First World Congress of Business History/
20 Congress of the European Business History Association
Business history around the World – today & tomorrow
25-27 August 2016, Bergen, Norway
th
Silvia A. CONCA MESSINA
(University of Milan)
Roberto TOLAINI
(University of Genoa)
Opening a debate:
Nobility and economic transformation in 19th century Northern-Italy:
(please do not quote without authors’ permission)
Abstract
During the 19th century, in northern Italian regions a large proportion of capital,
investments and improvements in the agricultural sector and agro-food production, as
well as, increasingly, in railways and infrastructures, industrial and financial sectors –
came from noblemen. They aimed to expand their own revenues, fostering economic
progress and applying scientific and technological innovations to agriculture and
industry. Several noblemen played a leading economic role, as they were the richest,
heirs to large properties and estates and to complex administration systems originating
from early modern times and updated to meet the new managerial necessities. They often
held scientific interests (and sometimes scientific knowledge), and belonged to wide,
national and international social (and political) networks which could easily be used for
economic goals.
The paper aims to open a debate on the role of nobility as a powerful economic
élite in the economic development of northern Italy, basing on the initial results of
ongoing research into primary sources. The literature on the topic has focused on several
cases of Italian entrepreneurial noblemen, or on nobility estate management, and has
shed light on their dynamic role. Their contribution, however, has generally been
perceived as not particularly influential in the economic process, as noblemen were
generally conservative on a social level and the 19th century is usually identified as the
century of the irreversible decline and loss of political and economic power on the part
of the aristocracy compared to the rise of the bourgeoisie.
By contrast, the role of the nobility’s investments, capital and economic activities
in northern Italy’s economic development seems to us to deserve and require broader
attention and investigation. As data are still being collected, the essay will assess some
emerging results focusing on: the management of properties and large estates, where
noblemen acted as a sort of ‘corporate director’, governing a complex structured
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enterprise; - investments and enterprises: agriculture innovations and experimentation,
railway construction, public debt, textile industries and banking seem to have been the
investment sectors preferred by noblemen; - the increase, after Unification and
particularly during the years of the agrarian crisis (1873-1896), in noblemen’s
diversification of capital and investments, from land to other uses, such as investments
in the financial sector and in joint-stock companies (transport, communication, public
utilities, banking, insurance, overseas ventures, new sectors and industries).
1. Introduction
In the nineteenth century the political role and the social and economic hegemony of the
European aristocratic élite underwent a significant, albeit gradual, reshaping, whereas the
importance of the middle classes grew considerably, as they substantially increased the
value of their assets and expanded their participation in local administrations and
political bodies.
This process was certainly connected to national, political and social transformations
and to the introduction of rules and laws which were less responsive to the interests of
the nobility, but it was mainly the result of dynamic international economic
development, which progressively allowed larger sections of society to gain wealth
through trade, industry and finance, and gradually involved new peripheral areas of
Europe in the economic and social changes.
The expanded economic networks and businesses included a larger number of
subjects in new industrial relations, led to integration of markets and thus to a
convergence of prices at international level, resulting in faster transmission of economic
fluctuations from one market to another. This is particularly evident in the last few
decades of the century, when the previous economic and social structures were
challenged by the international fall in prices of agricultural products, and a long-lasting
crisis (the ‘Great Depression’ 1873-1896) particularly affected rents from land, on which
traditional aristocratic wealth was based.
However, the process of the decline of Europe’s aristocratic classes has been
increasingly interpreted by scholars as a transformation that proceeded rather slowly
over the course of the century, since the social and cultural influence of the landed
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aristocracy would last until at least WWI. The debate opened up by the scholar Arno
Mayer in the early 1980s drove studies in this direction: he identified a strong
persistence of the old regime and of the values of the nobility in Europe which went far
beyond the nineteenth century, indicating the Great War as the point at which the old
order, while trying to defend itself, truly collapsed (a collapse which would finally end
only with the Second World War). Research studies in England, Germany, Austria,
France and Belgium then found new evidence to suggest the enduring role of the nobility
also in the economic capitalistic transformation of the nineteenth century.
In Italy, the discussions and criticisms raised by this argument, considered by some
scholars as provocative, contributed at the time to a revival of interest in the subject. In
the last thirty years the nobility has been investigated through its demographic, economic
and professional behaviour; in particular, studies have examined asset management,
marriage policies, forms of sociability and the “material life”, culture, ideology and
mentality. Some studies have focused on innovative aspects such as changes in asset
management in line with economic developments, political and cultural openings and
signs of changes in attitudes among the noble élites.
What has emerged is a vision of the nobility as a heterogeneous class, made up of
families which, in many cases, paid close attention to the innovations and changes which
were underway, and were able to maintain their prestige and wealth over time. At the
same time, since the 1980s, in Italy there has been a renewed interest in the history of the
bourgeoisie, so that a more complex interpretation of aristocratic decadence and of the
rise of the bourgeoisie has been discussed.
In the light of these latest perspectives, a certain interest has arisen in the study of
the response of the different groups of nobility to the economic stresses of the nineteenth
century and in the analysis of the strategies adopted to conserve and expand their wealth
in a changed and changing economy, which was increasingly influenced by the
international framework, and more difficult to govern. The literature on the topic has
focused on some cases of Italian entrepreneur noblemen and on nobility estate
management, and has shed light on their dynamic role.
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Nevertheless, despite all the recent developments in the topic, until now the
contribution of the nobility to economic transformation has generally been perceived as
not particularly influential or decisive, as noblemen were generally conservative on a
social level and the 19th century is still usually identified as the century of the irreversible
decline and loss of political and economic power on the part of the aristocracy compared
to the rise of the bourgeoisie. In Italy the studies mostly underline the exceptional nature
of the cases studied, which they attribute to the uniqueness of the male protagonists of
the events described. Noblemen are not perceived as a real innovative force, but as part
of a (sooner or later) declining class, generally adverse to widespread modernisation
which led to social mobility, individualism, success by merit and economic progress.
They are at best described as forced or able to adapt to the new economic market rules
and to an industrialised and urban society in order to retain their power, properties and
consumption level for as long as possible. Even if the evidence tells a different story,
noblemen are often supposed to be basically more interested in rents than in profit, and
their entrepreneurship seems to be sui generis. At the state-of-the-art, the real impact and
role of the nobility’s investments and capital in Italy’s economic development still
deserve and require broader investigation.
The paper will consider both the initial results of broad, ongoing research into
primary sources and the literature on the topic, while attempting to provide some
reflections on issues such as: were the nobility’s capital, investments and economic
activities influential on northern Italy’s economic development? In which sectors did the
nobility prefer to make direct investments? Was innovation firmly supported by the
nobility’s interest in scientific advancements and technological progress?
As the research is in the initial stages and the collection and processing of data are
still underway, the true dimension of the role of nobility in the northern Italy economy
has still to be determined. Certainly, much evidence indicates the high value of the
contribution made by noblemen to the development of agriculture, transport, banks,
insurance and industry in 19th century Italy, although – given the deep-rooted and
widespread tendency to hide and only partially disclose in official documents the true
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amount of the investments in entrepreneurial and financial activities – it is always
difficult to reconstruct their actual level.
2. Noblemen in the northern Italian economic context
The history of 19th century Italy is marked by the national unification process, which can
be considered completed only after the annexation of Rome in 1870. Until Italy’s
unification in 1861, the domestic market maintained a high degree of fragmentation at a
national level and each regional state operated under a different economic policy. Only
Piedmont along with Liguria (Torino and Genoa) was independent, while the others were
directly or indirectly dominated by Austria.
Notwithstanding the political fragmentation, in the first half of the century the
northern regions were moving forward in a first wave of industrialisation. Faster
circulation and transmission of technological innovations and scientific achievements
were undertaken and successfully linked northern Italy to Paris, Lyon, Mulhouse,
London, Manchester, Zurich, etc. Part of this progress was due to the strong commercial
and economic relationships which merchants and industrialists exploited all over Europe.
Businessmen from France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany and even England were also
coming to Italy (in this regard we can only note that, alongside technicians and
industrialists, some of them were noblemen) and establishing their businesses or
industries in Milan, Turin, Genoa, Florence (a phenomenon which also concerned
southern Italy, albeit they were not supported there by local entrepreneurial forces, and
would increase after national unification). Without doubt, the contribution of self-made
men and of the bourgeois (first involved in the silk and cotton sectors and later in
mechanics, banking, and new industries) played a decisive role.
However, until (and after) Unification, in the northern regions a significant
proportion of capital, investments and improvements in the agricultural sector and in
agro-food production, as well as, increasingly, in railways and infrastructures, and in the
industrial and financial sectors – came from noblemen. They fought side by side with the
bourgeoisie for the independence and unification of Italy and often followed similar
investment strategies, sharing the same initiatives and ventures. Noblemen belonged to
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that part of the population which owned most of the national wealth and while they tried
to increase their properties and assets in their home country, they promoted national
economic progress. They aimed to expand the economy, fostering progress by applying
scientific and technological innovations to agriculture and the burgeoning industries.
Several noblemen played a natural leading economic role, as they were the richest, heirs
to large properties and estates and to complex administration systems sometimes
originating from early modern times; they held a strong scientific interest (and
sometimes scientific knowledge), and belonged to wide, national and international social
(and political) networks which were easily transformed into economic relationships.
During the century, investments of the nobility’s capital assets partially changed,
moving from land into industrial, financial and urban estates. Starting from the last few
decades of the century, when a national economic policy was embraced, an increasing
amount of capital, mostly from the upper classes, financed the construction of
infrastructures, the national debt, urban development, the foundation of national and
local banks and of large stock companies. Noblemen from central regions and,
occasionally, from southern areas, which were still tied to an agricultural economy and
were mostly lagging behind in the industrialisation process, joined in and invested in
national initiatives and businesses. As wealth had been distributed very much unequally
throughout the whole century, and was still mostly concentrated in the upper class,
economic development would probably not have occurred at the same level without the
contribution of the nobility’s capital.
In the nineteenth century, noblemen were still among the greatest landowners, and
above all, the aristocratic predominance was even more striking at the very highest levels
of land ownership. Scholars have underlined how, for much of the century, the
endurance (or the survival) of the nobility’s social and economic power was still based
on large-scale land ownership, which usually represented the majority of the nobility’s
assets and in many cases was extended or reinforced (e.g. thanks to public sales of
former common properties or of expropriated Catholic Church estates).
As extensive land ownership was a traditional kind of property, with connotations of
status, normally handed down over the generations and finally belonging to the
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agricultural sector (whereas economic progress was linked to industry and
industrialisation), historians have often evaluated it as a traditional conservative
investment, not worthy – with only a few exceptions – of particular attention from the
point of view of entrepreneurial attitudes and management capabilities.
Therefore, although noblemen were closely involved in the development of their real
estates, their efforts have been mostly considered as an attempt to adapt to the evolution
of the economy, while keeping their traditional, dominant social and economic role.
They were fundamentally aiming to maintain a conspicuous level of consumption,
conserving or increasing the level of rents: rents and not profit, as they were rentiers and
not entrepreneurs. The definition of rentier has had a negative meaning throughout the
history of the nobility and still makes it impossible to define noblemen as true agents of
economic growth, due to the negative connotation of the term.
Here we aim to discuss the framework of this definition.
Management
As it appears from the archival evidence, rents were not money earned by idle noblemen
whose aim was mainly to spend it. If spending and conspicuous consumption were one
of the ultimate aims of noblemen and the élite, rents were the result of a complex
administration of the patrimony, which involved not only an articulated administrative
structure, but also economic knowledge and the ability to produce prompt economic
evaluations. Constant attention to updated information on prices and market trends by
consulting specialised journals and daily bulletins was the norm. In fact, noblemen
analysed costs and benefits and studied the potential profit or level of capital
remuneration expected.
Noblemen took care of, supervised and managed their large estates mostly by acting
as a sort of ‘corporate director’ (as John Beckett has stated for the British counterparts),
making vital decisions about crop selection, appointing and overseeing the management
team, assessing grievances and smoothing over relationships on the estates. As they
could not physically be on all of their lands at the same time, they needed a general
delegated administrator and one or more offices with lawyers, attorneys, notaries,
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engineers and bookkeepers; rural or commercial agents, farm labourers and technicians
all to work for them and suppliers and sellers (also at an international level) of goods,
plants and technical tools.
These complex administration systems sometimes originated from early-modern
times and were updated to meet the new organisational necessities. The general
administrators could be noblemen or might come from the professional bourgeoisie.
Indeed, most wealthy noblemen worked their way through dense daily correspondence
with the general administrator, who had to inform them about every problem that
emerged and also had to carry out all the orders received on investments, profits and
agrarian innovation which the noblemen often wanted to introduce (plants, practices,
land recoveries). The letters noblemen wrote were full of advice concerning the
maintenance of the farm and general cultivation. Constantly, and especially during the
summertime, the noblemen visited their estates in person. The general administrator, in
turn, could only supervise all the house’s affairs and so he appointed many other
employees and consultants (a central office was nearby) to keep the accounts, give
periodical reports, go to visit real estate, gather information about the economy and
enterprises for investment (engineers, lawyers, notaries, accountants, stewards).
How then should we define this widespread behaviour of the nobility?
Improvements
It can be widely documented (e.g. from their ample correspondence) that noblemen tried
to earn as much as possible from their lands and were generally successful in exploiting
their rural properties economically. They were increasingly involved in commercial
agricultural activities and invested a huge amount of money in crop and livestock
innovations and experimentation, in introducing new kinds of plants and cultivation
techniques and in canal building for irrigation. Yields and rental incomes increased. It
has been recognised that their lands were essential to the economy, supplying
commodities such as hemp, linen, silk, wood, and untapped raw materials (minerals),
waterpower (renting ancient water rights and old cereal mill-sites to be transformed into
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silk or cotton mills) and in addition, the lands could be used to provide security for the
borrowing of capital.
Moreover, following the movement of “agrarian activism” which was spreading
throughout Europe at the time, the nobility provided much of the leadership for the most
important agricultural improvement societies, such as the Royal Academy of Agriculture
and the Subalpine Agrarian Association in Piedmont or the Agrarian Society of
Lombardy and that of the Bologna area. Agricultural issues were discussed in social
meetings and in the numerous brochures which were published and circulated among
them.
Just to mention one well-known nobleman innovator, we can cite Count Camillo
Benso di Cavour, one of the main figures behind Italy’s Unification and the first prime
minister of the new Kingdom of Italy, who long enjoyed a deserved reputation as one of
the most prominent aristocratic agricultural entrepreneurs. He was not alone: we can find
significant noble agrarian entrepreneurs in several other regions, and also, for instance,
in the State of the Church, such as Alessandro Torlonia, prince, banker and entrepreneur.
As farm prices rose, so did the value of rental rates (which reached unequalled
heights until the mid-century). Many investments and improvements were made,
depending on the environment and characteristics of the lands: in the production of
cereals (and the transformations they underwent, such as when corn mills and rice
refineries were introduced), silk (with the cultivation of thousands of mulberries and the
promotion of the rearing of silkworms and in many cases of silk reeling), fruit (lemons
around the lakes in the north).
Silk in particular has been defined as the «main leading sector» of the Lombardy
economy, the wealthiest Italian region even before unification, which at the end of the
19th century and throughout the 20th century was to be «at the helm of Italian
industrialisation». Within this area, the quantity of mulberry trees tripled from 1796 to
1834; the production and export of silk grew and in the 1830s Lombardy was the region
which produced and exported the greatest amount in Italy (about 75 % of exports was
reeled silk), while more than 50 % of the silk manufactured in Europe was produced in
Italy. The capital accumulated in this sector by landowners, manufacturers and
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merchant-bankers would be decisive in furthering investments in financial activities and
later in the new industries of the second industrial revolution; indeed, the silk industry
would deploy its «propulsive role» after Unification.
Beyond agriculture: nobility’s investments until Unification
Agriculture had never been the only source of wealth for the nobility. First of all, in
northern Italy, alongside the ‘old’ aristocracy, the new nobility generally originated from
merchant families or members of the bourgeoisie who distinguished themselves because
of special merit and wealth. So the fortunes of many families maintained a certain
variety in terms of their sources of revenue. Indeed, another general aspect which
deserves to be stressed is the persistence of a clear strategy of diversification of
investments, which is not surprising considering the size of the assets, a phenomenon
which in European and Italian aristocratic families was nothing new: in addition to
income from land or from products derived from direct management there were indeed
profits and shares in commercial and industrial activities, banking and insurance, in
some cases ship ownership. Added to this were the earnings arising from public debt,
and sometimes from the practice of lending money (mortgages) on a small or large scale
to relatives, local municipalities and institutions (of which noblemen were usually
mayors and heads).
Based on the growth of the economy during the nineteenth century and alongside
noblemen’s initiatives in agriculture (which were imitated by merchants and
industrialists who invested a portion of their profits in the purchase of land and
improvements) noblemen tended to expand the shares in their portfolio by acquiring
government bonds, securities of Monte Lombardo-Veneto and public obligations of
Piedmont, stakes in banks, insurance and in various entrepreneurial societies, e.g. in the
textile sector, in prospecting for fossil fuels, in communications and infrastructures.
In the first half of the century, investments (shares and bonds) in railway securities
became an increasingly popular phenomena among the Italian and European nobility. In
the 1830s and the 1840s, in Milan, a nobleman such as Count Giuseppe Archinto (who
also financed the construction of the big cotton plant in Vaprio d'Adda later acquired by
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the Visconti di Modrone family in 1865) was at the centre of the construction projects of
railroads and of banking initiatives, supported by the local business community. In Italy
similar examples emerged in many cases that have been studied in the different regional
areas (Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria, Tuscany). This kind of economic approach was
taking place in other European countries including in the more advanced country of
England, where, after a period of distrust in the 1820s, the nobility saw the railways as a
source of income worthy of interest, due partly to the increased value of their land which
the new railway lines crossed or ran alongside.
From land to finance and joint stock companies
As well as diversification, until the mid-century the vast majority of revenue was still
derived from land estates, the sale of agrarian goods and the collection of rents. But
starting from the 1850s a series of difficulties gradually reduced the revenues from land
ownership and drove the nobility to faster innovation and increasing diversification in
order to address these issues: first, in the northern regions, the crisis of ‘pebrina’ (a
serious silkworm disease) and ‘oidium’ (a vine fungal disease) damaged a large part of
the vine cultivation and the breeding of silkworms (in 1865 the cocoon harvests were at
half the level they were 10 years previously); since the 1870s, the downward trend in the
price of cocoons and ‘phylloxera’ (a vine pest) had caused a further decrease in the
values of agricultural funds; a long crisis (1873-1896) occurred with the ‘Great
Depression’, with the decrease in agrarian prices due to international competition
(American and Russian grains particularly) and the first globalisation of markets. All
these events limited land revenues and led to improvements in livestock and dairy
industries or specialised cultivations wherever it was possible.
The downward trend in income was due to agriculture which for Lombardy can be
easily explained by oidium (and later ‘phylloxera’) and more particularly by ‘pebrina’.
Considering the value of silk in the economy, the crisis drove Lombardy business groups
and the big landowners involved in the sector to make great efforts to replace the native
infected seed, researching new species in the Turkish Empire, in China, Japan and
elsewhere. The noblemen, as larger landowners and producers of silk cocoons, set up
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massive scientific studies on the problem and sent agents and founded companies to
import silkworm seeds from various foreign countries (Portugal, Montenegro, Anatolia,
Macedonia), including Japan, which since the late 1860s had become the largest supplier
and ensured the resumption of production. Nevertheless, after the introduction of
Japanese seed and the technological renovation of reeling and twisting, which ensured
good returns for a number of years, starting from roughly the mid-1870s, the price level
began an uninterrupted descent due to increased world production, the improvement of
competitive Asian production and the lowering of the costs of transportation and
communication,
in addition to dwindling yields on the agricultural estates of the
nobility.
In the last few decades of the century, it is not surprising that noblemen, who were
so careful about the profitability of their assets, strengthened the previous trends, which
can be summarised as follows: first, they tended to reduce the negative impact on their
assets caused by declining land incomes, by adjusting the proportions of income from
agricultural rents and of the marketing of their products, even though they continued to
be highly interested in and to support scientific and new discoveries applicable to
agriculture; second, they intensified their strategies of diversifying investments, not
unlike the bourgeois capitalists in Italy and in Europe. In particular the capital was
increasingly directed towards the acquisition of Italian government bonds (easily
converted into cash if needed), finance and industries assumed some importance as well
as foreign bonds and shares in large stock companies. They even took an active part in
the foundation and support of the new initiatives in industry and communications. The
shareholdings were accompanied by appointments to the boards of directors or to the
chairmanship.
A similar shift in interest is shown, after unification and later in the century, by
different aristocratic Italian groups, who moved on from the prevailing land uses to
significant investment in bonds and shares. Examples of this shift can be seen in the
Lords of Tuscany, who drained capital from agriculture and mining in order to finance
banks, railway companies, insurance or electricity companies, in which they sat on the
boards and often held presidential positions. Similarly, also the Neapolitan nobility, in
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the last quarter of the century, significantly shifted its investments. It is a noteworthy
transfer which also affected the assets of the nobility abroad, as in the case of the
aristocrats living in Paris who, in 1911, not unlike the bourgeoisie, would invest about 50
per cent of their assets above 1 million francs in stocks and shares.
Many examples of this shift are mentioned in case studies on aristocratic families
from Milan, Florence, Genoa (and also Rome). In Milan, one of the city’s richest and
most influential families, the Visconti di Modrone, acquired one of the biggest cotton
factories in Lombardy in 1865. After his death in 1902, Duke Guido Visconti di
Modrone left net assets, half of which was invested between his cotton factory (3 million
Lire) and bonds and stocks (5.8 million Lire, which represented one third of the asset).
As for shares in joint stock companies, these were accompanied by direct participation in
the boards of directors, as in the case of the cotton enterprise Festi and Rasini in the
electricity distribution company of, and in the Lombard Bank, of which he became vice
president. Among the most significant investments in addition to the national bonds
(more than one million lire), those which particularly stand out are shares acquired in the
banking sector (more than one million Lire in the Bank of Italy, more than 650,000 in
Lombard Bank); in the Lombard chemicals factory (600,000 Lire); Edison, in the
electricity sector (192,000 Lire) and the Lombard Society of electricity distribution
(146,000 Lire).
Several Lombard noble families participated in the creation of the Popular Bank of
Milan in 1865 and of the Popular Agricultural Bank (later the Agricultural Bank) in
1874, in addition to controlling the Insurance Society Against the Damage caused by
Hail. In the 1870s the aristocracy’s capital played a significant role in the origin of many
Lombardy joint-stock companies such as Pirelli, the innovative (and now nearly worldfamous) producer of rubber, Lanificio Rossi (wool), or Richard (potteries).
In Genoa, noblemen participated in the board of joint-stock companies such as steam
navigation corporations, banks, insurance companies, sugar industries. In the early
1870s, Raffaele De Ferrari, Duke of Galliera, offered the huge amount of 20 million Lire
to the Italian state to redevelop and modernise the port; the donation was essential for the
further development of Genoa, which would become one of the poles of Italy’s
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industrialisation. In Florence, the Corsini family, one of the wealthiest titled families in
the country, sold most of its old investments to support railway construction and to
invest in high finance. The same move was undertaken by Baron Bettino Ricasoli
(second prime minister of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861-1862, after the death of Cavour),
who invested 50 per cent of his portfolio in stocks and bonds. Also renowned and
important Roman noblemen such as Prince Paolo Borghese or Prince Don Prospero
Colonna expanded their activities into business and increasingly relied on non-land
assets.
However, this shift in interest occurred gradually and did not imply rapidly or
immediately abandoning a focus on land ownership and real estate. In the last few
decades of the century Italian noblemen were also increasingly attracted to the
investment opportunities which lay in the exploitation of urban real estate (since this was
a time of great urban growth in Milan, Turin, Genoa, and also in Rome and Naples, rents
from urban buildings provided a high overall income), to the development of ports and
transport (e.g. Genoa), so that the effects of the "agrarian crisis" after 1873 would
probably be somewhat mitigated by profits from these areas.
3. Genoese nobility during the XIXth Century: a case of resilience
While traditional European nobilities emerged from military enterprises, the Genoese
one, like many others in Italy, came mainly from trading, finance and shipping. At the
end of the 18th century, the Genoese patricians still had assets mainly held in financial
investments: according to G. Felloni, these usually represented more than 50% of their
assets (Felloni, G., 1971, p. 58). And the Genoese nobility still played an important role
in Europe. Felloni estimates that the nobility probably owned more than 60% of 340
million Genoese lire (1 franc 1805=1 Piedmontese lira= 1.2 Genoese lira) invested in
public debts and private mortgages of all Genoese capitalists in 1785.
This economic power also constituted the material basis of the Genoese nobility’s
political power considering the fact that it ruled over a state with a very limited size. The
Repubblica di Genova was a kind of private government consisting of a small number of
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noble families. This elite was characterised by a strong endogamy, and ruled the territory
by imposing low taxes, following a line of conservation and substantial inertia, without
building necessary new infrastructures (roads, ports and so on).
The Napoleonic period destroyed a very large part of the financial wealth of
Genoese people (table 1). The aristocracy lost political control of the territory and was
subjected to new masters, who eliminated privileges, while respecting private property.
Most of the nobility aligned themselves to the new Napoleonic regime which aimed at
amalgamating the old aristocracy with new middle classes in the name of wealth.
Nevertheless, at the end of Napoleonic period, most of the nobility had suffered losses.
Consequently, they entered the new period of Restoration much poorer than they were in
the revolutionary early age. For these reasons many scholars have considered the
contribution of nobility to the modernization of the economy to be irrelevant and to be
overshadowed by the rampant bourgeoisie (Doria, G., 1969). But there are many signs
which prove this view wrong. We intend to reconsider the aristocracy’s role by using
several primary sources, above all archives of noble families. Our initial research points
out that the Genoese aristocracy, as a group, was able to keep economic relevance, by
strengthening their wealth. Besides, a nucleus of influential individuals emerged from
that group, playing a central role in the modernisation of different economic sectors.
Evolution of wealth
A quantitative approach is needed to define how rich Genoese noblemen were and how
their wealth evolved. We are building a sample with 6-7 asset accounts of the richest
families in XIXth century Genoa, but unfortunately we are not able to present the
complete results here; so we have just gathered partial estimates and some figures
testifying to the resilience of the nobility during this century.
A useful starting point may be a document drawn up by an informer to the Austrian
police who made detailed assessments on the skills and wealth of the most important
aristocrats and bourgeois in Genoa in 1815 (Vitale V.). This document shows that 48
noblemen considered influential on the political scene possessed an overall income of
more than 5 million Piedmontese lire. If one assumes a return of capital of between 3.5
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percent and 4 percent, which were the usual interest rates in Genoa in this period, it may
possible to estimate a total wealth of this sample of around 120 million to 142 million.
But the nobility was bigger in number than this sample shows: quoting the above
mentioned informer, he stated: “there are many other wealthy men, but they are far from
being able to exercise some influence, because they are little known” (Vitale V.). How
many were they? It is hard to say. But one can make some estimates, considering that in
1820 no fewer than 200 noblemen possessed real properties in Genoa on which they paid
“imposta prediale” (a land tax). If we accept this number, assuming that at least 60
percent of the total nobility’s wealth was concentrated in the hands of the 48
most influential noblemen, we can cautiously estimate that 200 Genoese noble
families overall possessed from 200 million to 236 million lire of assets. This could
be the preliminary quantitative starting point of our research.
What happened in the following decades? Was there a continuing downward trend,
with noblemen selling their real estate or were noblemen able to stop this trend and to
restore their wealth?
The records of the "Contribuzione territoriale”, held at the Historical Archive of
Genoa (Archivio storico comunale), represent a very useful source because they identify
the taxable amount (palaces, houses, lands, etc.) on which taxpayers had to pay the
“imposta prediale”. In twenty years, the nobility's real estate assets suffered an
insignificant reduction going from 38.01 percent in 1820 to 34.15 percent in 1840.
Noblemen continued to own more than one third of the buildings and land subject to
taxation in Genoa. The urban property of the nobility endured. One has to consider that
Genoese noblemen represented only 5% of approximately 3700-3800 taxpayers, out of a
population of over 90,000 inhabitants.
If one looks at the end of the 19th century, the weight of urban real estate of the
nobility decreased, but it was still significant. There were 24 noblemen among the top 60
taxpayers in 1889 compared to 37 in 1840 (“Corriere mercantile”, 1889). It seems that
noblemen’s property ownership lasted considering the expansion of the town (between
1840 and 1901 the population increased from 90,000 to more than 150,000 inhabitants in
historic districts, an increase of 60%) and the simultaneous stagnation in the number of
16
noble families, around 200 units. In any case it does not seem appropriate to speak of its
collapse or its marginalisation.
This is a partial outlook because it concerns just the urban properties of nobility,
without considering agricultural ones, within and outside Liguria, or urban properties in
other cities (Rome, Turin, etc.). A first glance at the available accounts shows the
resilience of many noble families. Leaving aside the particular case of De Ferrari, one of
the few Genoese families playing a leading role in European finance, with wealth which
went from 10 million in 1827 to 100 million Piedmontese lire in 1875, the families of
our sample increased their assets compared to the restoration. The Brignole Sale family,
for example, who lost half of their wealth between 1797 and 1815, recovered their assets
and in the 60s Antonio Brignole Sale owned wealth equivalent to that owned by his
father before the French revolution (see table 2). Similar stories can be told about other
families like Raggi or an important branch of the Spinola family (see table 3). Besides
there were families like that of Paolo Gerolamo Pallavicini who did not suffer the effects
of the Napoleonic storm. In the following decades, his heir preserved the family’s
position and was able to bring together his considerable estate, around 8 million lire, in
one of the branches of the Durazzo family, when Maria Teresa Pallavicini, niece of Paolo
Gerolamo married Marcello Durazzo IV.
For other families, the evolution of wealth is harder to define because of the
division of assets among children as in the case of Durazzo, the most prominent Genoese
noble family at the end of 18th century.
Marriage strategies had considerable importance too. For most of the century, the
Genoese nobility maintained considerable class endogamy (about 60% of weddings till
the sixties) which limited the scattering of assets beyond this narrow group of families.
The most emblematic example was the concentration of assets in the hands of Matilde
Giustiniani, after the First World War. In 1921 she inherited the wealth of her first
husband, Giacomo Filippo Durazzo Pallavicini, heir of two of the richest families of
19th-century Genoa, and in 1924 that of her second husband, the marquis and senator
Pierino Negrotto Cambiaso, who was also very rich, amassing a fortune of over 25
million lire.
17
Even in the case of Genoa, one may say that the nobility maintained substantial
economic importance during the 19th century, with consequences on the political level
too, in line with what has been shown by many other scholars for other European areas.
Income and the composition of assets
Two elements seem to have been essential in ensuring the resilience of old nobility:
urban rent and land rent. In this respect, it does not seem that the Genoese aristocracy
deviated much from the actions of other European nobilities during the 19th century. An
initial survey on archival sources points out that the persistent control of a large part of
urban buildings and the ownership of vast farms in the neighbouring valleys near Genoa
and in the Po Valley allowed a continuous, but in many cases growing, inflow of income.
The town’s population growth had a decisive role in keeping the real estate income and
the land rent high. One must particularly consider that a very large part of wine, olive oil,
vegetables, meat and other agricultural products consumed in the town came from land
owned by these noblemen. Moreover, they were ready to convert agricultural lands into
building sites when the city expanded and the process of industrialisation began: in that
situation noblemen were often promoters of housing companies.
The income from rents of urban properties and from the management of farms
was very important especially in the early years of the Restoration when the nobility had
to deal with the significant curtailment of financial wealth which occurred during the age
of revolution. However, there were also families who were able to get over this period of
crisis, thanks to a combination of financial investments less centred on French public
debt. In these cases financial revenue continued to cover more than half of total income
as in the case of Pallavicini (table 5).
Did noblemen regain confidence in financial investments in the following decades
as they had done at the end of the Ancient regime? We can give only approximate
answers for the moment. We can suppose two patterns of behaviour, based on the
archival research and on the available literature. The first is characterised by a strong
focus on international finance leading some patricians, like Andrea and Raffaele De
Ferrari, Antonio Brignole Sale or Gio Luca Durazzo, to begin or to renew relationships
18
above all with the Parisian bankers, to invest in foreign public debt and in companies
that built canals. The next step, from the forties, was the investment in railways, first in
France and then in the Italian peninsula. In this case, financial investments were about
half the value of assets.
The second model focuses on the management of urban land and agricultural
property. The composition of the portfolio is significantly biased towards real estate. An
exemplification of these two models is found in table 4, in which there is a comparison
of the income composition of Antonio Brignole Sale and Giacomo Spinola.
Research seems to indicate that the second model was prevalent; therefore the
weight of finance in assets of Genoese nobility no longer recovered the importance it had
at the end of the Ancient regime. Even personalities like Giacomo Filippo Durazzo
Pallavicini, fully active at the highest levels in national business communities, President
of large steel companies and financier of modern initiatives in industrial, commercial and
banking fields, at the beginning of 20th century had mainly incomes from real estate,
while only 20-22% came from financial assets (see table 6). Although less risky,
investment in land cannot be considered a sign of backwardness a priori: it is necessary
to analyse how noblemen managed their properties to understand if during the 19th
century there was a prevalence of traditional methods or a diffusion of more advanced
agricultural and technological practices.
How did Genoese noblemen run their properties?
I can only offer partial indications. The analysis of correspondence between owners and
managers highlights the existence of market oriented practices, addressing the different
opportunities for making money from agrarian production. Information collected in
different periods shows that noblemen were able to enhance land rent through various
practices, for instance introducing new crop varieties, installing hydraulic systems,
introducing agrarian machines and new phytosanitary treatments, participating in the
foundation of agrarian consortia or building relationships with agrarian schools.
Nevertheless there is much work to do, because there are very few studies on the
management of the properties of Genoese patricians in the 19th century. It is crucial to
19
understand if there were increases in land productivity. If this is proved, what are the
causes? Was it due to a simple increase in the labour factor or to the introduction of more
efficient technologies and practices?
Among the available studies, a particularly significant one is that of a former
feudal property of about 500 ha, owned by a branch of the Doria family, at Montaldeo, in
Piedmont (Doria G, 1963). This study shows that the nobleman’s property started a
"policy of maximum exploitation” of labour. Management focused on viticulture and
wine production, alternating modern agricultural contracts with more traditional ones,
such as sharecropping, achieving a significant increase in land rent, which increased
fivefold between 1830 and 1890. The increase of land rent was not caused by
investments, but by farm labourers’ work. They were obliged to plant new vines for
agricultural contracts, imposed by the owner, and if they were indebted, they would pay
back their debt with full working days. The result of this process was the further
expansion of nobility property between 1830 and 1894 and an increase in income from
9,000 Italian lire in 1830 to 47,000 lire in 1880.
The increase of land rents is also shown for other large farms of Genoese
noblemen in the second half of the 19th century and in the first years of the 20th century
and also in these cases the specialisation in viticulture to produce wine played an
important role: Durazzo Pallavicini and Spinola, together with other Genoese noble
families, founded companies to sell their wine in American markets too.
The largest agrarian properties, composed of several units (in Italian “tenute” or
“agenzie”), such as the case of the large Durazzo Pallavicini one, which had units on
different sites of the Pianura padana, near Naples and in Spain, had a pyramidal structure
managed by a director who reported directly to the owner. The director, an engineer in
the Durazzo Pallavicini case, coordinated the work of various managers or “agenti”, each
one with the responsibility of a unit managed with a group of different agricultural
contracts. Local managers corresponded at least weekly with the director, sending reports
of revenues and costs every month, which were re-elaborated by the central office for
precisely determining the economic performance. Such a complex administrative
structure has left behind an archive of significant dimensions with a remarkable temporal
20
continuity. One can also find such a structure for the Spinola, Brignole Sale and De
Ferrari families.
Beyond agriculture
What were the other fields which attracted the interests of the Genoese nobility and
which contributed to the industrial and financial modernisation of the town, one of the
most important poles of economic development in Italy between the end of the 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th century?
A turning point seems to have been the change of economic policy towards free
trade by the Kingdom of Sardinia, which since the second half of the 1830s opened
decisively to commercial exchanges, increasing the attractiveness of Genoa port. In the
1840s this trend was reinforced by the decision to build a railroad between Turin, the
kingdom’s capital and Genoa, a necessary step to enlarge the internal market. The
spontaneous development of the Genoese maritime economy was supported by the
State’s action.
The role played by noblemen was important above all in changing the financial
institutions and in supporting the building of infrastructures, while it was less significant
in supporting the first modern industrial firms.
Very influential noblemen such as Duke Raffaele De Ferrari, the baron Giuliano
Cataldi, the marquises Camillo Pallavicino, Lazzaro Negrotto Cambiaso, Giacomo
Filippo Durazzo Pallavicini, in different periods, were among the main protagonists of
the foundation of modern banks, such as the Banca di Genova, from which Banca
d’Italia, the central bank of Italian state, originated or Credito italiano, one of the first
universal banks in Italy, and other commercial banks. The noblemen’s presence at the
highest level was a guarantee of solidity, and it served as a catalyst for middle-class
capitalists. Besides, we must not forget that noblemen often held important
organisational roles.
The role of the nobility was even more significant in the modernisation of
infrastructures. Raffaele De Ferrari was the most prominent figure. Since the early forties
he participated in the founding of many railway companies in France and he put his
21
knowledge and his capital at the disposal of a group of Genoese investors to start a
project for building a railway line which linked Turin and Genoa to Milan. However, this
project was rejected by the government of the Kingdom which preferred to entrust the
railway building to the State. Then De Ferrari, with a few other noblemen, supported
similar initiatives in France and in Switzerland. After the unification of Italy, De Ferrari
increased his investments in several Italian railway companies when the railways became
a key aspect of national market construction. His role was so important that he was
becoming the chief of a company that was able to manage the entire Italian network,
when his sudden death interrupted this project.
De Ferrari, furthermore, played a most important role in the modernisation of
Genoa’s port. While traffic grew in the middle decades of the 19th century, the port
facilities remained essentially those of the Ancient Régime. In the 1870s, the situation
was unsustainable. The national government did not seem to realise the vital importance
which the port was playing in supporting greater integration of northern Italy in the
circuits of international trade, so crucial for the support of the country's economic
progress. In 1875-76 De Ferrari intervened with a donation of colossal dimensions, 20
million lire, to be allocated for the modernisation and expansion of port facilities. Thanks
to this legacy, to which the State added a further sum, Genoa's port was adapted to the
growth of trade. Genoa became more attractive for locating firms which were heavy
consumers of coal and other industrial resources. In short, the unusual gesture of the
Duke De Ferrari had a significant impact on improving the efficiency of Genoa's port,
increasing the area's location advantages, encouraging the processes of agglomeration
and accelerating exchanges between the inland areas of the north west and international
markets.
The presence of the nobility in starting up modern industrial enterprises, however,
was limited. Noblemen had some importance in launching the first steam shipping
companies, while their influence was very limited in the sugar industry, in shipbuilding,
in milling, in the cotton and steel industries. Some data, however, indicate that they
showed interest in these fields in the following decades, when these experiences were
consolidated. The analysis of the board composition of several corporations on the eve of
22
World War I shows that the interest of noblemen for industrial activities
eventually
increased. The presence of members of the Genoese nobility at the top of the joint stock
companies is not episodic and it also extends to fields in which they initially were not
attracted, such as the steel industry.
Table 1. Genoese financial investments before and after the revolutionary period
(Million Genoese lire).
Original financial capital
(1785 ca.)
Registered capital or
refunded (1815 ca.)
Loss in
nominal
capital
Securities of
the Ligurian
Republic
Foreign
securities
Foreign loans
115,0
17,8
97,2
113,2
50,4
62,7
110,2
63,7
46,5
Totals
338,4
131,9
206,4
Source: Felloni G. 1971
Table 2. The balance sheet evolution of Antonio Brignole Sale
Piedmontese lire
January 1
1811
6782353
January 2
1847
10369885
July 1
1854
7280595
October 1
1863
10446144
Liabilities
1058283
3179019
665223
1288682
Net assets
5724070
7190866
6615372
9157462
Assets
Source: Historical Archive of the Municipality of Genoa, Fondo Brignole Sale,
registers n. 171, 178, 180.
23
Table 3. The balance sheet evolution of Giacomo Spinola and his son Franco Gaetano
Piedmontese lire
December 31
1849
1855472
December 31
1882
5074017
December 31
1889
5769906
Liabilities
623692
574476
577962
Net assets
1231780
4499541
5191944
Assets
Source: National Gallery of Spinola Palace, Genoa, Spinola Archive, f. Agenzie.
Table 4. Income breakdown of A. Brignole Sale, G. Spinola, P. G. Pallavicini and M. Durazzo (IV).
Piedmontese lire
A. Brignole
Sale (1833)
Incomes from real estates and
farms
Incomes from financial activities
99210
G.
Spinola
(1849)
54665
93174
12814
Incomes from diplomatic
assignments
Other incomes (commerce,
shipping etc.)
18000
P.G.
Pallavicini
(1821)
109227
M. Durazzo
IV (1834)
112245
37294
17465
797
25918
210384
67479
248187
54759
Sources: for A. Brignole Sale: Historical Archive of the Municipality of Genoa, Fondo Brignole
Sale, registers 174 e 175, for G. Spinola, National Gallery of Spinola Palace, Genoa, Spinola
Archive, f. Agenzie; for P. G.Pallavicini and M. Durazzo: Private Archive Cattaneo Adorno,
Pallavicini Archive, f. 189 and Archive Durazzo di Gabiano, f. 748.
24
Table 5. Incomes of P. G. Pallavicini 1796-1821
Genoese lire, three-year
average
Incomes
1796-98
1802-04
1808-10
1813-15
1818-20
209659
308870
265328
252719
261780
Expenditure
128679
139299
203837
152925
167959
80980
169571
61491
99794
93821
1796
1802
1811
1819
1821
48594
109584
120252
77654
109227
119780
175754
153071
125380
111660
41840
4852
3980
35130
26716
210214
290190
277303
238164
247603
Savings
Incomes from real estate
and farms
Incomes from financial
activities
Other incomes
(commerce, manufacture,
shipping etc.)
Total
Source: Private Archive Cattaneo Adorno, Archive Pallavicini, Balances, f. 189.
Table 6. Income breakdown of marquis Giacomo Filippo Durazzo Pallavicini, 1896-1900
Italian lire
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
Rents of urban properties
136449
137015
138562
139517
141987
Farms incomes
205410
189882
176446
171556
240513
37713
24602
19672
18550
26011
2727
62818
17887
4078
4590
382299
414317
352567
333701
413101
Financial incomes
Other incomes
Total
Source: Private Archive Cattaneo Adorno, Archive Durazzo di Gabiano,
Registro di rendite generali, 1892-1934.
25
Overall, we can say that noblemen were successfully able to integrate into an economy
that became more dynamic and uncertain (even though the dynamism was concentrated
particularly in the northern part of the country), following a similar path to that of
wealthy merchants and emerging industrialists. It should also to be underlined, as stated
above, that many groups of the nobility had always welcomed people from trade and
industry and were still accepting them into their ranks during the nineteenth century. It is
not surprising, therefore, to find a certain unity of paths, of intent and behaviour, at least
in terms of the purely economic élite of the period. They were also aware of what was
happening across the Alps, in particular in France and in England, where economic
expansion made a variety of investment opportunities available to the holders of capital.
The second industrial revolution, with the acceleration of technological innovation,
transport and communication, seemed to help to bring together the economic strategies
of the middle class and of the nobility, who were already linked from belonging to the
same business élite, as they were sharing and reinforcing scientific and cultural
exchanges, networks of family relationships, business and local financial networks.
Considering that great wealth and economic inequality was the rule in nineteenth
century Italy, the aim of future research will be to better understand the importance of the
upper nobility, holders of the largest assets, in economic development, as their role
seems to have been much more important than has so far been supposed.
26
ARCHIVAL AND DATA SOURCES:
Genoa Municipality Archive: Fondo Brignole Sale; Fondo Contribuzione
territoriale;
Genoa University, Faculty of Economy, Doria Archive: Fondo Lamba Doria, Balbi
Family; Fondo Salvago Raggi, Raggi Family;
Private Archive Cattaneo Adorno, Fondi Pallavicini, Durazzo and Durazzo
Pallavicini
National Gallery of Spinola Palace, Genoa, Spinola Archive
State Archive of Milan: Fondi: Serbelloni, Sormani-Andreani, Crivelli-Giulini, Litta
Modignani;
Ca’ Granda Foundation, Ospedale Maggiore Archive, Litta Archive
Catholic University of Milan, Faculty of Economy, Visconti di Modrone Archive
Database
Imita
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