PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE
Michael Beer and Mark D. Cannon
Why would managers abandon pay-for-performance plans they initiated with great hopes? Why
would employees celebrate this decision? This article explores why managers made their decisions in 12 of 13 pay-for-performance “experiments” at Hewlett-Packard in the mid-1990s. We
find that managers thought the costs of these programs to be higher than the benefits. Alternative managerial practices such as effective leadership, clear objectives, coaching, or training
were thought a better investment. Despite the undisputed instrumentality of pay-for-performance to motivate, little attention has been given to whether the benefits outweigh the costs or
the “fit” of these programs with high-commitment cultures like Hewlett-Packard was at the
time. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Introduction
Immense pressure for higher performance has
led corporations to search continually for
managerial practices that will enhance competitiveness. An increasingly large number of
corporations have explored how rewards, particularly money, could be linked to desired behavior and/or performance outcomes to improve effectiveness (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003;
Pfeffer, 1998; Rigby, 2001). This has led to
widespread and growing development of payfor-performance plans (Schuster & Zingheim,
1992). For example, a survey of 1,681 companies indicated that 61% had implemented
variable compensation systems (Hein, 1996).
The powerful role that financial incentives can play in influencing behavior has
been widely acknowledged since ancient
times (Peach & Wren, 1992). Early motivation theories such as expectancy theory
(Vroom, 1964) have demonstrated intuitive
appeal, and its basic components have received empirical support (Van Eerde &
Thierry, 1996). In addition, decades of empirical research in a variety of areas indicate that
financial incentives are a potent motivator. An
examination of studies of pay-for-performance programs suggests that performance
improves in approximately two out of three
programs (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham,
2000). Gibson (1995) reported on a study by
Carla O’Dell and Jerry McAdams (sponsored
by World at Work and conducted by the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies),
which suggested that the average net return
Correspondence to: Michael Beer, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02163, Tel:
(617) 495-6655, Fax: (617) 496-4072, E-mail: mbeer@hbs.edu
Human Resource Management, Spring 2004, Vol. 43, No. 1, Pp. 3–48
© 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com).
DOI: 10.1002/hrm.20001
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
However,
despite the
breadth and
sophistication
of topics being
examined in
research related
to pay-forperformance,
the crucially
important issue
of managers’
approach to
implementation
has not received
much attention.
on money invested in pay-for-performance
programs was an impressive 134%. Surveys of
500 companies reported in the Economist
(“Business: Pay Purview,” 1998) indicated
that those actively using pay-for-performance
programs showed twice the shareholder returns as those who were not actively using
these programs.
Proponents of pay-for-performance assert that traditional compensation systems
can be detrimental to efforts to make an organization less hierarchical and more competitive, focused, adaptable, and collaborative (Baker, 1993). For example, traditional
pay systems may experience the following
problems: pay becomes an entitlement, benefits are given for tenure, base pay is a function of levels and not performance, merit increases do not differentiate performance
sufficiently, and even executive bonuses become an entitlement.
Recent research has examined a variety
of ways in which pay-for-performance systems impact individuals, groups, and organizations (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). There
has been a growing interest in group pay-forperformance systems and the conditions
under which they are most effective (GomezMejia, Welbourne, & Wiseman, 2000; Hollensbe & Guthrie, 2000). Scholars are also
looking not just at motivation, but also at the
broader impact of pay-for-performance systems, such as how they affect organizational
learning (Arthur & Aiman-Smith, 2001), the
type of employees who self-select into and
out of the organization (Banker, Lee, Potter,
& Srinivasan, 2001), and the managerial
turnover within the organization (Bloom &
Michel, 2002). In addition, gender differences and their impact on pay satisfaction
(Graham & Welbourne, 1999) have been
identified, as have the consequences associated with satisfaction with pay systems
(Miceli & Mulvey, 2000). The impact of pay
dispersion has also been a topic of growing
interest (Bloom, 1999; Bloom & Michel,
2002; Shaw, Gupta & Delery, 2002). Furthermore, some attention has been given to
particular professions, such as accounting,
and the distinctive impact that pay-for-performance systems can have on different professions (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002).
However, despite the breadth and sophistication of topics being examined in research related to pay-for-performance, the
crucially important issue of managers’ approach to implementation has not received
much attention. Pfeffer (1998) argues that
there are significant potential problems with
implementing pay-for-performance programs. For example, pay-for-performance systems can have a destructive effect on intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, teamwork, and
creativity (Amabile, 1988; Beer & Katz, 2003;
Deci & Ryan, 1985; Kohn, 1993; Meyer,
1975; Shaw et al., 2002). Furthermore, other
scholars have argued that the real problem is
that incentives work too well. Specifically,
they motivate employees to focus excessively
on doing what they need to do to gain rewards, sometimes at the expense of doing
other things that would help the organization.
Pay-for-performance advocates respond
that intelligent design of programs is essential
to avoid these pitfalls. However, intelligent
design alone is insufficient to assure the success of such programs. As Pfeffer and Sutton
(2001) note, persistent gaps exist between
what managers know (the concepts they can
articulate) and what they can actually do.
Thus, intelligent design must accompany effective implementation over time in order for
pay systems to run effectively. In particular,
two significant barriers must be overcome:
barriers associated with linking performance
to effort, and with linking pay to performance. In addition, these must be overcome
in a way that is perceived as fair and equitable
by management and employees alike.
Potential barriers to linking performance
to effort include difficulties in measuring
performance; factors outside the control of
individuals and groups being paid for that
performance; and that managers and peers
are uncomfortable with rating employees differently. Potential barriers to linking pay to
performance include the following: employees can come to rely on the additional compensation; employees are biased toward overestimating their own contribution; corporate
budgets for bonuses often limit payout; and
managers can lose commitment to the pay
system if it pays out more than anticipated
due to problems in payout standards and if
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
there are changes in performance standards
due to changes in technology and organizational arrangements and unanticipated
learning curves. It is changing circumstances
that make it difficult for managers to sustain
links between pay and performance in a way
that will avoid perceptions of unfairness and
inequity. Such perceptions can undermine
the perceived link between pay and performance so important to sustain its motivational power.
Despite the importance of understanding
implementation in order to overcome these
and other barriers, little research has studied
implementation (Fay, Thompson, & Knight,
2001). In a broad review of the theory and evidence on compensation practices, Gerhart
and Rynes (2003) detected a number of significant disparities between what is important
to know about compensation and what is
being researched. In addition to the lack of attention to implementation, the study of managerial decision making related to pay systems
has also been neglected. More specifically,
Gerhart and Rynes (2003) note that pay practices vary widely and are not simply dictated
by market forces and the environment. Instead, managers play an active role in determining whether to initiate, retain, or modify a
system of pay-for-performance and what type
of system to use. However, very little academic
research has investigated how managers make
these decisions.
The focus of this article is on the experience of managers in one company in implementing pay-for-performance and how they
made sense of and made decisions about
their pay-for-performance initiatives. In addition, one other neglected area of research
we will deal with in this article has to do with
how an organization’s particular or distinctive culture might affect its management’s
ability to effectively implement a particular
pay-for-performance system. In other words,
rather than assuming that there are universal
best practices for pay-for-performance, it
may be that what is effective for a particular
organization depends on some unique aspects of its culture, and one must, therefore,
be cautious in generalizing from one organization to another, even within the same industry (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). More
specifically, Gerhart (2001, p. 235) has argued that a pay-for-performance program
might be more easily implemented in an organization that has distinctive characteristics, such as the following: “(1) the culture
discourages opportunism, (2) top management reinforces this culture by its example,
and (3) employees have long-term careers or
professions in which their reputation is a
valuable commodity.”
Our goal in this article is to provide case
data and share insights that inform these
neglected research areas. Specifically, we examine managerial decision making and sense
making in the area of designing and implementing five pay-for-performance systems in
a high-commitment culture—HewlettPackard (HP). This study does not attempt to
assess the efficacy of pay-for-performance
programs, though the initial experience with
pay-for-performance indicated it had a positive impact on motivation and performance.
A case-writing visit to Hewlett-Packard
in the mid-1990s presented an unusual opportunity to study the managerial experience
of implementing pay-for-performance programs. In the early 1990s, local HewlettPackard managers at thirteen different sites
established pay-for-performance initiatives
to improve their businesses. HewlettPackard provided us with the opportunity to
review their documents and to interview the
managers who sponsored the pay programs.
We report here on five of the thirteen payfor-performance initiatives that we researched. The fact that the events reported
here occurred in the early 1990s does not
take away from the findings and insights
since they represent dilemmas managers
would face today in implementing pay-forperformance in a high-commitment culture
such as the one HP had during the period in
which the pay initiatives took place (it is
widely acknowledged that since 1999 HP has
moved away from its traditional high-commitment culture).
This novel research opportunity offered
several methodological advantages compared
to many previous studies. Specifically, many
other studies relied on only one or a very limited number of cases, which makes generalizations difficult. Previous studies often covered
•
5
... the study of
managerial
decision making
related to pay
systems has also
been neglected.
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
In order to give
fair treatment
to the topic of
implementation
of pay-forperformance,
knowledge
about the
context in
which the pay
system is being
implemented is
necessary.
such short time frames that the long-term efficacy of the programs was difficult to assess
(Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999). Interviewing
local managers, as we did, is also not a typical
characteristic of previous studies. Yet, interviews were essential for us to accomplish our
goal of better understanding how the managers were making decisions about the introduction of a pay-for-performance system and
later how they made sense of various performance and human outcomes and drew conclusions with regard to the success or failure of
their pay design.
In order to give fair treatment to the
topic of implementation of pay-for-performance, knowledge about the context in
which the pay system is being implemented
is necessary. That context, the company culture, the measurement and performance
management systems in place—the motivation of managers to implement pay-for-performance and their effectiveness as managers—can have an important effect on the
success or failure of the pay-for-performance
system. We had a lot of information on this
context from two cases on HP that had been
written by one of the authors in 1982 and
again in 1995 (Beer & Rogers, 1995; Beer &
von Werssowetz, 1982). Indeed, the HewlettPackard cases on which we report here had
in place many of the conditions that should
lead to success. First, they were the initiatives of local management; thus, local management had a very high level of commitment to their successful implementation. In
addition, these initiatives had the approval
and full support of higher management. Resources such as consultants were also made
available to support these programs. Furthermore, with a reputation as a high-commitment company (Beer & Rogers, 1995;
Collins & Porras, 1994) in which trust between management and employees is strong
and in which communication is good, we
would expect HP to have an advantage in implementing these programs. In fact, Gerhart
(2001) specifically hypothesized that pay-forperformance systems introduced in organizations with cultural attributes such as those at
HP would experience fewer problems than
those introduced in other organizations.
Similarly, lack of trust (Pearce, Stevenson &
Perry, 1985) and poor communication (Hammer, 1975) has been cited as the cause for
the failure of other programs. Thus, this investigation enables a preliminary test of the
proposition that high-commitment cultures
make it easier to implement pay-for-performance systems.
Furthermore, local managers had significant autonomy and the freedom to continue or discontinue their pay-for-performance programs, depending on how they
assessed the costs and benefits. They were
not constrained or pressured by outside
forces to do either. Therefore, we were able
to study not only the challenges these managers encountered in implementing the
programs but also the decision-making
processes that they used in responding to
these challenges over time, as well as their
attribution of benefits and costs that
guided these decisions. These conditions
provided an unusual opportunity to examine the natural evolution of the decisionmaking and sense-making processes in
which these managers engaged as they initiated and then implemented these pay programs in a high-commitment company.
Along with these advantages, we should
also acknowledge that our data set has
some significant limitations. The fact that
these initiatives emerged naturally meant
that this research is not a randomized experimental design with control groups, despite the fact that Hewlett-Packard’s corporate human resource executives thought of
them as “experiments.” The “experiments”
emerged spontaneously as a result of what
was going on with local management. We
therefore refer to them in this article as
“programs” or “initiatives” rather than “experiments.” Given that these initiatives
were conceived and implemented by practicing managers, they also lacked some of
the measures of satisfaction and other variables that could have been of interest to researchers (Sturman & Short, 2000).
Setting and Method
Beginning in the early 1990s, HP authorized a diverse set of 13 different alternative
pay programs (Table I). Most of these in-
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
volved team- and skill-based pay systems;
some involved gain sharing and some cash
incentives or bonuses. Half the sites were
outside the United States and were spread
across five countries. The workers included
were mostly involved in various kinds of
blue-collar work at the production level,
with the exception of one group of engineers. All programs were initiated at the request of local divisional management. In
each instance, local management felt it
needed to use pay-for-performance as an
additional inducement either to achieve
particular goals, to reinforce learning
and/or team behavior in semi-autonomous
teams, and/or to compensate for an increase
in span of control due to de-layering.
The Company
These initiatives must be understood in the
context of HP’s corporate human resource
policies and culture at the time. Initiated by
its founders, numerous highly consistent and
mutually reinforcing policies and practices
have developed over HP’s 50-year history
(Beer & Rogers, 1995; Beer & von
Werssowetz, 1982). These include the following: decentralized business units; strong
commitment to management by objectives;
participative management and delegation of
responsibility to the lowest level; extensive
communication, such as open-door policies
and “management by walking around”; recruitment and hiring practices that screen
for interpersonal skills, not just technical
competencies; and a career system based on
internal promotion and cross-functional and
divisional movement.
HP’s pay systems included the following
at the time of these initiatives: merit pay
based on ratings by supervisor (for exempt
and nonexempt employees) and performance
ranking of employees (exempt employees); a
profit-sharing system for all employees that
pays out the same percent of salary, regardless of level; no executive bonus system,
though total executive compensation was
comparable with industry standards; stock
options for employees at all levels according
to contribution; and incentives used in the
sales organization (team and individual).
•
7
Research Method
HP’s corporate human resource department
tracked these programs and learned that all
were discontinued within approximately
three years. An internal study was commissioned to understand the reasons why each
was discontinued so that implications for
the future could be drawn. Their methods
were interviews, examination of production
data, and employee surveys. We reviewed
HP documents. We also conducted interviews at five U.S. sites to gather additional
data. The interview protocol involved an introduction in which we explained that we
were doing follow-up research on their payfor-performance initiatives, and we assured
them that what they said would be confidential. We then asked them to describe the
pay-for-performance program they had introduced. Then we probed further to learn
the managers’ perspectives on these programs: what they had hoped to achieve, the
challenges they faced in implementing the
pay program, their response to the challenges, their own calculus of the cost and
benefits of using pay programs as an active
management tool, and the reasoning behind
their eventual decision as to whether to continue the program. These interviews provided us with an opportunity to deepen our
understanding and to validate HP’s own
conclusions.
Given space limitations, we provide
brief descriptions and findings from the
five sites in which we conducted interviews. The results at these sites are illustrative of results for HP’s larger data set of
13 initiatives, but we confine our later discussion to the findings from these five pay
initiatives.
Five Case Examples
Case 1: San Diego Site
Description. In an effort to support a transition to self-managed teams and encourage a focus on team rather than individual
performance, the San Diego site initiated
team pay-for-performance (TPP). Previously, responsibility for implementing HP’s
... local
management
felt it needed to
use pay-forperformance as
an additional
inducement
either to
achieve particular goals,
to reinforce
learning and/or
team behavior
in semiautonomous
teams, and/or
to compensate
for an increase
in span of
control due to
de-layering.
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
During the first
six months,
team members
liked the TPP
program and
significantly
outperformed
the performance
goals set at the
beginning of the
experiment…
merit-based pay philosophy and for managing the development of employees was given
to individual managers who would divide
workgroup objectives into individual assignments and then monitor individual contributions. Under the new self-managingteams structure, a layer of supervision had
been removed, and managers had wider
spans of control and less manager\subordinate interaction. Teams themselves divided
up the work and were managed to a set of
business objectives. Consequently, managers were not as well positioned to make
merit-increase decisions or to manage the
development of individual employees.
Therefore, management put together a TPP
plan to focus employees on team performance and to encourage them to manage
their own development and acquire the
broader set of skills that would be required
by workteam responsibilities.
Team pay-for-performance was established to motivate achievement of specific
workteam goals, such as team-process improvement, production, and quality goals.
The team-based pay for achieving certain
goals was added incrementally to base pay.
There was no “takeaway” for failing to meet
team goals. Three levels of team performance were possible within the pay structure. Ninety percent of the teams were expected to achieve Level I performance and
thus receive a payout. Fifty percent were expected to reach Level II performance, and
10–15% Level III performance, the highest
level. For achieving Level III performance,
for example, members of a particular work
team would receive between $150–$200 additional pay at the end of the following
month. Teams also had production coaches
to assist them.
San Diego’s new pay package also included a skill-based pay system called payfor-contribution (PFC). Instead of the typical merit system, employees would advance
from a starting rate by demonstrating competence to perform additional sets of tasks
within the team. The system was intended to
motivate employees to learn new skills on an
ongoing basis. Possession of a new skills set
was measured and certified by “subject matter experts.” The rationale was to create a
continuously learning workforce capable of
adapting to new situations.
Results. During the first six months, team
members liked the TPP program and significantly outperformed the performance goals
set at the beginning of the experiment, with
a majority of the teams reaching Level II and
III. However, because the TPP program paid
out more than expected, management concluded that they had set the performance
standards too low and decided to adjust
them. This effort was met with great resistance from team members, who complained
bitterly. They had built a lifestyle around the
higher monthly pay they had come to expect,
and now saw the program as taking something away. Managers also concluded that
workers’ attention was now focused on their
pay instead of their work.
Another drawback of pay-for-performance
that managers saw had to do with factors outside of the teams’ control that affected team
performance. For example, delays in shipment
of parts or a mechanical breakdown in the
assembly line prevented teams from building
the units they needed to meet their goals for
that month. This caused serious dissatisfaction with the pay system. Team members felt
as though they had very little control over
their performance.
Furthermore, high-performing teams
often refused to admit anyone to their team
who they thought might be below their
level of competence. This resulted in selfreinforcing positive and negative spirals in
team performance. Some teams had many
top performers, while others stagnated with
low performers who needed further training. Furthermore, barriers to employee mobility between teams reduced the capacity
of the organization to transfer learning
from one team to another, a major barrier
in a dynamic environment.
Regarding the skill-based PFC pay system, management reported that the majority
of employees disliked this system. They did
not like the additional pressure of taking tests
to increase their pay, some in how to read and
write and do math. Because they were afraid
it wouldn’t leave them enough time to study
and test for new work skills, employees would
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
often refuse new job assignments. Moreover,
many of the newly acquired skills were not
used on the job. Furthermore, at the beginning of the program, employees had to
demonstrate proficiency on skills required in
their current job to maintain their skill classification. If they failed, the system called for
them to drop to a lower classification and pay
level. Managers found it difficult to do this,
however. These constituted takeaways from
expected levels of pay that had been established in the minds of employees.
Local site managers concluded that a
team structure together with training would
have provided the same benefits as the team
structure combined with team- and skillbased pay, but without the additional effort,
money, and communications demanded by
the team-based pay system.
Managers also concluded that the pay
system did not motivate employees to work
harder or learn, though it did stimulate
them to better understand relevant performance metrics, the manufacturing system
as a whole, and its broader goals. This improved understanding may have been used
by employees to define their own interests
rather than the broader interests of the organization as a whole when TPP stopped
paying off.
One of the largest of the San Diego site
divisions dropped the pay program after about
a year. Managers were tired of having to constantly reengineer the pay system to overcome
its numerous problems. Surveys indicated
that employees preferred to switch back to
HP’s standard pay structure. When management of that division announced they would
drop the pay program, employees threw a
party to show their gratitude.
The rest of the site eventually dropped
the program as well, due to a major manufacturing reorganization. The divisions found
that team-based pay made it extremely difficult to maintain consistency in the pay system across the whole site.
a complementary team and individual performance incentive plan. The traditional HP
merit pay system was replaced with a skillbased pay system. Within a skill level, pay
could be increased variably depending on individual and team performance. If a team was
among the highest-performing teams for a
particular month, it was awarded a bonus.
Those who were evaluated as performing
above average were allowed to pursue development and advancement to the next skill
level with resultant higher pay. Because these
teams were intended to be self-managing, the
evaluations were to come from peers and
management. Those with performance problems could not pursue new training opportunities until their performance was corrected.
This system was designed to provide additional pay, not to take any pay away when
team performance lagged.
Results. The results were very much like those
at San Diego. It was difficult to establish realistic performance goals. After some months,
teams received much more contingent pay
than had been expected. Management at this
site also found it very difficult to reset goals
once they were established. Here, too, teams
became very selective about who they wanted
on their team. External factors outside of the
team’s control also affected goal accomplishment and irritated many of the employees.
Peer evaluation of individual performance, also part of the system, was difficult to
implement. Team members had a very difficult time judging the work of their respective
team members. Tempers flared after employees received negative feedback. Consistent
with attribution theory, negative evaluations
were attributed to a bad evaluation system and
teammates that were not objective. This, of
course, led to further problems within teams.
Like San Diego, the pay program was
dropped. Long-term results initially hoped
for never materialized. Management came to
believe that employees were too focused on
pay and insufficiently focused on the task.
Case 2: Boise Printer Formatter Shop
Case 3: PRCO Loveland
Description. The Boise situation was similar to
San Diego; they had introduced self-managed
teams, and management wanted to implement
Description. PRCO is a printed circuit fabrication shop that was slow in reaching its targets.
•
Managers were
tired of having
to constantly
reengineer the
pay system to
overcome its
numerous
problems.
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10
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
During one quarter, the fabrication shop was
behind schedule and wanted to reach at least
95% of its target. With a month left, management offered a $250 cash bonus to all of its
employees if they reached the goal.
... managers
felt that a
more effective
approach
would have
been to work on
coaching
employees in
how to make
manufacturing
process
improvements.
Results. The shop didn’t reach its goal and the
bonus was never paid out. Managers reported
that employees were not angry when the
bonus did not materialize. On the positive
side, managers reported that the bonus did
highlight their serious intention to reach the
production target. On the negative side, some
employees felt insulted by the fact that the
company tried to “bribe” them to reach a goal
that they were already motivated to reach. In
the final analysis, managers felt that a more
effective approach would have been to work
on coaching employees in how to make manufacturing process improvements.
Case 4: Colorado Memory Systems
Description. Colorado Memory Systems
(CMS), which was acquired by HP, had not
previously had a profit-sharing system. Prior
to being acquired, management thought they
would take the company public. Employees
were told that they would have a chance to
share in the company’s success through
stock-purchasing plans.
When the company was acquired by HP,
the stock-purchasing plan did not materialize. CMS management opted to institute
HP’s corporate profit-sharing program to engender a feeling that they were becoming a
part of the larger HP organization. However,
management did not feel they could afford to
pay employees at HP levels. Thus, they instituted a local gain-sharing program that they
hoped would augment CMS’s base salary and
provide employees with total compensation
that matched or exceeded HP’s total compensation package.
The local gain-sharing program was installed by management because they believed it would increase the following desired
behaviors: individual initiative and responsibility; willingness to learn; adaptiveness;
teaming and collaboration; hustle; willingness to confront conflict; and focus and attentiveness. Managers believed that increas-
ing these behaviors would translate into increased financial success for the company
and help to close the “pay gap” between
CMS and HP. Management planned to pay
out bonuses quarterly based on attainment
of certain levels of operating profit.
Results. Management reported that the program had the following positive effects: increased visibility between departments, the
effective use of cross-functional teams to
achieve goals, a heightened awareness of
business fundamentals and financials, clearly defined and communicated quarterly objectives, and a high level of uniform companywide focus.
However, a number of problems soon
emerged. For example, many employees
wanted their compensation program to be
the same as other HP employees. Employees
also perceived the program to be promoting
short-term behavior.
In addition, the gain-sharing program intended that employees be rewarded on the
success of CMS. After integration into HP, it
became difficult to determine whether
CMS’s performance was attributable to its
own employees’ efforts or to contributions
made by other HP departments and employees. Finally, for the program to pay out
enough to close the gap with the HP pay
scale, CMS managers judged they needed to
pay out at least five out of six times (payouts
were every two months) and average at least
10% of base salary. The program only paid
out four out of six times and averaged 6.13%
of base pay. Employees began to question the
program, and its credibility was damaged.
Due to these and other concerns, management concluded that the benefits of the program did not outweigh the costs.
Case 5: The Workstations Group
Description. HP was having considerable
trouble completing their new high-speed
UNIX-based workstations in the early 1990s.
Because speed to market is so important in
the high-technology arena, management
made the introduction of this product a very
high priority. Local management wanted to
complete the project early, with high quality
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
and with all the standard support services
ready and trained. They, therefore, attempted
to motivate employees to work more efficiently and effectively by implementing an
experiment in pay.
The pay program introduced offered two
different bonus packages, one for managers
and one for engineers, to be paid at the completion of the project (if accomplished by the
target date). Because management realized
that the decisions made by managers would
be vital to success, they offered a cash and
stock program for managers (10% of salary
stock grant and 5% of salary in cash). Stock
awards were to be given six months after
completion of the project to ensure quality of
product and customer service. Engineers
were to receive cash (between 5–7% of
salary). The pay program was intended to
motivate effective completion of the project.
There was no intention to continue it. The
reward amounts depended on a nomination
and approval process that determined individual levels of contribution.
Results. The project was completed six
months ahead of the target date. While some
in the organization saw this as a success story
for pay-for-performance, others were quick to
point out that the pay program did nothing
more than communicate the utmost importance management was placing on this project. Many people, including Pete Peterson,
vice president in charge of personnel, believed that the perception of high priority was
the most important motivating factor leading
to the early completion of the workstation. A
local personnel manager validated this view
independently. She referred to the pay system
as the “great catalyst” in the project. The fact
that HP utilized an incentive program that
had such high visibility showed, she felt, that
the company was willing to try something
new to get the workstation finished. That was
motivating in itself.
An HP survey showed that 70% of the
employees felt they would have worked just
as hard on the project without the incentive
program. But interestingly enough, 60% of
the employees surveyed recommended that
incentive programs be used with other projects at HP.
•
11
Summary of Hewlett-Packard
Conclusions
Hewlett-Packard corporate executives examined the results of these five cases as well as
those of the additional eight programs that
we do not report on here (see Table I). Their
goal was to learn from these “experiments”
and use this data in making decisions as to
whether to encourage broader use of payfor-performance at Hewlett-Packard. The
additional eight programs had similar outcomes to those reported here. The local
managers who enthusiastically initiated
these pay-for-performance programs ran
into difficulties in implementation and
maintenance and were ready to abandon
them so they could allocate their efforts
elsewhere. In the calculation of local management, the benefits of most of these programs did not outweigh their costs. In other
cases, such as the workstation group described in case 5, though implemented
without difficulties, local management and
the corporate compensation department
were not convinced that the alternative pay
program could be credited with performance outcomes. Specifically, they were
not clear whether the outcomes were motivated by the rewards themselves or whether
they were motivated by the implicit message that Hewlett-Packard’s introduction of
the reward system was communicating the
importance of the goals.
Based on the experiences reported by
management at these 13 sites, HewlettPackard executives decided to discontinue
experimenting with the alternative pay-forperformance programs. The reasoning and
conclusions that the local managers shared
in our interviews at the five sites were consistent with the reasoning and conclusions
shared in Hewlett-Packard’s “White Paper.”
Below are some of final conclusions from
this report (White Paper, 1994):
1. “Team-based work environments appear to be producing increasing business results.”
2. “Alternative pay systems have not
proven necessary to produce positive results.”
The local
managers who
enthusiastically
initiated these
pay-forperformance
programs ran
into difficulties
in implementation and
maintenance
and were ready
to abandon
them so they
could allocate
their efforts
elsewhere.
12
•
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
TABLE I
Locations, Programs Elements, and Final Status
Locations (Date Approved)
Program Elements
Final Status
Workstations Group (7/90)
• Cash
• Incentive awards
Implemented; Completed 1992
Puerto Rico (10/90)
• Skill-based pay (with payfor-performance)
• Team bonus
Discontinued
San Diego Site (2/91)
• Skill-based pay (no payfor-performance, 9/93)
Team bonus (6/92)
Discontinued
NCMO (2/91)
• Gain sharing
• Division profit sharing
(gain sharing)
Cancelled by entity management
due to organization change
LID (5/91)
Cancelled by entity management
due to division reorganization
Eastern Sales
Parkridge, NJ (12/91)
• Modified skill-based pay
(with pay-for-performance)
• Transitional reward and
incentive plan
Program implemented but
cancelled due to reorganization
(part of organization moved to
Roseville)
Boise Printer Division (12/91)
• Skill-based pay (no pay-forperformance, 2/93)
• Team bonus (2/93)
Discontinued
Vancouver Division and ICD (9/92) • Bonus pay for production
operators and supervisors
Discontinued
Colorado Memory Systems (3/93)
• Gain sharing with pay at risk
Program stopped due to
reorganization 9/94
Medical Products Group (7/93)
• Team recognition and reward
Discontinued
PRCO Loveland (7/93)
• Bonus program to increase
yield to 95% for Q4 FY93
Discontinued
Belgium (10/93)
• Base pay indexed with
merit pay as bonus
Not pursued at country’s request
Italy Sales (10/93)
• Freeze base pay with bonus
for performance
Discontinued
3. “HP’s current pay system and other
tools are sufficient to support the
work team environment.”
4. “Even though HP has gained valuable organizational learning from alternative pay experiments, the high
resource commitment necessary to
design and implement pay system
changes, and the limited return so
far, indicates that HP does not need
additional experiments unless they
are markedly different.”
Discussion
The five cases we researched provide a
number of insights into the dynamics of
managerial decision making in implementing pay-for-performance in a high-commitment company. As stated by Gerhart and
Rynes (2003), pay programs are not simply
determined by forces in the external environment. Instead, managers play a significant role in the adoption, modification, or
discontinuation of pay-for-performance
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
programs. However, current research tells
us little about how managers actually make
such decisions.
To understand the managerial decision
making at Hewlett-Packard, we should first
examine how managers were conceptualizing
their work with pay-for-performance. We observed that managerial thinking was driven
foremost by a pragmatic commitment to finding ways of improving performance. They
were not driven primarily by a deep philosophical commitment to pay-for-performance
or a desire to apply their newly acquired
knowledge about pay-for-performance. Their
goal was to improve performance. They conceptualized pay-for-performance as an underutilized tool among a variety of tools in
their managerial tool kit they hoped could
help them solve problems they were facing.
They hypothesized that implementing payfor-performance programs would be a costeffective way of boosting results. When their
pay initiatives had unintended consequences, the managers retained their pragmatic focus on improving performance and
concluded that they could gain more leverage through alternative managerial tools
such as good supervision, clear goals, coaching, training, and so forth. This decision does
not imply that managers believed that pay
did not motivate or that it could not be used
effectively in other settings. It does imply
that management saw their effort/benefit
ratio as more favorable if they focused on the
fundamentals of management that had
served Hewlett-Packard well in the past.
One of the most prevalent and striking
themes in managerial decision-making in
these cases is the size of the gap between
managers’ initial expectations and the subsequent realities. Managers made overly optimistic assumptions about how much time
would be required and how difficult it would
be to administer and make adjustments in
these pay programs. Managers were also
overly optimistic about the benefits that
would be achieved.
The biggest problem proved to be setting
performance standards that would strike the
right balance between paying out enough to
make incentives motivational without paying
out too much. The need to make adjustments
or renegotiate standards caused significant
problems. Presumably, the unusually high
levels of trust and communication at HP
should have given them an advantage in
working out such problems. However, making
adjustments produced major conflict and lost
trust, despite the superior levels of communication, trust, and commitment at HP.
This finding runs counter to the hypothesis that a company and culture like HewlettPackard’s should make implementation of
pay-for-performance easier. However, it is
supported by findings that executives in high
team-oriented cultures, when compared with
executives who perceived their cultures as less
team-oriented, observed more rather than
fewer unintended negative outcomes (damage
to teamwork and gaming, etc.) as a result of
executive incentive systems employed by their
firm (Beer & Katz, 2003). To understand this
counterintuitive finding, we draw on prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which
suggests that people tend to be loss-averse and
have a peculiarly strong reaction to the potential for loss. At the outset, managers and workers were each focused on the prospects for
gain. However, employees came to rely on the
extra money and perceived changes in terms
of loss or taking away something positive that
they had come to expect. Likewise, as workers
reacted emotionally to what they perceived as
loss, managers also became sensitized to what
they had to lose—which were the benefits of
the trust the corporation had built over time.
So a high-commitment culture may be a double-edged sword. On one hand, greater trust
and a better relationship among management
and workers, could increase the initial acceptance of and support for new pay initiatives.
On the other hand, when complications
threaten to undo the benefits of previous
managerial work, managers and workers, who
have invested more in building trust and have
more to lose, may be quicker to reject programs that put at risk the relationships they
have invested significant time into cultivating.
The turbulence of the technology industry and the need to adapt continually
took its toll on these programs. Workers’
aversion to fluctuating payouts, particularly
reductions in payout or no payout at all, did
not mesh well with the rapid pace of
•
13
When their pay
initiatives had
unintended
consequences,
the managers
retained their
pragmatic focus
on improving
performance
and concluded
that they could
gain more
leverage
through
alternative
managerial
tools such as
good supervision, clear
goals, coaching,
training, and
so forth.
14
•
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
... the more
rapid the pace
of change, the
more difficult
and timeconsuming
pay-forperformance
programs are
likely to be to
design and
maintain.
change in the technology industry. The efforts by management to change payout
standards in response to new technology or
simply unanticipated performance improvements and payouts also threatened
trust and commitment of employees. This
finding is consistent with previous experience with and research on incentive compensation for production employees. Many
of the piece-rate systems that were very
popular in the 1950s and 1960s disappeared due to similar reactions from employees. Inflexibility on the part of workers
can be particularly problematic in the technology industry, where firms need to innovate continually and improve efficiency just
to stay competitive. Two of the pay experiments were one-time events, but four out
of the eleven programs that, ideally, would
have been ongoing were disrupted by reorganizations or other organizational changes.
Similarly, disruptions in other areas of the
company (outside of the control of the organizational units experimenting with pay)
interfered with employees’ ability to achieve
performance objectives and rewards. This
caused major frustrations for the workers. It
suggests the importance of the context; in
particular, the more rapid the pace of
change, the more difficult and time-consuming pay-for-performance programs are
likely to be to design and maintain. Future
consideration should be given to the rate of
change in the environment and its impact
on such systems, particularly for lowerlevel employees whose compensation is
lower than that of managers. This may be
of particular concern, given the general
rate of acceleration in competitive forces
and the need to adjust to them.
The fact that managers had misestimated the potential difficulties and the need
to make adjustments in payout standards
meant that they were somewhat limited in
their ability to communicate clearly about
what workers should expect. Nonetheless, in
theory, either group could have initiated
more explicit sharing of expectations. Both
management and employees had hopes and
expectations of the pay system. Management hoped to obtain some kind of cost savings or productivity gains while employees
hoped for additional pay. Both workers and
managers appear to have been overly optimistic about their ability to achieve benefits
from the pay systems (Taylor & Brown,
1988), and neither group was particularly
explicit in communicating their expectations to the other. It would have been interesting to see what the reaction would have
been if both sides had communicated their
expectations clearly. Perhaps if their expectations had been voiced and explored, they
would have been able to recognize potentially incompatible expectations and could
have made more-informed decisions as to
how to proceed.
All of this suggests that there is an implicit negotiation going on anytime a payfor-performance system is introduced. Both
parties accept the new pay practice based
on unstated and undiscussed expectations.
When circumstances change, a “negotiation” about how to alter the pay system to
meet these expectations is very difficult.
The Hewlett-Packard case suggests that
such an explicit ongoing process of discussion and negotiation during the life of the
pay system may be necessary to assure a
longer life for pay systems than that typically experienced by corporations. It is interesting that management at HP, a firm
whose philosophy and values would have
made a dialogue about pay-system redesign
more possible than in most firms, did not
see this as an option. We suspect that this
may have something to do with assumptions most managers make about how
much participation is possible or advisable
about pay systems. The case of Sedalia Engine (disguised name), a high-commitment
manufacturing plant, is instructive in this
regard (Beer & Spector, 1982). Facing discontent from employees with pay, the plant
manager decided to convene a task force of
employees, against the advice of higher
management, to make recommendations
about how the pay system should be redesigned. The view of higher management
in that case is clearly the dominant view of
most managers. However, the positive outcome at Sedalia (the recommendations
were not self-serving and resulted in a
practical solution to which employees were
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
committed) and research by Lawler &
Hackman (1969) suggests that participation of employees in pay-system redesign
may be possible.
Conclusion
That Hewlett-Packard managers abandoned
the pay-for-performance programs they initiated with great hope tells us more about
how managers were conceptualizing their
options for influencing employees than it
does about pay-for-performance programs
per se. We do not draw the conclusion that
pay-for-performance plans do not motivate.
Indeed, the initial performance improvements obtained suggest that pay-for-performance did motivate behavior desired by
management.
The case data presented here does suggest that pay-for-performance systems
present implementation problems that may
be underexamined by researchers and insufficiently acknowledged by practitioners.
Part of the problem stems from a fundamental human tendency, to which managers are also subject, to be unrealistically
optimistic about what can be accomplished
by a management intervention (Rigby,
2001; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Another aspect of these unrealistic assumptions may
be attributable to the inherent complications in designing and maintaining effective pay-for-performance programs, particularly in the rapidly changing business
circumstances that face many companies
today. In these circumstances, the barriers
to linking performance with effort and the
barriers to linking pay to performance, discussed earlier, are significant and were not
apparent to managers at the time they
launched the pay programs. Managers may
also have been unaware that, unlike other
interventions such as training, shortcomings
in the design or maintenance of pay-for-performance programs can actually cause significant problems such as bitter feelings and
damage to important relationships.
The implementation costs and risks of
pay-for-performance systems appear to be
higher in high-commitment cultures like HP
where trust and employee commitment is
perceived by managers to be crucial to longterm success, though more research is
needed before conclusions from this case
can be generalized. Managers at HP probably weighed the dissatisfaction of employees
with incentive programs or their attribution
that a one-time bonus “was a bribe” differently than managers in firms without a highcommitment culture. Ironically, HewlettPackard’s distinctive culture seems to have
had an unexpected disadvantage, one that
runs counter to prediction in the literature
(Gerhart, 2001, p. 235). This may suggest
that the conclusions of this study do not
apply to low-commitment firms. An alternative conclusion is that monetary incentives in
a fast-changing environment may undermine
the capacity of a firm to build trust and
commitment unless the process of introduction incorporates an honest discussion of
mutual expectations.
The implications for practice we draw
from these cases is that managers might
best approach the introduction of pay-forperformance systems as a process of “negotiation” with employees if they are to avoid
the unintended consequences we observed
at HP. They might state clearly their expectations for the program and ask employees
(through a representative task force) to clarify theirs. Both sets of expectations would
ideally inform the design of the pay program
and the process for reexamining and redesigning the pay program should expectations of either side not be met. There is
some evidence that this sort of participation
works (Lawler & Hackman, 1969) but considerably more action research in a variety
of organizational cultures is needed to test
this proposition and the contingent situations in which it might apply. Clearly, management’s philosophy with regard to employee participation and power sharing will
influence its propensity to employ the
process of participation and negotiation we
are suggesting.
Stress-Testing the Conclusions
All research, particularly a case study like this
one, is subject to a variety of interpretations.
Are our findings an artifact of circumstances
•
15
... pay-forperformance
systems present
implementation
problems that
may be underexamined by
researchers and
insufficiently
acknowledged
by practitioners.
16
•
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
Is it possible
that the
managers in
our case were
wrong when
they abandoned
the pay-forperformance
system due
to concerns
about employee
trust and
commitment?
that may not have been explicated in the case
itself? We have discussed the high-commitment culture of HP as an important factor in
the decision to abandon pay-for-performance.
But was preserving the culture a mistake?
Below we will evaluate this question and
other situational factors that one could argue
undercut our interpretation of the HP cases
we discussed above.
Hewlett-Packard had exemplary financial performance for nearly six decades
(Beer & Rogers, 1995; Collins & Porras,
1994). However, the company’s performance suffered in the late 1990s compared
to competitors (Beer & Weber, 2003). In
response, the board of directors recruited
Carly Fiorina, a senior executive from Lucent, to lead the company. She immediately
set about changing the culture through a
variety of interventions, including the introduction of an extensive pay-for-performance incentive system (stock options and
bonus systems) for a substantial number of
senior executives (Beer & Weber, 2003). As
we discussed above, HP had never used
pay-for-performance systems as a primary
tool for motivation and was one of the few
companies that did not have executive
bonus systems. Is it possible that the managers in our case were wrong when they
abandoned the pay-for-performance system
due to concerns about employee trust and
commitment? Could it be that they missed
a crucial opportunity to change HP’s culture in their organizational unit when they
did not persist with the pay-for-performance pay system they had introduced?
Such changes are disruptive as was evident
when Fiorina’s efforts to change the culture roused strong negative employee reactions (Beer & Weber, 2003; Burrows,
2003). Perhaps they should have ignored
the reaction of employees and recognized
that to change HP’s performance a countercultural pay-for-performance system was
needed? Indeed, this is precisely the argument for pay-for-performance its advocates
espouse. It is a way to change entitlement
cultures and improve financial performance dramatically (Baker, 1993). We do
not think this interpretation of events at
HP is warranted given 1) the performance
of the company since Fiorina introduced
the incentive system and changed HP’s culture and 2) the evidence about the performance of high-commitment cultures that
typically do not rely on individual and
group pay-for-performance systems to motivate instrumentally, though they use
money to recognize performance.
Hewlett-Packard’s performance since
Carly Fiorina introduced pay-for-performance at the executive level has been less
than stellar (Beer & Weber, 2003). The company has not achieved many of the financial
results she promised and is continuing to
lose market share to Dell. If HP’s financial
performance in the 1990s is used to argue
that the pay-for-performance system, abandoned by the managers in our case, was
needed to change the culture and improve
lagging performance, then it is equally valid
to question the value of pay-for-performance
and the new culture introduced by Fiorina in
1999 given the company’s performance between 1999 and 2003.
It is our view that financial performance, except over a very long time period
(decades), is not a good criterion for evaluating pay-for-performance systems. It is a
function of so many factors that to attribute
this outcome to pay-for-performance is a
vast oversimplification. Behavioral and intermediate operating outcomes seem much
more appropriate. We argue that HP’s financial performance problems lay in poor
strategy and in their inability to redesign
the corporate organization to enable the integration of HP’s many products into solutions for customers, something that IBM
has been able to do. There is much evidence to indicate that these problems were
tied to political problems triggered by the
CEO succession process at the top that no
incentive system would have solved (Beer &
Weber, 2003).
One could also argue that HP managers had their eyes on the wrong measure
for judging whether the pay system was a
success. Pay-for-performance advocates
argue that clear and explicit performance
goals must be present for a pay-for-performance system to work effectively and these
performance goals should be the criterion
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
for deciding whether a pay system is working. Instead of attending to employee concerns and loss of trust, the managers at HP
should have kept their eyes on operating results and ignored employee attitudes. After
all the pay-for-performance system had
boosted productivity in the months after its
introduction. This argument seems to us to
ignore decades of evidence that trust and
commitment are essential to the capacity of
organizations to outperform their competitors. Can increasing distrust and reducing
commitment ever improve performance?
High commitment can only be created
if employees develop an emotional attachment to the task, management, and the
company. This in turn can only be developed if they feel fairly treated. And, this in
turn is a function of how much voice they
have in issues that affect task performance
and their well-being (Beer, Spector,
Lawrence, Mills, & Walton, 1985). To ignore employee discontent with the pay system would have meant undercutting the
high-commitment culture that had contributed to HP’s nearly six decades of outstanding performance. The high performance
of
other
high-commitment
companies like Southwest Airlines and SAS
Institute, built on many of the same principles as HP (including modest use of pay
systems as a means of motivation and narrower spread between the CEO and the
lowest-level employee) demonstrates that
paying attention to what employees think
and feel pays off (O’Reilly & Pfeffer, 2000).
Given the importance of establishing
appropriate performance metrics to the
success of pay-for-performance programs,
one could question whether the failure of
pay-for-performance at HP could have
been attributable to limitations in the performance metrics at HP. As we said above,
pay-for-performance advocates argue that
quantifiable objectives are a key to success.
Had HP managers established better metrics, employees might not have been dissatisfied with the pay system. There is no evidence, however, that this was the case in
the situations described above. Management by objectives and metrics to measure
progress was the cornerstone of Hewlett-
Packard’s management philosophy for
nearly six decades (Beer & Rogers, 1995).
Moreover, HP managers did invest what
they perceived to be considerable time and
money in the design and development of
metrics for the team-based pay-for-performance program they were introducing.
This was not a quick or lightly considered
change initiative.
Even if one could convincingly argue that
the design of metrics was less than ideally required to implement a pay-for-performance
system, it is questionable, given the fastpaced and unpredictable changes in hightechnology companies such as HP, whether
such metrics could have been developed at
reasonable cost in time and money. Furthermore, it seems questionable whether managers in this case would have embraced such
an increase in cost. After all, they already
considered the cost of designing and administering the pay-for-performance system
onerous given the benefits, and consequently
abandoned the system. Additional effort to
develop metrics would have further increased the time that these managers would
have had to spend managing the system at
the expense of time spent in managing and
training their employees. This is what they
ultimately decided was more beneficial than
the pay-for-performance system.
This is not to say, however, that they
were not managing effectively in the first
place or that such a deficiency had something to do with the failure in implementing
pay-for-performance. Hewlett-Packard had
always encouraged and expected managers
to lead effectively and institutionalized
management by objective and managing by
walking around, among many other practices, to establish good management as a
norm for all managers (Beer & Rogers,
1995). We found no evidence that this was
not also true in the situations described in
the cases although we did not focus our investigation on this.
Pay-for-performance advocates argue
that the value of a pay-for-performance system lies in the clear differentiation in rewards obtained by high performers compared
to low performers. Even if low performers
are unhappy with the pay-for-performance
•
17
This argument
seems to us to
ignore decades
of evidence
that trust and
commitment
are essential to
the capacity of
organizations
to outperform
their
competitors.
18
•
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
So while
differentiating
performance
of individuals
or teams is
desirable to
maintain the
perception of
fairness, it
also has
unintended
consequences
when coordination across
individuals and
teams is
essential for
performance.
system, high performers are not, the argument goes, and they are the ones who contribute most to organizational performance.
Could it be that the pay system introduced
at HP did not differentiate sufficiently between high and low performers and/or managers listened to the wrong voices? In fact
evidence indicates that the pay-for-performance and skill-based systems were “forcing” differentiation in rewards and that this
was an unintended negative outcome. It became very difficult for managers to transfer
workers in a low-performing team to a highperforming team (remember that in many
cases a team-based pay-for-performance
system was introduced). This made redistribution of talent across teams harder
(higher-performing teams did not want
workers from lower-performing teams) and
was one of many reasons HP managers
abandoned the system. So while differentiating performance of individuals or teams is
desirable to maintain the perception of fairness, it also has unintended consequences
when coordination across individuals and
teams is essential for performance. We believe the pay system at HP differentiated
between high and low performance (a desirable outcome according to pay-for-performance advocates) but that this also contributed to coordination problems that
ultimately caused managers to abandon
pay-for-performance.
Could it be that HP managers abandoned the pay-for-performance system when
it ran into difficulties because, like many
managers, they had a penchant for the “program du jour”? Perhaps HP managers are no
different than managers in so many other
U.S. companies who abandon an improvement program when it runs into difficulties
in order to move on to the next fad. Indeed,
the tendency of human beings to be overly
optimistic, cited earlier, might contribute to
this penchant. If this played a role in abandoning pay-for-performance, it would render
a serious blow to our interpretation that it
was implementation problems inherent in
the very conception and design of pay-forperformance systems that caused discontinuation of the pay-for-performance system at HP.
To deal with this question we must understand the root causes of the flavor-of-themonth improvement programs so often seen
in corporations. Research suggests that the
causes of these programs have to do with their
top-down nature (Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector,
1990a; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990b).
Programs fail to be sustained and give way to
new programs because top management
pushes an improvement initiative through the
organization unilaterally, without much involvement or commitment from lower-level
managers. They do so to introduce a solution
to the organization that they, often with the
help of consultants and staff groups (often the
HR function), believe to be essential for performance improvement. Because they do not
involve lower levels, their overly optimistic
evaluation of the potential for success is never
challenged. When the improvement program
runs into implementation problems in lowerlevel units, such as the ones experienced by
unit managers in the HP cases described here,
uncommitted managers do not invest enough
energy to overcome the problems. However,
the HP cases we report on in this article were
not introduced from the top nor were they
initiated by the HR function. The initiative
came from the unit managers closest to the
action. These were programs they, not senior
management or the HR function, were committed to and thought would improve their
business’s performance. Therefore, we do not
find that it was HP managers’ penchant for
the “program du jour” that could possibly be
the cause for discontinuing the pay-for-performance system. It seems unlikely that they
would easily give up on a program for which
they felt real ownership. The HP managers
made a business-like cost-benefit analysis, as
we have argued.
After consideration of the alternative
explanations for the failure of pay-for-performance systems at HP discussed in this
section, we continue to see our analysis of
the cases as correct. While pay-for-performance systems theoretically promise many
motivation and performance benefits, researchers and managers have underappreciated the costs incurred when these systems
are implemented, particularly in high-commitment systems.
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
Michael Beer is the Cahners-Rabb Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus
at the Harvard Business School. He has authored many articles and authored or coauthored eight books, among them Managing Human Assets and The Critical Path to
Corporate Renewal. The latter received the Johnson, Smith & Knisely Award and was
a finalist for the Academy of Management’s Terry Book Award. Professor Beer has
served on the editorial board of several professional journals and the board of governors of the Academy of Management. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Management,
National Academy of Human Resources, and the Society of Industrial and Organizational Psychology.
Mark D. Cannon is an assistant professor with a joint appointment in Leadership, Policy and Organizations as well as Human and Organizational Development at Vanderbilt
University. He has published on executive coaching and has a paper on “transition
coaching” for leaders in new positions that will appear in Research in Management Consulting. He investigates barriers to learning in organizational settings, such as positive illusions, individual and organizational defenses, and barriers to learning from failure. His
work on learning from failure has appeared in the Journal of Organizational Behavior,
and he is co-editor of Organizational Psychology from Dartmouth Publishing Company.
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document.
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAYFOR-PERFORMANCE” BY MICHAEL BEER AND
MARK D. CANNON
Commentary by James N. Baron
We promise in proportion to our hopes,
and we deliver in proportion to our fears.
François La Rochefoucauld,
Moral Maxims and Reflections
Professors Beer and Cannon underscore
some important points about reward systems, which apply far beyond HewlettPackard. First, some conditions that make
pay-for-performance (PFP) especially desirable or feasible may also, paradoxically, make
it especially tough to implement. For instance, the trust HP had engendered among
its workforce also meant management had
more to lose reputationally if/when things
turned sour. Having captured employees’
hearts and minds, HP was especially vulnerable to the “ratchet effect” (as in the San Diego
experiment) and the danger of undercutting
intrinsic motivation, loyalty, and teamwork by
overemphasizing financial incentives.
Like HP, companies implementing PFP
often confront challenging and turbulent
environments, which is part of what makes it
appealing to tie financial rewards to increases in output or quality. Yet, as Beer and
Cannon note, this environmental uncertainty and volatility can make PFP hard to
implement, because of the difficulty in determining how much measured results reflect employees’ efforts versus factors outside their control (as at Colorado Memory
Systems). Moreover, when the environment
is uncertain and rapidly changing, results
will fluctuate markedly over time regardless
of what employees do, simply due to random
events. Because employees generally dislike
wildly oscillating pay, variations over time in
PFP payouts may be a disincentive.
This is especially true given the reasons
for expecting positive, but fleeting, initial effects when PFP is first introduced, including:
Hawthorne effects; “low-lying” improvements
to be realized; and the fact that workers are
anchored on what their pay used to be, so any
supplementary pay represents a “bonus.” If
initial payoffs are generous, employees begin
anchoring against what they received when
the plan paid out most handsomely; a shortfall relative to this anchor may seem like a
penalty, not a “smaller bonus.” All too often,
however, initial PFP payouts are modest, as
Beer and Cannon imply was true for at least
some of HP’s experiments. When initial payoffs are low, the losers may still bitterly resent
being placed at the bottom of the heap, while
the winners won’t have won very much.
HP’s experiments also highlight how pay
plans depend vitally on the entire constellation of human resource practices and values
in which they are embedded. For example, the
Boise facility struggled to implement peer
evaluations as part of its PFP experiment, in a
context that did not support this. It may have
appeared tempting to new management at HP
to move away from the less formal, more implicit controls the firm employed historically,
Correspondence to: James N. Baron, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305,
Tel: (650) 723-4832, Fax: (650) 725-7979, E-mail: baron_james@gsb.stanford.edu
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
toward a more balanced mix incorporating
some formal and explicit controls. Yet it’s not
clear in this case that the middle ground is a
better place to be than at one of the extremes.
This point is illustrated by some findings from the GLOBE project, a recent collaboration between some of us at Stanford
Business School and McKinsey & Company. GLOBE examined how large global
corporations seek coordination worldwide
while maintaining local flexibility. Interviewing senior executives in prominent
global companies in the United States, Europe, and Japan, we identified various
“control levers” from which leaders seemed
to be choosing. These levers clustered into
two distinct groups. One group involved
“harder,” more explicit controls: incentive
systems, standardized processes, and use of
metrics. The second cluster involved
“softer” levers: enculturation, personal networks, and corporate strategy statements.
Companies relying on one lever within
each group tended also to rely on the others within that cluster.
We constructed scales measuring each
firm’s reliance on hard and soft controls,
which attained their maximum values when
a company utilized all three levers within the
hard or soft cluster. Figure 1 portrays 16
GLOBE companies along these two dimensions. Firms that were moderate to high on
one dimension were generally low on the
other. Firms tended toward one pole or the
other; hard and soft controls served as alternatives among these large global companies.
One conspicuous exception is the firm circled in the figure, considerably above the
sample average on both dimensions. This
company was Enron in 1999–2000. Some
post-mortems have emphasized how Enron’s
leadership sent confusing signals about what
it valued and expected—put differently, their
soft levers, such as strategy, networks, and
culture, didn’t necessarily align with the intense emphasis on metrics and incentives.
Figure 1. Reliance on “Hard” and “Soft” Drivers of Coordination in 16 Global Corporations. Source: Stanford/McKinsey
GLOBE Study.
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
Admittedly, Enron is only one data point.
Yet Beer and Cannon’s account of PFP experiments at HP can be read as the story of
a quintessential “soft control” company trying to move closer to the 45-degree line in
Figure 1. The risk of such experiments is that
the organization shifts from being an ideal
example of something to a mediocre example
of everything, thus becoming a clear example
of nothing.
Beer and Cannon make a strong case
that PFP can have unexpected, even adverse,
effects on organizations. In my view, it is not
PFP per se that is dangerous, but rather systems that excessively emphasize financial rewards for performance. As Ronald Dore
wrote in discussing piece rates:
There is a further, intangible cost in disaffection and suspicion. Because the whole
system is geared to keep their earnings
level constantly in the workers’ consciousness, they carefully calculate what their
earnings ought to be.1
wards for performance. Should professors be
rewarded, even financially, for outstanding
teaching? Absolutely. Should HR professionals
be rewarded, even financially, for delivering superior service to their clients? Sure. But imagine being a student in a class and knowing your
professor has a huge financial stake in the
course evaluations or in your standardized test
score. Or imagine working in a company
whose HR staff have enormous incentives
based on your “customer satisfaction rating” or
on processing your inquiry hastily. For the jobs
that increasingly characterize our economy, it’s
not just about what people do or the quantity
they produce; it’s about how they relate to their
work and what motivates them to excel. Like
Beer and Cannon, I suspect PFP plans will attain superior results when their framing, communication, and implementation don’t batter
employees over the head with financial attributions for their behavior.
NOTE
1.
Instead of pay for performance, we
should be thinking more broadly about re-
Dore, R. (1973). British factory, Japanese factory. Berkeley: University of California Press; p.
83 (emphasis in original).
James N. Baron is the Walter Kenneth Kilpatrick Professor of Organizational Behavior and Human Resources at Stanford Business School. His research focuses on
the determinants and consequences of organizational structures and human resource
policies, particularly their effects on workers’ careers and organizational performance.
With David M. Kreps, he is the author of Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks for
General Managers (Wiley, 1999). Professor Baron has been a consultant on strategic,
organizational, and human resource issues to corporations, law firms, government
agencies, and nonprofits. He currently serves on the advisory boards of relatia.com,
BeyondWork, and SkyVenture Silicon Valley.
•
23
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAYFOR-PERFORMANCE” BY MICHAEL BEER AND
MARK D. CANNON
Commentary by Patrick R. Dailey
“Good strategy followed by great implementation” trumps “great strategy followed
by good implementation.” It seems like this
is always a truism. And Beer and Cannon’s
case analyses support this premise. Overall,
the analyses were instructive, yet I felt in
somewhat of a “time warp,” with analysis
completed in the early 1990s used to make
contemporary points and argue current issues. Perhaps many of these conclusions
are enduring insights into the dilemma of
implementing pay-for-performance systems. Yet, as I describe below, including
Carly Fiorina’s leadership agenda into the
interpretative comments seems to be an
error in timing and attribution of cause and
unintended effect.
As the now former head of Global Workforce Management for HP during a significant part of Carly’s tenure, I offer my comments with the hopes of being insightful.
1. It is wrong to connect Carly Fiorina with
the outcomes of these experiments. The text
connects these experiments in variable compensation with Carly’s broad cultural change
agenda and suggests that poor management of
these experiments was a missed opportunity
for change. It must be noted that the experiments occurred in the very early 1990s; Carly
did not arrive with her change agenda until
2000. These experiments were conducted
during a time of very steady state cultural conditions at HP and during a time when perfor-
mance was relatively robust. As the 1990s
came to a close, HP fell upon a series of financial quarters in which the company failed
to perform and experienced losses. So, these
experiments were truly local experiments, and
not part of any large-scale cultural change initiative. These were not missed change opportunities in the sense of renewing vision, values
strategies, and operational approaches. Fundamental change was not on the agenda at the
time of the experiments.
2. Fundamental principles of good
change management seem to be missing
in all of these experiments. They were
local “tweaking,” in fact, “add-on” compensation elements to the existing pay system.
To use these experiments to make a fundamental assessment of pay-for-performance
systems conceptually seems to be a reach
for this reader. The experiments were optional, apparently were not part of a broad
revisioning process, and failed to put pay at
risk to any significant level. These spotty experiments across an organization that
shares information widely might have been
seen as a signal that things “might be
changing,” and thus I agree with the authors’ comments about “informal negotiation” that occurs when change is poorly sold
and its implementation lacks managerial
support for longevity. A fundamental “values
statement” for making these changes seems
to be missing in the implementation.
Correspondence to: Patrick R. Dailey, 4070 Falls Ridge Drive, Alparetta, GA 30022, Tel: (770) 754-0407,
E-mail: pdailey1@yahoo.com
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
The success of
PFP programs
is highly
contingent on
the ability to
measure these
differences and
the willingness
of managers to
apply rewards
differentially.
3. Change is complex. And something as fundamental as the difficulties associated with
change compensation systems was underestimated by the local managers. The authors
noted this, but could develop this issue more.
The cross-functional/teaming culture of the
HP organization would lead people to know
the elements and operational details of these
programs, and, true to the culture, participants would be inclined to “pick and choose”
elements from any of the experiments and
“negotiate” for the most desirable elements
from all of these experiments. Any downside
of any one program would be construed as an
“unfair” takeaway by employee participants.
The authors appropriately discussed “expectancy theory,” and in most cases the issues
of “attractiveness” and “attainable” benefits
from the behaviors being rewarded are discussed in the context of “employees,” not
managers. I suspect with the inept positioning of the programs, a lack of long-term ownership to the program, and lots of questions
and concerns from knowledge workers, that
expectancy theory would predict that managers’ motivation for continuing the experiments might be quite low. Going forward was
just not worth the hassle to the managers and,
frankly, it appears the pay out of $150–200
per month is not a life-changing level of compensation. Perhaps the programs and their
payout defaulted to a level of a nuisance to
the managers and not attractive enough for
employees—especially when no pay was at
risk—to build excitement and emotional commitment. From a change management perspective, there was not a “burning platform”
for continuing these experiments and no
penalty for poor implementation. Managers
had low commitment to stay the course, it appears. In summary, the experiments failed to
appreciate the context of the initiatives and
the content of the programs themselves.
4. The risk/return issues of various organizational change initiatives would be a very
productive topic for the authors to focus
more attention on. The authors compared the
impact of poor implementation of one type of
intervention—i.e., a training program—versus
the poor implementation of a compensation
program. What are the potential upsides?
What are the potential downsides?
5. Pay-for-performance requires pay systems and managers to encourage certain selected behaviors and reward differentially
the resulting outcomes. Certain cultures are
more or less willing to differentiate individual
or team contribution. The success of PFP programs is highly contingent on the ability to
measure these differences and the willingness
of managers to apply rewards differentially. I
would like to see more attention to these matters in the discussion the authors provide.
6. HP has a long reputation for “startstop” practices on many things. This may
be the fundamental explanation of the demise of these efforts.
7. Words are important. The manner in
which an initiative is introduced and described has important implications in the perception of the initiative. For a highly competent engineering professional to be
“subjected” to being part of an experiment
could negatively impact a current level of trust
and commitment in a new process. Few of us
want to be “guinea pigs.” I wonder how these
experiments were described to the participants, in contrast to how the early Roethlisberger and Dickson studies on workplace illumination that were used to coin the concept
of Halo Effect—with its positive effects—
were described to the participants. Why did
“experimentation” work in one condition
(Western Electric) and not in another (HP)?
In summary, I applaud the authors’ focus on
the perils of implementation and hopes that
more energy is invested in learning the keys
to “great implementation”—the real differentiator in change management initiatives.
I particularly appreciate investigation into
the efficacy of program implementation in
contrast to investigation into theoretical
concepts.
However, these experiments and the discussion seem to be anecdotal rather than
fundamental to the investigation of pay-forperformance concepts and initiatives. It is a
“reach” to base assessment of pay-for-performance systems on experiments conducted
more than ten years ago—even with the authors’ disclaimers. Implementation issues are
extremely important to successful outcomes
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
and the authors are “on to” issues that are
important to ultimate outcomes and organizational success.
It appears that these compensation experiments largely failed and faulty implementation is the culprit—yet there are so
many unmentioned, uncontrolled independent variables operating in these experiments
that it is difficult to draw anything more
than interesting anecdotal insights from the
case analyses.
The final conclusion is that pay-for-performance programs may be unproductive instruments for influencing behavior and results due
to their high “costs” of implementation. Basically, these initiatives are perhaps too tough to
manage. The authors make a persuasive case,
but I do wish the authors had offered recommendations that might remedy the unproductive outcomes from the experiments reported in
the core of the article. That is where the value
in reading this article could have been derived.
Patrick R. Dailey, PhD, is a senior human resources generalist with expertise in talent management and the implementation of large-scale change initiatives for major
global companies including Hewlett-Packard, Lucent Technologies, and PepsiCo. He
is a frequent contributor to the editorial critique of articles submitted to our journal.
Mr. Dailey was originally trained as an industrial and organizational psychologist.
•
27
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAYFOR-PERFORMANCE” BY MICHAEL BEER AND
MARK D. CANNON
Commentary by Barry Gerhart
The Beer and Cannon study tells a convincing and important story about the “peril”
part of the “promise and peril” of pay-forperformance plans. Part of the peril experienced at HP may have been due to inadequate “due diligence” regarding the key issue
of fit, both between the new pay programs
and the business and human resource
strategies, and between the new pay programs and the existing HP workforce(s). Another problem may have been a lack of
homework regarding the typical risks of variable pay plans. It is well known that these
plans, when applied to blue-collar jobs,
often flounder because of problems with setting and maintaining a performance standard that is seen as fair by both management
and workers (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003;
Whyte, 1955). This problem is exacerbated
to the degree that changes in technology,
product markets, and so forth require frequent standard revision.
Even where such issues are understood
and anticipated, variable pay plans of the sort
used at HP are known to be risky. Indeed, I
have cautioned, “One must consider whether
the potential for impressive gains in performance” from such plans is “likely to outweigh
the potential problems, which can be serious”
(Gerhart, 2001, p. 222) and that such plans
are best thought of as representing “a high
risk, high reward strategy” (p. 222).
We (Gerhart, Trevor, & Graham, 1996)
have addressed the risks associated with pay-
for-performance plans in some detail, noting, for example, that although success stories tend to receive the most attention, it is
at least as informative to study the many instances of plans not surviving for any significant period of time. The Beer and Cannon
article is very helpful in providing specific
examples of how this can happen, even in a
company that is generally viewed as having
strong and capable management.
I also agree with Beer and Cannon’s argument that companies already having
strong employee relations may have the most
to lose (or most at risk) in “experimenting”
with the types of pay-for-performance programs they describe. A company like HP has
followed a particular historical path that has
resulted in its current unique culture and
employee relations. Any program that would
potentially damage this long-nurtured intangible asset should indeed be considered with
great caution.
Consistent with Beer and Cannon’s general message, however, not all companies are
like HP. Context probably matters. Some
companies must change. These companies
may choose to make important changes in
HR. Other companies (or some of their facilities) may be in a start-up phase where it is
easier to shape HR practices unencumbered
by history and these, in turn, may shape a
workforce that fits those practices. Indeed, it
is difficult to understand why a company like
HP, having apparently made no compelling
Correspondence to: Barry Gerhart, University of Wisconsin-Madison, School of Business, 975 University Ave.,
Madison, WI 53706, Tel: (608) 262-3895, (608) 265-5372, E-mail: bgerhart@bus.wisc.edu
30
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
Beer and
Cannon, in a
few instances,
make general
statements
about pay-forperformance
that go beyond
the HP data
and which are
not necessarily
supported…
case for change and having the same workforce and culture today that it had yesterday,
would expect its “experiments” with pay programs to be well received. The only rationale
described for the experiments seemed to be
an interest in a mechanical ad hoc “quick fix”
to some problem. Beer and Cannon provide
evidence that variable pay programs do not
necessarily provide this quick fix.
In speaking of context, Beer and Cannon
ascribe to me (Gerhart, 2001) the argument
that “a pay-for-performance program might
be more easily implemented” (Beer & Cannon, p. 5) in organizations having certain
characteristics. These (directly quoted from
my chapter) are: “(1) the culture discourages
opportunism, (2) top management reinforces
this culture by example, and (3) employees
have long-term careers or professions in
which their reputation is a valuable commodity” (p. 235). They argue that HP has these
characteristics, but was nevertheless unsuccessful in implementing variable pay. Thus,
these three factors may not explain implementation success. To clarify, I did identify
these three factors, but not as contingency
factors in explaining how “easily implemented” a program would be and not in the
context of a plan geared toward blue-collar
workers (the focus of the HP experiments).
Rather, my focus was on how these three factors might “reduce” the “significant risks” (p.
234) of such plans, especially the risk of “opportunism” and the examples I gave of opportunism included four instances of companies
that were sued because their executive or professional employees engaged in opportunistic
behavior that was unethical or illegal, arguably in response to incentive systems. This
distinction was perhaps not sufficiently clear
in Gerhart (2001). I hope it now is.
Having spoken to the substance of the
hypothesis, let me now clarify what would
constitute an informative test. If one did
wish to test whether certain organization factors moderate the effectiveness of pay programs, it is clearly not possible to do so using
data from a single (i.e., N ⫽ 1) company.
With no comparison companies, there is no
way of knowing whether implementation
would have gone better or worse at companies having different characteristics (than
HP in this example). To understand its impact, we must have a design that provides
variance in context.
For the same reason, we should not generalize too much from experiences at a single
company. Pay-for-performance programs for
blue-collar workers have survived and been
integrated into the culture at other companies (e.g., Kraft, Lincoln Electric, Nucor,
GE). So while Beer and Cannon do an excellent job of demonstrating the peril, we should
not completely dismiss the promise aspect.
However, consistent with their general argument, established companies may encounter
more barriers and more risks than companies
(or facilities) that begin with variable pay as
part of their fundamental makeup.
Beer and Cannon, in a few instances,
make general statements about pay-for-performance that go beyond the HP data and
which are not necessarily supported, in my
view, by the broader literature. Contrary to
their discussion on p. 4, I do not believe there
is any evidence from employment settings to
show that pay-for-performance plans necessarily harm intrinsic motivation or creativity
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). The notion that
pay-for-performance harms teamwork (p. 4)
is certainly plausible under some conditions,
but depends on the design of the program.
Further, it is important to recognize that (individual) pay-for-performance can have beneficial effects via attraction-selection-attrition
(Schneider, 1987) such that better performers stay and others leave in organizations
where pay and performance are strongly
linked (Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997).
Teamwork likely has a bigger payoff when individual team members are strong.
Finally, I would perhaps give more
weight than Beer and Cannon do to the
competence of “local management,” the apparent drivers of the pay-plan changes at
HP. As noted earlier, it is not clear that they
did their homework. Indeed, the plans were
described as “experiments,” which suggests
this may have been lacking. Although understanding, awareness and anticipation of potential problems with variable pay certainly
does not eliminate the risk, it should improve the odds of making a good decision
and implementing it successfully.
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
In closing then, let me make the following suggestions to any company (or
manager) considering a new variable pay
program. First, by all means, read Beer and
Cannon’s article. Then, tap into others’ experiences with such plans. Learn from both
the successes and the failures. After that,
consider whether a compelling rationale for
a change can be made and how it will better support the business objectives. Next,
consider whether other aspects of the HR
system (e.g., the current workforce, performance assessment, employee input, work
design) will fit the proposed change. If not,
how will this issue be addressed? If the
plan is to move ahead, get input from employees before a decision is made (and afterward). Lastly, review the promise and
peril, both of acting and not acting, and
then decide.
Barry Gerhart is professor of management and human resources and the John and
Barbara Keller Distinguished Chair of Business, School of Business at the University
of Wisconsin-Madison. His previous faculty appointments include serving as chair of
the organization studies area at Vanderbilt University’s Owen Graduate School of
Management and as chair of the Department of Human Resource Studies at Cornell
University. His major fields of interest are human resource management and strategy,
compensation, and business performance. Professor Gerhart received his BS in psychology from Bowling Green State University and his PhD in industrial relations from
the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Current and past editorial board appointments
include the Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, the International Journal of Human Resource Management, the Journal of Applied Psychology, and Personnel Psychology. In 1991, Professor Gerhart received the Scholarly Achievement Award from the Human Resources
Division, Academy of Management. He is also a Fellow of the American Psychological Association and of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Professor Gerhart is co-author of the recent book, Compensation: Theory, Evidence, and
Strategic Implications, as well as co-editor of Compensation in Organizations, and coauthor of Human Resource Management: Gaining a Competitive Advantage.
REFERENCES
Gerhart, B. (2001). Designing reward systems: Balancing results and behaviors. In C. H. Fay
(Ed.), The executive handbook on compensation (pp. 214–237). New York: The Free Press.
Gerhart, B., & Rynes, S. (2003). Compensation:
Theory, evidence, and strategic implications.
Foundations for Organizational Science series.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Gerhart, B., Trevor, C., & Graham, M. (1996). New
directions in employee compensation research.
In G. R. Ferris (Ed.), Research in personnel
and human resources management (pp.
143–203). Oxford, UK: JAI Press/Elsevier.
Schneider, B. (1987). The people make the place.
Personnel Psychology, 40, 437–453.
Trevor, C., Gerhart, B., & Boudreau, J. W. (1997).
Voluntary turnover and job performance:
Curvilinearity and the moderating influences
of salary growth and promotions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 44–61.
Whyte, W. F. (1955). Money and motivation. New
York: Harper’s Brothers Publishers.
•
31
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAYFOR-PERFORMANCE” BY MICHAEL BEER AND
MARK D. CANNON
Commentary by Herbert G. Heneman III
This is a very interesting and unique article.
While reports of multiple failures are rarely
published, it is important for them to be.
From these instances, perhaps we can discern
meaningful lessons about how to prevent failure in the future. In this regard, the authors
seek to inform us on two underresearched issues—namely, the implementation of pay-forperformance plans, and managerial decision
making regarding their initiation, modification, and discontinuation. I would like to add
to the speculation as to why the plans failed
and suggest that the case descriptions are potentially lacking some critical information as
to specific practices.
The five pay plans encountered, in varying degrees, implementation and maintenance problems. In each instance, the design
of the plan by the site manager went awry
during implementation, with a host of problems surfacing to bedevil the plan and the
manager. As I read these five cases, I was
struck by the familiarity of problems: validity
of performance measures, contamination of
performance by extraneous forces, fluctuating performance standards, counterproductive team-member behaviors, unfamiliar performance assessments (e.g., peer evaluation),
insufficient payouts, fluctuating payouts, and
so forth. There is nothing new on the list; all
the problems have been uncovered by previous research and known for some time.
This raises the obvious question: Why
did all of these problems occur? We are told
that the company “had in place many of the
conditions that should lead to success.”
Clearly these were not sufficient. Let me
suggest some potentially missing conditions.
First is a lack of knowledge and skill regarding pay-for-performance plans among the
site managers. We are told that the managers
had considerable discretion in the decision to
experiment with pay-for-performance plans,
which they exercised on their own without
initiation by (or assistance from?) the HR
function. Though we lack information, it
seems plausible that naïve managerial discretion underlay use of the complex behavioral
tool of performance pay. While the plans’ designs may have appeared to be technically
sound performance boosters, the managers
may have failed to anticipate the many behavioral problems that became “unintended
consequences.” Managers with behavioral
savvy would have taken steps up front to help
avoid these problems or perhaps never have
undertaken the plan in the first place. This
interpretation is consistent with the authors’
observation about the “overly optimistic assumptions” managers made about time and
administration requirements and benefits
that would be achieved.
A second missing (at least not reported)
condition is attempts to facilitate implementation with the use of other mechanisms
that typically accompany the introduction of
pay-for-performance plans, particularly formal communication and training programs.
Correspondence to: Herbert G. Heneman III, University of Wisconsin, School of Business, 975 University
Ave., Madison, WI 53706-1323, Tel: (608) 263-3461, (608) 262-8773, E-mail: hheneman@bus.wisc.edu
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
For the most part, the pay plans were quite
complex, and inadequate communication
about plan purpose, procedures, performance measures, and so forth may have
helped sow discontent. Likewise, inadequate
training for managers and employees may
have kept them from having the necessary
knowledge and skills for functioning successfully within the plan. For example, three of
the plans used special performance assessment systems that were a substantial departure from the merit system the employees
were accustomed to. These were skill assessments (San Diego site), peer evaluation
(Boise Printers Formatter Shop), and a nomination and approval process (Workstation
Group). In short, there appears to be a lack
of supportive programs that would help employees and managers adapt to the new payfor-performance plans.
A final, possibly missing condition is the
HR department or function. Where was it
during the design, implementation, and
maintenance of the pay-for-performance
plans? It sounds as though, with a certain
source of pride, that HR was intentionally
kept on the sidelines so that individual site
managers could be in control and make their
own choices. If indeed HR was kept at bay, I
submit this was a flawed decision that also
contributed to the pay plans’ demise. Quite
simply, pay-for-performance plans require
substantial specialized expertise to design and
implement, and such expertise is unlikely to
be found in line managers. Unfortunately, we
do not know the level and availability of payfor-performance expertise among the HR
staff at HP, so we must be cautious in assuming that their exclusion worked to the detriment of the pay-for-performance plans.
Herbert G. Heneman III is the Dickson-Bascom Professor, Emeritus, in the Business, Management and Human Resources Department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He also serves as a senior research associate in the Wisconsin Center
for Education Research. He has been a visiting faculty member at the University of
Washington and University of Florida and was University Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ohio State University. His research is in the areas of staffing, performance
management, union membership growth, work motivation, and compensation systems. He currently is investigating the design and effectiveness of performance management and compensation systems for schoolteachers and is on the Board of Directors of the Society for Human Resource Management Foundation and is its vice
president for research. He is the senior author of four textbooks: Managing Personnel
and Human Resources: Strategies and Programs (1981), Perspectives on
Personnel/Human Resource Management 3/e (1986), Personnel/Human Resource
Management, 4/e (1989), and Staffing Organizations, 4/e (2003). He is a Fellow of the
Academy of Management, former chair of its Human Resources Division, and recipient of the Division’s Career Achievement Award. He is also a member and Fellow of
the American Psychological Association and the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Other memberships include the Industrial Relations Research Association, the American Educational Research Association, the Society for Human
Resource Management, the International Personnel Management Association, and
the World of Work.
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAYFOR-PERFORMANCE” BY MICHAEL BEER AND
MARK D. CANNON
Commentary by Thomas Kochan
Back to the Future
Yogi Berra has long been recognized as one
of America’s most prescient baseball philosophers, but little did we know he could also
foresee the future of the human resource
management profession. Yogi’s famous statement that “it’s like déjà vu all over again”
came to mind as I read Michael Beer and
Mark Cannon’s analysis of failed pay-forperformance systems at Hewlett-Packard.
Even more pointedly, it reminded me of the
annual visit of Fred Lesieur to my HR
classes at MIT in the early 1980s. Fred was
the protégé of Joseph Scanlon, the Steelworkers’ Union official who invented one of
America’s most enduring pay-for-performance plans, appropriately labeled the
“Scanlon Plan” (Lesieur, 1957).
Each year, Fred would entertain (and
educate) my students with real-life examples
that illustrated why most incentive pay plans
fail. He liked to use their professor as cannon fodder to drive home the four principles
underlying the Scanlon Plan and other payfor-performance plans.
He stressed that for performance plans
to be successful and sustainable they must:
1. Provide for independent employee
voice and participation in (a) the decision to initiate a new plan, (b) its
design, (c) the generation of sugges-
tions for continuous improvement,
and (d) the plan’s administration
and adjustment;
2. Cover all employees in a facility so
as to encourage cross-occupational
and cross-level cooperation, not
competition;
3. Build on, and not substitute for, fair
base wages and benefits; and
4. Recognize that the Achilles’ heel of
any performance sharing formula
lies in the challenges posed to it by
changes in technology, market conditions, product mix, or organizational strategies and leadership.
These principles pretty much capture
what Beer and Cannon report happened in
these HP cases. Let’s be more specific.
The fact that HP had a “reputation for
high commitment and high trust” should
not have led management to expect workers
to be passive and uninterested in having a
voice in management decisions to alter
their compensation system. Unfortunately
for the HP employees, and ultimately for
the advocates of these plans, Beer and Cannon report that employees were not involved in the decisions to introduce these
plans nor did they have any voice in their
administration. So Scanlon’s Principle #1
was violated in all of the cases reviewed,
and as the authors suggest, in all other
Correspondence to: Thomas Kochan, MIT, 136 Eliot Street, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3808, Tel: (617) 2536689, Fax: (617) 253-7696, E-mail: tkochan@mit.edu
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
Don’t use an
incentive plan
to try to close a
gap between
current wages
and what
employees
perceive to be
the fair wage.
parts of the company that tried and then
abandoned similar plans.
Indeed, the HR professionals at HP apparently were so desensitized to the need for
independent employee voice that it did not
occur to them to consider the need to build
this feature into their plans. Instead, they
naïvely, and it turns out wrongly, expected
employees to just trust management to design the plans and take care of employee interests. The corporate scandals of the past
several years that came on top of a decade of
increasing workforce pressures should serve
as the final nail in the coffin of the naïve
view that employees should or will just trust
top management and its HR partners to take
care of their welfare. There is probably not
an employee in America who still believes
this, even in companies that had a reputation
for high commitment and trust.
Beer and Cannon note that most of these
plans covered blue-collar workers, not the entire labor force in a plant. This violates Scanlon’s Principle #2. This feature becomes even
more problematic in facilities like some of
those described here, where HP was simultaneously “delayering” and pushing decisionmaking authority down to lower levels. While it
is not mentioned in the case studies, I would be
very surprised if there did not exist a cadre of
middle managers and former first-line supervisors who saw their jobs and positions being “delayered” who were outside the scope of these
plans, resented them, saw them as unfair, and
used their considerable and varied sources of
power to undermine them. At the very least, I
would be astounded if there were not some
who chortled “I told you so” after the fact.
The San Diego example illustrated the
problem of designing pay systems with different payouts to “autonomous or self-managing work teams” in an interdependent production system. Because the payout scheme
was team-based, Beer and Cannon report
some teams “often refused to admit anyone
to their team who they thought might be
below their level of competence.” Such a
scheme does not promote plantwide cooperation, a key requirement in any sustainable
pay-for-performance program.
The Colorado case illustrates Scanlon
Principle #3: Don’t use an incentive plan to
try to close a gap between current wages and
what employees perceive to be the fair wage.
The takeover of this facility by HP not only
quashed workers’ expectations that they would
share in the gains expected from an anticipated stock offering, but they also found that
their wages were considerably below those of
HP employees in other facilities. So this plan
started from a position of distrust and dissatisfaction. While management hoped the plan
would be the vehicle for closing the pay gap, it
failed to do so. Lo and behold, the program
never gained credibility with employees.
Robert McKersie and Laurence Hunter
captured the essence of Scanlon Principle #4
in their study of productivity bargaining programs in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s.
They noted that there is a “powerful tendency
for all incentives to deteriorate” over time and
that the revision of any incentive pay scheme
is always likely to be more difficult and more
closely watched by employees than its initial
design (McKersie & Hunter, 1973, p. 150).
Why is this the case, perhaps even more so
now than before? The basic reason is that,
particularly in today’s dynamic and uncertain
world, organizations are constantly changing.
Changes in technologies, market conditions,
business strategies, organizational leadership,
etc., all are likely to affect the payouts produced by pay-for-performance formulas.
Therefore, a strategy for coping with and adjusting to these changes has to be built into
the plan. And in today’s information-savvy
workforce, the effects of these larger organizational strategies and changes on the plan
and its payout potential must be transparent
and communicated effectively to the workforce. Today’s workers are watching and
scrutinizing top management actions and
market developments ever so closely and
have the tools to communicate with each
other quickly and easily. All HR strategies
need to address this increased interdependence between strategic management decisions and actions and workforce perceptions
of fairness and behavior.
When Lesieur spoke to my classes, he
loved to shock students and kid me by saying
that in plants that either were about to undergo major changes, or where the future
was uncertain or highly variable, the best
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
pay-for-performance plan was no plan. Then
he would turn to me and say, “To try to implement a new plan in such a setting just
makes more work for labor arbitrators like
your good professor.” The students loved it,
partly for the humor, but more because here
was a consultant willing to tell them and
prospective clients that his program, and
others like it, would not work in all settings.
Of all the examples reviewed by Beer
and Cannon, only the Workstations Group
case appears to have been viewed as a success, although both managers and employees seem to attribute the success of the operations to more intrinsic motivational
factors than to the bonus plan. And the
bonus plan was not introduced as a permanent change, but as a reward contingent on
meeting a short-term project objective.
This is consistent with a specific aspect
of Scanlon Principle #4 that Lesieur also
enjoyed pointing out to my students. He
would say with a twinkle in his eye that in
this type of situation even their ivory tower
professor could be a successful consultant
because any reward I might suggest for
meeting some target was guaranteed to
work. His point was that nearly any credible and fair reward for meeting a challenging time-specific objective has value, not
perhaps so much to motivate employees
who are already motivated to meet the
challenge for professional and personal
reasons, but to say a simple thank you in a
highly tangible way.
One overriding conclusion from these
cases is that perhaps there is no pay-for-performance plan that management is likely to
dream up and implement unilaterally that will
work. Pay is too important to be left to managers, HR professionals, and their consultants.
There is no substitute for employee voice. Beer
and Cannon note that there is always an implicit negotiation going on between the workforce and management as these plans are introduced. The challenge lies in making these
implicit negotiations explicit and real. Until
this happens, management and HR professionals will both be guessing at what employees are thinking and how they will respond and
lack the credibility and independence to serve
as the voice of the workforce.
Herein lies a dilemma for contemporary
HR professionals. Management needs and
employees want their own voice in the decisions that affect their interests but our generation of HR professionals has grown up in
an era where an independent employee
voice (i.e., a union or association) is viewed
as an HR failure. Until the profession confronts and resolves this dilemma, most HRand management-led innovations are likely
to experience a fate similar to the ones so
nicely chronicled here.
Thomas Kochan is the George M. Bunker Professor of Management at the MIT
Sloan School of Management. His research focuses on the changing nature of work
and employment relationships and their implications for organizational governance
and public policies. As co-director of the MIT Workplace Center, he is active in bringing together business, community, labor, and policy-making groups to coordinate efforts to better integrate work and family life. His most recent book is Working in
America: A Blueprint for the New Labor Market.
REFERENCES
Lesieur, F. (1957). The Scanlon Plan. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
McKersie, R. B., & Hunter, L. C. (1973). Pay, productivity, and collective bargaining. London:
Macmillan.
•
37
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAYFOR-PERFORMANCE” BY MICHAEL BEER AND
MARK D. CANNON
Commentary by Gerald E. Ledford Jr.
The Beer and Cannon study of five out of 13
Hewlett-Packard pay-for-performance experiments examines management decision making in the adoption and abandonment of
these plans. Their study offers several useful
contributions. The authors provide information about multiple cases from the same
company; they focus on implementation issues, which research and experience would
suggest are more important than design in
the success of such plans; and they provide
the perspective of local managers who made
decisions about the plans.
In commenting on the study, I argue that
the author’s findings are helpful but the conclusions about them are too broad, for three
reasons. First, the article draws overly broad
conclusions about “pay-for-performance” in
general rather than on the specific plans that
were used. Second, the criteria for determining success and failure of such plans are
troublesome. Finally, there are some specific
conditions facing HP that help explain the
abandonment of the new pay programs that
need greater emphasis.
that this definition excludes skill-based pay,
which provides incentives for learning rather
than for performance. Incentive plans vary
along many dimensions. For example, they
vary according to the organizational level of
the performance that is rewarded (individual,
team, organizational unit, corporate) and the
type of metrics used (behavioral, unit performance, accounting).
Definitions are important because the
authors draw very broad conclusions about
pay-for-performance and its compatibility
with a high-commitment culture. However,
at best, these conclusions should be limited
to specific types of incentive plans that were
the subjects of study. As the authors point
out, HP had two types of pay-for-performance (corporate profit sharing and broadbased stock options) throughout the period
of study, and these pay-for-performance
plans were not considered incompatible with
HP’s culture. Indeed, these plans probably
helped create the culture by encouraging a
sense of common fate.
Success Criteria
Definition of Pay-for-Performance
The authors define pay-for-performance
broadly as the linkage of monetary rewards to
performance. This includes such diverse approaches as merit pay, production piece rates,
team incentives, unit-level gain sharing, corporate profit sharing, and stock options. Note
The authors avoid drawing conclusions
about objective success of the plans, but
management decision making depends on
the managers’ views of success. The Workstations Group case appears to be an objective success—it was a short-term incentive
that did what it was intended to do. In the
Correspondence to: Gerald E. Ledford Jr., Ledford Consulting Network, LLC, 2015-B Havemeyer Lane, Redondo Beach, CA 90278, Tel.: (310) 318-6405, E-mail: gledford@adelphia.net
40
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
other four cases, managers believed that employee disaffection warranted termination of
the plan.
We are limited because HP did not systematically study employee attitudes about
the plans. Any incentive plan is likely to generate employee “noise.” What percentage of
the workforce felt negatively about the
plans? Was the noise at a “normal” level that
should have simply prompted ongoing communication and the kind of negotiation the
authors recommend, or was it so severe that
it truly threatened the culture of the company? We do not know. One wonders
whether the real weakness in the plans was
in the managers who adopted them.
Company-Specific Issues
One of the most durable findings in the compensation research literature over the past
30 years is that such plans are most likely to
be successful in high-commitment settings.
Reviews of the gain-sharing and skill-based
pay literatures have repeatedly confirmed
this conclusion (see Heneman, Ledford, &
Gresham, 2000, cited by the authors).
Therefore, we should be careful in concluding that pay-for-performance plans, or
specifically gain-sharing and skill-based pay
plans, are incompatible with a high-commitment culture.
Two factors other than culture are specific
to HP and help explain the fate of its incentive
plans. First, the rapid pace of change in products, production technologies, and organizational forms in the high-technology industry
makes it very difficult to design sustainable
local incentive plans. It is probably not an accident that the dominant incentives in high
technology have been broad-based stock options and firmwide bonuses for corporate performance, which can be administered companywide with relative ease. Second, HP’s
absence of management bonuses until recently
was unusual and was an unfavorable condition
for incentives. Managers simply had no personal experience with the “noise” that accompanies incentive plans, or with the negotiation
process that the authors correctly describe as
essential to the success of such plans.
Conclusion
The study permits us to draw some firm conclusions about how managers perceived the
plans and why they adopted and terminated
the plans. The results show the importance
of implementation processes and the need
for incentives to fit their context. I am not
convinced, however, that the cases imply an
incompatibility of incentives with a highcommitment culture—as opposed to the specific culture of HP.
Gerald E. Ledford Jr. is a nationally recognized authority on human capital issues,
including compensation. He is president of the Ledford Consulting Network. From
1998 to 2003, he was at Sibson Consulting, where he was senior vice president. Previously, he was research professor at the Center for Effective Organizations (CEO),
Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, where he was a key
contributor between 1982 and 1998. He received his PhD and MA in psychology
from the University of Michigan. He is the author of 75 articles and ten books and
monographs, most recently The Rewards of Work: The Employment Deal in a Changing Economy (2003).
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAY
FOR PERFORMANCE” BY MICHAEL BEER AND
MARK D. CANNON
Commentary by Edwin A. Locke
Beer and Cannon’s case study of some HP
incentive systems is an important piece of
worksomething that should be done more
often. It reinforces my belief that successful incentive systems, especially ones that
work for the long term, are very hard,
though not impossible (cf., Lincoln Electric, Nucor) to construct.
In my opinion, four of the five HP plans
they reviewed were not very well designed.
Here are some observations about mistakes
that seem to have been made:
1. The use of team-based pay when the
proper bonus unit perhaps should
have been larger (cases 1 and 2). The
individual teams evidently needed to
cooperate in some ways (changing
members, sharing information) but
did not want to due to a possible
threat to their bonuses.
2. Combining performance bonuses
with skill-based pay (cases 1 and 2).
It is confusing to have two types of
incentive systems operating at once,
especially given that the incentives
are for quite different outcomes.
And being rated by peers is very risky
both from the point of view of using
objective, consistent standards and
from the point of view of psychology
(resentment if you do not “pass,” as
occurred at HP).
3. Changing the standards (case 1 and
perhaps case 2). Frederick W. Taylor, the father of task and bonus systems, warned against ever changing
the bonus standards once set (Taylor, 1912/1967). Today we would say
this violates the principles of both
procedural and distributive justice.
It was ironic that the incentives actually worked too well, in that teams
did better than expected, which cost
the company more money. However,
this should have been anticipated
because incentives are supposed to
raise performance over past levels.
Furthermore, if the improved performance helps make more money,
this should benefit the company
anyway. This raises the question of
whether the performance measures
were the right ones.
4. Non-control over performance (case
1). It is an axiom of incentive systems that the employees need to be
able to control the outcomes for
which they are paid. If outside factors interfere, this needs to be
taken into account in designing the
system.
5. The use of competition to determine
bonuses (case 2). Competition may
be beneficial in commission sales if
cooperation between sales people is
Correspondence to: Edwin A. Locke, Professor Emeritus, 32122 Canyon Ridge Drive, Westlake Village, CA
91361, E-Mail: elocke@rhsmith.umd.edu
42
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
not needed, but it can be lethal if
people need to cooperate.
6. Lack of sufficient employee knowledge (case 3). Incentives may motivate effort but they do not necessarily guarantee that the employees will
have the knowledge needed to get
the bonus. In this case, it seems, the
employees needed coaching.
7. Bonuses too small (case 4). In this
case, the bonuses of the acquired
company did not get the employees to
the level of HP pay, their apparent
goal—a distributional justice problem.
It is interesting that the incentive plan
worked very well in case 5, even though it
was a one-time-only event. This success may
have been because it avoided the problems
listed above, especially as it involved the
whole project unit and presumably the employees had both knowledge and control.
Furthermore, 60% of the employees favored
using the same plan for other projects.
The general principle here is that incentive plans have to be designed very carefully
(see Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, for an excellent
discussion of issues involved in incentive pay
plans). It does not appear that HP thought
the issue through very carefully nor did they
seem to have learned everything they could
have from their experience. I agree with Beer
and Cannon that employee expectations are
one aspect to consider in designing incentive
plans, but they are not the whole story. One
must also consider (as the authors do early in
their article) how such plans will operate
within and affect the wider system (e.g., the
unit, the plant, the company), the employees’
task knowledge, the stability of the produc-
tion situation (static or dynamic), and the
long-term consequences of the plan. It is also
very important to know exactly what results
you want the plan to produce; you may not
get what you don’t pay for (Gerhart & Rynes,
2003). A poorly designed incentive system is
usually worse than no system (other then
merit pay), because it promotes bitterness
and distrust, as Beer and Cannon note.
I am not fully convinced by Beer and Cannon’s suggestion that incentive plans may be
unsuitable within a high-commitment culture. Nor do I think it is fair to criticize Carly
Fiorina’s performance and her use of incentives, given that the entire high-tech industry
took a huge hit over the previous three of four
years and that HP’s culture was, according to
most observers, clearly in need of change.
What they had was no longer working. The
employees may have been committed but not
necessarily to the right actions. The next three
years will tell the tale about whether she has
taken HP in the right direction or not.
A final remark about organizational
change. Beer and Cannon argue that “flavor
of the month” organizational change programs fail because they are pushed from the
top. I disagree. I think they fail because they
are not pushed from the top hard enough;
they are introduced and then forgotten, then
replaced by a new fad. In contrast, consider
Jack Welch at GE (Locke, in press). He
pushed Six Sigma and other change programs relentlessly from the top, basing manager bonuses on pushing the program, setting goals, and measuring progress
quantitatively. He did get buy-in from lower
levels, but only because he insisted that GE
was going to make this change. This is a
great topic for further study.
Edwin A. Locke is Dean’s Professor of Leadership and Motivation (Emeritus) at the
R. H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has
published over 240 books, chapters, and articles. He is internationally known for his
research and writings on work motivation, leadership, and related topics, including
the application of objectivism to psychology and management. He is a Fellow of the
American Psychological Association, the American Psychological Society, and the
Academy of Management, and has received many scholarly awards. He is a senior
writer for the Ayn Rand Institute and has published numerous op-eds.
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
REFERENCES
Beer, M., & Cannon, M. (2004). Promise and peril
in implementing pay-for-performance. Human
Resource Management Journal, 43, 3–20.
Gerhart, B., & Rynes, S. (2003). Compensation:
Theory, evidence, and strategic implications.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Locke, E. (in press) The leader as integrator: The
case of Jack Welch at General Electric. In L.
Neider & C. Schriesheim (Eds.), Research in
management. Greenwich, CT: Information Age
Publishing.
Taylor, R. (1967). The principles of scientific management. New York: Norton. (Original work
published 1912)
•
43
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS:
“PROMISE AND PERIL IN IMPLEMENTING PAYFOR-PERFORMANCE”
Michael Beer and Mark D. Cannon
The decision of managers in 12 out of 13 organizational units at Hewlett-Packard to
abandon pay-for-performance (PFP) systems
they (not corporate management) initiated
seemed to us to be an important story to report, particularly given the overwhelming
conventional wisdom in both the business
and academic community that PFP systems
are a model of motivation managers should
adopt. Enthusiasm for PFP is too often not
accompanied by warnings about difficulties
and risks, something that all of the commentators acknowledged.
Gerry Ledford correctly cautions that
there are many different PFP systems and that
they “vary according to the organizational level
of performance that is rewarded (individual,
team, organizational unit and corporate)” and
type of outcomes measured (behavioral and
business performance). We would add that
PFP systems also differ in how tightly pay is
coupled to performance (based on objective
measure or on managerial judgment). These
are important distinctions. We should have
been clearer that we were generalizing to the
same class of PFP systems employed at HP,
tightly coupled PFP systems tied to business
performance aggregated at the individual,
team, or unit level (when those units are interdependent). As Ledford points out, HP had
long used a corporate-level profit-sharing plan
and stock options quite successfully.
We saw this as a story about implementation failure, not a story that informs the
question of whether PFP can motivate behavior, although an argument could be
made, as Douglas McGregor (1960) did,
that pay-for-performance moves (external
control) but does not motivate (internal control) people. We are gratified that all the
commentators welcomed our focus on implementation and felt that failure was as important to document as success. All agreed that
the cases raised contribute to our knowledge
about pay-for-performance systems.
Many of the commentators justifiably
voiced concern about our capacity to draw
definitive conclusions from these cases. We
agree with this concern and were quite
aware from the beginning that these cases
could not definitively adjudicate the question of whether the costs of tightly coupled
individual and team incentives outweigh
their benefits. This is a fundamentally important question that we do not believe has
been adequately addressed by researchers.
Cases like this do, however, highlight issues
that are underresearched and questions that
we cannot answer. Given the lack of systematic data collected by the company at the
time and our limited retrospective interviews, the interpretation of these cases depends in part on the frame the reader uses.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the seven
commentators had different reactions to our
article and different explanations for the
PFP failures, though there were many overlapping points. We saw three different primary frames being applied in explaining the
failures. They were:
1. Unit managers’ lack of knowledge
about how to design and implement PFP.
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… we disagree
with the
implication
that if the
managers
had just been
a bit smarter
and more
experienced in
designing and
implementing
PFP, these
problems could
have been
avoided.
2. Tightly coupled individual and
group incentives did not fit the highcommitment culture of HewlettPackard, a company that historically
had eschewed instrumental incentive systems.
3. Local unit managers’ failure to involve their employees in the decision
to adopt PFP, its design, and solving
the problems of implementation.
All three frames are reasonable ways to
evaluate what happened at HP. All three explanations probably account for why the PFP
initiatives were abandoned. What we don’t
understand is the relative importance and interaction of these three frames of reference
in explaining success and failure. Below we
discuss these three interpretations of PFP
and along the way we also respond to a few
misinterpretations of our assertions.
1. Unit managers lacked knowledge
about how to design and implement
PFP. We were struck by how much
agreement there was about how difficult it is to design and implement
PFP. Unfortunately, few consultants
give this warning to managers and
few academics frame their research
in a way that enables an assessment
of the costs associated with PFP
(Gerhart’s work is an exception). We
agree with Locke, Heneman, and
Dailey that the failure to implement
PFP effectively can be attributed to a
number of “familiar problems,” as
Heneman says. And we agree with
most of the factors cited: changes in
standards of performance (Locke reminds us that Frederick Taylor
warned against this and Kochan tells
us that Lesieur did as well), the lack
of control by employees over factors
that affected performance, the appropriate design of performance
measures, the use of peer evaluation, insufficient payouts, and the
lack of knowledge by managers
about PFP and communication to
employees about PFP. All commentators agreed that an uncertain and
changing environment exacerbates the
problem of designing and implementing PFP, but only Kochan’s discussion
of participation and negotiation went
beyond the recommendation of simply
better anticipation.
While we believe all these and
many other factors did indeed undermine the success of the HP pay initiatives, we disagree with the implication that if the managers had just
been a bit smarter and more experienced in designing and implementing
PFP, these problems could have been
avoided. Heneman speculates, for example, that if the employees had received better training, there had been
better communication, and the
human resource function had been
more involved, these failures would
not have occurred. We have heard
these refrains about better design
and implementation from advocates
of PFP many times but are skeptical.
There are simply too many PFP failures to be explained away by poor design and poor implementation. PFP
advocates and researchers, we think,
have ignored the risks and costs associated with PFP, as Gerhart has also
suggested. It seems to us, just as it
appeared to the managers at HP, that
in many instances the cost (time and
money) of designing and redesigning
PFP systems, low morale, employee
focus on pay rather than the competitive task, loss of flexibility, and reduced teamwork make PFP a far less
universal answer to management’s
search for high performance than
normally assumed. Kochan reminds
us that McKersie and Hunter (1973)
found that “there is a powerful tendency for all incentives to deteriorate,” which means of course that
they must be redesigned and renegotiated over and over again. Elsewhere, Beer and Katz (2003) found
the same effect for executive incentive systems. We do not disagree with
Heneman that more communication,
training, and support from the
Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay-for-Performance
human resource function would have
helped, but these have to be added to
the cost side of the equation.
2. The choice of PFP design did not fit
the high-commitment culture at
Hewlett-Packard. Underlying the critique by Locke, Heneman, and Dailey, discussed above, is the implication that the difficulties with tightly
coupled PFP must be overcome at all
cost because such systems are essential for high performance. They seem
to reject our speculations that PFP
failed because it did not fit HP’s
high-commitment culture. Baron
and Gerhart, on the other hand, supported this view. We do not agree
with Ledford’s view that a wide body
of research has shown that tightly
coupled PFP plans are more likely to
be successful in high-commitment
organizations. For example, Pfeffer
(1998), in his book The Human
Equation, concludes that high-commitment and performance companies typically aggregated PFP at the
organizational level, not at the individual or group level. The findings of
the GLOBE project discussed by
Baron support the idea that companies choose an array of practices that
fit together. Firms that utilize instrumental mechanisms such as process,
measurement, and incentives as control mechanisms tended not to employ strategy, networks, and culture
as means of control and vice versa.
The Stanford research into the HRM
systems of high-technology companies of which Baron has been a part
also found that HRM systems align
and they align around the assumptions and beliefs of the founder or
successor CEO (Baron, Burton, &
Hannan, 1996). According to this research, fit trumps someone else’s
best practice.
It seemed to us that the noise
level about PFP and lowered trust
at HP that caused management to
abandon the team-based bonus systems reflected the fit principle.
Ledford suggests that managers inexperienced in managing instrumental
PFP systems may have overreacted.
But it may also be true, as we argued,
that they reacted to lowered trust
and commitment more aggressively
then other managers because they
saw these qualities in their relationship with employees as valuable assets to be protected. Our discussion
of Fiorina’s transformation of HP
away from a high-commitment system years later and the noise levels
and shortfall in performance that followed was intended to illustrate a
contrasting approach within the
same company, one that indeed did
damage HP’s high-commitment system. It was also intended to show
that PFP does not necessarily lead to
higher performance. We were not
confused, as Dailey seems to suggest, about the fact that these were
independent events motivated by different change agendas.
Pay-for-performance researchers
and consultants too often start with
the premise that pay-for-performance
systems are desirable as opposed to
helping managers answer a more fundamental question first: What are
your assumptions, value, and strategy,
and, therefore, what kind of HRM system do you want to build? The literature does discuss strategy, but values
and assumptions are not given sufficient weight. Having helped managers with this fundamental choice,
decisions about PFP can be made
much more cogently. A legitimate
goal of PFP might simply be fair pay,
a goal Lesieur reminded Kochan’s
students is essential for PFP success.
Other means such as work itself, involvement, leadership, and culture
can also provide rewards for performance, though these are less instrumental. Underlying assumptions
about motivation and pay reflect assumptions about the nature of
“man,” as McGregor (1960) pointed
out. Decisions about how to design
•
47
A legitimate
goal of PFP
might simply be
fair pay…
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2004
PFP reflect these assumptions and
influence the emerging HRM system.
And, of course, if the HRM system
has been set up with Theory X assumptions, it probably means that
only Theory X pay-for-performance
systems (pay tightly coupled to measurable goals) will fit. As Baron suggests, ideal organizational types,
whether they are based on soft or
hard control systems, may be more
effective then HRM systems that try
to mix these approaches. Compensation research has not engaged these
questions adequately to date. It has
almost completely ignored the underlying character of the HRM system as
an important contextual factor.
3. Failure of local unit managers to involve their employees in decisions
about the new PFP system. All commentators agreed that an uncertain
environment poses major challenges for all PFP systems. Tom
Kochan reminded us, using lessons
learned by Fred Lesieur in implementing Scanlon Plans, that participation in PFP design and implementation by those affected is a key
to success. As we said in the article,
participation and negotiation are
the overarching principles for successful implementation. As Lesieur
suggests, participation in the decision to adopt the plan, in its design,
in potential changes to the PFP
plan, and in its administration are
essential. Without it, employees will
come to see the inevitable changes
REFERENCES
Baron, J. N, Burton, D. M., & Hannan, M. T.
(1996). The road taken: Origins and evolution
of employment systems in emerging companies. Industrial and Corporate Change, 2,
239–275.
Beer, M., & Katz, N. (2003). Do incentives work?
The perceptions of a worldwide sample of se-
View publication stats
in standards of performance and
payout as unfair. Such participation
is, of course, a cost that must be
weighed against the benefits of PFP.
It seems to us that management is
often attracted to the promise of
PFP without considering the risks
and costs involved in participation,
probably because, as Kochan points
out, employee voice has fallen out
of fashion. The costs do not show
up until later. What the tradeoffs
are between top-down introduction
and participation in PFP design requires further research.
These three different frames applied by
experts in the field suggest that our current
understanding of PFP is incomplete. Future
research into the success and failure of PFP
introductions must collect data within all
three frames—design and implementation, fit
of the system with the culture, and the extent
of employee participation. Without understanding PFP through all three lenses, we are
unable to advise management competently. If
there is one thing we can learn from the different assessments of these cases it is that attributing failure to managers’ lack of competence in anticipating potential problems
when designing PFP is an oversimplification.
As Baron suggests, the conditions that make
PFP “especially desirable or feasible, paradoxically, make it especially tough to implement.” This is probably why some companies
concerned about trust and commitment generally eschew instrumental PFP systems except in situations that are most favorable to
effective implementation over time.
nior executives. Human Resource Planning,
26(3), 30–44.
McGregor, D. (1960). The human side of the enterprise, New York: McGraw-Hill
McKersie, R. B., & Hunter, L. C. (1973). Pay, productivity, and collective bargaining. London:
Macmillan.
Pfeffer, J. (1998). The human equation. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.