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Phronetic social science: a means of better researching and analysing
coaching?
Liv B. Hemmestada; Robyn L. Jonesb; Øyvind F. Standala
a
The Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Norway b University of Wales Institute, Cardiff, UK
Online publication date: 09 October 2010
To cite this Article Hemmestad, Liv B. , Jones, Robyn L. and Standal, Øyvind F.(2010) 'Phronetic social science: a means of
better researching and analysing coaching?', Sport, Education and Society, 15: 4, 447 — 459
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13573322.2010.514745
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Sport, Education and Society
Vol. 15, No. 4, November 2010, pp. 447459
Phronetic social science: a means of
better researching and analysing
coaching?
Liv B. Hemmestada, Robyn L. Jonesb* and
Øyvind F. Standala
The Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Norway; bUniversity of Wales Institute, Cardiff,
UK
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a
The aim of this paper is to present the case for phronetic social science as an appropriate lens
through which to view sports coaching. In doing so, we firstly define and then elaborate upon the
principal concepts contained within phronetic social science as related to complex action,
flexibility, moral reflection and power. By locating them within recent coaching research, the
case is further made how such concepts can help coaching scholars and coaches to better
understand the activity of coaching. Finally, a conclusion draws together the main points made,
particularly in terms of how using such a perspective and conceptualisation of coaching could
benefit future coach education programmes.
Keywords: Coaching; Phronetic social science; Bent Flyvbjerg
Introduction
In contrast to the traditional functional conceptualisation of sports coaching as an
efficient, operational process (see Cushion et al., 2003, for a fuller critique), recent
studies have positioned the activity as a complex social system, where knowledge is
produced on the basis of coaches’ everyday interactions within a particular sociocultural context (e.g. Cushion & Jones, 2006; Jones, 2007). Such work has
highlighted the importance of practice, and of reflective thought upon that practice,
in catalysing coach learning and development (Schön, 1983, 1987; Jones et al.,
2004). For example, Saury and Durand (1998) and Jones et al. (2004) among others
concluded that expert coaches invest much of themselves in or vicariously ‘live’ their
training sessions, reflecting the use of an implicit form of knowledge strongly tied to
past experiences and the people they are. In doing so, such coaches were found to be
principled yet flexible, retaining the ability through careful judgement and
consideration to adapt their practice to new, unexpected and problematic tasks
(Jones & Standage, 2006). In this respect, the coaches’ knowledge and actions were
neither complete nor absolute, but highly individual and ever evolving (Cushion
et al., 2003).
*Corresponding author. Cardiff School of Sport, University of Wales Institute, Cardiff, Wales
CF23 6XD, UK. Email: rljones@uwic.ac.uk
ISSN 1357-3322 (print)/ISSN 1470-1243 online/10/040447-13 # 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13573322.2010.514745
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448
L. B. Hemmestad et al.
Coaches’ knowledge then, has come to be seen as largely experience-linked and
situation-specific; as both the ‘product and manifestation of personally experienced
involvement’ (Saury & Durand, 1998, p. 12). It is a position further theorised by the
recent work of Jones and Wallace (2005) who postulated that, because it is beyond
the capacity of any coach to achieve full predictable control over the coaching
process, effective practice is built on learning to cope with an irreducible degree of
ambiguity and pathos that are endemic to the coaching endeavour. Such a strategy is
not to admit defeat to the forces of unbridled relativity and anarchy and simply hope
for the best (Jones & Wallace, 2005). Rather it is to accept a degree of uncertainty
and, in Schön’s (1983, 1987) terminology, to build a repertoire that involves
judgements and decisions ‘made in the manner of a virtuoso social actor’ (Flyvbjerg,
2001, p. 2). Coaching then, far from being rational and sequential, demands
constant and constructive deliberation, judgement and praxis, particularly in relation
to values and power (Flyvbjerg, 2001).
Despite this recognition, little ground has been made in proposing an appropriate
reality-based interdisciplinary approach to take account of this complexity (Bowes &
Jones, 2006). Indeed, even the recent call for more holistic theoretical perspectives to
analyse coaching may be somewhat criticised in terms of trying to consider
‘everything’ within one superior framework, thus being in danger of reducing
something very complex to something one-dimensional (Sørhaug, 1996). Similarly,
it has been argued that although a pluralistic perspective possesses the adaptability to
embrace the complexity of coaching, such flexibility also has some constraints
(Rosenberg, 1995). For example, if all knowledge is taken as being contingent then it
is necessarily in flux, allowing little appreciation for regularities in social life (Phillips
& Jorgensen, 2002). On the other hand, a preoccupation with evidence-based
practice across the pedagogical professions has undermined any standing given to
practitioners’ professional wisdom in dealing with problems created by power
contextualities and the ubiquities of interactions (Standal, 2008). What appears to
be at work here is something akin to a ‘Cartesian anxiety’ where a definitive position
is encouraged. It is an artificial dualism which, although easy to think with, bears
little resemblance to actual phenomena (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Flyvbjerg, 2001).
The task has been made all the more difficult by the general clamour for ‘clean’,
quick-fix answers particularly from the coaching professional preparation community, which inevitably reduces behaviour into decontextualised individual episodes. It
is a call which has not served practitioners well, as it has effectively limited their
‘judgements in [ways that are] sensitive and relevant to their own contextualised
settings’ (Biesta, 2007, p. 5).
The aim of this paper is to present the case for phronetic social science as
developed by Flyvbjerg (2001) as a means through which the theorypractice gap in
sports coaching can be addressed. We argue that such a stance, taking its lead from
the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, can better take account of the social intuition
and complexity of coaching than many of the perspectives used to date. It can do so
through its recognition of social practice as the product of context-dependent tacit
skills, which allows greater clarification of the ‘the problems, risks and possibilities we
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449
face’ in social interaction, particularly when we need to directly influence others
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 4). The theorypractice dualism criticised by phronesis is
addressed through a primary emphasis on contextualism, and how to manage
particular problematic situations for the good of all (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The purpose,
however, is to not propose that such analysis should totally replace others per se, but
to raise awareness of additional ways in which we can, and perhaps should, study and
analyse the actions which comprise coaching. In this respect, we argue that phronesis
is not necessarily better social science than other approaches in itself, but that it holds
the potential to give us an improved coaching science, because it explicitly sets out to
examine and unearth the nuanced everyday know-how and wisdom of practitioners.
An important methodological criterion of good research within social sciences is
connected to the ability to uncover the meanings behind social processes. This
includes an appreciation of both commonalities and uniquenesses within contextual
interactions, what Bourdieu (1990) called a ‘feel for the game’. In so doing,
recognition needs to be paid to both structural analyses and actors’ agency in near
equal amounts; a position which echoes the work of Geertz (1973) who classically
incorporated practices and symbols from the larger Balinese social and cultural world
to shed light on the seemingly localised event of a cockfight (Flyvbjerg, 2001).
Unfortunately, coaching, with a few notable exceptions has not been subject to such
investigations. Indeed, in a recent comprehensive review by Gilbert and Trudel
(2004) it was found that research on coaching during the period under study
(19702001) had overwhelmingly been guided by a quantitative research epistemology. Although the balance has altered more recently towards qualitative investigations, much of the analysis remains positivistic and rational in nature. Little wonder
that a practicetheory gap continues to exist within coaching, with practitioners
regularly claiming their dominant knowledge sources to be experimental and implicit
as opposed to explicit (Jones et al., 2004; Chesterfield et al., 2010). The significance
of the paper then lies in presenting the case for an enhanced blending of academic
rigour with ecological practical wisdom, as embodied in phronesis, so that the social
complexity of coaching can be better taken account of (Flyvbjerg, 2001). In terms of
structure, we firstly define and then elaborate upon the concepts contained within
phronetic social science. This is followed by a discussion of how such concepts can
help scholars, students and practitioners to better understand the activity of
coaching. Finally, a conclusion draws together the main points made, particularly
in terms of the relevancy of using such thinking within future coach education
programmes.
Phronetic social science
In his seminal text ‘Making social science matter’, Flyvbjerg (2001) suggested that
we replace the view of social science as science, with its role as a generator of practical
wisdom. His case stemmed from dissatisfaction at the dominant position of
rationality within the social sciences, and their consequent inevitable inability to
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L. B. Hemmestad et al.
address pressing social concerns. According to Flyvbjerg (2000, 2001), the natural
scientific model has become so dominant that entire scholarly disciplines have been
blinded to phenomena such as context, intuition and experience. However, he was
quick to point out that his thesis was not an unfettered attack upon the positivistic
approach, or to undermine the relevance of analysis and rationality as important
concepts. Rather, for Flyvbjerg (2001), the ‘rational fallacy’ consisted of raising such
concepts into the most important and dominating view of human activity.
Alternatively, his stance was that judgement based on context, experience and
personal values should be placed alongside rationality, thus somewhat redressing the
current imbalance (Schram, 2004).
The roots of phronetic social science can be found in one of Aristotle’s three
intellectual virtues. As opposed to episteme, which emphasised scientific theories and
analysis, and techne, associated with production-orientated craft, phronesis was
defined as a practical wisdom related to dealing ethically with context, practice
and experience (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Although both techne and phronesis are grounded
in the practical, the difference lies between making or producing knowledge and
acting on that knowledge (Dunne, 1993). That is, while techne is concerned with the
mechanical application of means to ends, phronesis ‘is a habit of attentiveness that
makes one’s past experience flexibly available [while] allowing the present situation
to unconceal its own particular significance’ (Dunne, 1993, p. 305). Despite
presented arguments that within Aristotle’s thinking, the difference between techne
and phronesis is perhaps not so clear-cut (Standal, 2008), the important point is that
the ‘distinction grounds a significant difference between technical and moral modes
of practical engagement with the world’ (Carr, 2003, p. 258; for a fuller discussion of
the distinction between techne and phronesis, see Standal, 2008). At the heart of
Flyvbjerg’s phronetic concept then, lies a virtuous practical value rationality which
refers to a reflective analysis on personal-value judgements in relation to future
actions. In this respect, it involves a shift from instrumentality to a deliberation over
what constitutes ethical praxis (Flyvbjerg, 2000, 2001). The person possessing
practical wisdom is deemed to have knowledge of how to manage each particular
situation; an expertise which can never be reduced to general truths (Flyvbjerg,
2001). However, in ensuring to avoid total relativism (techne) as much as rule-based
objectivity (episteme), Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 49) concluded that ‘there are rules and
there is the particular’, replacing the eitheror traditional dichotomy with a both
and approach. Acknowledgement is also made that an individual is never standing
over and objectively observing a situation, but rather is heavily involved in it. Such
knowledge is also linked to practical ethics, thus maintaining flexibility within given
carefully considered boundaries about what is good and advantageous both to the
individual and the social collective. Phronetic thinking then is concerned with
deliberation about values and interests, as a precursor for action (Flyvbjerg, 2001).
Flyvbjerg’s (2000, 2001) approach encourages us to move beyond the purely
technical into discussions concerning the practical knowledge of knowing how in
relation to the theoretical knowledge of knowing that (Dewey, 1910; Ryle, 1945).
Such thinking can be linked to that of the pragmatist William James, who
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451
distinguished the theoretical knowledge about from the practical knowledge from
(Smith, 1998). Phronesis, therefore, is founded on the notion that the principal
purpose of social scientific inquiry is not to develop theory per se, but to contribute
to society’s practice and workings (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Flyvbjerg concluded that this
has profound implications for social-science inquiry, as such expert or tacitly
developed competencies deny traditional clarification. Indeed, following the work of
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), who argued that context and judgement were
irreducibly central to understanding human action, Flyvbjerg believed that as an
individual progresses from beginning to advanced skills, behaviour becomes
increasingly intuitive and situation-dependent rather than rule-governed; the
development of a kind of concurrent know-how. Such know-how is grounded in
an assortment of implicit dexterity gathered from numerous experiences and a
multiplicity of cases. It is here, in the field of practical competence based on highly
nuanced, context sensitive tacit skills and their ethical application, that the essence of
phronesis lies. It is a perspective concerned with particulars, with how to act ‘well’ in
specific situations.
Building on Foucault’s belief that inquiry about society can only be complete if it
deals with issues of power, Flyvbjerg (2001) developed the classic concept of
phronesis into a more contemporary, power-inclusive one. Within Flyvbjerg’s
phronesis, power is seen as productive and positive as well as restrictive; and as an
opaque network of omnipresent relations (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Power is also considered
as being intertwined with knowledge and ‘truth’. A central subsequent question
within this conceptualisation of phronesis relates not only to who has power and why
they have it, but also to how power is exercised particularly at the micro level (‘power
is studied . . . in small questions’, Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 376). The resultant focus is on
process in addition to structure (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This kind of approach endows us
with the possibility to become aware of both oppressive and satisfying social
arrangements. Such arrangements, however, are not simply seen as dichotomous.
For example, for Flyvbjerg (2001), the suppression of conflict equates to the
suppression of freedom, because the privilege to engage in conflict and to struggle for
power is part of freedom. For Flyvbjerg then, as for Foucault, power cannot be
simply acquired, given or taken; neither do power relations exist externally to other
relations. Rather, ‘power comes from below’, is dynamic, always subject to resistance
and is inherently linked to discourses (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 121). Similarly, the
Foucauldian concept of both the dominant and dominated entering into a complex
dependent relationship where neither has absolute power, is adhered to.
Phronetic social science is about providing ‘detailed narratives of how power works
and with what consequences, and to suggest how power might be changed (to) work
with other consequences’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 140). Hence, it is not only about
learning the principles of action, but also applying such principles in the real world,
in situations which could not have been foreseen. Such a position echoes Foucault’s
critique of value neutrality leading to the creation of the central ethical and powerdominated questions which both underpin phronetic social science and mark its
distinctiveness from many other modes of inquiry. These questions include: ‘Where
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L. B. Hemmestad et al.
are we going?’ ‘Is this development desirable?’ ‘What, if anything, should be done?’
and ‘Who gains and who loses by which mechanism of power?’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001).
Although Flyvbjerg (2001) believed that no one has the wisdom and experience to
provide complete answers to such far reaching questions, the perspective of phronesis
enables us to try. In this respect, it allows us to engage in an ongoing dialogue about
the problems, possibilities and risks of coaching, particularly as related to the power
plays that happen within it, and perhaps how things may be done differently for the
greater good. For Flyvbjerg, this is where the true value of the approach lies, in
raising questions about values, theory, methods and data, about research fundings
and editorial biases towards historically privileged conceptions of investigative
questions and solutions (McNamee, 2005).
This ethical applied edge, in common with some other post-modern approaches,
forms the cornerstone of phronesis, with the aim being not only to describe the
world, but also to provide positive guidance about the way things ought to be within
it. Indeed, according to Schram and Caterino (2006), the outstanding facet of
Flyvbjerg’s challenge is the way he transgresses disciplinary boundaries to make a
compelling call for a social science that people can use to make a difference in their
lives. The change is proposed to come about through enlightened reflection on
actions and existing values, leading to an improved ‘practical understanding’
(Forester, 1999).
Although the phronetic concept has been criticised in relation to the undertheorisation of the ethical element, there is no doubt regarding Flyvbjerg’s intention
for phronesis to include a strong moral or value-reflective component, thus
comprising a programme for political action. The ethics referred to are those ‘in
relation to social and political praxis . . . the relationship you have with society when
you act’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 55). What are at stake here are the interests of social
commentary and social action in terms of the fundamental values-related questions
of ‘Where are we going?’ and ‘Is it desirable?’. For example, it is not enough to know
that one should be honest in dealing with others, as being honest without judgement
and deliberation can lead to pain, offence and the breakdown of relationships. Asking
such value-related questions then, does not assume a linear development, as the
credence Flyvbjerg’s phronesis gives to power ensures an awareness that progress is
often complex, transient and negotiated. It is here, of course, that the element of
practical wisdom comes to the fore. Phronesis then, represents value judgements
about what are ‘good and bad for man’; a stance which positions the reflexive
analysis ‘of values and interests’ as a prerequisite for enlightened social, political and
cultural development (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 3). In this respect, as mentioned earlier,
and in departing from much social scientific inquiry, Flyvbjerg (2001) takes care to
avoid the unconditional relativism associated with post-modernism and the grand
theorising advocated by a natural scientific approach, replacing them with the
hermeneutic notion of ‘contextualism, that is, situational ethics’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001,
p. 130). This does not mean the abdication of ethical responsibility to idiosyncratic
personal preference. Rather, that our value-based questions be judged in terms of the
moral collective climate or common view among the group or culture under study
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453
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). Indeed, for Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 375), ‘sociality and history is the
only solid foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet’.
If phronetic social science is about the development of practical social action
dealing with deliberation, judgements and praxis in relation to values and power
(Flyvbjerg, 2001), what sort of methods does it advocate? Primarily, it calls for the
provision of concrete examples and detailed narratives of the ways in which power
and values work. Through such gathered insights it is postulated that we can clarify
and deliberate about the problems, possibilities and risks that we face before
outlining how things could be done differently. Consequently, inspired by Foucault’s
‘power of example’, case studies are crucial for phronetic research, because they
produce precisely the type of context-dependent knowledge which makes it possible
to move from rule-based, context-independent rationality to experience-based,
situationally driven action. The point here is that value and human behaviour
must be seen in relation to the particular, and that tacit sense and knowledge result
from values, choice and judgement (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986).
In terms of particular methods espoused, echoing complexity theory (e.g. Bowes &
Jones, 2006), phronetic social science looks for the great within the small, believing
that small questions lead to big answers. Hence, it emphasises the particular before
the universal, requiring researchers to ‘focus on the minutiae’, to get close to the
field. Little wonder then that Geertz’s ‘thick description’ is given a central role,
echoing the tenets of hermeneutic and phenomenological perspectives (Flyvbjerg,
2001). As opposed to only observing, however, the approach also obligates
investigators to enter into conversations and discussion with those being studied
during all aspects of the research process; to help the latter address fundamental
questions related to direction, power and values. Within phronetic social science
then, context comes before theory, cases before samples and dialogue before final
answers leading to social action in addition to social understanding (Flyvbjerg,
2001). Although one could argue that such an approach is not unique to phronetic
research, the progress made by Flyvbjerg lies not in the issue of precise methodology,
but in his belief about the value of carefully examining social actors’ contextual
deliberation, judgement and praxis in relation to the key value questions outlined
previously (Flyvbjerg, 2001).
Researching coaching as complex social system: how phronetic social
science can help
What then can phronetic social science offer sports coaching? We believe it can offer
much, not least because empirical findings have begun to implicate key phronetic
concepts such as complexity, flexibility, morality and power within coaching.
Consequently, it would appear that phronesis holds the potential to exist as an
insightful over-arching framework through which coaching can be interrogated. This
is not only in terms of analysing and understanding coaching as an adaptable activity
capable of responding to circumstantial factors, but also as one heavily influenced by
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L. B. Hemmestad et al.
the environment and culture within which it occurs. For example, the coaches
interviewed by Jones et al. (2004) emphasised the importance of reacting to
situational variables and events; not to be too dogmatic or rigid in their approach.
Similarly, Saury and Durand (1998) found that elite sailing coaches’ practice was
heavily characterised by constant reactions and decision-making to unforeseeable
situational events: a ‘continuous step-by-step tuning to the context’ (Saury &
Durand, 1998, p. 264). Comparable conclusions were also drawn by Sève and
Durand (1999) and others (e.g. Sève et al., 2003; Hauw & Durand, 2005) who found
that the actions of expert top-level coaches were not planned in advance, but
comprised adaptations to cognitive anticipations and situational happenings.
Such flexible reactions, however, do not imply unfettered responses from an
unlimited range of options. Rather, that the reactive actions of coaches were bound
and enabled by the wider culture within which they took place. For example,
although the coaches researched in Cushion and Jones’ (2006) study cited the need
to treat situations on their merits, their largely autocratic responses were
subsequently dictated by their past experiences and what they generally thought
the players expected from them. Similar findings were reported by d’ArripeLongueville et al. (2001) in their work with elite French judo coaches. Here, the
coaches’ actions were largely directed by their perceived need to continually reestablish authority over the players. Such conclusions echo those of Bowes and
Jones (2006) about the nature of coaching as having individual agency within
personal relational schemata of how one should act in context. It is a view which
positions coaching as, although possessing a considerable amount of freedom, being
nevertheless rooted in the wider culture in which it occurs. Similarly, Mayer-Kress
(2001) and Passos et al. (2008) located coaching as occurring at or near the socalled ‘edge of chaos’, a dynamic zone which exists neither in a state of complete
stability nor total flux (Sonsino & Moore, 2001; Bowes & Jones, 2006). Such a zone
carries echoes of Flyvbjerg’s bounded value rationality, within which the everyday
dance of agency occurs.
Recent work has also conceptualised coaching as a moral activity (Hardman et al.,
in press). Building on earlier work arguing that coaches should be guided by a virtues
perspective (Cassidy et al., 2004), Hardman et al. (in press) put forward the case that
participation in sport is founded on central principles such as fairness, where
encounters with ideals of ‘fair play’ and a ‘level playing field’ abound. Hence, coaches
play (or should play) a pivotal role in developing a moral context; that is, to ensure
that the moral encounters inherent within sport ‘go well rather than badly’ for their
charges (Hardman et al., in press). They further argued that coaches’ moral
responsibilities extend beyond policing foul play and the like ‘to the fostering and
cultivation of certain virtues’ at all levels of sport (Hardman et al., in press).
Following Carr (1998) and McNamee (1998), the point is made that a recourse to a
rigid rule-based approach or absolute relativism merely ‘abdicates responsibility
towards improving practice’ (Hardman et al., in press). Rather, what required is
principled reflection, informed by a virtuous perspective, on the nature of coaching
practice for the good of all concerned. It is a position founded on Dewey’s (1938/1997)
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455
perception of a pedagogue as one who should always be alert to see what attitudes
and habits are being created and reinforced in context, to discriminate between
experiences that are educative and mis-educative, and to be able to judge what
attitudes are actually conductive to continued growth.
Such work resonates with that of Jones and colleagues (Jones et al., 2004, in press)
who, informed by the writings of Goffman (1959), posited that coaches use a
number of strategic actions constructed to save ‘face’ of both themselves and their
athletes; actions driven by the greater good of all concerned. Although such coaches’
practice was characterised by flexibility, it was also founded on a moral framework
with some core beliefs being more significant than other peripheral ones (Blasi &
Oresick, 1987). In this way, strong principles could be held while simultaneously
treating others flexibly (Cassidy et al., 2004). In a similar vein, Stelter (2007) argued
that coaches need to create the possibility for reflection and understanding in athletes
through stimulating a process of personal meaning-making for them. Finally in this
context, Malloy and Rossow-Kimball (2007) argued that Plato’s Sophist was a
relevant concept through which to view coaching. Here, it was argued that coaches
were more than technical conveyers of skill; rather they should be viewed as
‘philosopher therapists’ in developing athletes’ self-awareness. It is a stance which
further positions coaches, in line with phronesis, as moral actors in influencing
others’ actions.
Current research has also described coaching as a power-ridden activity (e.g. Jones
et al., 2004; Potrac et al., 2007). For example, Cassidy et al. (2004) outlined how
coaches often utilise French and Raven’s (1959) classic bases of social power,
including legitimate, informational, positional, expert, coercive and referent power
sources to keep sway and influence over athletes and other contextual stakeholders.
Furthermore, Cushion and Jones (2006) found that coaches constantly revoked their
contextually relevant cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1990) in an attempt to maintain
respect, while Denison (2007) focussed on how coaches use knowledge to produce
disciplined docile bodies that can be regulated (by the self as well as others) in terms
of time and space. Similarly, Jones et al.’s (2005) work with Anne, a former elite
swimmer, illustrated how the potency of her coach’s power led to drastic action on
her behalf in terms of her own self-surveillance. For such authors, the coaching
context is one inherently intertwined with issues of power, dominance and
compliance, with power viewed as both a liberating and constraining influence on
action. Such beliefs were also echoed in Purdy et al.’s (2008) work on elite rowing
coaches. The results here suggested that power within coaching is always a mix of
authority and dependence, as even the powerful (e.g. coaches) depend on the less
powerful (e.g. athletes) to carry out certain practices. The work of Jones et al.
(in press) has also indicated how coaches’ micro strategies are heavily influenced by
power considerations; particularly in terms of the front they portray to athletes in
order to secure the latter’s respect and subsequent acquiescence. In this respect, they
concluded that coaching was more akin to an obligation-ridden social activity than an
uncluttered world of free-floating heroes and villains (Stones, 1998).
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Concluding thoughts
No doubt investigative work has begun to conceive of coaching as a complex, moral
activity, heavily imbued with issues of power. It is through these constraints that the
‘practical wisdom’ of coaches is seen to emerge; a wisdom founded on principled
personal reflection on practice (Jones et al., 2003). Such a conceptualisation and
accompanying workings, however, need to be further researched, questioned and
evaluated in detail, as it is in these micro interactions that we believe excellence
emerges. Here, Gardiner’s (2000) project on everyday life can become an insightful
guide, where the ‘warm stream’ of creative, apparently instinctive, speculation gets
equal billing with the ‘cold stream’ of logical action. In this way, greater credence is
given to the inherent ambivalences, dilemmas and non-logical logics of real-life
coaching practice (Gardiner, 2000).
Taking a lead from such a perspective and earlier cited findings, we believe that
better ways of researching coaching need to be found in order to develop more
realistic and nuanced future coach education programmes. Phronesis, although still
maturing in many ways as a social-science theory (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Geertz, 2001), is
one such means through which this goal can be realised. It can do as it relates to
uncovering, in all its micro detail, why the world is the way it is, so that we can
change it for the better. This, of course, involves an exploration into the ‘dark side’ or
social life (Hoyle, 1982), to the manipulations of those who comprise coaching
towards desired ends. Echoing Flyvbjerg’s belief, we also consider that phronesis is
commonly seen in social practice. Hence, to reduce an examination of coaching to
either episteme (scientific knowledge) or techne (technical knowledge) is misguided.
Rather, phronesis is much better placed to delve into the context dependency of
coaching, and the committed, ethical personal reflection on what is, and has been,
seen. It also takes willing account of the situated messiness of the particular within
social encounters (Schön, 1983, 1987), and how pedagogical decisions are based on
finite understandings of actual circumstances (Gallagher, 1992). By adopting such a
perspective, our judgement of coaches could be moved away from one purely done in
terms of instrumental outcomes, to also include coaches’ decisions in relation to the
best interests of the individuals and the collective in their charge. Phronesis then,
gives credence to Standal’s (2008) recent call to ‘celebrate the insecure practitioner’;
to recognise and embrace the shifting sands on which coaching is built and to
develop ways to cope with and thrive in the inescapable insecurity (Jones, 2006;
Standal, 2008). In doing so, the ‘patterns that connect’ (Bateson, 1979) coaching
practice and, hence, the practical wisdom (Flyvbjerg, 2001) of coaches, can be better
understood and transmitted.
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