27
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY IN
TRANSITION: PART 2 – FROM STRATEGIC
CULTURE TO STRATEGIC REALITY
Gerhard M. Louw
South African National Defence Force
Abel Esterhuyse
Stellenbosch University
“Culture is as culture does”1
Abstract
The analysis reported here focused on the dynamic interaction between a
preferred strategic management model of the South African National Defence Force
(SANDF) on the one hand, and the SANDF’s acquired strategic culture on the other.
From a theoretical perspective, the analysis draws attention to the fact that the
properties of institutional culture inform the extent to which an organisation (such as
the SANDF) suffers the deleterious consequences of an inappropriate management
model. The article therefore argues that the military’s lack of consensus on an
appropriate political culture, the lack of a suitable social culture and the lack of an
effective military culture have resulted in maintaining the continued viability of two
discrete, concurrent strategic cultural paradigms in the SANDF: that of the defunct
SADF2 (initially dominant), and that of the obsolete MK3 (currently governing). The
uneasy co-existence of these two paradigms, each with its own worldview and value
system, has confounded the efforts of the SANDF to form an appropriate intended
strategy and to realise military effectiveness in its execution. A dichotomous
strategic culture has, in effect, reinforced the weaknesses of the SANDF’s strategic
management model, impeded organisational responsiveness, maximised
organisational entropy, and encouraged the defence force’s systemic decline – the
latter, a fact that the Defence Review 2014 specifically acknowledges in the
discussion of the review’s first milestone.4 This part mainly employs deductive
reasoning and draws its conclusions from a focused literary review.
Scientia Militaria, South African
Journal of Military Studies, Vol
42, Nr 2, 2014, pp. 27-53.
doi: 10.5787/42-2-1093
Introduction
Upon examining the defence budget
vote speech of 23 May 2013, one comes under
the impression that the SANDF is on the
28
threshold of a second transformation – this time, aiming at military effectiveness,
rather than civil oversight or racial representativeness. 5 Nevertheless, by the end of
2014 government still had to match its assurances of the previous year with tangible
action. Given the mandatory character of defence policy, one may consequently
presume that defence leadership of the past decade had not been convinced of the
appropriateness of South African defence policy from the beginning, and had never
meant to achieve its intended outcomes anyway. 6 Such an assumption would be
premature, though. In continuation of the reasoning reflected in Part 1, the study
now argues that the enduring strategic lethargy of the SANDF can instead be
explained by the dynamic interaction between defence’s preferred strategic
management model on the one hand, and its acquired strategic culture(s) on the
other. Whereas Part 1 reported on the development of a strategic management
archetype for the military (rendered graphically in Figure 1), the second part argues
that the strategic culture of an organisation will ultimately determine the extent to
which the institution suffers the harmful consequences of adopting an inappropriate
management model. Operating from within the organisation, the influence of the
defence force’s strategic culture would be visible from the formulation of its policy
(the Defence Reviews of 1998 and 2014, for example), through to its deliberate
implementation, and onwards to the forming of defence’s realised strategy.
1
E
X
T
E
R
N
A
L
Foreign
Environment
Domestic
Environment
I
N
T
E
R
N
A
L
Strategy
Formulation
Options
Evaluation
Intended Strategy
(As designed)
Deliberate Strategy
(As implemented)
2
Realised Strategy
(As achieved)
3
Figure 1: Forming realised strategy
Part 2 of the article therefore delves deeper into the relationship between the
strategic management model and strategic culture, starting with the latter idea.
29
Strategic culture as an intervening variable
Most of the available evidence suggests that the concept of a strategic
culture is real and powerful. What is debatable, though, is the magnitude of the
influence of culture on strategic behaviour.7 Some anthropologists and sociologists,
for example, consider the relationship between culture and strategy as a combination
of discursive (what is said) and non-discursive (what remains unsaid) expressions;
consequently, that the relationship between culture and strategy is so complex that it
is impossible to measure.8 On the other hand, analysts of a constructivist bent
consider culture as the major justification for all strategic performance, and would
be comfortable with a statement such as “[p]olities as more or less distinctive
strategic cultures tend to commit characteristic errors; indeed, their errors may be
caused by some of their virtues”.9 A third approach could be adopted by those who
merely consider culture as a supplementary explanation for strategic behaviour,
believing that its subjective influence on decision-making is subordinate to the
objective constraints of international systemic pressures – in other words, that
strategic culture is outranked by the functional imperative. 10 Whatever one’s
inclinations are, though, it would be difficult to deny that the response of a particular
institution to functional and societal imperatives is at least partly dependent on the
values and perceptions (and therefore the societal paradigms) of its decision-makers.
This basic fact is implied in Schein’s definition of organisational culture:
Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b)
invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns
to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid,
and therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct
way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these problems. 11
With specific reference to strategic culture, Johnston is of the opinion that it
consists of an integrated system of symbols (such as argumentation structures,
languages, analogies and metaphors), which act to establish strategic preferences for
the organisation. It exerts influence by generating paradigms on the role and efficacy
of military force in interstate political affairs, and by cloaking the resultant
constructs with such an aura of truth that the organisation’s strategic preferences
seem uniquely sensible and effectual to those immersed within the particular
culture.12 Strategic culture is therefore a primary component of the organisational
imperative, where it serves as an intervening variable between the external
environment (the functional and societal imperatives) and the organisation’s
expression of strategic behaviour. Stated in constructivist terms, strategists
subconsciously employ their cultures to assist with their interpretation of the
30
objective constraints from their external environment, i.e. creating order from chaos,
and comprehension from confusion.13 Culture therefore serves both as a perception
filter for the realities of the strategic and domestic contexts on the cognitive input
side of the organisational imperative, and as a focusing lens on the behavioural
output side. This means that any two organisations, distinct in terms of strategic
culture, will come to different conclusions when faced with the same set of
functional and societal imperatives. To arrive at the reasons why this should be so,
one has to turn back to point (b) of Schein’s definition and consider the origins of
strategic culture.
Physical Sources
Political Sources
Societal Sources
Geography
Historical Experience
Myths and Symbols
Climate
Political System
Defining Texts
Resources
Elite Beliefs
Generational Change
Technology
Military Organisations
Transnational Norms
Figure 2: Potential sources of strategic culture14
For a start, one may generalise that strategic culture is rooted in the relevant
community’s early, seminal experiences, and that the viability of the culture is
dependent upon inspiration by its opinion-forming elites and the philosophical and
cognitive characteristics of the state.15 On the other hand, one may be more specific
and expand the sources of strategic culture into a full typology, comprised of both
ideational and material elements, as per the example above. The differences among
strategic cultures are therefore consistent with the variance in their sources. Societies
may, for example, share a common geographic area, climate and natural resource
base (material factors), but very little content from the other elements (ideational
factors) from which they source their cultures. While the import of most of the listed
sources should be self-explanatory to the informed reader, the study may benefit
from an elaboration on some of the origins of strategic culture at this time.
Technology is the first of these.
Some authors argue that armed forces bring about military change primarily
by their constant search for a combat advantage and their consequent adoption of
new technologies and ways of conducting warfare. Others dispute this determinist
view of technology, and contend that societies and organisations differ substantially
31
in their ability to exploit new technologies, create new operational concepts and
reorganise their armed forces to take full advantage of the opportunities that
technology offers.16 As a source of inspiration for a strategic culture, one can
therefore only appreciate the influence of technology within the context of that
particular military’s historical experience, its defence organisation, and its preferred
style of warfare – the totality of its strategic culture, in other words. For example,
armed forces that idealise conventional war and manoeuvre warfare17 (as the SADF
had been doing by the late 1980s)18 would assess the value of technology differently
from those espousing revolutionary war or guerrilla warfare (as the MK had been
doing all along).19 To the former, increased technological sophistication would have
allowed for a reduction in force levels, while to the latter it may not have meant
much in terms of improved military effectiveness. In fact, to MK it may have
entailed an unacceptable reduction of the revolutionary forces’ footprint among the
population in the operational area. Whether defence forces are therefore able to
manage and manipulate technology to their advantage depends on a combination of
organisational attributes, which yet another source of strategic culture seems to be
affecting of late, namely generational change.
Strategic culture changes over time as the security community develops new
understandings, translates them culturally, and programmes the result into
behaviour.20 With the arrival of (especially) information technology in the late 20 th
century, for example, individuals and groups are finding themselves empowered –
and their identities shaped – in ways that were unthinkable before.21 These changes
to societal culture, which the ubiquitous presence of information technology has
accelerated, are bound to affect every military eventually. Indeed, generational
change is believed to be the most consistent (albeit not the most rapid) driver of
cultural transformation, and is only rarely interrupted by other conditions that may
cause more rapid changes in strategic culture.22 Taking the SANDF as an example,
one has to consider that it had not been involved in major combat since its
establishment. Circumstances conducive to brisk, collective culture change have
therefore not arisen in this case, and one would imagine that the strategic cultures of
the defence force’s primary constituents could have remained largely intact,
awaiting generational change to transform the SANDF’s organisational culture as a
whole. From the above, it seems clear that defence forces with different sources of
inspiration would have distinctly different strategic cultures, and therefore different
strategic preferences and behaviours as well. Through an analysis of those
preferences and their expressions in policy statements, it should therefore be
possible to obtain usable indications of the particular military’s intended force
development strategy, and hence of its strategic culture as well. While setting out a
32
rationale for this deduction, the article will also begin to contextualise some of the
theoretical concepts that had been touched upon earlier.
Military strategy as a product of strategic culture and management model
As explained in Part 1 of the article, strategy and policy are so intimately
related that their formation processes can be regarded as virtually identical. Baylis,
Booth, Garnett and Williams, for example, assert that a policy connotes not only
what it intends to achieve (strategy’s ends), but also with what occurs during its
actual implementation (strategy’s means and ways), and that a policy without action
will have no authority in the society that it is supposed to direct. In practice, one can
accordingly think of defence policy as a stream of purposeful action over time,
incorporating not only what the department is known to have done, but also what it
intends doing, and what it is currently trying to do. 23 Defence policy gives birth to
two concurrent types of military strategy – operational strategy, based upon current
military capabilities, and force developmental strategy (the focus of this article),
which addresses future security threats and military tasks with future capabilities.24
A suitable definition of military strategy should therefore encompass both types,
which is why strategy is defined in this article as the “relating of ends, means and
ways to achieve the desired [defence] policy goal”.25 Militaries tend to categorise
strategy as being declaratory (what government and the armed forces say the
strategy is), actual (what government and the armed forces are essentially doing,
which may be different from their declared position), and ideal (what the decisionmakers would prefer to do if they had access to the necessary means). 26 Compared
with Mintzberg’s typology (see Part 1 of this article), a military’s declaratory
strategy would correlate with an intended strategy, while the actual strategy would
be equivalent to a deliberate strategy. Both forms of strategy are eminently suited for
employment within a design school management model, and both are subject to the
influences of an organisation’s strategic culture. To arrive at a declaratory strategy in
the first place, military decision-makers would have had to evaluate their strategic
options, and consciously selected the option that best passed the tests of suitability,
feasibility and (especially) the culture-constrained test of acceptability. In
accordance with design school management methodology, the armed forces would
then implement (not ‘achieve’) their intended strategy, believing that its realisation
is merely a matter of proper execution. Even if this belief were unfounded (which it
is, more often than not), a defence force that was responsive to feedback loops
would still have addressed the disparity between its declared policy position and
changing reality, and thereby guided its actual strategy towards the realisation of
outcomes that at least largely resemble those of the organisation’s intended
strategy.27
33
In Part 1, a potential explanation for the SANDF’s failure in this regard was
already suggested, when reference was made to the design school approach of
confining the military strategist to formulation of strategy only. This management
style precludes the strategist’s active participation in strategy implementation, which
substantially increases the enterprise risk of realising unintended outcomes. For
example, misperceptions between strategists and implementers regarding the
original principles and purpose of the strategy may, in the absence of continuous
strategic leadership interventions, cause the latter to revert to simplistic, incoherent
pragmatism. This gives rise to a morbid situation, within which management would
be prone to confusing expediency with effective governance. 28 A second, related
flaw is that the design school, by definition, disregards the possibility of strategy
formulation (strategic thinking) continuing in parallel with implementation of
strategy (strategic action). Adherents of the design school are therefore not amenable
to the incrementalism that successful strategy formation requires.29 Furthermore, by
reducing the influences of the external environment to the mere identification of
opportunities and threats they exacerbate this failing. While design school
strategists’ interpretations of the external environment (subject to the filters of
strategic culture as they are) may yet serve as inputs into the formulation of their
intended strategy, this information is not utilised consistently afterwards as
important considerations in the strategic management process. Military strategists
may therefore be inclined to account for functional and societal imperatives during
strategy formulation only, viewing such imperatives afterward merely as factors
through which the organisation must navigate, rather than as evolutionary stimuli
with which defence leadership should interact.30 Such a snapshot approach to the
external environment also implies that, though the design school’s strategic
management framework may never become outdated, it could easily go out of
context and become irrelevant with the passage of time – as had evidently happened
in the case of the SANDF.31
It is entirely plausible that the filters of the SANDF’s strategic culture had
distinguished between those events in the external environment that it deemed
cardinal, demanding a rapid response, and those it regarded as insignificant and of
secondary interest. Consequently, the strategic behaviour of the organisation
followed suit, giving rise to a realised strategy with which the organisation was at
least psychologically comfortable, regardless of the perceived functional
effectiveness of defence. What usually happens in cases such as these is that, as the
intended (declaratory) strategy becomes increasingly out of step with the demands of
the organisation’s external environment, an emergent strategy largely supersedes it.
Such an emergent strategy would neither be entirely intentional nor deliberate; it
would rather be an inferred strategy, based on empirical evidence that the actions or
34
neglect of the organisation had, over time, been converging into identifiable trends
and predictable outcomes, whether premeditated and desirable or not.32 In terms of
VSM theory (introduced in Part 1), the proliferation of emergent strategy indicates
that an organisation had reverted to its native cultural values and purposes–in–use,
instead of adhering to an intended strategy that the institution had previously created
and professed to. This form of strategic behaviour is often encouraged by deficient
internal discussions on the larger purpose of the institution, namely debates that are
lacking, inadequate or poorly grounded in the daily conduct of the personnel of the
organisation.33 Given that the attribute of military effectiveness is an essential
outcome of any reputable defence force’s overarching strategy – and features
accordingly in the South African Defence Reviews of 1998 and 2014 – effectiveness
will now be located within the strategic management model that has been developed
thus far.
Military effectiveness as an outcome of realised strategy
In spite of its potential importance for state security, literature on military
effectiveness does not provide a generally acceptable definition for the concept.34
Brooks and Stanley describe it as “… the capacity to create military power from a
state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital”.35
This definition accentuates military power as an absolute, but fails to acknowledge
the relevance of the strategic imperatives discussed previously. On the other hand,
Millett, Murray and Watman define military effectiveness as “… the process by
which armed forces convert resources into fighting power”, thereby confining
military effectiveness to its expression in combat only. 36 The latter definition is also
inadequate, because it focuses exclusively on the method and fails to account for the
purpose of the particular defence force, relative to the military problem on hand (the
‘ends’ of strategy).37 In their description of military effectiveness as a resource
conversion process (not a strategic outcome), both definitions appear to emphasise
the quantifiable attribute of organisational efficiency rather than that of effectiveness
– a concern with executing activities correctly, as opposed to performing the correct
activities. In lieu of an acceptable definition from literature, this article consequently
reflects on military effectiveness simply as the competency of armed forces to
produce a desired or intended result, i.e. the ability to execute the mission of defence
successfully, in reasonable disregard of absolute resource cost. However, one should
not assume that defence policy and (especially) military force development strategy
always have operational effectiveness as their only goal.
Countries invest in the creation and maintenance of armed forces for any
combination of reasons, including the enhancement of their national identities, the
legitimacy of government, international status, or leveraging diplomatic advantage.38
35
Aside from military effectiveness, realised strategy may therefore contain traces of
all of these strategic ‘ends’ originating from the host society’s culture, its social
structure, its political and economic institutions, and from international factors such
as global ‘mental models’ and competition among states. 39 Nonetheless, it would
still be possible to derive the extent of the SANDF’s military’s effectiveness from an
analysis of its realised strategy by applying only four tests: those of integration,
quality, skill and responsiveness.40 The test for integration relates to the ‘ends’ of
strategy, as the assessment seeks a verdict on the degree to which the management
behaviours of a military are internally consistent and mutually reinforcing.
Integration assumes a unity of purpose between force development activities
(premised upon future defence requirements) and the current execution of the roles,
functions and tasks of the military. By ensuring that actual objectives of defence are
in alignment with its declared aims, integration reduces wasteful expenditure and
duplication of effort. The test for quality, on the other hand, is concerned with
strategic ‘means’. Quality refers to the ability of a military to acquire weaponry and
equipment that are not only superior in terms of function, relative to that of the
opposition, but also optimised for the current (and plausible future) operational
context of defence. Quality associates with the cost-efficiency of means, since it
guides the organisation’s internal management and procurement processes to acquire
only that which the military actually needs.
Realised Strategy
Effectiveness
Integration
Ends
Quality
Means
Skill
Ways
Figure 3: Evaluating realised strategy
Likewise, the attribute of skill refers to the competency of military personnel
in the execution of their designated tasks. Skill concerns the inculcation of
proficiency through training, education and appropriate experience. It also refers to
the ability of the military to assimilate new technology, as well as the attitude,
morale and motivation of its personnel – in other words, considerations of
professional expertise and the service orientations of defence’s workforce. As
36
depicted in Figure 3, a military’s overarching level of skill would constrain the
‘ways’ available to defence when it considers strategic options.
Unlike an evaluation of the appropriateness of a strategy (discussed in Part
1), the gauging of military effectiveness does not seek to render an anticipatory
verdict of intended strategy, which is a mere theoretical construct at the time of its
judgement. As was explained previously, the strategic environment changes
continuously; hence, military effectiveness is context-dependent and varies across
time, place and the type of mission that the particular military has to execute (or
potentially has to accomplish).41 When the article therefore touches upon the last of
Brooks and Stanley’s characteristics – that of responsiveness – reference is made to
the ability of a military to customise its activities in the light of its own
competencies (organisational imperatives), the operational capabilities of
adversaries (functional imperatives), and other external constraints. A responsive
military is “… one that adjusts its operational doctrine and tactics to exploit its
adversary’s weaknesses and its own strengths” and “… one that adjusts and
compensates for external constraints, including material, geographic, technological,
social-structural, political, or cultural limitations in its domestic environment”.42 To
maintain military effectiveness, a responsive defence leadership will continuously
scan the political and strategic environment and adjust its policy, strategy, doctrine
and management processes accordingly. In contrast, “[m]ilitaries without
responsiveness may lose an accurate sense of their particular strengths and
weaknesses because of a lack of critical self-evaluation and of rigorous assessment
of the external environment”43 – precisely those internal debates previously referred
to. The attribute of organisational responsiveness is therefore much more significant
than its simplistic application as one of the tests for the effectiveness of realised
strategy would seem to indicate. It originates within the organisational imperative,
where the institution’s strategic culture resides, and shapes both the receptiveness of
defence to environmental influences and the reactions of defence to the same. As
discussed thus far, responsiveness is implicit in every aspect of dynamic
organisational behaviour. A military’s reactions to its operating environment are the
prime stimuli for its organisational learning and crucial for the successful evolution
of the organisation. Before arriving at a comprehensive hypothesis that could
explain the SANDF’s organisational entropy and declining military effectiveness,
though, a speculative validation of the main arguments is put forth, as the authors
have promised. The following section therefore contains an overview of the
development of the SANDF’s strategic culture.
37
A dichotomous strategic culture: The SANDF’s primary source of strategic
stasis
For the first decade of its existence, government deliberately subjected the
SANDF to cultural reprogramming: an epic exercise in social engineering, of which
the full implications are only lately being realised (as a result of the delays implicit
in all feedback loops). Given the cultural hegemony, administrative monopoly and
exclusive ownership of material resources of the former South African Defence
Force (SADF), government initially feared that its culture and methodology would
remain dominant in the contemporary national defence force. Four years after the
start of transformation, some of the smaller integrating forces were consequently
still of the opinion that they were being absorbed by the SADF, rather than being
equitably integrated into a new defence organisation.44 In its efforts to change and
consolidate the strategic culture of the military, government therefore generated a
new political vision for the SANDF: the institution was to be “… broadly
representative of the country’s people at all rank levels, where all people feel at
home, a defence force of national unity that is credible and legitimate in the eyes of
all our people”.45 This novel organisational culture centred on the respect of the
military for the values of a democratic society and directed national defence –
“to ensure that the functioning of the Department of Defence is
consistent with constitutional principles, democratic values and the law;
to ensure that military personnel treat each other and members of the
public with respect and dignity;
to maintain and enhance military professionalism;
to build confidence and pride in the SANDF; and
to build patriotism, loyalty, unity, discipline, morale and combat
readiness within the SANDF”.46
Political leadership was therefore intent upon ‘software’ changes, designed
to transform the ways by which defence managed its human resources, as well as
changing its institutional culture and the military ethos.47 Consequently, the SANDF
had an internal, structural focus, dedicating itself to the deliberate transformation of
the organisation, and aiming primarily at the legitimation of the national defence
function rather than ensuring the capability of the military to execute its
constitutional mandate.48 Since the country had just come out of a conflict that had
lasted for about three decades, the fact that neither the political vision nor the
intended transformation objectives listed above (with the exception of the last)
supported the creation of military effectiveness was possibly of lesser importance at
the time. However, this does not imply that the professed values of the country’s
new-found political system would have remained the primary source of strategic
culture for the SANDF ad infinitum. To illustrate, Francois Vreÿ wrote an article in
38
2006 – roughly a decade after the establishment of the SANDF – that dealt
extensively with the evolution of a South African strategic culture, albeit at national
level. In this article, he emphasises some of the changes that accompanied the birth
of the new dispensation:
An innovative, liberal political culture, founded on international norms
and human rights;
A foreign policy enamoured with multilateralism, collective defence, and
African solidarity; and
The subordination of the military instrument to other elements of national
power, focusing on conflict prevention and state reconstruction.
At the same time, some of the contradictions between declaratory policy and
strategic behaviour (which Vreÿ calls “operational practice”) were already becoming
apparent. 49 These include the acquisition of advanced weaponry for the air force and
navy, on the military side, but it also refers to South Africa’s apparent willingness to
intervene (virtually) unilaterally in the affairs of Lesotho (1998) and Burundi (2002).
Of greater concern, though, was the apparent lack of political will to pronounce on
human rights violations elsewhere in Africa. In fact, some analysts were of the
opinion that the apparent dichotomy was the result of South Africa having to
contend with two competing political cultures simultaneously – the professed culture
of a progressive democracy on the one hand, and the actual values of a revolutionary
liberation movement on the other.50 While a dichotomous political culture is worthy
of an investigation all of its own, the current study was predominantly interested in
the effects of a divided strategic culture on military strategy formation of the
SANDF. To tell that story, one would have to direct the analysis one level down, to
statements of defence policy intent and what those statements implied for realised
strategy.
There were early indications that, with the passage of time and the deliberate
implementation of force development strategies, the transformation focus of the
SANDF was shifting away from its declared aim. Whereas the original goal was to
effect appropriate changes to defence policy, military ethos and organisational
structure, the parliamentary committees and the new command cadre of the military
were increasingly preoccupied with simplistic racial representation – a strategic
intent for which the Deputy Minister of Defence was not about to apologise any time
soon,51 and which promptly made ‘transformation’ synonymous with racial
representativeness.52 While this bias would have been unsurprising, given South
Africa’s political proclivities in the past, the country’s overt pursuance of racial
representativeness by politician and defence leadership alike was bound to affect,
perhaps inadvertently, the strategic culture of the SANDF significantly. Upon the
establishment of the SANDF in 1994, the armed forces were overwhelmingly
39
comprised of white personnel from the now-defunct SADF: a reasonably
homogenous social group, with a distinct historical experience, a characteristic set of
myths and symbols, and defining texts – in other words, unique sources of the
SADF’s strategic culture. This context was due for brisk, deliberate change
thereafter. Despite the fact that “… the former SADF has clearly been in the driving
seat”, the racial composition of the defence force had already changed to 29% black
officers and 70% black ‘other ranks’ by 1998.53 By 2011, the percentage
representation (including civilian personnel) stood at 70,6% black, 12,6% coloured,
1,1% Asian, and 15,7% white,54 changing to 71,8%, 12,7%, 1,1% and 14,2%
respectively two years later.55 Considering that the current study was especially
interested in those levels where military strategy is formulated, the racial
composition of the Department of Defence’s (DOD’s) strategists and corps of
professionals (the latter included for the sake of completeness) had changed
likewise, with the black group, in particular, very strongly represented in top
management by then. Figure 4 substantiates these demographic trends.
Occupational
Band
Black
Top Management
29
(85,3%)
0
(0 %)
1
(2,9%)
4
(11,8%)
34
Senior
Management
199
(54,2%)
16
(4,3%)
22
(6%)
130
(35,4%)
367
Professionally
Qualified
4 183
(43%)
1 109
(11,4%)
270
(2,8%)
4 158
(42,8%)
9 720
Total
4 411
1 125
293
4 292
10 121
Coloured
Asian
White
Total
(100%)
Figure 4: Demographic representation in the DOD by 201156
By this time, defence had already explained the over-representation of white
personnel in senior management as a consequence of “historical reasons”, and that
white officers either had to resign or retire to release posts for blacks at this
occupational level.57 Clearly, a sweeping change in the SANDF’s demography since
its founding would have been accompanied by a major alteration in the social
sources of its organisational culture as well, especially in a South Africa where
communal cultures were perceived (and forced to evolve) along racial lines for
almost half a century before democratisation. For two reasons, though, this claim
does not automatically imply that the traditional black (predominantly African)
social culture has entirely superseded the archetypal white (predominantly Western)
culture of the SANDF since then. The first argument is based upon simple
arithmetic, where the table above provides evidence that there are still many senior
40
white officers remaining in – especially – senior management posts in the SANDF.
In these positions, one can expect them still to have a substantial, albeit everdiminishing, influence upon strategic planning. However, Figure 4 reveals that the
same argument does not apply to the vital activity of strategic visioning, which is a
function of top management and where the African culture is dominant. Secondly,
the armed forces as a whole would have been subject to generational change in all of
its constituent cultures, Western and African, over time. The cultures of South
African society would have been changing qualitatively since 1994, and those of
defence’s constituent race groups would have paralleled the gradual convergence of
the nation at large. Nevertheless, the differences between the two prevalent social
cultures would have been much more visible during the first years of the SANDF’s
existence. The values and norms of these two original cultures were bound to have
been in a tacit, imperceptible, intuitive competition with each other from the very
beginning, and the constant tension between the dominant social cultures would
have been enough to create vacillation and ambiguity in the formation of strategy.
Given that defence sources its strategic culture from social culture as well, and that
strategic culture guides both the institution’s perceptions of strategic reality and the
direction of its strategic behaviour, this article could plausibly attribute at least part
of the SANDF’s current stasis to this conflicted organisational culture. The
prognosis for military effectiveness becomes worse when one considers yet another
source of the SANDF’s strategic culture(s): that of former military force affiliations,
each with its particular historical experiences, organisational structures, myths and
symbols.
The co-existence of a number of strategic cultures within a defence force is
normal if the divisions run along vertical or functional lines (as with the ethos
differences among the services, for example).58 In the case of the SANDF, however,
this article argues that the cultural rifts tended to stretch horizontally within the
strategy-making bodies of the organisation right from the start. Assuming the early
dominance of the former SADF, one would expect to find evidence of its militarystrategic preferences in defence policy publications of that time – and so it is,
indeed. Three policy prescripts, in particular, provide clues to the conventional
cultural bias of the SANDF’s strategists in 1996. First, there is the injunction that the
force levels, armaments and expenditure of the military shall be determined by
defence policy, as derived from (among others) an analysis of the external and
internal security environment.59 This statement, logical and pragmatic as it appears
to be in theory, indicates compliance with the dynamic school’s approach to
strategic management, encourages reasoned flexibility, and gives credence to
feedback from the external environment. In practice, though, the extraordinary delay
in producing a revised defence review – a symptom of the SANDF’s increasing
41
entropy – trivialises the original policy statement and negates the formation of an
appropriate military strategy. Moreover, the original defence policy envisaged that
the “SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced
military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently”. 60 Apart
from the fact that the latter proclamation contains adjectives – “balanced”,
“affordable” and “technologically advanced”, for example – that would be difficult
to reconcile in a real world with limited resources, it also contradicts the pragmatism
of the previous statement. Its directive tone is indicative of a technocratic paradigm,
supportive of traditional military dogma, and leaving little room for innovative
adaptations to environmental realities. From the evidence available (some of which
the article referred to in the introduction), this intended strategic outcome, too, failed
to realise. Likewise, the third statement dispels any further doubt regarding the
strategists’ preconceptions, by saying that the primary role of the SANDF “shall be
to defend South Africa against external military aggression” – a contingency that the
defence fraternity has never faced since the establishment of the Union Defence
Force in 1912, and which is still highly implausible one hundred years later. 61 In
combination with other pronouncements in the 1996 White Paper and the 1998
Defence Review, these three policy prescripts point to the superior weight of
functional imperatives in the formulation of policy and declaratory military strategy.
The questions now begging answers are therefore:
Why were these prescripts, so indicative of the expired SADF’s
conventional warfare paradigm, given such prominence in defence policy;
and
Why were the prescripts not adhered to during implementation of
strategy?
Whereas a follow-on study should attempt to supply comprehensive answers
to these questions, the current study only attempted to provide some avenues for
investigation.
The first hint regarding the reasons for the prominence of the functional
imperative in defence policy arises from what Rocky Williams calls “the strong
ascriptive affinities that exist between many armed forces of the developing world
and the intellectual discourses of the former [Western] colonisers”.62 Had these
affinities dominated the SANDF’s strategic thinking, though, defence would
probably have adopted the transformation pathway of emulation, and modelled itself
exclusively upon the types of equipment, operational concepts and techniques used
by other, idealised defence organisations.63 Instead, the notion that the bulk of the
tactics, techniques and practices of the former non-statutory forces – and especially
those at the operational level of warfare – would not have been fitting in a modern
defence force, and especially not in the force design template of the SADF of yore,
42
seems to have held sway. As was intimated previously, the continuation of the
former SADF’s military practices was also encouraged by the fact that, at the time
when defence introduced its new policy, the SADF’s command structure was still
very much in charge and was using its pre-existing infrastructure, instructors and
training institutions to conduct the SANDF’s force development. Turning to the
glaring absence of defence policy prescripts in realised strategy, one could argue that
the intended conversion of (especially) the former revolutionary forces to the new
military paradigm that the policy prescribed was merely a pragmatic, tactful, facesaving illusion – at least, insofar as the former SADF’s ideological competitors were
concerned. In this case, much of defence policy’s drive towards military
effectiveness would boil down to mere utilitarian constructs, which stakeholders
superficially maintained to enhance all of the integrating forces’ self-worth, to avoid
defensive responses, to encourage the relationship-building process, and ultimately
to ensure the successful melding of the former forces into one unified institution. 64
In situations such as these, existing cultural rules regarding interaction and
communication dictate that the actors will readily sacrifice collaboration and
understanding to preserve their respective reputations.65 However, these charades
would also have had other deleterious consequences, in that they would have
suppressed the type of honest and exhaustive debates that stand central to learning
organisations. In this manner, the SANDF’s adoption of a novel, shared strategic
culture had been obstructed in the past, and may still be delayed in the present.
One finds evidence in support of this theory in the fledgling SANDF of the
late 1990s, where each of the integrating forces were ostensibly treated as if they
were all at the same level of military professionalism, had equally viable military
doctrines, and had been equally successful in achieving their military objectives. 66
This was especially true in the case of the relationship between the SADF and MK –
the predecessor regime’s defence force and the ruling party’s military force,
respectively – when the Chief of the SADF and the Chief of Staff MK served as cochairs of the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council.67 In spite of the patent disparities
between the SADF and the other integrating militaries, this power balancing was a
necessary machination, given that the revolutionary forces had clearly won the
political struggle and were now in power despite the SADF remaining undefeated in
combat. Given the adage that it often takes a beating for an armed force to adjust
substantively to the actual conditions of war,68 one may well ask which of the two
primary antagonists (the SADF or MK) perceived themselves to have been either the
vanquished or the victors, and therefore obliged to adopt a more functional military
theory. Colin Gray is of the opinion that, in strategy, nothing fails like success,
because the victor becomes unjustifiably persuaded of his or her genius or of the
favour of the gods.69 The article therefore argues that the lack of closure on issues of
43
an appropriate political culture, a suitable social culture, and an effective military
culture contrived to maintain the viability of two discrete, concurrent, horizontally
stratified strategic cultural paradigms in the SANDF: that of the defunct SADF
(initially dominant) and that of the obsolete MK (currently governing). 70 The uneasy
co-existence of these two paradigms, each with its own worldview and value system,
but within the same organisational imperative, would have confounded the
SANDF’s efforts to form an appropriate strategy indefinitely. Moreover, the
SANDF’s preferred strategic management model may have contributed further to
the stasis that, after almost two decades of transformation, is becoming more
apparent in defence’s realised strategy by the day. 71 To validate this assertion, the
article will again, as in Part 1, resort to Henry Mintzberg’s criticism of the design
school management approach.
Strategy formation by design: The SANDF’s primary method towards strategic
stasis
Mintzberg is of the opinion that strategists of the design school – whose
generic approach the SANDF is presumed to have been using – are liable to detach
thinking from acting, to encourage managers to remain aloof from the ground-level
activities of the business, to oversimplify strategy, and to deny its formation as being
a long, subtle and difficult process of organisational learning. 72 Nonetheless,
Mintzberg also recognises that the design school’s method of strategy formation
may be more viable in certain situations. The first condition for success is that, in
principle, one mind should be able to deal with all of the information relevant to the
formation of strategy. The organisation’s functional context should therefore be
relatively simple, allowing for an unambiguous definition of the strategic problem –
a setting which the transformation of the SANDF, in all of its complexity, certainly
did not provide. A second, related stipulation is that strategists at the top should have
sufficient access to and experience of the competencies of the institution and its
operating environment. To buttress their potential monopolisation of strategy
formulation, strategists should thus be insiders, and have constructed a deep,
intimate knowledge of both the organisation and the intricacies of its current
circumstance over a substantial period.73 Again, a study of SANDF internal
communication bulletins reveals that this condition, too, did not apply to the
organisation during the early years of its transition. In fact, the situation was
“extremely complex”.74 As early as 1998, the Deputy Minister of Defence admitted,
[t]he problems or [sic] merging into a new SANDF, and of
transforming the inherited institution, have proven to be a
monumental challenge. This is exemplified by the perception or
perhaps fear of former TBVC [Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda
44
and Ciskei] and NSF [non-statutory forces] members that they are
being absorbed by the old SADF rather than experiencing an evenhanded integration of all members – the SADF included – into a new
force.75
Considering the interest of this article in military effectiveness, the SANDF
even then (1998) suffered from a dubious (operational) role definition, institutional
overstretch, and a severe case of transformation fatigue: arguably, symptoms of
unsuitable strategic ends, inadequate strategic means, and inappropriate strategic
ways.76 In considering what the article has addressed before, one therefore
immediately appreciates the SANDF’s long-term strategic management challenge:
the environmental context of the SANDF would not have conformed to the caveats
for prescriptive strategy formation in the youthful days of the institution, and the
SANDF would have had to be exceptionally competent at organisational learning to
have become compliant since then.
A third condition for the successful application of a design strategy method
is that the strategist should have validated the stability of Mintzberg’s first two
criteria (mentioned above), before implementing intended strategy of the
organisation. Within this relatively stable context, planners should have a clear
understanding of current functional, societal and organisational imperatives, and be
able to predict with confidence the future changes that will come about in these
domains – all of this, to ensure that the organisation’s intended strategies remain
relevant well beyond their implementation date.77 This condition is necessary
because strategists of the design school are, by definition, ideologically constrained,
less responsive to the influences of (especially) the external environment, and
therefore less amenable to the exploitation of emergent events. However, it would
hardly have been plausible for the SANDF to know the future when it compiled the
1998 Defence Review, while it was already acquiring a suite of heavy combat
systems for the SA Air Force and the SA Navy – this, for a country that had always
been oriented towards a landward threat.78 Moreover, in its first decade of existence
one could scarcely have considered the SANDF as being in a state of stable
equilibrium. Within the short space of a few years, the external and internal
environments of the Department of Defence were changing radically with alterations
in social and political paradigms, adjustments to policy, and major amendments to
defence structures.79 Yet, even in this volatile environment, politicians were
informing the citizenry and its armed forces that, in typical design school style,
[t]ransformation and change represents a territory which can only be
successfully traversed when everyone is clear about our goals, puts
shoulder to the wheel, and strives as part of a united winning team in
45
a spirit of co-operation and trust. Sound policy, implemented
throughout a willing institution, by means of effective structures and
attitudes, will ensure the success of transformation. Transformation
is on track and we will achieve our objectives.80
The SANDF, too, was apparently convinced that the realisation of its
intended transformation strategy was purely dependent upon the formulation of
unambiguous ends and the application of a highly elaborated, systematic,
prescriptive method to achieve the same. 81 This approach, espoused by politicians
and military professionals alike, implied that the strategists’ individual learning
would have ended, and their intended strategy fully explicated, before
implementation could have commenced. In this manner, the SANDF seems to have
negated the benefits of organisational responsiveness to its external environment,
and vaccinated itself against organisational learning as well – both effects being
unintended and incidental consequences of adopting an inappropriate strategic
management model. Nonetheless, the poor prognosis for the SANDF’s
transformation strategy becomes worse when one considers the last of Mintzberg’s
criteria for the successful employment of the design school philosophy: that the
organisation should be willing and prepared to cope with a centrally articulated
strategy right from the start. Influential members of the organisation should not only
be ready to defer to the principal strategists, but should also have the time, energy,
resources and emotional commitment to implement the declared strategy. 82 The
SANDF has been aware of this proviso all along, as evidenced by its early
comments on transformation management.
International studies reveal that not many large institutions or
organisations are very successful at profound transformation, despite
their good intentions. Why is this? Is a large and complex
organisation such as ours doomed to a similar fate? It is submitted
that such failures mainly lie in the area of change management. In
most cases, the more technical aspects – designing and implementing
new and sound processes, structures and systems – are well executed
by competent people. The lack of success seems to be as a result of
the failure by the organisation’s executives to enlist employee
support. Studies seem to point to the requirement for an
understandable change message to employees, in particular as seen
from their point of view. Employees’ concerns have to be addressed.
Executives, and not lower level managers, should help people to
visualise their contributions to change. This needs to be addressed
throughout the implementation and continuously reaffirmed.
Executives are to be seen as leading and showing the way. 83
46
The article has already confirmed that the SANDF’s initial transformation
had occurred within a bipolar cultural context. This environment allowed for the
formulation of a declaratory statement of defence policy, largely based on the values
and norms of the defunct SADF, but at odds with the subsequent formation of an
pragmatic, deliberate military strategy. Whereas defence policy and the structures of
the SANDF – still overwhelmingly staffed by former SADF members – were mainly
intent upon achieving military effectiveness and cost-efficiency, political leadership
(presumably speaking on behalf of personnel from the other integrating forces) had
fundamental emotive and socio-economic goals in mind.84 Thus, for the members of
the former SADF, a transformed defence function possibly meant that the “SANDF
shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force,
capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently”, as promised by defence
policy.85 For the other constituents, though, transformation could primarily have
denoted a defence organisation that was representative of South Africa’s racial
demography, that treated its members fairly, attended to their conditions of service
and physiological needs, paid them regularly, and raised their social status “… to the
levels s/he deserves …”.86 Having had their basic needs satisfied all along, the
former SADF complement fixated upon functional imperatives, while (especially)
the former non-statutory forces were preoccupied with societal and organisational
imperatives. Presented with these substantial differences in the expectations and
institutional/occupational orientations of the two dominant cultures in the SANDF, it
would have been extremely difficult for the organisation to create those salutary
conditions for strategy by design that Mintzberg describes. It would also have been
virtually impossible to establish de facto consensus on the integration of the ends of
the transformation strategy, agreement on the quality of equipment needed, and
acceptance of the actual skills sets required for the SANDF – all of which military
effectiveness theory demands.
From the elaboration above, it seems clear that the design school method
was not suitable for employment within the first decade of the establishment of the
SANDF. However, this does not mean that the particular approach to strategic
management may not have become more viable since then. After all, the constraints
of the SANDF’s strategic context have been changing continuously for about two
decades now, providing the organisation with sufficient opportunity to respond
appropriately. For example, Mintzberg is of the opinion that the design school’s
model is eminently suitable for an organisation that is entering a period of reconceptualisation, providing that its functional context displays the following
characteristics. Firstly, the environment that previously supported and maintained
the former strategy of the organisation has changed drastically, so that the strategic
plans of the organisation are no longer viable; and secondly, the organisation has
47
already entered a period of relative stability, which will support a new conception of
its strategy.87
The design school model, therefore, seems most applicable to an
organisation that has just come out of a period of flux (the SANDF’s
“transformation”) and into one of operating stability. While a major realignment of
strategy usually occurs as a response to a crisis or challenge in the external
environment (such as the SANDF’s “Battle of Bangui”), an organisation may also
embark upon reformation proactively, for instance when key uncertainties are
resolved, or when a maximum period has elapsed since the last strategy review. This
article contends that such periods had occurred in the SANDF’s recent history. The
SA Army, for instance, agrees that its initial generalist strategic focus on the
integration of the former forces (and its accompanying inculcation of a human rights
culture) had officially petered out prior to 2006 already. Consequently, the army
then re-focused its force development strategy towards the achievement of military
effectiveness, by introducing the first iteration of what was to become its “future
strategy” at that time.88 This period also coincided with other signs that the SANDF
was ready for an evolutionary adjustment, as evidenced by the DOD’s abortive
efforts to adjust the 1998 Defence Review since then (e.g. Defence Update 2005).89
However, the mere fact that the SANDF was still purported to be relatively
ineffective by 2013, and that the new Defence Review still had to pass muster in
parliament by the end of 2014, implies that something other than the SANDF’s
strategic management model may be impeding the organisation’s responsiveness. It
is possible that the first, interim stage of the defence force’s declaratory
transformation strategy – with its focus on racial and former force representation,
workplace liberalisation and cultural reform – may have evolved into its ultimate,
realised strategy by default. Mintzberg supports the view that the clear enunciation
of strategy, coupled with a machine bureaucracy’s habitual planning and control
processes, would have made an organisation like the SANDF more resistant to
change than would have been the case if a dynamic strategy-forming method had
been followed.90 While one may therefore no longer blame defence’s strategic
management model for its current ineffectiveness, the consequences of its adoption
at the start of the SANDF’s first transformation still continue to bedevil initiatives
towards the second.
Conclusion
This study maintained that militaries in general (and therefore probably the
SANDF in particular) lean towards the design school’s approach to strategy
formation. When considering their options, defence strategists weigh influences
from two external contexts (the functional and societal imperatives) and one internal
48
environment (the organisational imperative). Whereas emphasis on the functional
imperative will shift a defence force’s strategic focus towards military effectiveness,
an accentuation of the societal imperative will encourage a concern with the
structure, service conditions and management efficiency of a particular military. The
organisational imperative, in turn, serves to mediate strategic influences from both
the external and the internal environments, and then shapes the armed forces’
strategic behaviour accordingly.
During the compilation of a hypothetical strategic management model, the
current study identified three feedback loops that allow an organisation to perceive
its environment, interpret its implications for strategy formation, decide on an
appropriate response, and then act accordingly. While insight into the first two loops
certainly contributes to the argumentation of the study, it is an analysis of the third
feedback loop that sheds most light on the research problem. When productively
utilised, this loop serves as an evolution mechanism that stimulates appropriate
responses to the external environment, facilitates organisational learning, minimises
entropy, and assists the institution in remaining functionally effective. However,
strategists of the design school generally underestimate the impact of the functional
and societal imperatives, have less appreciation for the potential effects of changes
in the organisation’s operational context, and are disinclined to manipulate emergent
strategy; ergo, they are less responsive in forming the institution’s realised strategy.
Two intrinsic qualities of all feedback loops further exacerbate the ensuing risk of
organisational obsolescence: the delay between cause and effect, and the fact that all
strategic actions have both intended and unintended outcomes.
A cursory interrogation of the South African military’s sources of strategic
culture revealed that the armed forces have had to adjust to the demands of a single
(novel and possibly dichotomous) political culture since the SANDF’s inception in
1994. At the same time, the military has had to contend with primarily two
(distinctive and probably irreconcilable) military cultures: the conventional, mobile
warfare mentality of the defunct SADF, and the revolutionary, people’s war
paradigm of the obsolete MK. Accordingly, government consistently touted the
societal imperative as the highest value in force development, while defence policy
took its prime directives from the functional imperative instead (albeit only for the
second stage of the implementation of strategy, after the SANDF had achieved the
integration of its constituent military forces). In terms of the design school
paradigm, defence strategists would have assumed the first, evolutionary stage of
transformation as an interim or transient condition and of passing importance in the
greater scheme of the implementation of strategy – and thereby underestimated this
stage’s detrimental impact upon organisational culture, and upon the SANDF’s
subsequent strategic behaviour. Given that, with the passing of time, MK’s strategic
49
culture was gaining ascendancy as that of the SADF waned, the value preferences of
the defence force generals eventually shifted closer to those that government had
espoused all along.
The ambitions of defence policy towards military effectiveness, through its
declared combination of ends and means, consequently became less acceptable – or
at least less pressing – as the armed forces’ strategic culture changed. While major
portions of the SANDF’s declaratory force development strategy remained
unrealised, the organisation’s actual transformation strategy maintained most of its
momentum, even after the period 2004–2006 when an opportunity arose to enhance
military effectiveness again. It seems that, subsequent to achieving its initial,
political transformation goals with defence, government has run out of ideological
steam when confronted with the realities of an ever-changing security environment.
As usually happens, the realised strategy of the SANDF is therefore comprised of a
combination of intended strategy (in this case, mainly the societal elements of it) and
emergent strategy (most of it unintended and unconstructive, in this instance). From
this evidence, the marriage between the SANDF’s preferred strategic management
model and its acquired strategic cultures has proved to be an unhappy one. This
provides a partial explanation for government’s apparent bemusement at adopting an
intended force development strategy in 1998, achieving its societal component by
about 2005, realising undesirable strategic outcomes by 2013, and now finding its
defence force in a state of virtual strategic paralysis. Through the combined
consequences of a singular political concern with societal imperatives, of a
sympathetic organisational culture change over time, of leaving the dogma of
‘transformation’ unchallenged, and of adopting the habitual planning and control
processes of a machine bureaucracy, defence may now be actively resisting change
towards military effectiveness rather than promoting it. Whether the Minister of
Defence and Military Veterans will therefore be able to turn her statements of
political intent into declaratory strategy (arising from Defence Review 2014) any
time soon, is a matter of conjecture. It is even more doubtful whether the SANDF,
given the dysfunctional character of the interplay between its strategic management
model and strategic cultures, has the capacity to convert its strategic intent into
realised strategy. With this hypothesis now in the public domain, the article has
opened the door to a full-blown validation study.
Endnotes
1
Gray, S. Modern strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 141.
The South African Defence Force, prior to 27 April 1994.
3
The abbreviation MK is used for Umkhonto we Sizwe (translated as “Spear of the
Nation”), the armed force of the African National Congress (ANC) before
2
50
1994. It was the most important revolutionary armed force mobilised against
the apartheid state.
4
Republic of South Africa. “South African Defence Review 2014”.
<http://www.sadefencereview2012.org/publications/publications.htm>
Accessed on 21 October 2014.
5
“Speech by Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Minister of Defence and Military Veterans
on the occasion of the Department of Defence Budget Vote 2013”. South
Africa Government Online.
<http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?
pageid=461&sid=36705&tid=107903> Accessed on 21 October 2014.
6
Gray, CS. Weapons don’t make war: Policy, strategy and military technology.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993, 67.
7
Hooker, RD. “‘The strange voyage’”: A short précis on strategy”. Parameters
42(4)/43(1). Winter/Spring 2013. 62.
8
Lantis, JS & Howlett, D. “Strategic culture”. In Baylis, J, Wirtz JJ & Gray, CS
(eds), Strategy in the contemporary world (3rd ed), New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010, 86.
9
Gray, Weapons don’t make war op. cit., p 3.
10
Dandeker, C. “ Military and society: The problem, challenges and possible
answers”. King’s College, London, 2003.
<https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications> Accessed on 21 October
2014.
11
Schein, E. “ Organizational culture”. American Psychologist 45/2. February 1990.
110. <http:/psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/45/2/109/>
12
Johnston, AI. “Thinking about strategic culture”. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, International Security 19:4, 1995, 46.
13
Dandeker op. cit,, p. 3.
14
Adapted from Lantis & Howlett op. cit., p. 91.
15
Johnston op. cit., p. 34.
16
Nielsen, SC. An army transformed: The US Army’s post-Vietnam recovery and the
dynamics of change in military organizations. Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College, 2010, 22–25. http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
Accessed on 21 October 2014.
17
A doctrine or approach to war that emphasises the specific, systemic disruption of
the opponent, aimed at collapsing the adversary’s will to resist suddenly
through the application of superior stratagems.
18
Fourie, DFS. The defence decision dilemma. Unpublished paper submitted to the
Defence Review Committee, 2011, 20.
19
A doctrine or approach to war that entails military and paramilitary operations in
hostile territory, conducted by irregular forces employing light weapons and
using hit-and-run tactics.
20
Gray, Modern strategy op. cit., p. 131.
21
Lantis & Howlett op. cit., p. 90.
22
Ibid., p. 95.
51
23
Baylis, J, Booth, K, Garnett, J & Williams, P (eds). Contemporary strategy II: The
nuclear powers. (2nd ed). London: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 2.
24
Yarger, HR. “ The strategic appraisal: The key to effective strategy”. In
Bartholomees, JB (ed), The US Army War College guide to national security
issues (4th ed; Vol. 1), Carlisle: US. Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute, 2010, 50.
25
Hooker op. cit., p. 60.
26
Bartholomees, JB. “ A survey of the theory of strategy”. In Bartholomees US
Army War College guide op. cit., p. 17.
27
Ibid.
28
Gray, Weapons don’t make war op. cit., p. 68.
29
Mintzberg, H. “ The Design School: Reconsidering the basic premises of strategic
management”. Engineering Management Review 19/3. Fall 1991. 89.
30
Ibid., pp. 90–91.
31
Ibid., p. 91.
32
Mintzberg, H. “ The fall and rise of strategic planning”. Harvard Business Review
January–February 1994. 111.
33
Espejo, R. “ The Viable Systems Model: A briefing about organisational
structure”. 2003. 6.
<http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Systems_and_Networks/Viable_Systems
_Model/INTRODUCTION%20TO%20THE%20VIABLE%20SYSTEM%2
0MODEL3.pdf> Accessed on 21 October 2014.
34
Millett, AR & Murray, W (eds). Military effectiveness. Vol. 1: The First World
War. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990, 1.
35
Brooks, RA & Stanley, EA (eds). Creating military power: The sources of
military effectiveness. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007, 9.
36
Millett & Murray op. cit., p. 2.
37
Bernasconi, J. Military effectiveness: A reappraisal. Fort Leavenworth, KS:
School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and
General Staff College, 2007, 1.
38
Farrel, T & Terriff, T (eds). The sources of military change: Culture, politics,
technology. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, 268.
39
Brooks & Stanley op. cit., pp. 16–17.
40
Ibid.
41
Biddle, S. Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, 5.
42
Ibid., p. 11.
43
Ibid.
44
Kasrils, R. “ Progress in transformation”. In Cilliers, J (ed), Continuity in change:
The SA Army in transition. ISS Monograph Series 26. August 1998. 16–17.
45
Ibid., p. 18.
46
Ibid., p. 19.
47
Ibid., p. 18.
48
Esterhuyse, A. “ Getting the job done: Transformation in the South African
Military”. Strategic Review for Southern Africa XXXII/1. June 2010. 1–30.
52
Vreÿ, F. “ From theory to culture: Emergent South African strategic culture”.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 9/3. Spring 2006/07. 26–28.
50
Ibid., pp. 24–25.
51
Cilliers, J (ed). Continuity in change: The SA Army in transition. ISS Monograph
Series 26. August 1998. 4. Also see Kasrils op. cit., pp. 15–17.
52
DefenceWeb 6 July 2011. For example, the chair of the Joint Standing
Committee on Defence explained in 2011 “that the lack of an effective exit
strategy appeared to be the reason for the lack of progress in transformation
in the SANDF”.
<http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=16939:sandf-77-male-72-black&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242>
Accessed on 21 October 2014.
53
Kasrils op. cit., p. 17.
54
DefenceWeb 6 July 2011 op. cit.
55
Department of Defence and Military Veterans. Annual Report 2012/13, 114.
56
Ibid., p. 122.
57
DefenceWeb 6 July 2011 op. cit.
58
Gray, Modern strategy op. cit., p. 131.
59
Republic of South Africa. “White Paper on Defence, May 1996”. Chapter 2. 7.
<http://merln.ndu.edu/whitearticles/SouthAfrica1996.pdf> Accessed on 21
October 2014.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid. Also see Republic of South Africa. “South African Defence Review 2012
(Consultative Draft)”. Department of Defence.
<http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=163570> Accessed
on 21 October 2014.
62
Williams, R. “ Defence in a democracy: The South African Defence Review and
the redefinition of the parameters of the national defence debate”. In
Williams, R, Cawthra, G & Abrahams, D (eds), Ourselves to know,
Pretoria: ISS Africa, 2002, 212.
63
Farrel & Terriff op. cit., p. 6.
64
Schein op. cit., p. 24.
65
Ibid.
66
Kasrils op. cit., pp. 18–20.
67
CSADF. “Construction and functions of the Joint Military Co-Ordinating
Council”. Internal Communication Bulletin 8. 1 February 1994 .
68
Murray, W. “ Does military culture matter? In Lehman, JF & Sicherman, H (eds),
America the vulnerable: Our military problems and how to fix them,
Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Institute, 1999, 141.
<www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/BookAmericatheVulnerable.pdf>
Accessed on 21 October 2014.
69
Gray, Modern strategy op. cit., p. 52.
70
The SANDF does not make unclassified data regarding former force
representation available. However, even a cursory internet scan reveals that
the posts of Chief SANDF, Chief of Corporate Staff, all of the service chiefs
49
53
and the vast majority of the division chiefs were occupied by former
members of MK in 2013; also that the Chief SANDF and Chief SA Army
(the latter commanding by far the largest service, which was also the most
committed in military operations past and present) started in the SANDF as
human resource practitioners, not as combat officers.
71
In contrast to the expectation of convergence between two race-associated social
cultures at some time in future, one can state the certainty of the demise of
the two dominant military cultures. By 2024, any serviceman that had
entered the SANDF at age 30 or older in 1994 would, regardless of former
force, have reached retirement age.
72
Mintzberg op. cit., p. 97.
73
Ibid.
74
SANDF. “Legal position of the forces comprising the SA National Defence Force
(SANDF)”. Internal Communication Bulletin 4. 6 May 1994; SANDF.
“Senior appointments in the NDF”. Internal Communication Bulletin 20. 29
June 1994 .
75
Kasrils op. cit., p. 16.
76
Cilliers op. cit., p. 4.
77
Mintzberg op. cit., p. 97.
78
Cilliers op. cit., p. 2.
79
Venter, C. “ Planning for transformation”. In Cilliers, J (ed), Continuity in
change: The SA Army in transition. ISS Monograph Series 26. August 1998.
30.
80
Kasrils op. cit., p. 24.
81
Venter op. cit., pp. 25, 28–29.
82
Mintzberg op. cit., pp. 97–98.
83
Venter op. cit., pp. 29–30.
84
Ibid., p. 26; Kasrils op. cit., pp. 20, 22–23.
85
Republic of South Africa. “White Paper on Defence, May 1996” op. cit.
86
Ibid. This reflexive behaviour became even more visible after 2009, when the
Minister of Defence implemented measures to substantially improve the
remuneration and service conditions of the SANDF.
87
Mintzberg op. cit., p. 98.
88
SA Army. Strategic profile of the SA Army 2020. Pretoria: SA Army Office, June
2006.
89
Parliamentary Monitoring Group. “Defence update 2005, first report”.
<http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/050614 reportupdate.htm> Accessed on
21 October 2014.
90
Mintzberg op. cit., p. 98.