumpf, Meinong—allowing the revival and reconstruction of a gnoseological realism faithful to Aristotle.4 Then, in 1934, he wins an award at the Pontificia Accademia Romana di San Tommaso d’Aquino for his dissertation entitled The Principle of Causality: Psychological Origins, Philosophical Formulations, and its Necessary and Universal Value; in 1937 he publishes an essay entitled ‘The Psychological Origin of the Notion of Causality’ in the Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica5 and, in the same year, he publishes a long review of Life and Psyche by Francesco De Sarlo.6 And finally, during the two academic years of 1938-1940, the young Fabro teaches biology and theoretical psychology at the Corso di Perfezionamento in the philosophy department of the Pontificia Università Lateranense; and, during the same period, publishes various articles on ‘The Problem of Sensory Perception’,7 on ‘Idealism and Realism in Sensory Perception’,8 and ‘Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelian-Thomistic Psychology’.9 Moreover, during Christmas 1939, he spends some time studying at the Istituto di Psicologia dell’Università Cattolica in Milan, where he expands and completes his own research and welcomes and carries out the proposal of Gemelli “of a theoretical reconstruction, on the basis of a new phenomenology, of the result and the principles of the Gestalt Psychology in a definitive summary”.10 In this summary, that is The Phenomenology of Perception, Fabro takes the opportunity to elaborate on and integrate the material gathered for his courses (1938-1940) and critically present “the results, principles, and teaching of the ‘Gestalt’”, in order to highlight its value and limits regarding the problem of knowledge.11 And in this way, with his teaching, but also in his reaction 2 against English phenomenalism, it was Brentano that ignited the debate which then developed around the problem of “form” (Gestalt). For all of these reasons, then, Fabro paid “particular attention”12 to Brentano, because he had a clear understanding of the “insufficiency of empiricism, at the level of psychical observation”,13 and then, he had traced “the basic aims” of a “recovery of the problem of knowledge, beyond that of Kant”.14 He analyzes the principle text on psychology in this way and rightly recognizes that in it “the central notion ... is that of intentionality,”15 which captures the peculiar features, emphasizing the Aristotelian and medieval sources and later developments. This perspective rejects modern gnoseologies, which starting from Descartes onward had wanted to liquidate the ancient way traced by Aristotle and St. Thomas; and they had given life to a schism between perception and thought and the principle of association, by which “the contents of perception are given to the consciousness immediately,”16 and then to the “famous principle of ‘autonomy’, the point of departure for modern philosophy and foundation of theories about consciousness that make recourse to Hume and Kant and lead to the principle of ‘creativity and absolute spontaneity of Thought’ (Idealism)”.17 For Fabro, the initial moment of Brentano’s work had expressed a judgment of dissent in respect to the primary associationistic theorems, and at the same time had proposed a return to a conception which by the Associanism was believed to be weakened and obsolete. Hence, one must acknowledge that associationism could never fulfil its own claims or the conclusions directly founded on its basic premise, it would collapse every foundation of the gnoseological problem upon which it was based. To this end, the philosopher Aschaffenburg, and his entire school of thought, would complete “an authentic revolution”,18 which had “taken in every area a storehouse of arguments against the principle of association”, such that “the significance and tasks taken from philosophies and psychologies that refer to the Cartesian dualism, has been abandoned forever”.19 The research of Brentano’s school of thought had laid the groundwork for a return to Aristotle, which understood “the profound beauty of Aristotelian gnoseology”20 and provided a way to return to a position that was “venerated and ancient, which Descartes had wanted to abandon and which now, with the death of such aspiration, comes forward to vindicate his own rights”.21 Reassuming the terms of the argument, we can affirm that, for Fabro, Brentano’s project is taken as a constant and diligent basis for comparison, which resolves itself on speculative grounds in a common defence of Aristotelian-Thomistic gnoseological realism. That which comes to the surface as his cornerstone is the principle of association, the Kantian concept of a synthetic a priori judgment and the idealist thesis of the absolute spontaneity of thought. That 3 does not prevent, however, some points of clear disagreement between the two authors: in fact, some developments in Brentano’s school of thought are rejected because the right instances brought forward by the German philosopher, in later developments of his argument spread in a variety of different ways which create several problems and inadequacies. In other words, Brentano “had accepted, on one hand, with excessive trust, the primacy of empirical analysis, and had stopped with a too historically determined Aristotelianism, without taking into account the developments of the later Arab-Latin tradition, and he was not able to hold back the current of new problems which came to dominate”; on the other hand, if we look at his earliest pupils, like Meinong, Marty, and Husserl among the most important, the same reasons have led them into open forms of rationalism”. And so the problems that were presented with admirable sagacity by Brentano need to be resolved. I will modestly attempt “to correct these inadequacies which Brentano’s method showed in the speculative part, beginning with the phenomenological analysis of which he had been the master”.22 The inadequacies that Fabro intends to address in his work, also constituted the points of disagreement with Brentano and his school of thought, which can be framed in two ways: 1) An “excessive trust” in the “primacy of empirical analysis”; 2) And “an Aristotelianism that is too historically determined”. These shortcomings, according to Fabro, not only seem to not allow the German philosopher to fulfil the task of reaching an equilibrium that resolves the internal tensions of his thought, but, rather, they appear to invalidate them and every attempt to forestall the emergence of new problems; and then, they seem to make sure that he ultimately, and still more than his disciples, endorses forms of rationalism. Particularly, in characterising “the psychical phenomena actually present”, Brentano retains that they are the “only facts immediately evident”, not the psychical phenomena, not the concrete res; and in this way, for the Friulian philosopher, it seems that the German philosopher “in the end, makes notable concessions to phenomenism that he wants to criticize, especially with the affirmation that gnoseological immediacy is privileged in an exclusive way, to the psychical act as such”.23 Fabro and Brentano’s School of Thought: Carl Stumpf Among the disciples of Brentano, only Carl Stumpf, who was his beloved pupil, with his later, more mature texts that “constitute one of the most important contributions toward the defence of gnoseological realism against any form of phenomenism and idealism,” especially his posthumous work Erkenntnislehre (1939-1940), was more inclined to move to a “more faithful adherence to Aristotelianism”.24 In fact, for Fabro, Carl Stumpf re-appropriates the famous 4 Aristotelian theory of common sensibles as well as the theory of the “synthetic function of consciousness (‘common sense’) ... he arrives at a purely psychological theory that has many more advantages—even today—than any other proposed by modern thought” and “preserves the original character of the primitive structures and recognises the contribution of experience”.25 It is no coincidence that this perspective advanced by Stumpf will constitute the basis for, and give life to, Fabro’s conceptual framework in the second volume of Perception and Thought, that is the “construction of a gnoseological realism of experience with a functionalistic background,”26. For that, according to Fabro, Stumpf always had “decisively contributed the solution to the phenomenological problem”27 and had also invested his criticism, and with good reason, against “the idealistic deviations of Husserl’s phenomenology”.28 Unpublished Letters from Cornelio Fabro to Agostino Gemelli regarding Stumpf In an unpublished letter, dated 19 May 1939, addressed to A. Gemelli, Fabro quotes in no uncertain terms: “Most reverent Father, I have received Stumpf’s book and I am very grateful for your exquisite favour. I have already started reading it as it is clear and interesting; regarding its content, judging from my first impression, the problem of perception seems very interesting to me in particular. Among all of Brentano’s disciples, it seems to me that Stumpf has remained the most faithful to Aristotelianism, and in this book he openly corrects the Idealist and Spinozistic directions of his teacher in his final years. When I have finished taking into account the proportions and general content of his work, I will happily send you a review also because Stumpf places the psychological problem of perception at the center of the controversial gnoseological discussions developed from Locke onwards and has strong words against Kantianism and Idealism”.29 For all these reasons, according to Fabro, is to stress the role and the work of Stumpf. This task is carried out, with full critical awareness, in Perception and Thought, which, not incidentally, wants to be a continuation and completion, from the rigorously speculative point of view, of the previously conducted research in The Phenomenology of Perception.30 Particularly, in Perception and Thought, Fabro intends to show “the exceptional importance”31 of the conclusions reached by Stumpf—student of Brentano, connoisseur of the Stagirite, wealthy psychologist, maestro of the most outstanding founders of the Gestalt movement—who constitutes “the most suggestive approach to new problems with Aristotelianism,”32 with his appropriation of the quality of form, in opposition to the school of Graz and against Meinong, and then with his theory of the 5 “immediate unification of sensory data ... made possible by way of the unity of consciousness: this Aristotelian teaching, honoured by Lotze and Brentano. And the so-called, ‘quality of form’ is none other than the teaching of Aristotle.33 These reasons lead Fabro to claim in no uncertain terms: “It is substantially this solution that I intend to take up and integrate in this work”.34 For the Friulian philosopher, Stumpf moves, in his psychological analysis, from the distinction of Erscheinungen (or phenomenal presentations, immediate content) and psychische Funktionen (psychical functions, or acts that unveil complex, unified sensory content), which has a fundamental character, because for him, in the cognitive process, the intimate and reciprocal interaction between these two terms condition every apprehension of the real. In fact, there are no presentations as real content without reference to the functions and vice versa: both then objectify one for the other in the act of perception.35 Moreover, the quality of these facts in general present themselves “always together with other qualities that integrate them and for this reason are called attributes of sensations”. In this, then, appears clear that the sensations manifest themselves, not as isolated, but usually as complex sensations, or better, as material, on which, then, the process of abstraction is exercised, which, constructs in construction, will give life to the elaborations of the sciences and arts.36 There are two points that Stumpf’s psychological reflection gathers around: 1. The theory of attributes, explicitly derived from Aristotle; 2. The theory of the perception of relations, shared with the Denkpsychologie. To comprehend the full impact of this discourse, according to Fabro, one must bear in mind that the philosopher from Berlin describes perception as “apprehending something” and distinguishes between outer and inner perception: the former has to do with external stimuli or sensible presentations; but the latter refers to the psychical functions. Hence he distinguishes between “perception of absolute content and perception of relations”, because it is the apprehension of a relation between the parts of a whole or multiple relations in a complex that which rightly constitutes the perception of its distinct stage of consciousness ... This complex of relations of sensible material is what constitutes the Gestalt ... The apprehension of a Gestalt is therefore on the basis of sensible presentations, inner and outer, which form the substrate of all the psychical machine; as the Gestalt arises, in turn, the substrate for the processes of thought.37 Consequently, the apprehension of a Gestalt is immediate in the same way as the absolute content: it is not Nachwahrnehmung, as Associationism would have it, but rather Mitwahrnehmung, a “perception-with...the ‘Gestalten’ are perceived with and in (in und mit) absolute content”38 and thus 6 their perception necessarily implies reference to the outer, the objects toward which they refer and on which they are grounded in. This perception in and with “is a perception of relations on the basis of a single or repeated presentation of relative sensible content”;39 and consequently, the Gestalt has, like a Träger, “a membered complex”, because it comes “apprehended as a unity, as a whole, in which however there are members, parts to distinguish, just as for every relation in respect to its foundation”.40 There are various categories of Gestalten, among which in particular are founded (natural and given in the sensible complex), which precede the others and ensures that the consciousness can perform the analysis and synthesis, and not founded (due to the intervention of subjective character). Another division is made between spatial Gestalten, but also acoustical, further subdivided into simultaneous and successive; the latter, in turn, distinguish between continuous and discrete. The problem of the perception of content re-emerges here. In fact, Stumpf considers the extension as an irreducible attribute of the content of sensation and from complexes of sensation. Moreover, another difficulty arises: for Stumpf, the continuous is infinitely divisible, but we perceive only the continuous in relation to the limits that are traceable. But why we perceive the real and not also the possible? ... According to Stumpf, sensible presentations are made so that in their nature there is no need for an end to the partition process of points, even if the quality of our sensible organs ... is limited in reality. The perception of continuity is, in this way, a consciousness that we have through a certain determinate content of perception, but it itself is not a content of perception.41 This discussion leads Stumpf to admit that there exists the “possibility of an indefinite division of the continuous and consequently differences of inadvertent sensation ... also there are also ‘inadvertent sensations’”.42 It is in the introduction of this further aspect that he brings about a return to Aristotelian positions. In other words, there are relations which can in single cases remain unperceived ... they manifest in the sensible complex, in a purely physical way ... they remain in some way ‘coexisting’ with those grasped in consciousness: this ‘concomitant consciousness’ is identified by Stumpf with the common sensibles of Aristotle.43 Thus, Stumpf pronounces the failure of Associationism and rationalist attempts at explanation, and realizes a progression in respect to both positions, considering the immanent relations of perceptual content. The Empfindungskomplex contains the relations, whether these come to be adverted or inadverted: if they are adverted the Empfindungskomplex becomes for consciousness a Verhältnisganz, that is, a Gestalt. The 7 perception reaches then its complete development in two stages: a) distinguishing perceptual relations; and b) reuniting them ‘synoptically’ in a unity (Zusammenfassung), making possible the unitary intuition of the Gestalt (Zusammenschauen) ... the two stages ... can also be described as selection and organization 44 and form the structure brought about through the process of perception. For Fabro, this is the major contribution of Stumpf’s theory. However, despite its merits, it presents several difficulties. Reassuming the terms of the discourse, we can claim the following:  Stumpf rightly criticized Associationism and re-appropriates the Aristotelian theory of common sensible, claiming, with his theory of Erscheinungen, a certain degree of structure  that belongs to sensible quality; Then, from the critique of this theory of Gestalt, he recognizes with his theory of Funktionen, the embryonic character of this structure and the necessity of its further  development for the problem of consciousness; This development, that is the organization of phenomena, becomes more complex through the relationship with physical-physiological conditions, which means that there is a transition from the indistinct to the distinct, that is a “differentiation” of distinct content, but also an “‘integration’ of the same in the characteristics which makes possible the  differentiation from the primary nucleus and their phenomenal subsistence”; These two moments occur simultaneously, and this means that there is a necessary reciprocity in the acquisition of one and the other: what happens in one, occurs in the other and vice versa.45 This process of differentiation-integration of formal or common sensible content, according to Fabro, ex parte objecti, gives rise to three problems, because it pulls in three directions: 1. “downward, in respect to proper sensible in general; 2. In its own sphere, in respect to the other common sensible for each of them in particular; 3. Upward, in respect to the superior functions of thought, of which common sensibles, unlike the proper sensible, constitute, in a developed consciousness, an area of objects that can reach the highest noetic elaboration (mathematical science and artistic activity, technique)”.46 According to Fabro, Stumpf had examined and egregiously analyzed only the first two aspects, completely ignoring the third, which is certainly not marginal in the ambit of the organization of psychical phenomena. So, we find ourselves before a theoretical framework of systematization, whose further development is still incomplete, even if there have been other 8 authors that are moving in this direction and have tried to realize a thematization that grasp the dense texture of relations which intervene in an essential manner in order to connect this point to the other two in the psychical life as a whole. In particular, writes Fabro, Neo-scholasticism operated on this level, whose merit was that “of having a third person point of view (Michotte, Gemelli, Moore)”, which “from this moment will form the object independent of the enquiry, given the decisive importance that it has, at least for us, for overcoming idealism and, first, its roots, the Kantian critique”.48 But at this point we open another chapter in the philosophical life of the Friulian philosopher, which can be summarized as the problematic relationship between Fabro-GemelliUniversità Cattolica of Milan, which is still open, despite many parts demanding more and more the need to test the basic assumptions—because it carries with it clear and important speculative consequences—in order to investigate the connection between the other aspects of his research. The first impression one gets by reading the 1941 texts and from the preface written by Gemelli in The Phenomenology of Perception, seems to confirm the idea of a Fabro that is still connected to Neo-scholasticism, especially as the founder of the Cattolica, and repeatedly, claims him as one of his disciples.49 This piece of information among others, however, needs to be attentively examined, through the direct and textual comparison between the basic positions of Fabro and that of Gemelli as well as Neo-scholasticism in general. Then, one must bear in mind when reading in the thought-provoking Perception and Thought, in which the Friulian thinker refers to Neoscholasticism, placing it in a amore extreme position than Stumpf, Gemelli is only cited three times and the preface written by Gemelli in the second edition of The Phenomenology of Perception is substituted in 1961 by one written by Fabro. In the end, Gemelli, as we saw in the unpublished letter dated 19 July 1939, before the publication of the two volumes on perception, to avoid Fabro accruing large amounts of publishing costs, asks him to let him pass as his student and collaborator, in his own words: “Dear Father ... I had an idea: since I think that She will find difficulty publishing the work on perception, when it will be completed, I would propose that you do it in this way: say that it is a work of the Psychology Laboratory so that it can be inserted in the publications of the University, and then give Her the right to publish it for free just like our Professors and Assistants do. If this is doable for Her, then I will claim the title before the academic Council which says that She can publish the work in our Collection. Think about it for a bit and write back to me. All the very best wishes”.50 9 After this invitation on 20 September 1939, Fabro sends to Gemelli an application for admission for the School of Psychology at the Università Cattolica of Milan. And a week later, on 28 September of the same year, Gemelli writes to Fabro again, telling him: “... Regarding the admission to the School of Psychology, I will find a way to reimburse you for the taxes of admission and then, for now, She pays nothing. I am delighted to have good news about your research and I am certain that it will turn out to be a job well done”.51 Concluding Observations In conclusion, some observations can be made; and especially from here, we might ask: what can be said after this rapid analysis of texts by Cornelio Fabro in 1941, when compared with some major works of Franz Brentano?  In the first place, and for the first time, after many decades of oblivion, from the analysis of two thought-provoking texts published by Cornelio Fabro—editions published by Vita e Pensiero from the Università Cattolica of Milan—we can take into consideration what emerges as an evident and substantial unity of intent and methodology with the basic positions expressed by the philosopher from Aschaffenburg and by some prominent members of his school of thought. Hence,  the expository portrait that so far we have tried to trace can serve: To fill a gap, which it is almost superfluous to highlight its gravity, in the clarification of the same basic lines of thought by the Friulian philosopher. So far, the vast group of diligent friends and scholars that concern themselves with him, have unilaterally emphasised only a few aspects of his thought, whilst ignoring the other no less crucial demands of his early writings which provide a picture of his  speculation which give us an idea of his vigor and original physiognomy; Consequently, it can serve to better understand the thought of Fabro; and more importantly, allow us to see how, where, and why there was an evolution in his philosophical reflection, on which the critical literature about him has gravely  overlooked its importance and its essential traits; It can be evaluated as an attempt to spark further reflection on specifying the, yet still incomplete, task regarding the place of Fabro, in his philosophical and contemporary European context. Truthfully, there needs to be a portrait of his philosophical reflection, apart from some attempts of summary, which remain 10 partial and limited, in the majority of cases, to his study of Thomism and several  aspects of his work on Kierkegaard; To make a contribution in clarifying the problematic relationship between FabroGemelli-Università Cattolica of Milan, which remains underexplored today and which covers a span of time that begins in the middle of the 1930’s until the end of 1958, with a collaboration and uninterrupted comparison, as well as with the founder of the Cattolica,52 also with Monsignor Olgiati and other faculty members  at the same university; Last but not least, to expand and consolidate a renewed reflection on the vexata quaestio of the speculative presence, and not merely physical,53 of the philosopher from Aschaffenburg in Italy, who was born in Marienberg am Rhein (Germany), to an Italian family, and then over the next twenty years (1895-1915) travelled on the peninsula to Palermo, Rome, and finally settled down in Florence, where in 1915, following the start of the war in Italy, moved to Zurich, in Switzerland.54 For more on the debates surrounding Fabro’s interpretation of the writings of Thomas, see the reviews of F.Olgiati, in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, VI, 1940, pp.595-604; G. Isaye, in Nouvelle Revue Théologique, 1940, pp.367-368; J.B. Lotz, in Scholastik, 3, 1941, pp.390-393. 3 Cornelio Fabro, La fenomenologia della percezione, (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1941) 39. Henceforth, FP. The two texts of 1941 were reviewed by A. Rossi, in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, XLIV, 1943, pp. 413-416 and pp. 416-419, who concludes that: “… the two studies are valuable especially for their breadth of research; a breadth that rivals its depth of analysis, with secure and complete summaries, with the richness and profundity of its arguments...No philosophical scholar should ignore these two volumes” (ibid., p. 416). 4 Cf. FP 47. On Fabro, see, among the many texts published over the last several years, the very recent and wellstructured collective volume edited by Ariberto Acerbi, Crisi e destino della filosofia: Studi su Cornelio Fabro, (Roma: EDUSC, 2012). 5 XXIX, 2-3, 1937, pp.207-245. 6 Cornelio Fabro, Un saggio di filosofia della biologia, in Bollettino filosofico, 1, 1937, pp.65-77 (review of F. De Sarlo, Vita e Psiche. Saggio di filosofia della Biologia, Firenze 1935). 7 Bollettino filosofico (Pontificia Università Lateranense), IV, 1, 1938, pp.5-63. 8 Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 1939, pp.117-135. 9 The New Scholasticism, XII, 4, 1938, p. 337-368. 10 FP xxviii. 11 A.Gemelli, Prefazione, in C.Fabro, La fenomenologia della percezione, cit., p.ix. 12 FP 151. 13 Ibid. p. 150-151. 14 FP 38. 15 FP 151. 16 Cornelio Fabro, Percezione e pensiero, (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1941), xiv. Henceforth, PP. 17 PP xv. 18 PP v. 19 PP xiv. 20 FP 421. 21 PP xiv-xv. 22 FP 39. 23 FP 155. 24 Ibid. 39. 25 Ibid. 434. 26 Ibid. 41. 27 Ibid. 35. 2 11 28Ibid. 36. For more on the person and work of Carl Stumpf, and his relation to Franz Brentano, see the more recent works in Brentano Studien, X, 2002-2003, see also the monograph on the theme: Essays über Carl Stumpf und Franz Brentano, ed. W. Baumgartner and A. Reimherr; also see, the biography of Stumpf, ed. H. Sprung (unter Mitarbeit von L. Sprung), Carl Stumpf – Eine Biographie. Von der Philosophie zur experimentellen Psychologie, (München/Wien: Profil Verlag, 2006). 29 Historical Archive Università Cattolica, Milan, (prot.82/127/1170). The book Fabro refers to here is the first of two posthumous volumes by C. Stumpf, Erkenntnislehre, as is evinced in other letters sent to the same Gemelli in addition to the review Fabro published in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 1939, XVII, 431-435. 30 C. Fabro, Prefazione, in C. Fabro, La fenomenologia della percezione, cit., p. vii. 31 C. Fabro, Percezione e pensiero, cit. p. 87. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 89. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 90. 36 Ibid. 90-91. 37 Ibid. 92. 38 Ibid. 93. 39 Ibid. 94. 40 Ibid. 95. 41 Ibid. 97-98. 42 Ibid. 99. 43 Ibid. 100. 44 Ibid. 103. 45 Ibid. 148-149. 46 Ibid. 149. 48 Ibid. 149-50. 49 For example, in the preface of the first edition of The Phenomenology of Perception, he claims to have “given to a very talented young person, Dr. Fabro ... the task of critically evaluating the conclusions, principles, and teachings of the ‘Gestalt’, and especially of demonstrating the value it has for those who face the problem of consciousness” (p. ix); Moreover, speaking, in an autobiographical text from 1952 about the psychology of perception he remarks of not having sufficient space to treat the issue and sees the studies “attained in this area, under my guidance, by my students Gatti, Cossetti, Zama and Fabro”, in A. Gemelli A History of Psychology in Autobiography, ed. E. Boring, H. Werner, H. Langfeld, R. Yerkes, vol 4 (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1952) 105. 50 Historical Archive, Università Cattolica di Milano, (prot. 82/128/1175). 51 Historical Archive, Università Cattolica di Milano, (prot. 82/128/1180). 52 Cf. A. Gemelli, Prefazione, in C. Fabro, La fenomenologia della percezione, cit., pp. ix-x: “I gave to a very talented young person, Dr. Fabro ... the task of critically evaluating the conclusions, principles, and teachings of the ‘Gestalt’ ... Dr. Fabro carried out the difficult task with such honest scruples of views and information, being able to write an original piece of work, and break away entirely with the above-mentioned works ... I would attest, because this has a great importance, which Fabro has fully understood all of the vast literature; he has repeated some of the most significant experiences; of others he took care to comprehend methods and conclusions; he has placed before the Italian reader a faithful portrait, complete and satisfying data that forms the basis of the teaching of the ‘Gestalt’”. 53 Introduzione. Brentano: il puzzle incompleto, in Brentano in Italia, ed. L.Albertazzi e R. Poli, cit., pp.11-18; For more on Brentano, see O. Kraus, Franz Brentano. Zur Kentniss seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, mit Beiträgen von Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl, Beck, München 1919. 54 Article translated by Joshua Furnal, Durham University. 12