HUMILITY AND MODESTY: SALVAGING THE DISTINCTION

HUMILITY AND MODESTY: SALVAGING THE DISTINCTION Craig A. Boyd Article Under Review Much of contemporary research concerning the relationship between humility and modesty seems to fall into two broad categories: the identity view and the continuum view. The identity view sees humility and modesty as either identified as roughly the same virtue or as having no significant differences in the two so that they can be treated in essentially the same manner.1 Michael Slote, G. F. Schuler, and Nicholas Bommarito all defend the identity view. And for Slote humility and modesty have no real distinctive features that amount to any substantive differentiation.2 This identification of the two ideas is not uncommon and can also be found in the work of others such as G.F. Scheuler who simply refuses to acknowledge any distinction between the two terms as he repeatedly writes about “modesty (or humility)” as if they are mere synonyms3 and more recently Nicholas Bommarito writes, “I take the terms to be interchangeable.”4 1 Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and G.F. Shueler, “Why Modesty is a Virtue,” Ethics. (1997); Nicholas Bommarito, “Modesty as a Virtue of Attention,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 122 (2013). Although Driver admits there is a difference, she takes little effort to draw out the distinction. 2 Slote sees humility as a kind of secular virtue that is a “desirable and positively characterizable way of avoiding vanity,” 62. In defining humility over and against vanity instead of pride, Slote conflates the two vices in way that parallels the conflation of humility and modesty. 3 G.F. Schuler, “Why Modesty is a Virtue,” Ethics, Vol. 107, (April), 1997: 467-85. 1 The second view is the continuum thesis. Here, humility is defined negatively as selfabnegation or low self-esteem while modesty in contrast is a positive, healthy view of oneself.5 For some of these thinkers, humility is too closely identified with a tradition in Christian moral theology that emphasizes an individual’s unworthiness and utter depravity. Norvin Richards sees this as a view that needs to be redeemed in favor of a more positive account where modesty is understood simply as the refusal to overestimate our own abilities.6 Other examples could be offered here but the important point is that in these discussions, contemporary philosophers often fail to distinguish humility from modesty and even when they do make the distinction, modesty often comes off looking better than humility. Driver, for example sees modesty as a kind of ignorance that leads to an “underestimation” of one’s value while others argue for accurate self-assessment.7 In these discussions humility is often presented as a cognitive problem that needs a cognitive solution.8 4 Bommarito, “Modesty as a Virtue of Attention,” 93, footnote 1. 5 Fritz Allhoff, “What is Modesty?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 23 (2010). 6 Norvin Richards, Humility. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). 7 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, 19. In response to this negative kind of assessment of humility, Josef Pieper writes, “the notion of humility has become blurred even in the Christian consciousness. In the whole tractate of St. Thomas concerning humility and pride, there is not a single sentence to suggest an attitude, on principle, of constant self-accusation, of disparagement of one’s being and doing, of cringing inferiority, as belonging to humility or any other Christian, virtue.” The Four Cardinal Virtues. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 189. 8 There is also significant recent research on humility in positive psychology. Julie Juola Exline, “Humility and Modesty,” Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification, eds. 2 Among philosophers the most notable exception to this tendency to conflate humility and modesty is Jonathan Kvanvig who argues that there is a parallelism between pride and humility that serves as a ground for making the distinction between vanity and modesty. Kvanvig contends that since there is an obvious difference between pride and vanity, there should also be an analogous contrast between humility and modesty. Yet, he never develops his critique of the modesty-humility confusion into a constructive argument about the precise nature of these allied virtues. As a result there are at least two important issues that must be addressed: (1) the distinction between modesty and humility, and (2) if humility and modesty are different virtues, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) blends definitions of humility and modesty but claims that, “In contrast, the term modesty refers primarily to the moderate estimation of one’s merits or achievements and also extends into other issues relating to propriety in dress and social behavior,” 463; Caroline R. Lavelock, Everett L. Worthington Jr., Don E. Davis, Brandon J. Griffen, Clelsea A. Reid, Joshua N. Hook, and Darul R Van Tongeren,” “The Quiet Virtue Speaks: An Intervention to Promote Humility,” Journal of Psychology and Theology, Vol 42 (2014) differentiate between warmth-based virtues and conscientious-based virtues where humility is clearly a warmth-based virtue and it would seem that modesty is a conscientious-based virtue akin to something like justice. They say, “Warmthbased virtues (e.g., humility, love, forgiveness, compassion) are aimed at motivating behaviors oriented to achieve an inner peace, comfort, and harmony. They tend to govern internal processes as opposed to societal interactions, though they often make societal interactions more pleasant. Conscientious-based virtues (e.g., patience, justice, responsibility, and self-control) are aimed at fairness, reciprocity, and cooperation between the self and others. These virtues are more inhibitory and explicitly directed at governing behavior within society,” 99. 3 then we can consider the different ways in which they might—or might not—be found in various individuals; that is, we should expect to see different ways in which the virtues and their opposing vices appear. My argument initially appeals to the work of St. Thomas Aquinas who delineates between moderation (a more general virtue) and humility. But there is a further distinction between humility as a kind of moderating restraint on our desire for our own excellence and other kinds of moderating influences we should exercise over our behavior. From Aquinas’ intuition on these virtues I develop accounts of humility and modesty in ways that can serve as a corrective to the contemporary confusion between the two. I hold that humility should be defined as an internal disposition of appropriately valuing the self—along with one's own strengths and weaknesses.9 This requires that the agent be receptive to the real relationships that shape and form her character as well as the ability to integrate knowledge of these relationships into her own valuing of herself. As such, humility is primarily a virtue concerned with an internal quality of the agent. Modesty ought to be an allied virtue to humility in that it can only truly be a virtue when the agent also possesses humility. Modesty primarily concerns how an individual presents herself to others in light of her abilities and how she values others and their feelings. In this respect, 9 My definition of humility is similar to that employed by Whitcomb et alia in their definition of intellectual humility. They say that intellectual humility “is an intellectual virtue just when one is appropriately attentive to, and owns, one’s intellectual limitations because one is appropriately motivated to pursue epistemic goods, e.g. truth, knowledge, and understanding.” Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol 10, (2015): 12. 4 modesty has some affinity with justice in that it concerns real social relationships and how they should moderate our behavior. I define modesty as the disposition to present oneself accurately to others in ways determined by prudence and humility given the appropriate social context. Modesty is therefore (1) subordinated to humility, (2) opposed to the vice of vanity—the attempt to portray oneself as greater than one truly is, and (3) opposed to servility—the attempt to portray oneself as less than what one truly is. With respect to how humility and modesty are both virtues, I appeal to Nancy Snow’s account of virtue as a form of social intelligence which requires an agent’s ability to navigate social dynamics by using acquired skills, knowledge, and insight. Without these abilities a person cannot effectively practice either humility or modesty. Moreover, this account of virtue as social intelligence fits nicely with a revised account of Aquinas’ treatment of these virtues. I. KVANVIG’S CRITIQUE OF THE CONTINUUM THESIS Jonathan Kvanvig argues against what he calls the “continuum thesis” which holds that modesty and humility exist on a continuum of attitudes one holds about oneself. On this view, “modesty” is seen as a positive self-evaluation of one’s abilities where, in the words of Fritz Allhoff, one has a “moderate opinion of oneself.” 10 This is the virtue that stands at one end of the continuum. Humility, by way of contrast, is placed at the other end of the continuum and is a condition in which one has a low opinion of oneself and of one’s abilities. There are, of course, varying degrees along this continuum depending on how much more or less one values oneself. Although both are character traits for Allhoff, only modesty is a virtue. 10 Allhoff, 184. 5 What is at stake here for Kvanvig is the definition of humility and its broader context. For Kvanvig, the definition of humility as “low opinion of oneself” is a bad definition. Even though he grants that humility and modesty are related to one another he denies that this relationship can be construed along a continuum where modesty stands at one end as the good quality and humility stands at the other as the bad quality. Kvanvig’s approach is to argue that they must be different conceptually by showing that their opposites—pride and vanity—do not exist along the same kind of continuum of self-assessment. To make this point he appeals to Jane Austen who famously writes, “Vanity and pride are different things, though the words are often used synonymously. A person may be proud without being vain. Pride relates more to our opinion of ourselves; vanity, to what we would have others think of us.”11 That is, vanity is primarily concerned with the manner in which we portray ourselves to others as well as their reception of this portrayal. External displays seem central to an account of vanity. Following Austen, Kvanvig, thinks that the vain person is primarily concerned about how others perceive him. The vain person needs others to see himself in the most positive manner possible. He inordinately desires the praise of others and feeds off of this praise. That is, the vain person’s value comes from the adoration and adulation of others. The proud person may or may not be vain since, for the proud person, it is her own sense of superiority that counts above all.12 Although both pride and vanity are both self-regarding attitudes the motivations differ. Vanity requires an audience for its satisfaction while pride needs no audience other than a self that is confident in its own superiority. 11 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice. 1813. 12 For more on vanity, conceit, and pride see Gabrielle Taylor, Deadly Vices. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 70-82. 6 We can make an important conceptual distinction between pride and vanity by observing that a person can have one without the other. Kvanvig points out that pride does not require the attention of others. In fact, “one can be so proud as to cherish the negative appraisals of others, taking it as further confirmation of their inferiority.”13 But still, the proud person needs neither the positive adulation that vanity requires nor the negative opinions of others. The proud person simply disregards the opinions of others as having any value at all. What we see, then, is that there is a clear differentiation between pride and vanity. And if these two are the opposing vices of modesty and humility—as I assume they are for the sake of the argument—then it follows that the continuum thesis is false. That is, since pride and vanity can be, and are, different character traits, humility and modesty are as well. Kvanvig concludes that “humility is neither the same as modesty nor a more exaggerated form of negative selfassessment, even if there is a causal relationship of a probabilistic sort between the two.”14 But even more importantly he observes that, “Since pride and vanity can each appear without the other, we should expect that humility and modesty can come apart in the same way.”15 This important insight helps set the stage for how we can helpfully tease apart the distinction between the two virtues since Kvanvig leaves at least two important questions unanswered: (1) what exactly is the relationship between humility and modesty? And (2) how might we more precisely define what humility and modesty are in ways that are philosophically helpful? And for this, I turn to the work of Thomas Aquinas who sees them as related but distinct. 13 Kvanvig, 4. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 7 II. AQUINAS ON HUMILITY AND MODESTY To understand the relationship between humility and modesty in Aquinas’ work, we should first begin by “mapping” the virtues and their relationships (See Figure 1). In the hierarchy of virtues, Aquinas ranks prudence over justice, courage, and temperance as the greatest of the four cardinal virtues.16 He says that prudence requires the employment recta ratio (“right reason”) in all of our activities and is thus responsible for guiding directing all of the virtues (STh II-II, q. 47) because right reason shape our desires and helps us make the right choices.17 Yet, temperance also directs and governs other virtues by appeal to the right reason found in prudence. This extension of right reasoning reaches out to an allied virtue of temperance, moderation. 16 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, q. 61, a. 4, ad1. All subsequent references are cited parenthetically in the text according to part, question, and article. All references to De Malo will also be cited parenthetically in the text as DM. In the Commentary on the Sentences he says that prudence is “the mother and mold of the other virtues,” 3, d.33, 2, 5. All translations are the author’s unless otherwise noted. Technically, prudence is an intellectual virtue of the practical intellect. However, a person cannot possess prudence without also possessing the other cardinal virtues since prudence is the one intellectual virtue that requires the right ordering of the desires. 17 James Kennan, S.J. observes that “The function of prudence or right moral reasoning is to determine, intend, and choose actions that will lead to the right realization of those appetites,” in his “The Virtue of Prudence,” The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2002), 259. Jay Wood says that prudence “unites moral knowledge and rectified appetites, giving us both knowledge of what to do, and the will to do it,” in his “Prudence,” Virtues and Their Vices, eds. Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd. (New York: Oxford University, 2014), 51. 8 The Latin term modestia (what I translate as “moderation”) is somewhat problematic as it conveys a number of different meanings in English. Aquinas says that the word itself derives from modo or “manner” and refers to the “manner in which things are done” (Ibid.).18 The contemporary use of the word “modesty” can refer primarily to one’s outward appearance or a way in which people conduct themselves with propriety. And both of these meanings are included in what Aquinas wants to convey (STh II-II, q. 161). Yet, modestia also concerns our desires and how we ought to we temper these desires for both greatness and knowledge. These latter two applications of modestia refer to internal operations of the soul and not to the external presentation of the self to others. In order to avoid complications, I will use the term “moderation” to translate modestia hereafter. Aquinas says that, “moderation differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while moderation tempers those that present less difficulty” (STh II-II, 160, q. 2). And in regard to these latter issues there are four areas in which moderation can be applied19: (1) in matters pertaining to the soul’s desire for greatness, (2) in matters pertaining to the intellect’s desire for knowledge20, (3) in matters pertaining to manner of our actions, and (4) in matters pertaining to manner of our attire (See Figure 1). The first virtue is 18 For a helpful discussion on Aquinas’ meaning of temperance and moderation and how they differ from some current meanings see Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 145-6. 19 Aquinas considers humility to be a “potential part” of temperance. Potential parts are “directed to secondary acts or matters that do not have the total power of the virtue,” (STh II-II. q. 48. a. 1). 20 The virtue here is studiousness and the vice is curiosity. In what follows I will focus my attention on the distinction between humility and moderation in action and moderation in dress. 9 humility. The second virtue is studiousness. The third is moderation in action. And the fourth is moderation in attire. Humility, for Aquinas, tempers the desire for excellence according to right reason. Since humility is primarily about how we desire our own excellence and it is an inward operation. He says that it, “like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul” (STh II-II, q. 161, a. 3, ad3). It is primarily about how we value ourselves and less about the kinds of actions that others might see but it does manifest itself in our behavior which is a reflection of the internal condition of the soul. He says “Now the inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues” (STh II-II, q. 161, a. 6). But what is “hidden within” concerns our deliberations, our choices, and the struggles we encounter when seeking what is truly good for the soul. And humility is primarily about tempering our desire for greatness. Humility provides an internal restraint on what we should and should not desire. Aquinas says that, “It belongs properly to humility, that a person restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity” (STh II-II, q. 161, a. 2). The key word here is “disproportion” as it indicates something contrary to the dictates of right reason. The excessive disproportion in which we can value ourselves is the chief of the vices: pride. In order to understand how pride is disproportionate we must first understand that all the virtues must conform to right reason (recta ratio), which is the capacity to understand real relationships that exist between and among persons. It, therefore, prescribes what we should and should not do given the circumstances of any situation. Right reason is sometimes equated with the “rule of reason” and is always person relative (DM, VIII). For example, one or two glasses of 10 wine with dinner for the average person would be in accordance with the rule of reason while two to three bottles would be excessive. But not only must reason identify what course of action we should take it must also shape our desires in appropriate ways. Thus, It pertains to reason to direct the appetites, and especially insofar as the law of God informs reason. Therefore, an appetite will be morally right and virtuous if the appetite is borne to a naturally desired good by the rule of reason, and there will be sin whether the appetite exceeds the rule of reason or falls short of it. For example, the desire to know is natural to human beings, and so it will be virtuous and praiseworthy if human beings strive for knowledge as right reason dictates. And there will be the sin of curiosity if one exceeds the rule of reason (DM, VIII,2) Two necessary conditions apply here: the knowledge of what one should do and the desire to do what reason directs. But there are ways in which we can fail to meet these conditions. And since being proud is “simply to exceed the proper measure in the desire for excellence,” we see at least three ways this can happen. In one way regarding the excellent good itself that one desires, namely when one’s desire is borne to something that exceeds one’s measure. . . . when one boasts that one has what one does not. It happens in a second way regarding the way of obtaining the good, namely, that one attributes to oneself or one’s merits an excellence that one can obtain only by the favor of another. . . . In the third way, one can exceed one’s due measure regarding the way on possesses an excellence, namely, as one affects to have something above others that it belongs to the person to have in the same manner as others do (DM, VIII,4). 11 In one way, we can desire too much. We can over-reach what is truly good for us. Like Icarus we can fly too close to the sun. In a second way, we can fail to acknowledge that our excellence is often derivative from others. For example, an athlete can fail to recognize that her success is due not only to her own abilities but also to good genes, excellent coaching, and the excellence of her team-mates. In a third way we can think more of ourselves than we should. We might be tempted to think we are better driving a car than our partner is.21 To be proud is to consistently make an effort at self-deception regarding one’s own relative value and abilities. Humility tempers our desire for excellence by taking into account who we are and what is appropriate to us as created, dependent beings. Right reason dictates how we should value ourselves in light of the fact that we are neither the most important person in the cosmos nor the most worthless. Aquinas says that humility is an “interior movement of the soul” whereby we value ourselves as we ought (STh II-II, q. 161, a. 2, ad4). Since humility is informed by the right reason of prudence, we see that—as in prudence—there is both a cognitive and an affective element in humility. We must be able to grasp who we are and what our abilities are. In this sense humility includes our ability to know who we according to the truth. Or, in the words of Pieper, “The ground of humility is man’s estimation of himself according to the truth.”22 And in this sense, contemporary accounts of humility are right as far as they go as they emphasize humility’s ability to grasp what truly is the case. Yet, right reason not only shows us the truth but shapes our desires as well. We must desire that which is excellent in the right way: neither 21 M.M Roy and M.J. Liersch, “I am a Better Driver Than You Think: Examining Self- enhancement for Driving Ability,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 43, No. 8, (2014): 1648–59. More than 80% of people think they are better drivers than is statistically possible. 22 Pieper, Four Cardinal Virtues, 189. 12 desiring more nor less than is appropriate for us. And it is for this reason that humility is primarily a part of temperance, moderating our desires. Both the restraint that reason places on the desire, and the desire itself, are internal to the agent; others can only assume that they know humble people when they encounter them by their outward behavior. Conversely, we also think that people who dress excessively or speak outrageously are arrogant. He says, “Excess in outward expenditure and parade is likely to be done with a view to boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appetite” (STh II-II, q. 161, a. 1, ad4). That is, humility provides the necessary internal attitude that regulates outward behavior. As a result, at least for Aquinas, there can be no genuine modesty without humility. Humility, therefore, precedes the other two types of moderation considered here. As an internal disposition, humility precedes and determines the extent to which a person can be modest. That is, as our actions are a direct reflection of who we are, and since appearances can be faked, humility is more central to who we are.23 Kvanvig, for all of his helpful discussion on the distinction between humility and modesty, neglects to prioritize the two virtues. And we can infer from Aquinas’ discussion—even though he does not explicitly prioritize the two virtues—that he sees humility as having a kind of priority over modesty. “Moderation in actions” is a phrase that pertains to both the person and his circumstances. This means the person must know who he is and his relationship to various people and the social context. For Aquinas this means the person must be self-aware to the point 23 This, of course, makes the research on humility from a psychological standpoint more difficult since the attitudes of a person and her valuing of herself are more methodologically elusive than her behaviors. And modesty, as we have seen, is fundamentally about behavior. 13 of knowing how his actions will be interpreted by others since, “It is from our outward movements that other people form their judgments about us” (STh II-II, q. 161, a. 1, ad3). As noted above, people assume—often rightly—that our outward actions are a reflection of an inward state of affairs. He writes, “Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition” (STh II-II, q. 161, a. 1, ad1). And so when we act, we assume that our actions will be interpreted by others. Moderation in action implies that we have an audience for our actions and that we act appropriately in the social context we find ourselves in. It is a kind of attentiveness to who we are and where we find ourselves.24 Moderation in outward attire is that kind of moderate action that depends greatly upon one’s social location. The circumstances may vary with the particular culture or within a particular social setting. For example, what one wears to the beach might not be appropriate for an evening at the opera. Aquinas notes that a lack of moderation in attire can happen in one way “in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore Augustine says in the Confessions: ‘Those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner’” (STh II-II, q. 161). Clearly, what is expected by others plays a critical role in how one dresses.25 24 25 For more on “attentiveness” see Bommarito, “Modesty as a Virtue of Attention.” It is important to note here that moderation in dress has nothing to do with what we might call “prudery” but is rather an “honest” reflection of who we are and our place in society. See Michael P. Foley, “Thomas Aquinas’ Novel Modesty,” History of Political Thought, Vol. 25, No.3 (2004): 402-23. 14 There is a second way in which a person might dress immoderately and this is by an “inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom” (Ibid.). In this case, a person becomes obsessed with his appearance and derives an inordinate amount of pleasure from this whether he attempts to be ostentatious or provocative. In this case, the extreme of “excess” produces the vice. But of special note here is that Aquinas draws the connection between the inward state of his desires and the outward presentation. The two are bound tightly together. In both moderation in actions and moderation of attire there is a sense in which the internal evaluation of what is and is not appropriate determines the moral value of the action. Aquinas contends that “It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately” (in actions). An internal disposition— temperance guiding moderation—provides the foundation for how one negotiates what to do and what to wear. But there are also internals disposition to act moderately. Moderation in action and in attire both seem to correlate well with Kvanvig’s argument that modesty fundamentally concerns the portrayal of ourselves to others. In this regard, we could say that modesty is the appropriate presentation of the self to others in word, action, and attire. By “appropriate” I mean that the behavior fits with the cultural, social and religious norms of a given community. Humility and modesty can be distinguished by the idea that humility is a relatively stable disposition—an interior movement of the soul—that helps us appropriately valuing ourselves as we ought. Modesty is a virtue that moderates our appearance to others that are socially acceptable. While the audience for humility—as is the case with pride—is the self, the audience for modesty—like vanity—is others. 15 III. HUMILITY AND/OR MODESTY Virtues are not only “good habits of the soul,” but they are also ways in which our culture, our families, and our religious institutions try to shape us so that we can become better persons. That is, virtues are socially located and their transmission is always through various forms of social organization and intentionality. Nancy Snow has argued that the virtues are forms of “social intelligence”26 in that social intelligence provides a necessary condition for the virtuous person but in itself is not sufficient. She says, Social intelligence is a complex, multidimensional set of knowledge, skills, and abilities, comprised of perception or insight, knowledge and behavioral ability, that, other things being equal, enables us to perform well or be successful in social or interpersonal affairs.27 The knowledge, skills and abilities Snow speaks of can be thought of in terms of a person’s ability to understand verbal and non-verbal communication and behave appropriately given a variety of social contexts. For example, the ability to understand sarcasm is one such kind of skill. In differing social contexts hearing the same words may mean entirely different things. And the ability to respond appropriately to these different meanings is also a part of social intelligence. Consider the following: I am at a professional basketball game, and I witness LeBron James score a game winning shot. I respond with “Nice shot,” as an expression of admiration. The context, my tone of voice, and being present on the front row of the stadium make my response to the shot an appropriate expression of admiration. Now consider a different 26 Nancy Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory. (New York: Routledge, 2010). 27 Ibid., 69. 16 scenario. I am playing one on one basketball with my brother, a person with whom I often engage in good-natured humor. He takes an advantage of a mistake I make and gets in position for an easy shot. He inexplicably misses the shot. I exclaim. “Nice shot.” He understands from the context and my tone of voice that this is sarcasm. What this presumes is that I, and he, have been enculturated appropriately, that I have the necessary psychological skills to internalize social norms and expectations, and that I can act in various situations appropriately given my internalized dispositions. There are times, of course, when sarcasm is not appropriate. For example, when taking my wedding vows, I should not respond sarcastically with “Yeah, right.” Social intelligence, then, enables us to navigate various social contexts and their meanings in appropriate ways. Yet, social intelligence is only a necessary condition for virtue. We also need the appropriate motivations and desires that result in the appropriate choice and action. For a person to be virtuous, she needs to be motivated by the right kinds of purposes and desires. We can easily imagine people who possess social intelligence—that is people who understand social contexts and have the ability to “read” others’ expression—who also use that intelligence to gratuitously inflict pain on others. Virtues, however, end up being “distinctive kinds of social intelligence that are distinguished from other types through the power of virtuous motivation to shape and direct other constituent elements of the virtues.”28 This reflects the classic tradition of the virtues as found in Aquinas that we must not only respond correctly, but in the right way, and with the right desire.29 In addition to social intelligence we can say that virtues require motivations for the good. A person must intend and be motivated by that which is truly good. That is, virtues require that 28 Ibid., 86. 29 Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.J. Litzinger. Bk IX, 1895. 17 the agent actually pursue morally good ends or ends that truly perfect the agent. Prudence, for example, is a virtue that motivates the agent to pursue the end of being a better person with regard to thinking and acting rightly about her actions generally while temperance motivates the agent to being a better person with regard to controlling her various desires in accordance with right reason. As a virtue subordinate to temperance, humility also concerns the motivation to want to temper the desire for our own excellence. Yet, these motivations and desires to do what is good always take place in social settings. That is, we must not only possess the right motivations but also the ability to act on these good desires. In order to do develop these virtues the agent must have the capacity to monitor and manage her reactions in various scenarios. In a particular helpful passage Snow writes the following: Being temperate and humble can help make the agent’s life go better in a social sense. Consider, for example, how rude and tiresome people who are intemperate about food and drink can be at a party, or how a spouse who is intemperate about sex can ruin a marriage. Consider, too, how difficult it is to live and work with people who are arrogant and conceited, who lack proper humility. . . . Temperance and humility are easily explained by the social intelligence model. They make our lives go better by making us pleasanter people to be around.30 Understanding one’s role in a social context, what the appropriate actions and responses are, and being able to internalize the right motivations are important so as not to overstep the boundaries of propriety. These qualities, although they help us to understand how social intelligence helps shape virtue do not distinguish between humility and modesty as distinct virtues. 30 Ibid., 97. 18 As we have seen, for Aquinas humility is the internal disposition to temper the desire for our own excellence. Yet, in one sense it can also be understood as the disposition to appropriately value oneself and one’s abilities relative to the abilities of others. Consider the following. A number of friends gather for a party. There is a piano in the room. James sits down and plays “Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star,” a fairly simple melody. He receives a smattering of applause and many jokes at the simplicity of the song. I am then encouraged to play something so I play Beethoveen’s Für Elise as it is somewhat more difficult than James’ performance and requires use of both the left and right hand. This performance receives some surprised looks and sincere applause. Then, Elizabeth sits down and plays a selection from Tchaikovsky’s Piano Concerto in B Flat Minor, one of the most difficult piano compositions. Spontaneous applause erupts at her virtuoso performance because she is a professional musician. For either James or me to presume to be the best pianist in the room would be absurdly arrogant. We must value our abilities, relative as they are, in ways that reflect reality. That is, Aquinas’ sense of right reason, as right understanding of relationships in this social context demands that we not value our abilities more than we ought. Moreover, it is here that humility should inform how we respond in terms of modest action. What I propose here is that we give credence to the contemporary notion of modesty in the following way: modesty is a disposition to present oneself to others in ways that are appropriate to social conditions. In my view, modesty is a virtue subordinate to humility in the sense that humility is more important to an individual’s character. In the example above, James and I should respond to Elizabeth with admiration and say so. She should be the one who receives praise while we should likely deflect any praise of ourselves to her performance. But 19 appropriate valuing of ourselves and our appropriate responses do not cover all the possibilities available to us. There are at least four different ways generally in which modesty and humility can be found in various individuals: the truly virtuous person, the obtuse person, the appearanceoriented person, and the vicious person. I assume, non-controversially that it is better to possess both virtues rather than possessing only one (See Figure 2). There are, of course, varying degrees in which people will possess the relevant virtue or vice and we should not expect to see the same kind of virtue or vice—or combination—in exactly the same way. And given the fact that the Thomistic account of vice sees that one can err on the side of either defect or excess we should expect to see the vice in at least two different manifestations. The more fully virtuous person here is one who possesses both humility and modesty. The individual who is humble and modest has an internal disposition to value herself as she should and also presents herself to others in ways that are socially acceptable. Consider Carli Lloyd who scored 3 goals in the 2015 women’s world Cup championship. She understands that she is merely one person on the team but as the center midfielder she is also an extremely important member of that team. So when the team wins she understands that she was merely a part of it but she is also quick to praise her team-mates for their excellent play. She not only knows how to value herself but also how to present herself appropriately in social situations by graciously and truthfully giving credit to all who deserve it. But not everyone can negotiate interpersonal encounters with the grace the humble and modest person possesses. A second type of person is the obtuse person who possesses humility but not modesty. This person either does not understand social convention or cannot present himself in ways that are perceived as socially acceptable. The fictional character, Mr. Bean, provides a good example 20 of this kind of person. Bean is an unassuming office worker in London. He neither thinks more nor less of himself than he should. He also neither values himself more nor less than he should. We could say he possesses humility but from his inappropriate antics we see that he does not possess modesty since he has often has difficulty navigating social expectations and norms. And it is the social awkwardness that leads to the humorous incongruity between his individual behavior and societal norms. In one sense this person possesses sufficient social intelligence with respect to how she values herself as a person, but lacks it with regard to how to respond successfully in some social settings. There are actually two ways this kind of person can go wrong. Even though she values herself as she should, she may respond in ways that either exceed or fall below social expectations. Mr. Bean often responds to the point of excess while others might respond in ways that fail to meet the minimal social expectations. When complimented a musician might respond with, “No, my performance was terrible.” Even though she may value herself as she ought her failure to meet the minimal expectations of a mere “Thanks you” demonstrate her lack of genuine modesty by negatively exaggerating her response. The third type is the modest but not humble person. We might call this individual the appearance-oriented person since he is able to act appropriately in social contexts but fails to value himself rightly. In one sense we might call the possession of modesty without humility the possession of a social virtue. Bommarito says, that this can “often have good consequences by allowing people to get along better. . . it can result in a more pleasant and productive workplace for everyone.”31 There can be two forms of this kind of person: the arrogant but modest person and the low self-esteem but modest person. 31 Bommarito, “Modesty as a Virtue of Attention,” 112. 21 The arrogant but modest person is able to navigate social contexts well but has an undue sense of his own worth. He understands well that people make illicit inferences about internal qualities from external actions. This person is excellent at navigating social situations and never, or rarely, acts inappropriately. He is attuned to social contexts and the need to act appropriately in them. He has mastered social intelligence with regard to normative expectations. He dresses speaks appropriately and always acts appropriately. However, this social presentation betrays the inward valuing of himself. Although he acts appropriately, he does not value himself as he ought to. In the more vicious type of this person we find modesty accompanied by conceit. Consider Shakespeare’s Iago who comports himself appropriately almost all of the time with Othello but has contempt for almost everyone. He can be modest but his conceit ultimately leads to his own undoing. He possesses the ability to deceive others into thinking he is a good person by carefully moderating how others perceive him through his actions. The modest person with low self-esteem also can navigate social contexts well but values herself less than she should. This person has internalized the sense of decorum and appropriate behavior expected of her but has not internalized valuing herself as she ought. Unlike the arrogant but modest person, this individual does not elevate herself above others but fails to value herself as she should. The musician who is given the compliment on her performance understands that the appropriate response is a sincere sounding “Thank you,” even though she might find her performance lacking in significant ways. The fourth and last kind of person is one who lacks both humility and modesty32 and we might call this person “vicious.” The extreme form of this person is the one who is both proud 32 There are 4 types of this person: (1) the proud and immodestly excessive person, (2) the proud but immodestly deficient person (3) the low self-esteem and immodestly excessive person, and 22 and immodest.33 She has neither the ability to present herself suitably in social situations nor the inner disposition to value herself as she ought to. It is the most vicious of the four types as there might be no attempt at the development of either kind of virtue. Consider the case of Flannery O’Connor’s character, Hulga, from the short story Good Country People. Hulga has a PhD in philosophy and looks down on everyone she encounters. She sees herself as superior in every way to others and makes this obvious in how she treats them. O’Connor says of her that “She looked at nice young men as if she could smell their stupidity.” This internal contempt of others is also reflected in her presentation of herself in social settings. She is consistently described as being “rude” to others and failing to respond appropriately to the standards and norms of southern culture. IV. CONCLUSION There are important differences between humility, as an internal disposition to value oneself as one ought, and modesty, as a disposition to act in ways appropriate to cultural and social norms. This distinction can clarify the confusion in much of contemporary discussion as it helps refine (4) the low self-esteem and immodestly deficient person. In the above I consider only the first case. 33 Aaron James addresses this in his Assholes, A Theory. (New York: Anchor Books, 2012). For James, an asshole is a person who “(1) allows himself to enjoy special advantages and does so systematically; (2) does this out of a sense of entitlement; and (3) is immunized by his sense of entitlement against the complaints of other people,” 5. This seems to capture both the internal valuing of the self over other people and the failure to present himself to others in appropriate ways that recognize the sense of decorum expected of most in people in society 23 and distinguish those qualities unique to each virtue. Humility is a virtue that rightly situates the self in terms of its own value. As a result, a humble person attends to herself without obsessing about herself. She is drawn to issues and people other than herself. She resists the desire to be the center of her own universe. Modesty is a virtue that has for its audience others. It is sensitive to social and cultural contexts and takes care to avoid offending others. Like humility, modesty doesn’t obsess about the self but is concerned with others. Yet, modesty is arises out of the prior humble value the agent has for herself. Modesty depends on humility since modesty is a reflection of our own internal attitudes and habits. The outward presentation of the self typically, though not always, is a good indication of the interior attitude from which it springs. Some puzzles still remain. If a person possesses modesty but also is secretly arrogant or conceited, can that form of “modesty” be a genuine virtue? To what degree does humility have priority over modesty? And how does the possession of humility provide a necessary condition for distinguishing genuine modesty from false modesty? Some may still find the use of the term “humility” to be too religious or having too many negative connotations. But if what I have argued here is right, then the value of the distinction might outweigh linguistic objections to the use of humility. That is, teasing apart the differences might serve to more accurately describe different virtues and avoid conflating the two unnecessarily. 24 Figure 1: Prudence Justice Courage Temperance Moderation Humility Studiousness Figure 2: Humility No humility Modesty Virtuous Appearanceoriented No Modesty Obtuse Vicious 25 in Actions in Attire