Do we owe more to our fellow-citizens than to others? ‘The right to enjoy our freedoms comes with the obligation to support the human rights of others’. (Robin Cook, 1997) Questions surrounding the significance of national citizenship and duties to the “other” have constantly arisen in the last few decades, mainly in response to globalization and ‘multiculturalism’. To rephrase the question, should our duties towards other human beings stretch across national borders? In this essay I will set forth the arguments on both sides of the debate, hoping to show why I find the argument for cross border duties more compelling than the counter argument, and will evaluate the credibility of nationalism. In furthering my arguments, I will examine the existing literature on the topic. According to Rawls, our duty to redistribute wealth to our fellow citizens is stronger than our duties to send aid abroad, and he explains this as in the following. He argues that there is a fundamental unique significance of redistributing resources at the domestic level, wherein our lives are regulated by the structure of the social scheme which we take part in. It is the political culture that determines the wealth of a state, and so each state is unique and responsible for their own wealth (Rawls, 1993: 228). This last point is hard to sympathize with, as we cannot simply treat individual people as parts of a whole entity such as a state, and therefore accountable for the decisions that the particular state has made in the past. Rawls’ view is reflected also by Nagel, who refers to justice as an ‘associative obligation’ (Nagel, 2005:121) – in that we owe duties to each other because we are citizens living and deliberating together The ‘fellow citizenship’ based argument discussed does not hold sway when we think of stateless nations, such as Palestine.. Similarly, Samuel Freeman argues that while a society exists at the global level, it is not a political society in which people deliberate about a common good; international society has yet reached the level of generating associative obligations. Nations retain sovereign rights in a way citizens in civil society do not (Freeman, 2006: 318). However, this citizenship-based argument of justice - which states that we owe more to our compatriots than to others - has been widely refuted by political philosophers such as Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz. The strongest argument for justice and obligation between nations, is the discussion of the impact of the international economic system on poorer countries. In the view of Beitz, justice, and not merely mutual aid, requires us to transfer wealth across borders (Beitz, 1979: 128). There are a number of grounds on which to refute the counter argument of those such as Nagel and Rawls, i.e. that justice is based on sovereignty and self-sustaining domestic societies. Firstly, nations are joined together in a network of interdependence with arguably, the same effect as a shared scheme of social cooperation. This phenomenon, known as globalization, has intensified in previous decades, lending more validity to this argument. The global economic order is a recurring theme in Pogge’s writings on global justice (Pogge, 2001), as is the idea of natural resources as undeserved. These natural resources have a crucial input in the material advancement of societies, generating benefits for the selective few. We would do well to remember that these natural resources may have been historically obtained in an unjust manner: historical processes (such as colonialism, slavery and foreign intervention) carried out by developed states, who used violence and repression to land themselves in an economically beneficial position, have undoubtedly contributed to current global inequalities. In particular, the example of Western European powers dividing Africa into inconvenient blocs of territory could be given, which subsequently has contributed to ethnic division and conflict. Ironically, one of Rawls’ philosophical ideas, the original position, can be applied when thinking about the injustice of natural resources. Utilizing his veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971) when reflecting on national citizenship, it is clear that one would realize the disadvantage of starting life in certain countries; and thus would want to maximize the position of the worst-off. If Rawls’ theory is valid for a domestic nation, it should certainly be valid for the unjust international economic system. Indeed, his limited sovereign-nation based view of justice obscures the pivotal role that the international economic order plays in reproducing global poverty and inequality, by suggesting that each domestic society bears solitary responsibility for its own status in the economic system. The argument that states are clearly no longer self-sufficient systems and are interconnected in complex ways through globalization (trade, travel, investment), serves to disprove Rawls’ idea of the sovereign social scheme. The global basic structure is defined by Allen Buchanan as a ‘set of economic and political institutions that have profound and enduring effects on the distribution of goods and burdens among people throughout the world’ (Buchanan 2000: 705). It is undeniable that the current global world order produces burdens for certain sections of society, with external forces being imposed on weak states. International trade works to benefit some countries but not others, widening global inequality, as poorer countries struggle to maintain control over multi-national corporations (Ponte 2002: part 7). Developing nations are dependent on economic developments elsewhere, and this idea is illustrated through the recent financial crisis, in that emerging economies were fundamentally impacted by a crisis that was initiated by other, more advanced economies. Absolute poverty may be very gradually decreasing, but there is countless evidence of inequality widening since neo-liberal western economic reforms and intensifying globalization (Chang 2010: 113), with the inequality between rich countries and disadvantaged ones –produced by the world order- continually widening every year (Van Zanden et al, 2014). David Miller, who takes an opposing stance to global redistributive viewpoints, emphasizes the importance of nationality, which imposes particular duties on citizens that cannot be transferred across national borders. He sees no value in contrasting comparative socio‐economic indicators between countries such as GNP or life expectancy, without looking at the justifiable autonomy of each country, and emphasizes how each nation contributes to its own ‘meagre life prospects’. (Miller, 2006: 209). In stark contrast to Miller, Pogge provides the most radical argument for cross-border duties (Pogge, 2001). He discusses how the international order perpetuates worsening inequality, in order to show that we have negative duties not to contribute to the poverty of others. He draws on similar arguments to Beitz: shared social institutions contribute to global inequality, imposed on the worst off, who are also excluded from the benefits of natural resources, their position being caused by repressive historical processes (Pogge, 2001:15). These three conditions are all currently satisfied according to him, and therefore our duty to not harm comes into existence. Pogge also attacks the idea that local governments are solely responsible for their own position; he states that local decisions are always influenced by the existing global order, with political and economic power concentrated in the hands of several western states. He cites corruption and bribery in developing countries, the prevalence of which, he says, may be a consequence of our economic policies. K Smits mirrors this idea in her paper ‘Should rich countries give more foreign aid?’, pointing to the example of international sex tourism in relation to the oppression of women and girls (Smits, 2009: 205). Pogge also furthers his argument by assessing global redistributive efforts against precarious foreign intervention in a profound manner: ‘If it makes sense to spend billions and to endanger thousands of lives in order to rescue a million people from Serb oppression, [why not] spend similar sums, without endangering any lives, on leading many millions out of life-threatening poverty?’. This quote is a reflective way of thinking about global relations, and the point rings true – If our governments are exercising their duties by attacking countries to protect their people’s rights, do they not have a duty to protect the basic rights of the citizens of the world’s poorest countries? The rights under threat being: adequate nourishment, basic sanitation and medical services, adequate shelter and education. The numbers of deaths due to severe poverty largely unmistakably outnumber deaths due to war. Pogge points out that there is no danger in spending money to secure these basic rights, in contrast to dangerous and expensive military operations, which are more difficult to overcome (in contrast to poverty), often not worth intervention. His argument: effects of military action are difficult to predict, incurring significant moral and economic costs which cannot be foreseen. In contrast, there are plenty of areas where aid can be spent - with no risk of worsening the situation - on local services, such as schools, basic health services and infrastructure. Malnutrition and poverty are intrinsically correlated with the civic and political rights of people – Pogge underlines that poor people, who are illiterate and heavily preoccupied with struggling to survive, cannot do much to resist their rulers, who rely on a small elite and foreign companies and governments rather than their people, to sustain their power. This last point emphasizes again why we have a duty to reduce severe poverty across borders. Pogge underlines the novelty of the modern age in its capacity to reduce poverty, and believes that for the ‘first time in human history it is quite feasible, economically, to wipe out hunger and preventable diseases’, with no inconvenience produced as a result, as higher income countries no longer face a military threat. Supporters of global redistribution, who think along the lines of Pogge and Beitz, regard justice as requiring all human beings to have a basic level of resources necessary to live a subsistent life. This reflects the cosmopolitan view – that these principles of justice apply to all peoples irrespective of nation, as we are all morally equal and owe duties to each other on the basis of shared humanity, not shared citizenship. Those who think along the lines of Rawls and Nagel would state that justice depends on the existence of a shared social contract, or shared participation in a political process, and that different principles of justice apply depending on association or community. However, this argument has been challenged by those political philosophers who state that there is substantial interdependence between countries, all which participate in shared international social and economic institutions. Adam Swift takes the aforementioned cosmopolitan view, challenging the notion of social and global justice being two distinct categories. He also criticizes the current discourse surrounding global redistribution; noting that the language of “aid” and “handouts” conceals the fact that we should talk of redistribution as a matter of justice and not charity, causing people to feel as though is it not their duty (Swift, 2014: 51). He calls this a ‘mismatch between philosophy and public opinion’, and claims that progressive outlooks on global justice are now labelled as radical. Like his progressive predecessors, Swift also underlines the negative duties we have not to harm, and cites the current economic world order as he refutes the argument that those who aren’t members of a society don’t have the same claim to fair shares as they are not involved in bearing the costs of producing the goods – he highlights that in our present globalised economy, it is not only our fellow nationals who are cooperating with us to produce those shared fruits. He reflects Pogge’s concerns with extreme global poverty: ‘it is the inequality between societies that seem more blatantly unjust than those within them’. Swift claims that in a world where millions die a year from lack of basic needs, inequalities within a society, such as the UK, may seem trivial on a global level. (Swift, 2014:49). The strongest arguments against global redistribution come from staunch libertarians such as Robert Nozick, who base their reasoning around the idea of private property (Nozick,1974). In context, states should not be entitled to demand the property of their citizens in order to redistribute it to others. Nonetheless, Locke (a fellow libertarian) and his classic views on liberty, seem to be incompatible with this view; Locke stated that everyone should be entitled to a proportionate share of the worlds natural resources, and that individual property is only justified if it can be shown that no one is made worse off by the appropriation Locke: 2016. Originally, all countries should have been entitled to a fair share, but through historical violence and repression, poorer countries have clearly lost out. Therefore, the entitlement theory of Nozick applied in the context of global justice misses the point, as it does not consider whether the affluent nations justly acquired the resources and therefore the privileged position they occupy in the current global order. The significant position that wealthy countries occupy in the current system are the result of accumulated structural advantages over time. One’s attitude towards cross border duties may depend on the degree to which one’s own thoughts are shaped by nationalistic inclinations. Nationalism is an extremely powerful force, and is a key source of violence and instability in history. Its psychological power shapes people’s feelings and impulses towards non-nationals and outsiders, strengthening their feelings towards their fellow-nationals. Emotional sentiment towards fellow citizens should be disregarded when talking of questions of justice. George Orwell captures the frailty of nationalism in his novel 1984 when discussing the possibility of Winston meeting a ‘foreigner’: “he would discover that they are creatures similar to himself and that most of what he has been told about them is lies… the fear, hatred and self-righteousness…might evaporate”. Conventional realist thinking driven by national interest encourages nationalist tendencies, furthering the idea of duties being confined to national borders. This way of thinking clouds our judgement; after all, why should we owe more to a fellow national citizen who has committed terrible crimes than we do to a non-citizen who is more like ourselves? After all, the nation does not function like a family; you do not personally know others who are participating in it. Thinking of justice as desert, it again seems clear that there is no morally justifiable reason to hold fellow-nationals above non-nationals. Would we turn away millions of displaced Syrian refugees all because we owed more to our own nationals and therefore could not tend to them? Prioritizing fellow nationals and/or citizens above ‘others’ has led to historical tragic consequences, and a recent example of this othering is the disenfranchisement of Kurds in Turkey, as a result of them being seen as the “other”, essentially seen as less valuable and therefore worth less than the fellow national, the fellow Turk. How we answer our original question centers around whether we merely view the others in the wording as our “fellow human beings” or “not our fellow citizens”. Thus, after considering the leading arguments for both sides of the debate, I see no plausible normative argument against global redistribution that would override the structural injustices that poor nations face As I have assumed a western-centric point of view throughout the essay, the ‘we’ in the question has referred to the more affluent Northern block of countries in the world, the “others” being the less advantaged. The reverse could also be discussed, for instance from the perspective of Islamist extremists who believe their countries owe nothing to the West, and in fact should work to destroy it.. The main reasons for this which I’ve highlighted in this essay are that the deprivations of the poorest nations are not totally unrelated to us – their social starting positions, and ours, have arisen from deeply unethical historical wrongs, and their destitute position continues to be aggravated through the imposed global order. Additionally, the concept of national citizenship may be important; yet there is a plethora of identity markers that may inspire cross-border duties such as religion, race, class identity, and gender. To conclude, the world is so tipped in favor of affluent Western economies that hypothetical international mobility is difficult to imagine; a radical change in the system is long overdue in order to create a truly just order. There is now, more than ever, a pressing duty to aid the disadvantaged to a basic right to a subsistent life. Word count excluding bibliography and in-text citations: 2500 Bibliography Beitz, Charles R. Political Theory and International Relations. 1st ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. Bolt, J. and J. L. van Zanden (2014). The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts. The Economic History Review, 67 (3): 627–651. Buchanan, A. (2000). Rawls’s Law of Peoples: rules for a vanished Westphalian world. 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