Modern Moral Epistemology Kenneth R. WESTPHAL Department of Philosophy Boðaziçi Üniversitesi, Ýstanbul In: Aaron ZIMMERMAN, Karen JONES, & Mark TIMMONS, eds., The Routledge Handbook to Moral Epistemology (2019), 254–273. This conspectus of ‘Modern’ moral epistemology (17th–19th Centuries, C.E.) shows how much of the contemporary agenda in moral epistemology was set then, and how in some important regards unlikely philosophical allies – Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel – made greater contributions than are familiar today. One virtue of moral philosophy in this period is that it includes both ethics and justice as its proper species, and often includes philosophy of education as its proper appendix. Sophisticated versions of many genre of moral philosophy were developed: natural law morality, commonsense morality, rationalist teleological theories (perfectionism), moral sentiment theories, moral consensus theories, utilitarianism, social contract theories, conservatism, varieties of moral constructivism, and a neglected species which may be called ‘natural law constructivism’. Prompted by issues of war and peace, international trade, scepticism and relativism, Grotius (1625) argued, contra sceptics and relativists, that natural law morality obligates us independently of theism or theology. The period is pervaded by permutations of Socrates’ question to Euthyphro about, e.g., whether an action accords with right reason (orthos logos) because it contributes to achieving the highest moral good, or instead whether an action contributes to achieving the highest moral good because is accords with right reason. More severe that Chisholm’s ‘Problem of the Criterion’ and Williams’ ‘Aggripan Trilemma’, this period is also pervaded by concern with the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion, which highlights crippling difficulties inherent in foundationalism, coherentism, self-evidence, and dogmatism. This Dilemma can be resolved, as Hegel recognized, by Kant’s Critical account of rational judgment and justification in non-formal domains, including matters moral. Natural Law Constructivism shows that strictly objective basic moral principles can be identified and justified rigorously, without appeal to moral realism (pro or contra) and without appeal to moral motivation or to sentiments. 1 INTRODUCTION. Philosophical taxonomies vary significantly; on the European continent, ‘Modern’ philosophy is commonly regarded as beginning in the Seventeenth Century (C.E.) and continuing to the present – despite declarations that our age is ‘Post-Modern’ (or even ‘post truth’). In Anglophone circles, ‘Modern’ philosophy is commonly regarded as a Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century affair, followed by a century of philosophical excesses, ‘philosophy’ being re-born early in the Twentieth Century. This chapter considers key issues and views in moral epistemology in the Seventeenth through the Nineteenth Centuries. This period set much of the current agenda in moral epistemology, though also innovated in ways which merit recovery. Anglophone philosophers largely credit Descartes’s Meditations (1641) with inaugurating Modern philosophy. Yet Jean Barbeyrac (in 1708) and Thomas Reid (in 1788) lauded Hugo Grote, or © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 1 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. Grotius (1625), for inaugurating modern moral philosophy, centrally because he argued against sceptics and relativists that natural law morality would obligate us independently of the Almighty, thus breaking with Thomistic syntheses of pagan philosophy and Christian theology. This Grotius did in his major work, De jure belli ac pacis (Of Justice in War and Peace, Prol. §11; cf. Schneewind 1991). For a host of cultural, intellectual, religious and political reasons, innovation in moral philosophy was urgently needed. Culturally, the expansion of international commerce inevitably provoked issues about cultural relativity. Intellectually, Sextus Empiricus’ great compilations of Pyrrhonian scepticism were translated into Latin, edited and published by Étienne Stephani (or: Stephanus, also editor of Plato’s dialogues), first his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Paris, 1562), then a scholarly edition of all extant works (1569); this edition appeared again in Genève (1621), with a bi-lingual critical edition by Fabricius (Greek and Latin; Leipzig, 1718). Pyrrhonian sceptical concerns were propagated by Montaigne’s Essays (1580, vols. 1, 2; 1588, vol. 3), so influential that they established the very genre of the essay. Regarding religion and politics, what should have been evident from – if not before – those sanguineous events Christian militants called their anti-Muslim ‘Crusades’ (1096–99, 1147–49, 1189–92, 1202–61), European Christians brought home to themselves in their Thirty Years’ War (1618–48). These violent lessons were augmented by the English civil wars (1642–51), three Anglo-Dutch wars (1652–54, 1665–67, 1672–74) and the English revolution (1688–89). Born upon arrival of the Spanish Armada (5 April 1588), in his autobiography Hobbes quipped: ‘fear and I were born twins together’. In this period, moral philosophy too was in turmoil, with a profusion of attempts to identify and to justify fundamental moral laws or principles, and to explain how we can recognise them and behave accordingly. One major shift in moral outlook during the Seventeenth Century is to regard human beings as equally and sufficiently morally competent, unless proven otherwise; thus no longer regarding morality as consisting primarily in obedience to authority, whether of custom, tradition, governors, clergy or the Almighty (Schneewind 1998). Any cleft between causal laws of nature and normative laws of morality was not yet manifest; nature was regarded as divinely ordered, so that natural laws pertain to human governance in ways comparable to other natural regularities. Human coöperation was recognised to be necessary both to the common good and to individuals’ good, though lack of foresight, understanding or due consideration to others, i.e., excessive self-interest or ignorance, pose huge obstacles to achieving sufficient, proper forms of social coöperation. As Newtonian physics became established, major issues appeared to loom about whether or how human agency can be free, responsible and thus morally imputable. Hence moral philosophy addressed a broad agenda of issues regarding agency, freedom, motivation, perception, sensibility, understanding, authority and legitimacy. From the Ancient Greeks up to the very end of the Nineteenth Century, including Sidgwick (1883, 1891, 1898, 1903), moral philosophy was regarded as the proper genus comprising two coördinate species: ethics and justice. Considerations of constitutional and civil law were central to moral philosophy throughout this period. This host of practical issues bear upon moral epistemology, and conversely. This concise review of modern moral epistemology focuses on several main issues and alternatives regarding the identification and justification of basic moral norms or principles; for more comprehensive treatments see Further Readings. 2 NATURAL LAW & MORAL TELEOLOGY. One recurrent epistemological as well as moral issue in ‘teleological’ moral theories concerns the © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 2 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. relation of orthos logos – recta ratio, right reason: reason(s) which indicate(s) what is morally right to do, and why so – to the final end(s) of human action: Whether an action (or a reason for action) is right because it contributes to the final end(s) of human action; or whether an action contributes to the final end(s) of human action because that action accords with right reason (or is done because it so accords). Aristotle, the Stoics and Leibniz held the latter view, though many teleological natural law theories held the former (e.g., Wolff 1769, Baumgarten 1763, cf. Ahrens 1850, 1870; Muirhead 1897, 1932).1 Both options raise acute issues about whether or how we can correctly identify right reason(s), and justify our so identifying them, in contrast to merely apparent, morally negligent or vicious reasons. Though Modern moral philosophers and natural lawyers were theists, including Hobbes though excepting Hume, the Thirty Years’ War made plain that moral principles must be identified and justified independently of sectarian theology. Various authors attempted to revamp Classical notions of jus gentium – natural moral law holding for all humanity; an incipiently cosmopolitan aspiration. Natural law theories derive from Ancient Greek and Classical Roman sources; e.g., Plato (esp. Laws 903) and Cicero (de Leg. 42–44); Julia Annas puts the points relevant here succinctly: We recognise natural law … by reflecting on human reason recognising its role in the cosmos. We come to realise that law has an objective basis in nature, not just in the force of existing human laws. Having a share in natural law unites all rational beings in a community in which they are related to one another by natural justice. So justice, a proper attitude to ourselves and to others in relation to ourselves, has a natural basis. And when we articulate what is involved in having this proper attitude to ourselves and to others, we can see that this is the basis of all the virtues. … nature … has given us all shared conceptions (intelligentiae communes) which are latent and unarticulated, but which everyone can develop until we achieve clear and distinct knowledge – assuming … that we are not corrupted by pleasure, or misled by specious divergences of opinion. (Annas 2103, 214) Many stout volumes of Modern natural law and natural theology (e.g., Wolff 1769, Paley 1802) are devoted to detailing in extenso the divine order of nature, and of human life and society within it, in grandiloquent, comprehensive synopsis, apparently so as to induce within the reader a wonder, admiration and inspiration by this order, re-presented by the wise author of the treatise in hand, who comprehensively details divine providence within nature and society. However majestic, the epistemological problems are evident, well before the same literary technique is used to very different ends by the conservative traditionalist, Burke, in his Vindication of Natural Society (1757) and his highly imaginative Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Natural law theories span the range from radical reformist, even revolutionary, to conservative, depending upon the author’s view of the most ‘natural’, hence proper, order of things: individual liberty, or conservative stability (Stanlis 1955, 1958; Neumann 1957; Haakonssen 2002). With characteristic relish Nietzsche skewered the key problem with traditional natural law, exemplified by Stoic views: “According to nature” you want to live? … In truth, the matter is altogether different: while you pretend rapturously to read the canon of your law in nature, you want … to impose your morality, your ideal, … you demand that [nature] should be nature “according to the Stoa,” and you would like all existence to exist only after your own image – as an immense eternal glorification and generalisation of Stoicism. (Nietzsche 1886, §9) One epistemological problem is that (putative) normative natural laws cannot be specified unam1 On Leibniz see Johns (2013); for more detailed discussion of this contrast, see Westphal (2016b). © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 3 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. biguously, much less sufficiently, by appeal to empirical evidence open to public scrutiny. Though long-term self-interest may largely coincide with the requirements of justice, when issues of welfare and advantage arise, so do controversies about which ‘facts’ are relevant, how they are relevant and what they justify. Addressing these questions provokes issues about relevant criteria of justification, and whether or how those criteria can be identified and justified. 3 IDENTIFYING & JUSTIFYING BASIC NORMS: PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS. Though Grotius is one of the few to mention Sextus Empiricus (1625, 1.12, 5.7) – and at the outset, Carneades (1625, Prol. §§5, 17, 18; 12.9.1) – thanks to Montaigne’s Essays if not to Sextus Empiricus’s works, Modern moral philosophers sought to address, if implicitly, the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion: … in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who claim to know] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning. (PH 2.20, cf. 1.116–7) Stated regarding criteria of truth, this Dilemma holds equally of criteria of justification; often mistaken today for the original, the Pyrrhonian Dilemma is more severe than Chisholm’s ‘Problem of the Criterion’ and Williams’ ‘Aggripan Trilemma’ (Westphal 2017, §§60, 84). This Dilemma directly undermines two standard approaches to justification: foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalist justification starts with first principles or basic facts, and seeks to justify other important claims on their basis by deduction or other derivation (‘basing’) relations. Coherentism rejects the foundationalist distinction between basic and derived claims or principles, and seeks to justify principles or specific claims through their maximally comprehensive and informative integration within a coherent system of claims, a whole view – however extensive or specific it may be (see further chapter 22). One key problem foundationalists must address is why their preferred first principles or basic claims are plausible, true or justified. Citing ‘values’ as foundations for identifying and justifying a moral theory cannot assist our determining which ‘values’ are the appropriate such foundations, just as Sextus’s Dilemma indicates. Proponents of natural law, intuitionism, strong forms of moral particularism and commonsense moral theories often claim that basic foundational moral claims are self-evident. Sidgwick (1874, 7th ed.: 1907, 382) and Pritchard (1912) claim that basic moral judgments, when properly conceived and considered, are as self-evident as elementary geometrical proofs. That itself is mistaken: geometry provides proofs by reductio ad absurdum and disjunctive syllogism; no such proof or reductio is afforded by basic moral intuitions (Westphal 2016a, §41). Others have claimed that basic moral truths are manifestly evident to human reason, as in jus gentium; e.g., Locke proclaimed that the non-governmental state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 4 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. (Locke, ST §6) Locke equally proclaimed a natural right to punish transgressions of the law of nature (ST §§7, 12), and correctly distinguished punishment from revenge (ST §8). Yet no party to a dispute can be entrusted to judge or to act impartially (ST §§124–8); unjust use of force against anyone’s person amounts to war, according to Locke (ST §19). Hence within the non-governmental ‘state of nature’ we cannot be entitled to prosecute putative violations of the law of nature; Locke’s own claims about the law of nature are insufficiently evident, within his own terms (Westphal 2016a, §45). Thomas Reid likewise held that ‘There must therefore be in morals, as in all other sciences, first or self-evident principles, on which all moral reasoning is grounded, and on which it ultimately rests’ (1788, 3.6), yet he acknowledged that genuine basic principles must be distinguished from counterfeit (1788, 5.1), which requires sufficient education, ‘ripeness of understanding’ and lack of prejudice (1785, 6.4, 6.8). Reid’s appeals to self-evidence and to commonsense morality invoke reliabilist and evidentiary (testimonial) considerations underwritten, he believed, by the Almighty: In a matter of common sense, every man is no less a competent judge than a mathematician is in a mathematical demonstration; and there must be a great presumption that the judgment of mankind, in such a matter, is the natural issue of those faculties which God hath given them. … Who can doubt whether men have universally believed, that there is a right and a wrong in human conduct; some things that merit blame, and others that are entitled to approbation? The universality of these opinions, and of many such that might be named, is sufficiently evident, from the whole tenor of human conduct, as far as our acquaintance reaches, and from the history of all ages and nations of which we have any records. (Reid 1785, 6.4) Appealing to the uniformity of human nature and sentiments rather than to divine providence, Hume (1758) similarly claimed the universal approbation of, e.g., friendship. One problem with such appeals is that much of the claimed uniformity is more apparent than real; e.g., friendships amongst the morally vicious (bigots, racists, sexists) strongly tend to reinforce those friends’ shared vices. The presumed ‘universal’ rights of man and citizen declared by the French Republic (1789) conspicuously omitted women, whose equal rights also as citizens were proclaimed by Olympe de Gouges (Paris 1791). With equal clarity and conviction Jeremy Bentham (1795) proclaimed: ‘Natural Rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts’ (WJB, 2:501A). Naturally enough, to Sextus Empiricus it appeared that any such ‘bare assertion counter-balances a bare assertion’ (AL 1.315; cf. 2.464). ‘Self-evidence’ suffers the same epistemological difficulties noted above regarding traditional and Modern natural law theories. In regard to any cognitively or morally significant claim, no account of self-evidence succeeds in distinguishing adequately or reliably in principle or in practice between: (a) someone’s being utterly convinced that s/he has grasped a significant truth, and on that sole basis believes that claim to be true; in contrast to: (b) grasping a significant truth, and on that sole basis being convinced that one has indeed grasped that significant truth. Self-evidence re-iterates manifold Cartesian circularities in each alleged instance.2 Even when strong, durable consensus may prevail, commonsense morality may be insufficiently enlightened or virtuous: J.S. Mill (1850, 1869) argued vigorously against the altogether predominant commonsense morality which condoned or supported sexism, racism and slavery. Commonsense consensus is thus insufficient to identify or to justify basic moral principles. For 2 Five distinct, vicious justificatory circles vitiate Descartes’ Meditations (Westphal 1989, 18–34). © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 5 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. similar reasons, neither are coherence nor reflective equilibrium (Griffin 1996, 124–5; Daniels 1996, 333–52): vicious people or (e.g.) morally negligent contractarians or intuitionists can hold entirely consistent, coherent, integrated moral views which are nevertheless morally inadequate, negligent, irresponsible or willfully vicious. Utilitarianism offers a different strategy for identifying and justifying fundamental moral principles. Jeremy Bentham’s (1786–1830) extensive writings in jurisprudence won him acclaim as ‘legislator to the world’ and as ‘the Newton of legislation’3; his unqualified hedonist account of value directly answers the vital question: Who or what falls within the moral domain, directly or indirectly, and who or what does not? In this regard J.S. Mill followed suit, including within the scope of moral concern not only ‘all mankind’ but ‘so far as the nature of things admits, … the whole [of] sentient creation’ (1861, CW 10:214). Though Bentham (1823, 4, 5) sketched a procedure for calculating and comparing the expected utilities of various acts – whether by individuals, groups or governments – neither hedons nor dolors (units of pain) have yielded to quantification. Acknowledging that actual calculations cannot be made, Bentham (1789, 4.6) suggested that his procedure ‘may … always be kept in view’ and approximated. Waiving issues of quantification, three difficulties stand out (they and others are discussed elsewhere in this Handbook): Bentham’s procedure may select between total quantities of net pleasure, yet for that reason, his procedure says nothing about whether alternative net distributions of pleasure(s) across a group, nation, region or the globe are more or less utile, moral or just than others. Second, Bentham’s calculations appear largely to accord with commonsense notions of just distribution only if sentient creatures all experience diminishing marginal utility, so that obtaining more of any one good provides him or her ever lesser increments of utility. The presence of some few who instead experience increasing marginal utility (‘utility monsters’) throw off the putative utilitarian calculations; discounting or disregarding such utility monsters requires appeal to non-utilitarian reasons or standards. Third, to many it appears entirely evident that, if someone enjoys committing unjust or morally vicious acts, that happiness neither does nor can count at all in favour of so acting. Understandably, J.S. Mill rescinded hedonism (1861, 2.4; CW 10:211), but unleashed a flood of questions about whether or how ‘utility’ can be used to specify which acts are obligatory, permissible or forbidden. Critics often suspect that utilitarians’ claims about which acts are most advisable because they are (putatively) most utile, instead reflect prior convictions such that those acts are said to be most utile because they are advisable; similar concerns arise in the putative weighing of the net moral worth of various consequences, now that usefulness rather than happiness or pleasure have assumed centre stage in contemporary consequentialist moral theories. This suspicion permutes the question Socrates put to Euthyphro, whether the pious is pious because the gods so love it, or whether the gods so love it because it is the pious (Euthyphro, 10d). Another such permutation runs through Hume’s views on moral sentiments, whether such sentiments merely respond to (and so indicate) a vicious or virtuous act or character, or whether an act or character is virtuous or vicious because we so respond to it with moral sentiments. Hume’s nominalism and explanatory aims drive his ethical theory toward the latter, more radical view; he takes great care to try to explain how any distinctively moral valence comes to characterise the relevant pleasures or displeasures.4 Reid (1788, 5.5, 5.7) advocates the former, less radical view, that our moral sentiments respond to moral characteristics of acts or persons, which characteristics or status our sentiments do not constitute. Settling this disagreement by philosophical means 3 See Beneke’s Vorrede to his translation of Bentham (1830b), iii–xxv; Gervinus (1859), 3–40; Schofield (1998). On Hume’s two accounts of moral sentiments see Westphal (2016a), §§13.3, 14.1, 15.1, 16. 4 © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 6 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. does not appear promising, unless other standards, independent of sentiments, are established to specify which moral sentiments are (sufficiently) appropriate to what acts or observations; which feelings are apt is not specified reliably by mere feelings of aptness. Social contract theories offer still different strategies for identifying and justifying basic moral norms. Socrates (as reported in Plato’s Crito) sketched an implicit yet fundamental agreement by which he was obligated to obey the laws of Athens. Though it was well understood that few if any actual societies were founded by contract, social contract analyses of political obligation gained prominence in the Modern period, especially in the writings of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Such analyses raise another version of the Euthyphro question: Whether a particular social contract analysis illustrates, illuminates or ratifies the (agreement-independent) grounds and principles of moral or political obligation, or instead whether that analysis or persons’ agreement to its terms constitutes those grounds or their normative validity. The latter, much more (analytically) radical view has been explored by contemporary moral philosophers (esp. Gauthier 1997). Advocates of such radical views often claim that their contractual agreements bootstrap the very grounds and principles of moral (or political) obligation into existence, or at least into validity. Exactly how such bootstrapping is possible is often neglected. A credible account is required, because de facto agreement does not suffice for de jure agreement (and so for normative justification of the terms of that agreement) unless several agreement-independent conditions are met, including all the conditions of fair bargaining, sufficient information and sufficient independent resources so as to conclude such an agreement as a free agent with sufficient resources and understanding to be free not to conclude that agreement. Because we homo sapiens sapiens are so profoundly and manifoldly limited and interdependent creatures, that kind of free contractual agency is illusory (Westphal 2016a, §§29–34). A further critical question about any social contract analysis of moral, social or political obligation is whether the counter-factual contractual situation is so designed as to achieve the theorist’s antecedently desired results: What issues are kept off the contractualist agenda can be as morally important as any issues expressly stated in it (cf. Pateman 1988); note too that Adam Smith did not hold the laissez faire views ascribed to him by neo-conservatives (Lieberman 2006, Long 2006, Rothschild & Sen 2006). That we are such manifoldly interdependent beings was widely acknowledged in the Modern period. It was common to seek to identify and justify the grounds and principles of moral obligation by appeal to psychological or anthropological premises. Here Hume’s cardinal distinction between facts and norms (‘is’ and ‘ought’) is crucial, for in connection with our psychology or anthropology Hume’s distinction highlights issues of ‘psychologism’ – an approach championed by Fries (1824), Beneke (1833) and Lipps (1893), prominent at the turn of the Twentieth Century across Europe and the Americas, though rejected by Kant (KdrV A86–7/B118–9) and sharply criticised by Frege (1884) and Husserl (1900): That we do think, feel, respond, judge, act or affiliate in various psychologically or anthropologically characteristic ways does not suffice to show that we should, nor that we are morally obligated, so to behave – or to behave in the ways issuing from such processes. Hume (T 3.1.1.27) is right that empirical facts alone – whether social, historical, geographical, anthropological or psychological – do not suffice to identify nor to justify normative principles or conclusions about what anyone morally may or ought (not) do. The Euthyphro Question and the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion thus raise fundamental challenges to the prospects and strategies for justifying moral views, in both ethics and justice, typical of Modern moral philosophy and its contemporary descendants. The Euthyphro question underscores the desideratum of robust moral objectivity; the Dilemma underscores the host of © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 7 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. problems confronting our identifying or justifying sufficiently robust, omni-lateral, objective moral principles. Though sound moral theory won’t persuade the obtuse or the vicious to change their ways, sound moral theory is required to identify who genuinely is obtuse or vicious, and what forms of prevention or redress are justifiable. Two further responses to these epistemological difficulties deserve note. One is to insist that morals is much more a matter of habituation, enculturation and sensibility than knowledge, so that the best we can do is also what we ought to do: to acquiesce in our own cultural tradition or society and behave accordingly, revising our social practices only piecemeal whenever such revisions can no longer be avoided. This kind of view may be called ‘reform conservatism’ (Epstein 1966, 13); this pre-Modern view was advocated prominently, zealously and very imaginatively by Burke (1790). Alternatively, following Rawls and also Hume’s sentiment-based ethics, many recent moral theories seek to ‘construct’ the basic principles of morals by identifying and analysing the significance of some preferred range of subjective factors, such as basic moral intuitions, various ‘response-dependent’ concepts, (putatively) apt feelings, manifest preferences or ‘validity claims’ (Habermas’ Geltungsansprüche). These are considered elsewhere in this Handbook; two points deserve note here. First, such irrealist or anti-realist moral constructions join Hume’s ethical theory in requiring pervasive uniformity in the human species of whatever factors are preferred by a specific moral construction. Such uniformity is historically and geographically fictitious. Moreover, this basis for moral theory tends to fail when we most need a credible moral theory: whenever issues of moral difference, disagreement or conflict arise (e.g., moral relativism, cultural chauvinism). Second, such constructivist theories strongly tend to regard moral justification as the task of justifying an action, claim or principle to some person(s) based upon his, her or their antecedent considerations, where these considerations are provided by or based upon the theory’s preferred domain of basic factors; i.e., such theories presume justificatory internalism, the view that all relevant justificatory considerations must be such that a person is aware of them, or can become aware of them by simple reflection. Consequently, such theories provide little or no justification to those persons who happen genuinely to lack those purportedly relevant antecedent basic factors, or to those who reject or disavow them or (finally) to ascetic adepts who have so conditioned themselves to lack or to be unmoved by them. These are precisely Kant’s grounds for seeking to analyse moral obligation and its justificatory grounds independently of human motives, affects or desires (Gr. §1, KprV 5:71–89). Kant’s aim to decouple issues of obligation from contents of our putative psychological states is corroborated by how Hume’s contrast between is and ought bears upon one of his key questions, ‘Why utility pleases’ (EPM §5): Hume disregards the question, whether utility ought to please, and ought to please morally. This review of issues central to Modern moral epistemology indicates how the current agenda of debates between contractarianism, Kantianism, consequentialism, intuitionism and contructivism was set then, and why it has remained vexed. Moral epistemology must solve or dissolve the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion, cogently answer the Euthyphro Question, avoid appeal to controversial substantive commitments – including the sorts of subjective factors taken to be basic by most contemporary moral constructivisms – and preserve individual moral liberty. An unexpected theoretical alliance reveals that Modern moral epistemology achieved all this. 4 NATURAL LAW CONSTRUCTIVISM. The social contract tradition – including Hobbes’ – is a branch of the natural law tradition. © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 8 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. Hume’s key insight is that the core content of a natural law theory can be identified independently of issues about moral realism (i.e., mind-independent moral facts to which true moral judgments correspond). Hume recognised that if the most fundamental rules of justice may be artificial, it does not follow that they are optional or arbitrary: The basic artifices of justice are altogether necessary to our very finite species of embodied, interdependent agency (T 3.2.1.19). Why so is revealed by the two most important points Hobbes established in his analysis of the nongovernmental state of nature: 1) Unlimited individual freedom of action is impossible due to consequent total mutual interference. Hence the fundamental moral question is not, Whether individual freedom of action may or must be limited, but rather: What are the proper, justifiable limits of individual freedom of action? 2) Complete though innocent, non-malicious ignorance of what belongs to whom suffices to generate the total mutual interference characterised in the non-governmental state of nature as the war of all on all. Consequently, justice must fundamentally be public justice, to remedy such ignorance and thus to substitute social coördination for chronic mutual interference. The key to providing objectivity within a constructivist moral theory is not to appeal to subjective states of the kinds prominent in contemporary forms of moral constructivism (mentioned above), but instead to appeal to objective facts about our human form of finite, embodied rational agency and to circumstances of action basic to the human condition. Hume’s theory of justice focusses upon physiological and geographical facts about the vital needs of human beings, our limited capacities to act, the relative scarcity of materials required for us to meet our vital needs and our ineluctable mutual interdependence. The principles Hume constructs (i.e., identifies) on their basis merit the designation ‘Laws of Nature’ because for human beings they are utterly indispensable and so are non-optional. Hume’s strategy breaks the deadlock in moral theory between moral realists and non- or anti-realists, by showing that their debate about ontology is irrelevant to identifying basic, objective, universal moral principles. Hume’s most basic social coördination problems stem directly from Hobbes: Under conditions of relative scarcity of external goods, the easy transfer of goods from one person to another, the limited benevolence typical of human nature, our natural ignorance of who rightly possesses what, and our mutual interdependence due to human frailties, we require a system of rightful possession to stabilise the distribution and use of goods and thereby to avoid chronic, fatally incapacitating mutual interference.5 The minimum effective and feasible solution to this social coördination problem is to establish, in principle and in practice, this principle: Respect rights to possessions! This is Hume’s first Principle of Justice. Hume’s three principles of justice are ‘that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises’ (T 3.2.6.1, cf. 3.2.11.2). His construction of these basic rules of justice shows that they count for us human beings as ‘laws of nature’ because without them human social life – and thus all of human life – is impossible. Remarkably, Hume constructs his entire account of justice and argues for its fundamental utility without appeal to sentiments, moral or otherwise. In particular, Hume’s exemplary case by which he argues for rule rather than act utilitarianism – that justice rightly requires 5 Relative scarcity of goods: T 3.2.2, ¶¶7, 16, 18; their easy transfer: T 3.2..2, ¶¶7, 16; our limited generosity: T 3.2..2.16, 3.2.5.8, 3.3.3.24; natural ignorance of possession: T 3.2.2.11, 3.4.2.2, 3.2.6.3–4; limited powers and consequent mutual interdependence: T 3.2.2.2–3. © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 9 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. returning a lost fortune even to a miser or to a seditious bigot (T 3.2.2.22) – neither involves nor requires appeal to anyone’s sentiments nor to any agent’s character. I call the approach Hume thus inaugurated ‘Natural Law Constructivism’. Hume’s basic rules of justice omit personal safety, security and collectively permissible distributions of social benefits and burdens. Rousseau (1762) addressed these issues by adopting, adapting and augmenting Hume’s constructivist method (Westphal 2013a). Rousseau’s conditio sine qua non for just collective distributions of wealth is that no one is permitted to have any kind or extent of wealth, power or privilege which enables him or her to command unilaterally the actions of anyone else (Neuhouser 2000, 64–78). That kind of dependence upon the personal will of others Rousseau (CS 1.6.1, 1.8.2) rules out as an unjust infringement of any- and everyone’s ‘original’ right to be free to act solely upon his or her own will. More clearly than Hume, Rousseau emphasised that principles of justice and the institutions and practices they inform are mandatory for us in conditions of population density which generate mutual interference. Rousseau’s insistence that social institutions be such that no one can unilaterally command the will (and so the action) of another is required for moral freedom, which requires only obeying self-legislated laws. This may be called Rousseau’s ‘Independence Requirement’. Rousseau’s proclamation of and plea for moral autonomy may be bracing, yet analysing and justifying moral autonomy as the correct account of human freedom and conditio sine qua non of moral justification is Kant’s key Critical contribution. Kant’s universalisation tests (using the universal law formula of the Categorical Imperative) determine whether performing a proposed act would treat any other person only as a means, and not at the same time also as a free rational agent. The key point of Kant’s method for identifying and justifying moral duties and proscriptions is to show that sufficient justifying grounds to commit a proscribed act cannot be provided to all affected parties. Conversely, sufficient justifying grounds for omitting positive moral obligations cannot be provided to all affected parties. By contrast, morally legitimate actions are such that sufficient justifying reasons for so acting can be given to all affected parties, also on the occasion of one’s own act (O’Neill 2000a, 200; Westphal 2016a, §§26–28). Sufficient justifying reasons which can be given to all affected parties are such that all others can, they are able, to follow consistently the very same principle (for the very same reasons) in thought or action on the same occasion as one proposes to act on that maxim. This is a modal issue of capacity and ability, not a psychological claim about what someone can(not) bring him- or herself to believe or to do, nor an issue of de facto agreement or acceptance. This possibility of adopting a maxim expressing a principle of, and grounds for, action thus differs fundamentally from ‘accepting’ one, in the senses of ‘believe’, ‘endorse’ or ‘agree to’. Kant’s tests rule out any maxim which cannot possibly be adopted by others on the same occasion on which one proposes to act on that maxim. The universality involved in Kant’s tests includes the agent’s own action, and extends (counter-factually) to all agents acting the same way at that time and over time. What we can or cannot adopt as a maxim is constrained by the form of behaviour or its guiding principle (maxim), by basic facts about our finite form of embodied rational agency, by basic features of our worldly context of action and most centrally by whether the maxim of the proposed action cannot be adopted (in the indicated sense) by others because that action either evades, deceives, over-rides or over-powers their rational agency. Kant’s Contradiction in Conception test directly rules out maxims and acts of coercion, deception, fraud and exploitation. In principle, such maxims preclude offering to relevant others – most obviously to victims – reasons sufficient to justify their following those maxims, their (putatively) © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 10 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. justifying reasons or the courses of action they guide in thought or action, especially as the agent acts on his or her maxim (O’Neill 1989, 81–125). This is signalled by the lack of the very possibility of consent, which serves as a criterion of illegitimacy. Obviating the very possibility of consent on anyone’s part obviates the very possibility of offering sufficient justifying reasons for one’s action to all affected parties. Any act which obviates others’ possibility of acting upon sufficient justifying reasons cannot itself be justified, and so is morally proscribed (cf. Westphal 2018, §§2, 3). Because any maxim’s (or any course of action’s) passing his universalisation tests requires that sufficient justifying reasons for that maxim or action can be given to all affected parties for acting on that maxim on that very occasion, such that they too can think, judge and act upon those same grounds, evidence and principles on that and on any relevant such occasion, Kant’s universalisation tests embody at their core equal respect for all persons as free rational agents, as agents who can determine what to think and to do by rationally assessing the reasons which justify that principle or act (as obligatory, permissible or prohibited). Thus Kant’s universalisation tests require no appeal to any independent premiss regarding the incommensurable value or ‘dignity’ of rational nature or the moral law. Ruling out maxims which fail to pass his universalisation tests establishes the minimum necessary conditions for resolving fundamental problems of conflict and social coördination which generated the central concern of Modern natural law theories with establishing normative standards to govern public life, despite deep disagreements amongst various groups about the substance of a good or pious life. These principles hold both domestically and internationally; they also concern ethnic and other inter-group relations. These principles are neutral regarding theology or secularism; their point is to establish minimum sufficient conditions for just and peaceful relations amongst groups or peoples who may disagree about such often contentious, divisive issues (O’Neill 2000b, 2003, 2004). Kant’s constructivism identifies and justifies key norms to which we are committed, regardless of whether we recognise it, by our rational requirements to act only in justified ways and by the limits of our very finite and interdependent form of human agency and our worldly context of action. According to Kant, there is no public use of reason without this Critical, constructivist principle of justification, which uniquely avoids presupposing any particular authority, whether ideological, religious, socio-historical or personal. Ulpian, the third Century (C.E.) Syrian natural lawyer, has been celebrated as a pioneer in human rights (Honoré 2002). Kant agrees: his sole innate right to freedom (MdS 6:237–8) includes constitutively innate equality, self-mastery and the presumption of innocence. These rights obligate us to Kant’s versions of Ulpian’s three core duties: to live honestly, to treat no one unjustly and to render unto each what is properly his or her own – which latter Kant reconceives as the duty to participate in a legitimate jurisdiction which secures each person’s proper due (MdS 6:236–7). Although Kant’s text may appear simply to assert these rights and duties, they are justified by his Critique of reason (in all three Critiques) as necessary to rational judgment and justification in all non-formal domains. (Exactly how and how well Kant justifies these views about rational justification cannot be detailed here; see Westphal 2016a, 2018.) Some important aspects of Kant’s justification of his account of rational justification can be indicated, as they were further explicated and augmented by Hegel, who used them to further develop the same Natural Law Constructivism in moral philosophy.6 If we focus solely upon 6 The important relations between Kant’s and Hegel’s views are not metaphysical; they are instead methodological, epistemological and semantic: Hegel was the first to realise that Kant’s Critical accounts of judgment, of rational justification and of conceptual explication – in all three Critiques and in his Critical principles of natural science and of morals – stand independently of, and indeed are more successful without, transcendental idealism, or any such view (Westphal 2018). Hegel’s infamous objection to empty formalism (Rph §135R) criticises the dozens of pseudo-Kantian © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 11 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. propositions and their inferential relations, the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion is insoluble. However, rational judgment not only assesses relevant evidence and its purported implications (conclusions, judgments); rational judgment requires and involves assessing one’s own judging to determine whether the considerations one presently brings together into a candidate judgment are integrated as they ought best to be integrated to form a cogent, informed, informative and welljustified judgment about the matter under consideration (KdrV B219, A261–3/B317–9). Hegel (1807) realised that the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion can be solved by carefully explicating the possibilities of self-critical assessment and of constructive mutual assessment; this is the ultimate significance of his account of mutual recognition (Westphal 2018, §§60–64, 83–91). Hegel’s explication of these critical and self-critical capacities are crucial to identifying and developing virtuous forms of justificatory circularity, and distinguishing these from vicious circularities.7 Methodologically and substantively, Natural Law Constructivism is neutral with regard to moral realism, because it is strictly independent of it; yet by this very fact it is consistent with the content of a traditional natural law theory. Physiological, psychological and geographical facts regarding our capacities as agents and our context of action are required to identify and to justify basic moral principles; these are morally relevant facts, they are not themselves moral facts. Accordingly, Natural Law Constructivism shows that the distinction between moral realism and moral constructivism, typically regarded as exclusive and exhaustive, is a false dichotomy. Because Natural Law Constructivism identifies and justifies core moral principles without appeal to subjective states (per above), it provides an important form of justificatory externalism: the grounds for identifying and justifying these core moral principles are not limited to factors of which individuals may (not) be aware. The physical, physiological, anthropological and sociological facts relevant to Natural Law Constructivism set the benchmark for assessing what individuals do (not) adequately acknowledge morally; what individuals may be willing to acknowledge does not set the benchmark for assessing moral relevance. Kant argued that rational principles – including moral principles – guide judgment; they do not univocally determine (fully specify) judgments (KdrV A132–5/B171–4, KprV 5:67–71). Kant also held that using the a priori principle of the categorical imperative (or its juridical counterpart, the universal law of justice) to identify our duties also requires a specifically ‘practical anthropology’, a catalogue of basic anthropological facts about our finite form of embodied semi-rational agency (Gr 4:412, TL §45; cf. Anth. 7:330–3). Taken together, these provide conditiones sine qua non to distinguish morally permissible, obligatory and prohibited forms of action. In this way, Kant’s universalisation tests specify which logoi can possibly be orthoi – which reasons can possibly be right, or morally upright, because they accord with and respect the Independence Requirement (Westphal 2016b). Only those actions, principles, reasons or practices can be (up)right for which we can address sufficient justifying reasons and analysis to all persons, such that they can consider, assess and judge those reasons and analysis to be sufficiently justifying, so that they too can guide their thought and action on that basis, on all relevant occasions, including the occasion on which one proposes so to act. This is Kant’s publicity requirement, that no one’s rational capacities be either evaded (e.g., by deception) or over-powered; these partially constitute the sole innate right to freedom. To act only in those ways which can be so justified is to treat everyone – including oneself – as a rational agent who is a moral person. So thinking and doing honours the Independence natural law theories published between Kant’s Groundwork (1785) and his own theory of justice (Rechtslehre, MdS Part 1; 1797); Westphal (2016–17), §9.1. 7 The relevant justificatory circularity is not a form of coherentism; why not is complex; key points are examined in Westphal (2017), the full account in Westphal (2018). On virtuous epistemic circularity, see Alston (1989), 319–49. © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 12 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. Requirement embedded in Kant’s sole innate right to freedom. Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, including his account of moral education, contributes to how we can learn, know and understand why and how acting and conducting ourselves with moral integrity is constitutive of our moral freedom, our autonomy, which includes our rational freedom from subjection to our own affects (cf. Rousseau, CS 1.8.3; pace Hume, T 2.3.3.4).8 To develop Kant’s account of moral autonomy and his basic deontic classifications into an action-guiding doctrine of duties – not merely a set of a priori principles of morals, but a code of moral conduct by which to act and to live – requires, Hegel realised, re-incorporating Kant’s Critical principles of morals into the moral sciences of political economy, jurisprudence and constitutional law. To do so, Hegel brilliantly drew upon Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1749) to show how legitimate law is justified only by how and how well it functions within a republic’s political, civil and economic institutions and activities, so as to facilitate, promote and protect free, voluntary, effective and responsible action by all.9 This Hegel does in his Philosophical Outlines of Justice (1821), which is the most robustly republican moral philosophy on record, in which Rousseau’s and Kant’s Independence Requirement is institutionalised and constitutionally protected as the civil right due each and every adult citizen to non-domination (Westphal 2017b, 2018). Central to Montesquieu’s and to Hegel’s republican philosophies of law is that freedom does not consist merely in the silence of the law (to do whatever is not illegal). Instead, most law is literally a vast artifice constituting enabling conditions without which an enormous range of daily activities, including nearly all forms of economic activity, would not be possible (Jhering 1897). Additionally, because law is so fundamental to the structure and functioning of the society into which people are born and within which they grow, mature, develop their skills, talents, work, leisure, aspirations and most often their own families, each person develops his or her own agency, personality, understanding, character, aspirations and achievements in ways made possible by the legal, economic and social structures and practices of his or her society. Hence the cardinal importance of legitimate law, both constitutional and statute, and the assessment and when justified: revision, repeal or replacement of statute law as people develop their social, political or economic activities in ways which further enhance their legitimate exercises of freedom. Hegel’s ardently republican system of political representation is designed to enable and to promote such political and legal culture, in part by insuring political representation to all civil, economic and confessional sectors of the republic. There has been revival of interest in republicanism, in part due to dissatisfactions with how contemporary forms of liberalism appear to condone, if not promote, democracy of the few. Such distinctions are genuine, though not terminological. Classical Roman republics were ruled only by free male citizens. Against the historical school of jurisprudence, Hegel argued that Roman law lacked an adequate account of, indeed an adequate basis for justice, precisely because it countenanced slavery (Rph §§2R, 3R; Enz. §433Z), whereas Kant identified the sole and sufficient basis of justice, which is our rational human freedom (Rph §§4, 133, 135R; Enz. §502R). As for liberalism, whilst his chapter 8 How to respond to those who fail to act morally raises a host of further issues, but these can only be identified by specifying who does fail to act as morality requires, what failing(s) they exhibit, how chronically, and what best can be done to redress past or present failings and to preclude their recurrence. The core aims of education, informal or formal, at whatever level, are moral aims (Green 1999, Westphal 2016c). Neglecting this fact is morally negligent. 9 Montesquieu’s institutional theory of law highlights the ‘correspondences’ and mutual complementarity of social institutions and activities; his language may derive from Malbranche (Riley 2009, §8.1), his innovation is that these contemporaneous intra-social correspondences and forms of complementarity suffice to account for the content, function and legitimacy of sound constitutional and statute law (Miraglia 1912, 18). Hegel (Rph §3R) recognised Montesquieu’s singular achievement, and made it the juridical cornerstone of his own robust republicanism. © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 13 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. on justice (Utilitarianism, ch. 5) omits it, J.S. Mill required that no one be subjected to the will of another (1861, CW 10:216). Despite his tolerance, if not advocacy, of some forms of benevolent paternalism (CW 21:118–9; 1859b) and his grave misjudgment of the opium wars (OL, ch. 5; CW 18:293), elsewhere Mill argues in detail that such subjugation is unjust (1850, 1869). This review of Modern moral epistemology suggests that much contemporary moral epistemology adheres to an early Modern taxonomy of philosophical options (empiricism, rationalism, intuitionism, sentimentalism, commonsense, conventionalism, constructivism or scepticism), to the neglect of a much more cogent and fruitful form of Natural Law Constructivism developed by the apparently unlikely alliance of Hume, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. When their texts and views are reconsidered with regard to the proper genus of moral philosophy, embracing both justice and ethics, considered in connection with the natural law tradition, jurisprudence and political economy – to which Hume’s writings on economics gave rise – their methodological and substantive alliance is far less surprising, and highlights problems generated by faulty philosophical taxonomies.10 As for the much debated links between justifying reasons and motivation to behave ourselves, these are formed by proper education, both formal and informal; to moral philosophy also belongs philosophy of education, as all moral philosophers up through Mill (1867) recognised (Kant TL §§49–53, GS 9; Hegel Rph §§173–80, 1853; Jaeger 1944–47, Green 1999, Curren 2000, Westphal 2016c). FURTHER READING: Henry Sidgwick’s classic, Outlines of the History of Ethics (1886), should be considered together with his equally important The Principles of Political Economy (1883), The Elements of Politics (1891) and his posthumus The Development of European Polity (1903; all: London, Macmillan). Taken together, the epistemological issues stand out in relief, as also in J.B. Schneewind’s outstanding study of Sidgwick’s comprehensive moral philosophy, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1977). Schneewind’s other contributions to history of moral philosophy attend copiously and sensitively to their epistemological problems and views; see his ‘Natural Law, Skepticism, and Methods of Ethics’, Journal of the History of Ideas 52.2 (1991):289–308; The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and his compendium, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For concise introduction to Bentham’s moral-epistemological concerns, see Philip Schofield, ‘Jeremy Bentham: Legislator of the World’, Current Legal Problems 51.1 (1998):115–147. The natural law (and hence epistemological) context of Hobbes’ Leviathan is brilliantly explicated by Bernd Ludwig, Die Wiederentdeckung des Epikureischen Naturrechts. Zu Thomas Hobbes’ philosophischer Entwicklung von De Cive zum Leviathan im Pariser Exil 1640–1651 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998), a study far ahead of the recent Anglophone reappraisals of Hobbes. Excellent contributions on modern moral philosophers, with good attention to their epistemological concerns and views, are provided in John Skorupski, ed., The Routledge Companion to Ethics (London: Routledge, 2010). ‘Natural Law Constructivism’ is examined and defended in detail in the author’s How Hume & Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2016). A bibliography of Anglophone works in history and philosophy of law is available from the author’s webpage on Academia.edu. References Because the chronology of moral-epistemological issues and views is theoretically significant in this period, works are cited by their original (or occasionally, contemporaneous) date of publication, even when collected editions of an author’s works are also cited. Where possible individual works are cited by the divisions indi10 C.D. Broad (1930, 165, 206–8) introduced the contrast between ‘deontological’ and ‘teleological’ ethical theories to mark idealised poles of a continuum along which to array specific ethical theories for comparative assessment. He acknowledged no actual theories of either extreme type; only later simplifications reduced Broad’s comparative spectrum to a specious dichotomy. © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 14 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. cated in their respective tables of contents, according to book, part, chapter, section (§) or occasionally paragraph (¶) numbers, rather than by page; such references hold for any reliable edition or translation. Arabic numerals have been used consistently; an author’s sub-divisions are indicated by (as it were) decimals, e.g., Hume’s Treatise, Part 3, §1, last paragraph (¶) is indicated thus: (T 1.3.1.27). Ahrens, Heinrich, 1850. Die Philosophie des Rechts und des Staates, 1. Teil: Die Rechtsphilosophie, oder das Naturrecht, auf philosophisch-anthropologischer Grundlage. Wien, C. Gerold & Sohn; 4th rev. ed.: 1852. (Only volume published; superceded by next item.) ———, 1870. Naturrecht oder Philosophie des Rechts und des Staates, auf dem Grunde des ethischen Zusammenhanges von Recht und Cultur, 6th rev. ed., 2 vols. Wien, C. Gerold’s Sohn. (1st ed., French: Paris 1838; 1st German ed.: 1846.) Alston, William P., 1989. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. Annas, Julia, 2103. ‘Plato’s Laws and Cicero’s de Legibus’. In: M. Schofield, ed., Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions for Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 206–224. Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, 1763. Ethica Philosophica, 3rd ed. Halle im Magdeburgischen, Hemmerde. Beneke, Friedrich Eduard, 1833. Die Philosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Erfahrung, zur Spekulation, und zum Leben. Berlin, E.S. Mittler. Bentham, Jeremy, 1838–1843. J. Bowring, ed., The Works of Jeremey Bentham, 11 vols. Edinburgh, W. Tait; London, Simkin, Marshall & Co.; New York, Russell & Russell; cited as ‘WJB’. ———, 1786. Principles of the Civil Code. WJB 1:297–364. ———, 1789. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford, The Clarendon Press; rev. ed. 1823, rpt. 1907; WJB 1:1–154. ———, 1795. ‘Anarchical Fallacies; being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights issued during the French Revolution’. WJB 2:491–534. ———, 1802. 1802. Principes de législation et Traités de législation, civile et pénale, 3 vols. Paris, Bossange, Masson & Besson. ———, 1830a. Constitutional Code. For the Use of All Nations and All Governments Professing Liberal Opinions, vol. 1. London, R. Heward; rpt. WJB 9. ———, 1830b. F.E. Beneke, ed. & tr., Grundsätze der Civil- und Criminal-Gesetzgebung, 2 vols. Berlin, Amelang. Broad, C.D., 1930. Five Types of Ethical Theory. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Burke, Edmund, 1757. A Vindication of Natural Soceity: or, A View of the Miseries and Evils arising to Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society, 2nd ed. London, R. & J. Dodsley. ———, 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France. London, J. Dodsley. Curren, Randall, 2000. Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education. Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield. Daniels, Norman, 1996. Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Epstein, Klaus, 1966. The Genesis of German Conservatism. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Fries, Jakob Friedrich, 1824. System der Metaphysik. Heidelberg, Winter. Frege, Gottlob, 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Breslau, Koebner. ———, 1950. J.L. Austin, tr., The Foundations of Arithmetic. Oxford, Blackwell. Gauthier, David, 1997. ‘Political Contractarianism’. Journal of Political Philosophy 5.2:132–148. Gervinus, G.G., 1859. Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts seit den Wiener Verträgen, vol. 4. Leipzig, Engelmann. Gouges, Marie Olymp de, 1791. ‘Décleration des droits de la femme et de la citoyen’. Paris, (n.p.); http://www.philo5.com/Mes%20lectures/GougesOlympeDe-DeclarationDroitsFemme.htm. Green, Thomas F., 1999. Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press. Griffin, James, 1996. Value Judgment: Improving our Ethical Beliefs. Oxford, The Clarendon Press. Grote, Hugo (Grotius; Grotii), 1625. De jure belli ac pacis. Paris, N. Buon. ———, 1738. The Rights of War and Peace, J. Morrice, tr. Rev. ed.: R. Tuck, 2005; Indianapolis, Library of Liberty. Haakonssen, Knud, 2002. ‘The Moral Conservatism of Natural Rights’. In: I. Hunter & D. Saunders, eds., © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 15 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. Natural Law and Civil Sovereinty: Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political Thought (London, Palgrave), 27–42. Hegel, G.W.F., 1986–2016. Gesammelte Werke, 31 vols. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, with the HegelKommission der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften and the Hegel-Archiv der Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Hamburg, Meiner; cited as ‘GW ’. ———, 1821. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Berlin, Nicolai; abbreviated ‘Rph’, rpt. in: GW 14; cited by main sections (§), or by Hegel’s published Remarks: (§nR); tr. in: idem. (2008). ———, 1830. Enzyklopädie der philiosophischen Wissenschaften, 3 vols., 3rd ed. Heidelberg, Oßwald; cited as ‘Enz.’. ———, 1853–54. G. Thaulaw, ed., Hegel’s Ansichten über Erziehung und Unterricht, 3 vols. Kiel, Akademische Buchhandlung. ———, 2008. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. T.M. Knox, tr., S. Houlgate, ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press. ———, 2009. K. Worm, ed., Hegels Werk im Kontext, 5th Release. Berlin, InfoSoftWare. Honoré, Tony, 2002. Ulpian: Pioneer of Human Rights, 2nd ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Hume, David, 1739–40. A Treatise of Human Nature. London, A. Millar; cited as ‘T ’. ———, 1748. Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding. London, A. Millar. (Original title of Hume’s first Enquiry); cited as ‘En’. ———, 1751. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. London, A. Millar; cited as ‘EPM’. ———, 1758. ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. In: idem., Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, rev. ed. (London, Millar), 134–146. ———, 2001. D.F. Norton & M.J. Norton, eds., A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Husserl, Edmund, 1900–01. Logische Untersuchungen, 2 vols. Halle, Niemeyer. Jaeger, Werner, 1944–1947. G. Highet, tr., Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 3 vols. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Jhering, Rudolph von, 1897. O. Lenel, ed., Die Jurisprudenz des täglichen Lebens, 11th ed. Jena, Fischer. ———, 1904. H. Goudy, ed. & tr., Law in Daily Life: A collection of legal questions connected with the ordinary events of everyday life. Oxford, The Clarendon Press. (Translation of previous item.) Johns, Christopher, 2103. The Science of Right in Leibniz’s Moral and Political Philosophy. London, Bloomsbury. Kant, Immanuel, 1902–. Könniglich Preussische (now Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 29 vols. Berlin, G. Reimer (now De Gruyter); cited as ‘GS ’. ———, 1995–2016. P. Guyer and A. Wood, eds. in chief, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Margins provide pagination of GS.)11 ———, 1996. M. Gregor and A. Wood, eds., M. Gregor, tr., Practical Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. ———, 2009. K. Worm and S. Boeck, eds., Kant im Kontext III, 2 ed. (Release 6). Berlin, InfoSoftWare. Gr Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (1785); Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. KdrV Critik der reinen Vernunft (1781: ‘A’; rev. 2nd ed. 1787: ‘B’); Critique of Pure Reason. MdS Metaphysik der Sitten (1797–98); Metaphysics of Morals – in two Parts: RL Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre; Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Justice. TL Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlerhe; Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue. Lieberman, David, 2006. ‘Adam Smith on Justice, Rights, and Law’. In: K. Haackonssen, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 214–245. Lipps, Theodor, 1893. Grundzüge der Logik. Hamburg and Leipzig, Voss. Locke, John, 1690. ‘Second Treatise of Government’, in: Anon., Two Treatises of Government. London, Awnsham Churchill; cited as ‘ST’. Long, Douglas, 2006. ‘Adam Smith’s Politics’. In: K. Haackonssen, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 288–318. Mill, John Stuart, 1963–1991. J.M. Robson, ed.-in-chief, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill , 33 vols. Toronto, Uni11 Locating items or passages in this edition can be difficult; a comprehensive Table of Contents + Indexes is available gratis on my website. © 2019 Kenneth R. Westphal; ALL rights reserved. Do not 16 cite, quote, copy or distribute in any form, whole or part. versity of Toronto Press; London, Routledge & Kegan Paul; cited as ‘CW’; <http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/165>. ———, 1850. ‘The Negro Question’. CW 21: 87–95. ———, 1859a. On Liberty. CW 18: 213–310; cited as ‘OL’. ———, 1859b. ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’. CW 21: 111–124. ———, 1861. Utilitarianism. CW 10: 205–259. ———, 1867. ‘Inaugural Address, Delivered to the University of St. Andrews, 1. Feb. 1867’. London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer; rpt. in: CW 21: 215–257. ———, 1869. The Subjection of Women. CW 21: 261–340. Miraglia, Luigi, 1912. Comparative Legal Philosophy Applied to Legal Institutions. Boston, The Boston Book Company; rpt. New York, Macmillan, 1921. Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, de, 1749. 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