Journal of Environmental Psychology(1994) 14, 1-19
0272-4944/94/010001+19508.00/0
© 1994 Academic Press Ltd
PSY0LOGY
COGNITIVE MAPS:
WHAT ARE THEY A N D WHY STUDY THEM?
ROBERTM. KITCHIN
Department of Geography, University College of Swansea, Wales SA2 8PP, U.K.
Abstract
It is often implicitly assumed by researchers that their readers understand what cognitive map and
cognitive mapping are, and their justification for study. This paper differs in this respect by explaining
explicitly the 'what' and 'why' questions often asked, demonstrating cognitive mapping's multidisciplinary
research worth. First, it examines questions concerning what cognitive maps are, the confusion inherent
from the use of the term 'map', and the usage and reasons for alternative expressions. Second, it examines
the theoretical applications or conceptual research, concerning cognitive maps role in the influencing and
explaining spatial behaviour; spatial choice and decision making; wayiinding and orientation; and the
cognitive maps utility and role as a mnemonic and metaphorical devise; a shaper of world and local attitudes
and perspectives; and for creating and coping with imaginary worlds. Third, it discusses cognitive mapping's
practical and applied worth, concerning the planning of suitable living environments; advertising; crime
solving; search and rescue, geographical educational issues, cartography and remote sensing; and in the
designing and understanding computer interfaces and databases, especially Geographical Information
Systems (GISs).
Introduction
This paper aims to discuss explicitly what
cognitive maps are and their justification for
study. It is intended as a broad overview of the
subjects multidisciplinary nature and its current
and potential applications, and to highlight the
inherent definitional problems associated with
such a wide range of users. Such a review is
necessary to stimulate and encourage more
collaboration between researchers from different
backgrounds, reveal applications t h a t individually
we m a y have not been aware of, and to try and
strengthen definitional problems, hopefully introducing an element of conformity in term use, so
far lacking because of a multidisciplinary research
background. It is not intended as an in-depth
review of specific applications, nor as a platform
to discuss, critique or explain the m a n y other
issues, such as the m a n y theories concerning
learning, development, content, form, structure,
thought, brain location and measurement of cognitive map knowledge. It deliberately contains
m a n y references to allow and promote crossdisciplinary reading.
What are Cognitive Maps and Cognitive
Mapping?
The traditional definition used and accepted by
m a n y researchers states that:
cognitive mapping is a process composed of a series
of psychological transformations by which an individual acquires, stores, recalls, and decodes information about the relative locations and attributes of the
phenomena in his everyday spatial environment
(Downs & Stea, 1973a, p. 7)
Cognitive mapping can thus be thought of as a
marriage between spatial and environmental cognition, where spatial cognition is defined as:
...the knowledge and internal or cognitive representation of the structure, entities, and relations of
space; in other words, the internalized reflection and
reconstruction of space in thought (Hart & Moore,
1973, p. 248)
and environmental cognition refers to:
the awareness, impressions, information, images,
and beliefs that people have about environments...it
implies not only that individuals and groups have information and images about the existence of these
environments and of their constituent elements, but
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R.M. Kitchin
also that they have impressions about their character, function, dynamics, and structural interrelatedness, and that they imbue them with meaning,
significance, and mythical-symbolic properties
(Moore & Golledge, 1976, p. xii).
In this way cognitive mapping refers to a 'place
cognition' as described by H a r t and Conn (1991), so
t h a t rather t h a n dealing exclusively with either the
spatial aspect or the environmental aspect of how
we think about everyday environmental and geographical data, it combines the relevant sections of
the two so that:
...one is brought closer to meaning and action, for
"place" is the focus of human intentions. Consequently, the study of place leads us to the simultaneous investigation of thinking, feeling, and acting in
the environment (italics added) (Hart &Conn, 1991,
p. 278)
Cohen (1985, p. 9) sums such a 'place cognition' as:
A union of spatial knowledge, social knowledge, and
an understanding of the physical and social nature
of environments--all in relation to...cognitive ~hnc.
tioning.
Tolman (1948) first used the term 'cognitive map',
to describe how rats, and by analogy, h u m a n s
behaved in the environment. He hypothesized t h a t
we construct a map-like representation within the
'black box' of the nervous system which is used to
guide our everyday movements. This representation
is actually structured in the same way as a cartog r a p h i c map, gaining euclidean properties with
repeated experience. The t e r m gained little recognition until it was resurrected by experimental and
development psychologists in the early 1970s, and
although used with extreme caution for a time
owing to behaviourist connotations (Allen 1985),
the phrase eventually took hold, especially among
geographers to whom the term had appeal (Downs
& Stea, 1973a, Boyle & Robinson, 1978).
At its most general, a cognitive map is a mental
construct which we use to understand and know the
environment (Kaplan, 1973a). The term assumes
t h a t people store information about their environment which they then use to make spatial decisions.
Tversky (1992, p. 134) suggests t h a t at its broadest
definition a cognitive map is the:
cognitive apparatus that underlies...behaviour.
while Stea and Blaut (1973, p. 227) describe it as a
construct which enables a person:
to predict the environment which is too large to be
perceived at once, and to establish a matrix of environmental experience into which a new experience
can be integrated.
In effect, a cognitive map is a mental devise and
store which helps to simplify, code and order the
endlessly complex world of h u m a n interaction with
the environment (Walmsley, et al., 1990). Downs
and Stea (1973a) refer to them as 'convenient shorth a n d symbols t h a t we all subscribe to, recognise
and employ'. This subscription does not have to be
performed consciously, but can be if necessary. It is
in effect a mental representation of spatial/environmental knowledge (N.B. the term representation is
not m e a n t to imply image).
This construct is thought to exist because it is
assumed t h a t people store information about their
environment which they then use to make spatial
decisions which guide behaviour, and is, in effect
responsible for geographical 'survival' knowledge.
(Stea 1969; Kaplan 1973b). Kaplan (1973b)
similarly hypothesizes t h a t cognitive maps develop
as a means of quick and efficient mechanism for
handling information thus giving man a selective
advantage in a difficult and dangerous world. They
~re in effect 'evolutionary adaptive' giving m a n a
'~ense of place' necessary for survival (Stea, 1976).
Downing (1992, p. 442) in a discussion of images
wrote a passage which neatly describes cognitive
maps. Cognitive maps:
suspend impressions, thoughts, feelings and ideas
until, for some reason, consciously or unconsciously,
the mind solicits, changes, and often distorts or manipulates its contents for some immediate purpose.
In this way cognitive maps (images) allow us to
bridge time, by using past experiences to understand
present and future situations.
Cognitive maps, though, are not just a set of
spatial mental structures denoting relative position,
they contain attributive values and meanings. As
Wood and Beck (1989) explain, the cognitive map is
not independent of meaning, of role, of function, of
need, of end, and of purpose. This distinction leads
to the conclusion t h a t a cognitive map includes
knowledge about places as well as knowledge consisting of spatial relationships (Kaplan, 1976) and
t h a t cognitive maps involve the integration of
'images, information and attitudes about an
environment' (Spencer & Blades, 1986 p. 240). They
are in effect 'representations of objects and their
associations' involving generic and motivational
information (Kaplan, 1973b). As Spencer et al.
(1989, p.108) state:
. . . cognitive maps are not isolated and contextless
entities: they are formed during purposive activity in
the everyday world of the child, and, in as much as
they encode the resources, valued friends, memories,
and aspirations as well as factual information about
Cognitive Maps
geographical layout and routes, they should perhaps
better be described as cognitive/affective maps.
Golledge and Timmermans (1990) have reported
t h a t cognitive maps are in effect a series of knowledge structures which consist of different levels of
detail and integration. These knowledge structures
develop with age and education, thus increasing the
information held. By combining different knowledge
structures and information using cognitive processes relating to perception, storage, retrieval and
reorganization t h a t interact with memory structures a cognitive map is formed for specific tasks
(Golledge et al., 1985). This, if interpreted literally
means there is no one cognitive map in memory but
rather we construct t h e m for specific events (Siegel
& Cousins, 1985). In this respect cognitive maps are
dynamic.
It m u s t also be recognized t h a t cognitive maps
are not independent of time and space and t h a t
'since each environment exists in a time-space context, so too will cognitions of those environments'
(Moore & Golledge, 1976 p. 11). In s u m m a r y then,
and for the purpose of this paper, cognitive maps
constructed from the knowledge store contain
information concerning, spatial relations and
environmental attributive data which reside within
a Space-time context allowing the possessor to
operate within an environment and to process
environmental and geographical data. They are
'complex, highly selective, abstract and generalised'
structures which are 'incomplete, distorted, schematised, and augmented' (Downs & Stea, 1973c, p.18)
Problematic definitions and the confusion created
using the term 'map'
Buttenfield (1986, p. 238) has reported t h a t the cognitive map is not in fact the internal representation
of the environment but rather the external product
of measurement.
Because it reflects an internal, spatial memory, the
external reported information reflects a cognitive
process, and so is called a cognitive map.
Gatrell (1983) has noted this confusion as to
whether a cognitive map is an inferred internal representation or an elicited external representation.
Buttenfield's position is not advocated here: a cognitive map refers to the internal thinking of the everyday spatial environment. The external form of this
thought, elicited through an appropriate methodology, is called a spatial product, a term initially used
by Liben (1981) which has gained some standard
recognition.
3
Kuipers (1978) has called 'common-sense knowledge' a cognitive map and again this is not strictly
true. Kuipers (1978, p. 129) defines common-sense
knowledge as:
knowledge about the physical environment that is
acquired or used, generally without concentrated
effort, to find and follow routes from one place to
another, and to store and use the relative positions of
places.
This implies the ability to make inferences and
propositions, both of which are not necessarily
needed to be able to complete a cognitive mapping
exercise, but r a t h e r exercises needing the use of
configurational knowledge (knowledge of the associations between, and relative locations of places).
Although there is a general acceptance as to what
cognitive mapping refers to, there still remains
much misunderstanding in the use of the word 'map'
i~ the term 'cognitive map', and thus the form of
cognitive maps. The form of cognitive maps (images,
conceptual-propositional, dual coding, holograms,
genetic coding) are not investigated within this
paper, but there are four main viewpoints t h a t can
be adopted in explaining the use of the term 'map'
which has caused confusion and misuse in the past
(see the debate between G r a h a m 1976, 1981 and
Downs 1981):
(1) Is it the case t h a t the cognitive map is a cartographic map (Explicit statement)?
(2) Is it the case t h a t the cognitive map is like a
cartographic map? (Analogy)
(3) Is it the case t h a t a cognitive map is used as if
it were a cartographic map (Metaphor)?
(4) Is it the case t h a t the cognitive map has no
real connections with what we understand to be a map,
i.e. a cartographic map, and is neither an explicit
statement, analogy or a metaphor but rather an unfortunate choice of phrase: 'a convenient fiction?'
(Siegel, 1981). I n effect just a hypothetical construct.
Explicit Statement: A cognitive Map is a map.
O' Keefe and Nadel (1978) have hypothesized t h a t
the hippocampus, a part of the brain associated
with long-term memory, is a cognitive map, and
t h a t this map is a three-dimensional, euclidean
model of the world, with rigid geometrical properties.
This belief is based on findings of several experiments
which found the activity of the rats hippocampal
neurons correlated with the rats location in the
maze. Other neuroscientists such as Lieblich and
Arbib (1982) have agreed t h a t the hippocampus
does play a role in wayfinding but are not so sure
of its role as a store of the whole 'world graph'
4
R.M. Kitchin
(cognitive map), but r a t h e r argue t h a t it holds a
'chart of the local neighbourhood t h a t m u s t be
presumably read from a whole atlas stored in longterm memory' and is effectively a situation recogniser' (Lieblich & Arbib, 1982 p. 640). Few, though,
have drawn the same conclusion t h a t neurons
within the brain act as a three-dimensional model of
the world. The main argument suggesting otherwise
focuses upon scale change, that is, every neuron is an
individual and so to cover all experiences the cognitive
map would have to be huge. Second, there is no allowance for an update of new data, which would effectively m e a n a rebuilding of each neurons identity.
Analogy: A Cognitive Map is like a map. Alternatively, an implicit argument for cognitive maps having
map-like properties are the same results which discover euclidean spatial relationships within the spatial
products. If the spatial products we obtain in experiments are euclidean or can be considered to be
euclidean after t a s k strategy error is removed,
surely it is implied t h a t the spatial relation
knowledge held within the mind is also euclidean
in nature. Kaplan (1973a, pp. 275-276) initially
hypothesized this viewpoint:
It further assumes that this information is coded in a
structure which people carry around in their heads,
and this structure corresponds, at least, to a reasonable degree, to the environment it represents.
He continues to state t h a t 'this map is far from
a cartographer's map, however. It is schematic,
sketchy, incomplete, distorted, and otherwise simplified and idiosyncratic' (Kaplan, 1973a, p. 276).
In effect, the analogy is t h a t the 'map in the head'
inspected by the 'mind's eye' is functionally identical
to a graphical map inspected by the physical eye
(Kuipers, 1982). That is, cognitive map information
is isomorphic to information held in a graphical
map, so t h a t information added to, and retrieved
from, the cognitive map is similar or the same as
operations used to add or retrieve information from
a graphical map (Kuipers, 1982). Although this does
not mean t h a t there m u s t be a region in the brain
onto which the environment is physically mapped
(Stea, 1969; Kuipers 1982), but r a t h e r t h a t there
will be a correspondence between i n p u t - o u t p u t behaviours of the storage and retrieval functions of the
two representations (Kuipers, 1983). Statements such
as 'Every person acquainted with an environment
possesses a simplified cognitive structure of the
environment' (Goodchild, 1974, p. 157); '...integrating
information.., to form an overall representation
something like a survey map' (Newcombe, 1982, p. 74)
and '...that give the cognitive map its maplike
properties' (Garling et al., 1985, p. 147) do though
imply a representation with map-like qualities.
Downs and Stea (1973c, p. 11) used the term 'map'
to denote a functional analogue. 'The focus of attention is on a cognitive representation which has the
functions of the familiar cartographic map but not
necessarily the physical properties of such a pictorial
graphic model' and consequently argue it is an
analogy to be used, not believed. One of the problems
encountered by readers are these deceptive and
misleading qualities of the analogy (Downs & Stea,
1973c).
Metaphor: A Cognitive Map works as if it were a
map. The reason for believing t h a t the cognitive
map is a metaphor is the belief t h a t we act as if we
possess a map in our minds (Kaplan, 1973a; Graham,
1976). If being used as a metaphor, the cognitive
map should be interpreted, 'it was like he had a
map in his head':
The problem is, it is easy to slip into the belief that a
map is something that people have stored away
somewhere in the head (Downs, 1976, p. 68).
As Spencer et al. (1989, p. 108) state:
The metaphor of a map in the head is so persuasive
that we are tempted to believe that there is no
metaphor, but rather that our questioning of the subject is the search for the dimensions of a real 'thing'.
This though does not mean t h a t we do in fact
possess such a map, and assuming we do, removes
the metaphors heuristic value (Tuan, 1975). What
makes the spatial metaphor 'map' so useful is that it:
makes the relationships explicit and because it
provides the necessary guidance for using imagery to
remember abstract conceptual relationships that are
not easily imaged (West et al., 1985, p. 22).
The main argument against such a cognitive map
construct is the non-euclidean properties discovered
by some methods of investigating our knowledge
structures, and the fact t h a t we have incomplete
knowledge not integrated into one single 'map' but
r a t h e r disconnected components (Kuipers, 1983).
Hypothetical Construct: a convenient fiction. Cognitive m a p s described as hypothetical constructs
render the word 'map' redundant. In this context
'map' has no literal meaning and although the term
could be misinterpreted to imply t h a t a cognitive
map is a map, or is like a map, or works like a map,
the implication is not intended:
As hypothetical constructs, cognitive maps have an
allegedly real status; they refer to hypothesised
underlying entities or processes that there is reason
Cognitive Maps
to believe do exist, which are inprinciple observable ....
Thus, as a hypothetical construct, the term cognitive
map and its approximate synonyms refer to covert,
non-observed processes and organisations of elements of knowledge (Moore & Golledge, 1976, p. 8).
The reasoning behind such arguments are spatial
products with non-euclidean natures, such as intravisity (A is estimated greater t h a n B, B is estimated greater t h a n C, C is estimated greater t h a n
A, where A, B and C are interpoint distances) or
non-communicavity (distance from A to B, is not
equal to the distance from B to A i.e. asymmetry),
and leads to arguments of 'impossible figures' or
'spaces' (Tversky, 1981; Baird et al., 1982). Whether
these hypothetical internal entities' (Newcombe, 1985,
p. 277) are like, or work like, a map is immaterial;
the term map is used just to represent a set of
processes which are believed to exist and affect our
everyday spatial behaviour. As Siegel and Cousins
(1985, p. 349) state:
...cognitive maps are hypostatizations--abstractions
that we create and use in understanding the sequence
and development of the continual activity of cognitive
mapping. In this sense, cognitive maps are a convenient fiction.
The position adopted for this paper and explained
earlier, is t h a t cognitive maps are hypothetical constructs.
Alternative expressions. This confusion concerning the meaning and context of the term has also led
to the use of surrogate terms. These terms while
being defined and used in some papers in a slightly
different context to a cognitive map, have been used
in others, instead of, or to imply 'cognitive map'.
This is not aided by the fact that several authors are
using the terms interchangeably across articles and
in some cases within articles. Possible surrogates
include abstract maps (Hernandez, 1991), cognitive
configurations (Golledge, 1977), cognitive images
(Lloyd, 1982), cognitive representations (Downs
& Stea, 1973b) cognitive schemata (Lee, 1968),
cognitive space (Montello, 1989), cognitive systems
(Canter, 1977), conceptual representations (Stea,
1969), configurational representations (Kirasic,
1991), environmental images (Lynch, 1960), mental
images (Pocock, 1973), mental maps (Gould &
White, 1974) mental representations (Gale, 1982),
orientating schemata (Neisser, 1976), place
schemata (Axia et al., 1991), spatial representations
(Allen et al., 1978), spatial schemata (Lee, 1968),
topological representations (Shemyakin, 1962),
topological schemata (Griffin, 1948), and world
graphs (Lieblich & Arbib, 1982).
5
Why Are There Variations in Definitions
Cognitive mapping's varying defmitions are basically
the result of its multidisciplinary nature. Cognitive
mapping has no one strong subject base and is essentially a research topic with inputs from most of
the social sciences. Papers and books can be found
from geographers, planners and architects, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, cognitive scientists and neurologists. This has
advantages, giving the subject a wide base of knowledge and viewpoints, but does tend to m e a n that
there is no strong united philosophical and theoretical base. This position has led to a variety of standpoints that currently exist. The movement towards
integration (Garling & Evans 1991; Garling &
Golledge, 1993) should help to alleviate the situation.
One additional problem noted by Allen (1985) is
the fact that the t e r m 'cognitive map' has become
an all-purpose, unrestricted entity describing all
behaviour and thought concerning the spatial
environment. The t e r m has no practical constraints
or boundaries. As a result he (Allen, 1985) calls for
the use of more rigorous constructs from the study
of cognition. The position advocated here is that
the term should be used in this utilitarian way
to represent the knowledge of, and interactions
with, the everyday environment, and geographical
information gained through other secondary sources
such as maps, and that a new set of terms such as
Liben's (1981) 'spatial thought', 'spatial storage',
and 'spatial product' should be used to represent
specific concepts.
Theoretical Worth: C o n c e p t u a l R e s e a r c h
General: influences and explains behaviour
In the early 1960s, the behavioral approach in
geography evolved as an answer to positivism
(Golledge, 1981), as researchers began to realize
t h a t to exist in, and comprehend the environment,
we formed cognitive maps from the m a s s of 'to
whom it m a y concern' messages emanating from the
world in which we live (Golledge & Stimson, 1987).
The belief was that we could increase the explanatory powers and the understanding of geographers
by incorporating behavioural variables, along with
others, within a decision making framework that
sought to comprehend and find reasons for overt
spatial behaviour r a t h e r t h a n describing the spatial
manifestations of behaviour itself (Golledge, 1981).
In effect it was an:
6
R.M. Kitchin
attempt to base the explanation of human spatial
activities on a foundation of human behavioral
processes (Golledge, 1985, p. 113);
to define models of m a n that were alternatives to
the classic models of normative economic rationality
used in the past (Pocock, 1972) using data collected
at the individual/micro-scale rather than using
large scale governmental data (Golledge, 1985), and
analysed using a series of:
methods and models tied to non-normal statistical
populations, non-parametric data, non-linear distribution activities, with an interest in multidimensional spaces, as well as physical spaces (Golledge,
1985, p. 113).
Thus the black box of man (an unknown constant
in the study of environment/behaviour relationship) is replaced by a white box, in which the
variable nature of m a n is recognized as being of
fundamental importance (Downs, 1970). As Couclelis
(1986) explains we have become interested in
'answers to questions such as "how do people really
behave" or "how do people really make decisions".'
The g e n e r a l belief is that cognitive mapping
explains and leads not only to the understanding of
spatial behaviour, b u t the cognitive map is a mental
construct (be it explicit, analogical, metaphorical or
hypothetical) that actually influences behaviour,
and by examining a whole range of spatial products
(external representation of our cognitive map
knowledge) we can understand spatial decision
making and subsequent behaviour. Lynch (1976, p.
xiii) explains that:
People's behaviour in large-scale environments can
be explained more completely through recourse to
internal, subjective factors than by more traditional
external, "objective" factors, and that behaviour
is mediated by the image (cognitive map) of the
environment.
A sentiment shared by MacEachren (1992, p. 245):
The knowledge of space (cognitive maps) is critical
to attitudes toward, decision making about and
behaviour within places
and strongly advocated by Downs and Stea (1973c,
p.10):
We are postulating the cognitive map as the basis
for deciding upon and implementing any strategy
of spatial behaviour .... We view cognitive mapping
as basic component of human adaptation, and the
cognitive map as a requisite both for human survival
and for everyday environmental behaviour.
It is argued that we all have daily navigation
decisions to make involving choice processes, for
example, migration, shopping or recreation, which
it is hypothesized are influenced by our ability to
understand the everyday environment, i.e. cognitive
maps (Golledge et al., 1976). As Baird et al. (1979,
p. 92) point out:
The ability to plan and execute movement in a familiar environment seems to require that one possess a
cognitive map [representation] of that environment
in addition to the stimulus information directly
available to the sensory systems.
This has led Cadwallader (1976, p. 316) to suggest
that the cognitive maps affect at least three types of
decisions:
(1) The decision to stay or go.
(2) The decision of where to go.
(3) The decision of which route to take.
Garling et al. (1985, p. 143) add one more decision to
this list:
(4) The decision of how to get there.
One of a cognitive map's functions then is to rehearse spatial behaviour in the mind so that when
we are actually travelling, we can act with a degree
of assurance that we would otherwise not have
(Tuan, 1975). They are in effect advanced organizers
that influence the impact of later direct experience
of the environment (Liben, 1991).
The arguments concerning cognitive maps and
spatial behaviour are circular though, and although
'our knowledge of the external world impinges upon
our actions...our acts affect our knowledge' (Webber
et al., 1975, p. 100). This suggests that our cognitive
maps are not stable entities, b u t are dynamic: constantly changing and evolving. We are constantly
learning and altering the information we use to
make spatial decisions. 'Behaviour modifies and is
modified by interaction with the spatial environment' (Matthews, 1980, p. 178).
Boyle and Robinson (1979) have expressed doubts
as to what a cognitive map is, and define it as a
figural image with a cartographic form, in a sense
an analogy. Upon this basis they argue that
cognitive maps have a use in explaining h u m a n
behaviour but conclude that 'cognitive maps play
only a minor and intermittent role in effective
thinking and that it is misleading to impute to them
any great significance in the co-ordination of our
spatial activities' (Boyle & Robinson, 1979, p. 64).
A more effective argument against the utility of
cognitive maps in explaining spatial behaviour has
been argued by Piaget & Inhelder (1956) who state
that behaviour in space and representation of space
are in fact very different and they make the distinction between 'practical' space (the capacity to act in
Cognitive Maps
space) and 'conceptual' space (the capacity to
represent space. The capacity to act and move
intelligently through space may well occur before,
and possibly in the absence of, the capacity to
represent that space (Spencer et al., 1989). This
argument is accepted, but it is argued that the
subject still possesses cognitive map knowledge,
which they find difficult to represent externally.
Research concerning spatial behaviour within the
environment can be divided into three main strands
of spatial problem solving: spatial decision making
(whether, why and where questions), wayfinding
(how questions) and development of acquisition and
learning (what and when questions).
Spatial problem solving: spatial choice and spatial
decision making
It is hypothesized that the cognitive map provides
information necessary for spatial decision making
and to execute the consequent behaviour (Briggs,
1973). The cognitive map as discussed, therefore
plays a role in four vital questions: whether to go
somewhere; why go there; where it is that is the
destination; and how to get there. Researchers have
investigated these questions from the perspective of
cognitive mapping in relation to a series of application areas: consumer behaviour (Coshall, 1985a,b);
residential and business location (Pacione, 1978,
1982); movement patterns within an urban area
(Johnston, 1972; Briggs, 1973) and recreational and
leisure destinations (Golledge & Timmermans, 1990).
These all have real world applications, concerning
planning, teaching and advertising. These are discussed later, but the general argument is that if we
can understand where people want to go and why,
then planners both governmental and commercial
can plan for their needs. Another application could
be advertising. For example, it is now noticeable
within the marketing of business parks the use of
centrality and ease of access as factors that sell. If
you can alter peoples cognition of distance you could
attract more custom. Studies that have looked at
cognitive mapping in relation to spatial decision
making though, tend to only take theory and investigate its worth, without then re-contributing to
theory making.
Spatial problem solving : wayfinding and spatial
orientation
Wayfinding is the ability to learn and remember a
route through the environment (Blades, 1991) with
the overall goal being able to relocate from one place
7
to another in large-scale space (Gluck, 1991). Spatial
orientation refers to the process by which a person
knows where he or she is relative to something else
(Garling & Golledge, 1989). These both use high
level cognitive processes and are different from
kinaesthetic senses of orientation and wayfinding
which are low level reflexes for maintaining equilibrium (Gluck, 1991).
Gluck (1991) has divided up wayfinding research
into two main categories: Competence and Performance literature. Both can be split into two further
categories. The competence literature subdivided
into computational models and information processing models, both of which can be interpreted as
acquisition and learning models. These are often
still implicitly or explicitly based in the theoretical
frameworks of environmental cognition. The performance literature can be divided between general
studies (applicable across all groups) and specific
studies (children, elderly, special needs).
Computational models of wayfinding are the
result of the continuing expansion of artificial
intelligence to research in the social sciences. There
are two main model types: cognitively based and
biologically (connectivist) based. The cognitively
based models are centred around memory structures and information processing and the biologically based around the behaviour of neurons and
are often referred to as parallel distributive process
models (PDP) (Golledge & Timmermans, 1990). A
further distinction in artificial intelligence is made
between 'scruffies' and 'neats' (Zimring & Gross,
1991). The 'scruffies' primary focus is on producing
a computational model where the outcomes mimic
human behaviour and in general are searching for
direct links between the environment and behaviour. 'Neats' are interested in reproducing
human outcomes, but adopt cognitive science
approaches that attempt to model people's mental
processes accurately as well (Zimring & Gross,
1991). It is generally the case that biological models
are scruffy, whereas cognitive models are neat.
Most popular among social scientists are cognitively based models. These models attempt to
simulate human mental processes with computer
programs (Kuipers, 1982) with the belief that an
'individuals permanent knowledge structure provides the basis for interpreting objects, actions and
events in the external environment' (Smith et al.,
1982, p. 307). In general, they attempt to simulate a
wayfinder that learns the paths and landmarks in a
large-scale space, and then can navigate through
the space it knows, solving route-planning tasks.
Models are often distinguished in terms of how the
8
R.M. Kitchin
environment is represented, and to the extent
to which the knowledge is seen as procedural, topological, or metric (Golledge 1992). The aim is to
determine the types of knowledge that exist, the
manner in which such knowledge is represented
and organized, the mechanisms by which it is activated, and the elementary and higher level cognitive
processes that operate upon the knowledge base to
produce new knowledge, inferences, evaluations
and external behaviours' (Smith et al., 1982, p. 307).
In other words to discover how we store, think
about and carry out wayfinding activities. It is
though not intended to replace theory but add to its
development (Garling & Golledge, 1989).
Example cognitive programs include, TOUR
(Kuipers, 1978); TRAVELLER (Leiser & Zilbershatz,
1989) ELMER (McCalla et al., 1982); SPAM
(McDermott & Davis, 1983); MERCATOR (Davis,
1983); CRITTER (Kuipers, 1985); NX Robot
(Kuipers & Levitt, 1988); and Qualnav (Levitt
et al., 1987, 1988). NAVIGATOR (Gopal et al., 1989)
combines elements from spatial cognition and
neurologically based information processing. Application studies includes G011edge et al. (1985) on
wayfinding of children in a suburban area, an
Couclelis's (1986) navigation in an airport.
Information Processing models are the second
category proposed by Gluck (1991) These are effectively non-computational process models of how and
why we acquire and learn the everyday environment, including routes for wayfinding. Much of
the work in this area has been carried out by the
Environmental Psychology Research Group at the
University of Umea, Sweden (Garling et al., 1981,
1985, 1986; Saisa et al., 1986) concerning the use of
travel plans to link cognitive map information processing with actual behaviour. These travel plans
are in essence action plans, and are predetermined
courses of action to reach a desire destination with
the minimum investment of effort.
The Performance Literature is concerned with the
actual collecting and assessment of data rather than
the building of acquisition and learning theories. It
focuses on problems of measurement, discussing
how to collect distance, direction or locational estimates to assess the route knowledge individuals
possess for wayfinding. The aims of this research is
to find factors that affect the cognitive map, thus
route knowledge and hence wayfinding, and then
to integrate the results into existing theory. The
number of factors are huge, ranging from personal
characteristics, traits, meaning and ability; perceptual context; environmental influences to social
influences.
This is often looked at the general scale where
results are considered applicable to all types of subgroups of people. Some studies though concentrate
at the more specific level concerning the wayfinding
and orientation of specific subgroups of the population such as children (see work by Blades &
Spencer), the elderly (see work by Ohta; Kirasic) and
those with special needs be it mental or physical
(see work by Spencer & Blades; Golledge et al.,
1979, 1983).
Spatial problem solving: acquisition and learning
The previous section dealt with wayfinding and
discussed two types of investigation that looked at
the acquisition and development of wayfinding and
orientating skills. This section discusses cognitive
map development as a whole, and why this research
is important at a academic, intellectual level and
the implications for both theoretical and applied
research.
Research in this area has been traditionally been
dominated by psychologists particularly those of
developmental persuasion (Spencer & Blades, 1985),
and can be split into three competing philosophical
traditions which attempt to explain the development of cognitive mapping (Matthews 1992). These
can be neatly represented by three questions
(Table 1).
From a purely academic standpoint the study of
development and acquisition is vital to our understanding of how a cognitive map is composed, constructed and organized, and when changes occur in
the development of this knowledge (Hazen et al.,
1978). Such studies are 'admirable because they
portray an unfolding process' (Lynch, 1976, p. v)
and essentially form the 'basic cornerstone in the
understanding of mature forms of understanding an
experience' (Moore, 1976, p. 138). The implications
of this research are therefore fundamental in the
development of models of spatial behaviour and in
practical applications such a teaching and planning
TABLE1
Philosophical traditions of development research
1 Is cognitive mapping ability given innately, and closely
aligned to language acquisition (nativism)?
2 Is cognitive mapping ability built up empirically from
sensations derived from experiences of different geographical environments (empiricism)?
3 Is cognitive mapping ability constructed out of some
sort of interaction between inherited and experiential
factors (constructivism)?
Source: Matthews (1992, p. 69).
Cognitive Maps
because it reveals what knowledge people know and
when this knowledge can be expected to develop.
Mnemonic and metaphorical devise
Tuan (1975) suggests that one of the functions of a
cognitive map is as a mnemonic devise. They are
important because if 'we wish to memorize events,
people, and things, it helps to know their locations
or even assign them arbitrary locations' (Tuan, 1975,
p. 210). Cognitive maps are therefore a means to
structure and store knowledge (Saarinen et al.,
1988). Gilmartin (1985) has suggested that the visualization component (the images we can form on the
'mind's eye') has been used for thousands of years to
enhance the learning and recall of information and
Bellazza (1983, p. 830) describes such visualization
as the 'oldest known mnemonic devise'. West et al.
(1985) explain that this involves imagining to-be
remembered items in locations in a familiar environment, and then remembering the items by taking a
'mental' walk through that environment. Spatial
thinking is often used as a metaphor for non-spatial
tasks, where people performing non-spatial tasks
involving memory, imagery and inference use spatial
knowledge to aid processing the task (Downs, 1985).
Local / world attitudes and perspectives
The cognitive map as explained earlier extends beyond knowledge of spatial relations to contain social
and environmental meaning knowledge. This information is used to shape our attitudes towards, and
perspectives of, the world, and hence our behaviour
patterns at the local and national level. This,
Golledge & Timmermans (1990) hypothesize manifests itself in everything from public reactions to
events, to individual decision making as reflected in
tourism and investment. These attitudes are more
than just 'ignorance surfaces' as discussed by Gould
(1983) b u t rather models on which people make
everyday decisions. Obviously studies which reveal
how we think about 'places' can give us insights into
how 'we' are cognized and how we cognize other
areas, and clues as to how to change our 'image' to
create a more favourable one. As pointed out by
Saarinen (1973, p. 148):
It seems important in a world continually upset by
international conflicts to try and gain an understanding of variations in world views.
The underlying belief is that when current world
'images' are understood, education can be designed
to remedy any weaknesses revealed, thereby provid-
9
ing a basis for improved international understanding (Walmsley et al., 1990). Saarinen and his assistant MacCabe have been investigating the world
'images' of students (3863) from all over the world
(49 countries) as part of a large scale study (see
Saarinen, 1988; Saarinen et al., 1988, 1992) Studies
of cognitive mapping reveal how we do think about
places, and certain studies show the connection
between attitudes and planning, such as Gould
(1969), Banerjee & Lynch (1977) and Lynch (1977).
Creating and coping with imaginary worlds
Tuan (1975) has hypothesized that cognitive maps
also act as imaginary worlds. They depict attractive
goals that tempt people out of their habitual rounds.
We can as h u m a n beings construct mental descriptions of places we have never been to, from text such
as a novel or word of mouth, such as a friend's
description of a holiday area. What we essentially
do is fit them into our schema of similar events we
have experienced either first hand or secondhand
through the media. In this w a y our cognitive map
schemata allow us to create and cope with unknown
place information. This m a y h a v e practical relevance to studies of our attitudes towards places
as discussed above, or to historical geography in
explaining why people migrated to certain destinations (Tuan, 1975).
A p p l i e d Worth: I n s t r u m e n t a l R e s e a r c h
Understanding cognitive maps for geographers and
urban planners
General. The general implicit belief, especially
amongst geographers (Aitken, Downs, Golledge,
Gold, Humphreys, Pocock, MacEachren) and planners (Appleyard, Lynch, Moore, Okabe) is that:
knowledge gained about perceptual-cognitive processes may improve the quality of human environments through policy, planning, and design, to the
extent that it tells us how to plan and design environments that do not interfere with the proper functioning of these processes (Garling & Golledge, 1989,
p. 2O3).
Lynch (1976, p. xi) clarifies this by stating:
...[we] can better plan, design and manage the environment for and with people if we know how they
image the world.
In effect, there is increasing evidence that environment and behaviour are interdependent (Lee, 1968),
so that environments can influence behaviour, and
10
R.M. Kitchin
explanations of behaviour can be used to influence
the make-up of environments. Indeed Golledge and
Timmermans (1990, p. 76) report that:
specific applications of the models and knowledge
gained from investigations of cognitive mapping and
the acquisition of spatial knowledge are occurring
with increasing frequency in environmental design,
architecture and planning.
The challenge then-is to provide both information
about how people experience the physical environment, and the sorts of h u m a n needs that the physical environment m u s t satisfy, to planners relatively
starved of detailed behavioural data, so that there is
adequate planning in the built environment that
reflects the behavioral propensity of residents and
other users (Kaplan, 1973a; Aitken et al., 1989).
This has resulted due to pressure on public decisionmakers to provide structures and facilities which
are useful and acceptable to their intended users
(Lowery, 1973). By studying the spatial products of
the cognitive map, such data will hopefully become
available, rather than designers relying on intuition,
rule-of-thumb and details from past work, to decide
on what places of the future will look like (Kaplan,
1973a, Downing, 1992).
If cognitive mapping can be used to improve environmental design then this should be explored.
Canter (1977) has preliminarily examined the idea
of encorporating cognitive mapping into design, but
there has been little conceptualization of guidelines
or policy. A fact of which Siedel (1985) is critical.
The implication of this are discussed later.
Examples of where policy has been suggested
include Golledge et al.'s (1979, 1983) investigation
of policy guidelines needed to allow the mentally
retarded a full and active use of their local environments. Carpmen et al. (1985) explored the effects of
hospital design upon wayfinding, and found that
poor design caused increased environmental stress
to staff, patients and visitors. They suggest that
this could be avoided through the introduction of a
policy of clear maps, directories, you-are-here maps
at key decision points, as well as trained staff able
to give clear and concise directions.
Passini (1992) has also examined wayfinding and
the role of planners and designers in environmental
design. He presents a guideline design method, which
conceptualizes wayfinding as a spatial-problem
solving process. There are seven steps, the first four
area analytical, and the last three are aimed at
stimulating reflection to arrive at a design solution.
Seelig and Seelig (1986) have noted that it must
be made c l e a r that other types of knowledge must
TABLE 2
Reasons for planning for children
1 Children and adults differ in behaviour patterns, with
play and education having a major role for children.
2 Their land uses and facilities differ; or, where shared,
are often used for different purposes.
3 Daily ranging patterns differ, in ways that reflect
adult's greater autonomy and access to resources.
4 Children face different (and possibly greater) threats
from their environment.
5 Children are entirely outside the politico-economic
decision-making process that determines land-use;
adults have a greater chance of participating
6 Children and adults differ in their interpretation of
plans.
Source: Spencer et al. (1989, p. 223).
be included in the design process (including cognitive mapping knowledge) beyond analytical, objective knowledge. As Goldberg (1983, p. 24) states:
subjective and value laden intuitive knowledge merit
equal credibility as sources of planning know-how.
Experientially rooted synthetic knowledge is an
essential complement to the deductive analytical
information base of the present.
Children's environments. Can research concerning cognitive mapping provide us with information
concerning the environmental needs of children?
The previous section suggests that they can. If they
can, why should we want to plan environments for
children? (Hill and Michelson (1981) have offered
some reasons (Table 2).
These points mean that children and adults
cognize and use the environment in different ways
for different means. If how children cognize the
environment affects their behaviour, activity patterns
and interaction environment, r e s e a r c h into how
children do cognize the environment could be valuable to both sociologists and architectural planners,
with a view to creating environments more suited
to children's needs, and m a y go someway to help
alleviate the growing youth social problem. One
study that has tried to do this was an international
project sponsored by UNESCO, and carried out in
Mexico, Poland, Australia and Argentina (Lynch
1977). This research focused on low-income, lowresource areas of cities, and was intended to suggest
public policy for neighbourhood improvement.
Elderly environments. The elderly have been
studied by a small number of researchers (Ohta,
1983; Ohta & Kirasic, 1983; Regnier, 1983 Kirasic,
1985, 1989, 1991; Kirasic et al., 1992) interested
in how the elderly learn new environments. It is
Cognitive Maps
hypothesized that age-related decrements in the
ability to learn and wayfind in an environment
could have a impact on the quality of life for elderly
adults (Gold & Goodey, 1987; Kirasic et al., 1992).
As Kirasic states (1985, p. 185):
It is ...imperative that we understand the nature of
any spatial cognitive changes that occur with the increasing of age because any age related decline in
spatial abilities should have a clear and significant
impact on the elderly's individual's transactions with
his or her spatial environment.
A possible solution to this would be to discover
the type of environments the elderly map coguitively, and hence can learn most quickly. These
'optimum' environments m a y be more suitable as a
living area, and as such should be useful to planners creating places used predominantly by elderly
people, such as residential homes and hospitals (Axia
et al., 1991). They should not, however, disregard
environmental features that appeal to the elderly's
environmental assessment, but should contain a
mix of easy to remember and pleasing features. It is
also important that they contain features of practical importance, such as needed resources (shops
and services) (Regnier, 1983).
Environments for special needs people (both physically and mentally handicapped). People with special needs often come to know the environment in
different ways to the fully-abled. For some, interaction may be hampered due to some type of physical
or mental handicaps, meaning fewer and lessactive participation with their surroundings. Others
might suffer from less interaction due to impaired
perceptual development or loss--most commonly
blindness (Spencer et al., 1989). The need for research into how these section of society form and
use cognitive maps is vital to the planner and educationalist if we are going to be able to maximize
their interaction and enjoyment of everyday environments.
Fears are based around the notion that an immobile child will become an immobile adult, suffering
dependency problems which could lead to psychosocial and adjustment problems (Spencer et al., 1989).
The aim is to improve the life style of these groups to
the point where they can 'travel safely, comfortably,
gracefully and independently' (Foulke, 1983). For
this to be realized individuals have to possess basic
cognitive maps, that is they have to know where they
are, where their goal is, and how to get between them.
This requires that motor, perceptual and representational skills are attained by the traveller (Spencer et
al., 1989) and cognitive map knowledge built.
11
The arguments run circular so that, we need suitable environments for special needs groups to operate in, and cognitive mapping research tells us
whether such environments exist and point clues as
to how to improve them. Golledge et al. (1979, 1983)
have studied the cognitive maps of mentally retarded subjects with the aim of understanding how
they cognize the environment they operate, so that
guidelines could be provided for enhancing the environmental behaviour competence, and to discover
which elements of the environment facilitated and
impeded their use. Such information has dual purposes of enhancing education and providing details
to planners.
Understanding cognitive maps for education and
computer interfaces
Geographical education: general. Children's cognitive mapping research has been and continues to
be studied for the purpose of improving education
(Catling, 1979; Matthews, 1980, 1992). There are
two hypotheses. First, it is believed that the spatial
products reveal clues as to the level of geographical
development of individuals, and provide us with
information which we can use to improve education,
increasing the range of spatial stimuli and elicit
more suitable techniques of teaching (Hart &
Moore, 1973). Second, that cognitive mapping
exercise could be used as a means of enhancing
the child's personal geography and as such is a way
of enriching the teaching of geography, especially
at the personal level (Catling, 1978a,b, 1979). The
approach advocated is that children examine their
own and their peer's cognitive maps to learn about
their experiences with the environment, with the
aim of increasing awareness of places, details, and
patterns in the neighbourhood (Spencer et al., 1989)
and to introduce a number of aspects of map
work and geographical and environmental studies
(Catling 1978b). Such thoughts have provoked a
number of researchers to argue for environmental
education becoming central to the contemporary
curriculum (Goodey & Gold, 1985; Matthews, 1986).
As H a r t & Moore (1973, p. 283) point out:
Geographic education has only recently begun to
take note of the crucial importance of considering
the development of the child's conception of space.
Beyond the confines of a classroom and academic
learning, Brewster and Blades (1989) have found
that both children and adults can be taught how to
improve their cognitive maps, and to operate in an
enviro nment more efficiently, thus leading to
12
R.M. Kitchin
greater environmental awareness and ability. A
reason for study noted by Pocock (1980). This
finding has yet to be carried into the classroom,
where the lack of studies mean that evaluation of
the impact of such teaching make it difficult to
assess. Do children performing such exercises gain
a better environmental awareness, greater graphicacy and locational skills to those that are not?
(Spencer et al., 1989).
Geographical education: concern for gender differences. Another area of concern focuses upon gender
abilities of boys and girls to perform to the same
level at geographical problem solving tasks. Saarinen
et al. (1988) have noted that females consistently
performed below males on the NCGE Geographic
Competency Test and in their sketch map
experiments. Other researchers have noted similar
such differences (Kail et al., 1980; Jahoda, 1979;
Moore, 1979; Brown & Broadway, 1981; Spencer &
Weetman, 1981; Gilmartin, 1984; Matthews, 1986;
Brewster & Blades, 1989; Downs & Liben, 1991) but
others have found none or expressed reservations
and unhappiness with the findings (Feldman &
Acredolo, 1979; Liben & Golbeck, 1980; Gilmartin &
Patton, 1984; Webley & Whalley, 1986; Allen, 1988;
Garling, 1989; Blades, 1990; Self et al., 1992). The
reasons for this are a contentious issue and a
large debate is currently in progress centring
around the spatial ability literature (for possible
reasons see Table 3).
Obviously if such differences actually exist, we
need to determine the reasons, so that we have the
opportunity to alter our curriculum to readdress the
balance. As noted earlier cognitive mapping and
spatial ability influence other subjects beyond
geography and the ability to navigate within the
environment both of which are important issues.
If the reason is due to social roles and stereotypes
TABLE3
Possible reasons for differences between male and female
spatial products
research can be used to provide evidence for this
social justice issue.
Geographical education: cartography and remote
sensing. It is believed that cognitive mapping
(Thorndyke, 1981; MacEachren, 1991) and associated
spatial abilities (Self et al., 1992) could have an
effect on more technical aspects of geography
including cartography, remote sensing and GIS
(discussed next section). There are two ways to
approach the problem, which are interrelated. First,
you can try and discover how we cognize and use
cartographic maps with a view to improving spatiovisualization skills and general understanding and
comprehension of spatial relations. The second
method is by improving cartographic based material
to make learning easier (see next section). Both involve the use of cognitive mapping skills.
Research concerning how we cognize and use
cartographic maps with a view to improving spatiovisual and geographical understanding focuses
around two central research themes. The first is
concerns how we literally perceive the map and integrate this knowledge into the cognitive map, with
the aim of teaching these skills more effectively.
Much of this work focuses around improving map
reading and interpretation skills, and spatial ability
(Thorndyke & Statz, 1979; Gilmartin & Patton,
1984).
The second concerns how we use other geographical
knowledge in understanding the map. As Golledge
et al. (1992) notes one of the unanswered questions
is how do we convert travel experiences upon which
we base much of our understanding of space and
spatial properties into comprehension of simple spatial processes such as nearest neighbour, distance
decay, regionalization and others fundamental for
comprehending maps and diagrams and interpreting them for use in human activity (Golledge et al.,
1992)? Such research is necessary if we are to improve cartographic based education and open up
such areas to naive users.
I do not know of any research that specifically investigates the utility of remote sensing to improving
geographical education although a few investigators
have looked at effect of gathering spatial products
through aerial photography recognition Stea &
Blaut, 1973; Matthews, 1984).
1 Malesand females having different ways of approaching
the same problem, using different cognitive strategies.
2 Performance and behaviour indicators favouring boys.
3 Males and females possess different cognitive maps
and information.
4 Males and females are taught differently, and attending different courses.
5 Females positively react to stereotypes.
Improving cartography and remote sensing. By
6 Females have different social role constraints limiting investigating ways in which we currently integrate
their opportunities for environmental experience.
7 Males and females have biological differences affecting map information into the cognitive map, and how
this information is subsequently used in navigation
the ability to understand and perform the task.
and to interpret other maps it is hoped we can learn
Cognitive Maps
13
how to improve cognitive map ability and the maps.
As Lloyd (1989, p. 109) points out:
TABLE4
Applications of cognitive maps to GIS
Cartographers hoping to provide better maps for
people to read should understand the cognitive
processes used to read maps.
1 Cognitive map information could be used to supply
designers with knowledge that could improve system's
interface, and thus make them easier to use.
2 Cognitive map information concerning how we store
and think about geographical data could be useful in
improving database design and efficiency.
3 Cognitive map information could be used to improve
education, specifically to increase understanding of the
images displayed (discussed in the previous section).
Researchers such as Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth
(1982), and MacEachren (1991) have argued that
there needs to be an interface between h u m a n
perception and cognition and the graphic characteristics of a map. Thorndyke (1981) has suggested
that how we judge distances can be affected by our
use of maps and that clutter on maps leads to overestimation of distances. He suggests that We should
consider presenting geographical displays that
supply requested information b u t minimize the
amount of attendant, irrelevant data (Thorndyke
1981). By understanding which elements of maps
distort our cognitive maps it is hoped we can
improve the map, in this case by removing unnecessary clutter. There are other factors which
influence the cognitive map such as the map projection used (Gilmartin & Lloyd, 1991). The solution to
this is to produce maps applicable to specific needs
0nly, maybe a role of GIS in the future. MacEachren
(1991, p. 161) sums up neatly by stating:
Considering how people learn about space and how
they deal with the spatial aspects of their environment on a daily basis will allow us to devise maps,
and map presentation strategies, that facilitate
thinking and problem solving rather than memorising.
The same argument could be used to improve
remote sensing, a situation noted by Edwards
(1991). He has discussed how the cognitive map
may be a vital base upon which our inferences
concerning remote sensing data are based. In such
cases we convert the images into two-dimensional
base maps, by utilizing our perceptual systems in
conjunction with our cognitive maps to identifying
regions with similar spectral and textual properties,
the relationships between these regions and
neighbours, and knowledge about the physical
connections between scene elements (Edwards 1991).
If we understand how we cognize such images (most
of which are false-colour composites) we could try to
improve them to increase user understanding.
Improving computer interfaces and databases
focusing upon GIS. GISs and cognitive maps share
similar purposes. GISs being systems designed to
process data concerning the everyday geographical
• environment, and cognitive mapping concerning
how we think, store, produce and utilize such data.
Both contain data concerning spatial relationships
and attributive data assigned to specific places in a
space-time framework. Work though into the possible connections has been confined to the application
of spatial cognition to GIS, and a handful of investigations utilizing GIS for behavioural studies. Concentrating on the application of cognitive maps to
GIS it hypothesized that cognitive maps could be
of importance in three main ways (see Table 4).
GIS suffers from two basic interface problems
that cognitive mapping research could be useful in
rectifying: unfriendliness reducing potential benefits
and misinterpretation leading to misuse. These
problems need to be addressed if GIS is to succeed.
Medyckyj-Scott et al. (1990) have noted that the
increased sophistication of GIS has not always been
accompanied by an improvement in usability,
because GIS makes considerable demands on its
users. The enlarged functionality makes the GIS increasingly complex and daunting, especially if interfaced in a non-intuitive way, and leads to focusing
upon a small number of specific tasks reducing the
exploitation of potential benefits (Medyckyj-Scott &
Blades, 1992). The utility of the GIS is being undermined. As Mark and Gould (1991, p. 1428) state:
When the user sits at a workstation and uses a GIS,
he or she should be thinking about real-world phenomena, and not about computers or peripherals,
commands or syntax, layers or pixels.
The second problem of misuse through misinterpretation often stems from the first. Where efforts
have been made to improve usability, the ease of
use, coupled with a lack of appreciation of the complexities of spatial data, has led to the employment
of the wrong data types, at the wrong scale/resolution, and in the wrong context to produce erroneous
results and conclusions (Medyckyj-Scott & Blades,
1992).
There are two ways to tackle this problem. The
first expects the user to adapt to the system by
learning about space in the systems terms, acquiring
a set of data structure-based concepts and the
14
R.M. Kitchin
accompanying vocabulary (Gould, 1991). The second
involves the GIS design to be centred upon how
people think and utilize everyday geographical space,
i.e. based upon people's cognitive map knowledge. A
view adopted by Mark (1989, p. 551) who asserts:
Optimal GIS interfaces will be based on the same
cognitive maps [image-schemata] that are used when
the person involved interacts directly with the realworld phenomena represented in the GIS.
The first method of learning is impractical both in
terms of time and resources. As such it is rejected,
and the second approach of adaptation is advocated.
In this approach adaptive interfaces are proposed,
that operate at a level suitable to the user. Ideally
(but probably not practically for a number of years)
they should not only be 'user-friendly' but 'userintimate', changing its approach to suit the particular
operator's current needs (Turk, 1990). There are
three prototype systems based upon this idea of
adaptation: HyperArc; CUBRICON and ArcView.
The first two work on the principle of trying to connect the package to the users view of the problem,
and the third on the idea of reduced functionality, in
effect creating a non-expert GIS.
Cognitive maps may also aid the use of interfaces
by allowing them to become more easily remembered. This is because how we interface the GIS can
be thought of as an analogy to wayfinding, and in
the same w a y we use cognitive maps to facilitate
movement in the environment we can build up and
use conceptual models of the how to manoeuvre
within the GIS. J u s t as when we are not familiar
with a region we stick to safe, known routes, the
user will do so with the GIS, and as such fail to
explore the system (Turk, 1990; Medyckyj-Scott &
Blades, 1992). In essence we form cognitive maps of
the system, where certain screens are linked to
meaning and the understanding of actions. In this
w a y cognitive maps act as mnemonic devices as discussed by Tuan (1975). If these cognitive maps can
be improved so will user efficiency.
An understanding of cognitive maps may also
improve database design and efficency. The brain
is probably the most efficient user of data known
to man, and an implicit argument based upon
such a statement is that, if we can start to understand its structure and contents we can produce
more efficient databases, both in terms of storage
capacity and speed. If we can start to unravel
the complexities of the cognitive map, and
determine its structure the implicit argument
is we can design better GIS databases. The prototype systems mentioned above are merely
scratching the surface of a potential revolution
in how computers m a y be designed and used in the
future.
Other Applied Uses
David Canter has used cognitive mapping theory in
tracking down criminals for the police (Canter &
Larkin, 1993; Canter & Gregory, in press, Bouquet,
1994). He suggests that criminals' cognitive maps
shape and constrain the criminal and non-criminal
spatial activity of any offender (Canter & Gregory,
in press). First-time offenders commit crimes in
areas where they have good cognitive maps, usually
their local neighbourhood and as they get more
experienced they will stray further afield. Because
criminals on the whole are domicentric (reside in
one location) and value familiarity with an area
over the risks of being recognized (although there
is a minimum distance of travel), by plotting the
sites of the attacks their home location can be
determined (91% of criminals had circular ranges)
(Canter & Larkin, 1993). Using this as a basis
coupled with a criminal profile, a rapist and
murderer, John Duffy, was tracked down to
Cricklewood, in north-west London.
Another possibility for an applied use, m a y be in
search and rescue operations. Certain cognitive
mapping characteristics could in theory be profiled
onto victims who are lost, through the descriptions
of relatives and friends. This m a y give a detailed
portrait of the victim revealing how they might
behave, w h a t type of strategy they are likely to use
in trying to find their w a y again, and even how far
they might have strayed. This m a y make the
searchers job easier by suggesting where might be
an appropriate place to look for the victim, rather
than conducting large random or systematic searches.
Conclusion
This paper has broadly outlined what cognitive
maps and mapping are, the reasons for misunderstandings and their theoretical and applied worth.
It has been demonstrated that cognitive mapping has
a role to play in spatial behaviour, spatial decision
making, learning and acquisition theory making and
in real world applications, such as planning, teaching,
map making and computer interfaces and databases. What should be made clear though is that
conceptual research is considerably more developed
and actively practised than applied research. There
are three main reasons for this (see Table 5).
In an age where it is increasingly difficult to
Cognitive Maps
TABLE 5
Reasons for more conceptual research
1 The (seemingly) lack of potential clients (Lynch 1976).
2 Little attempt to put conclusions into guidelines
accessible to potential users (Siedel 1985).
3 Very few specific direct pieces of applied work in the
past (Moore 1979).
attract grants and funding (especially in the U.K.)
for cognitive mapping research to develop and take
place, it has to attempt to practise applied research,
formulate guidelines, and attract and make potential clients. This paper aimed to highlight the many
current and potential applications, to justify cognitive mapping research, and to encourage more multidisciplinary research, especially that of an applied
nature. The way forward in cognitive mapping
is further integration of conceptual research and
continued diversification and practice of applied
research.
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Manuscript received 16 September 1993
Revised manuscript received 12 January 1994