Evert Jordaan

The study focused on the making of South African defence policy from 1994 to 2015. Since democratisation, South African defence spending declined as socio-economic development became the national priority. After integration, the South African National Defence Force struggled with affordability regarding its personnel, main equipment, internal deployments, and increasing operational involvement in African missions. The research question was to determine why there is a disconnect between the means and ends in South African defence policy since 1994. To answer this question, a theoretical case study with emphasis on domestic policy-making was done. The work of Graham Allison was used to analyse South African defence policy-making in terms of rational choice, organisational process, and bureaucratic politics. This study found that South African defence policy is not made in a rational, logical, or cost-effective manner – as society expects – but is predominantly influenced by party-political considerations and vested military institutional interests.

The 2015 South African Defence Review set out to reverse the deterioration of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) capabilities. Within the South African Department of Defence (DOD) this deterioration is expressed mainly in terms of a decreasing defence budget, subsequent declining conventional capabilities and obsolete prime mission equipment. Contemporary research and defence expert debates on this theme, point out the disjuncture between policy ends and the available means, with scepticism for an increased defence budget given the DOD’s lack of internal reform and strategy adjustment. One question that remains largely unanswered in the literature regarding the decline of the SANDF, is why both the policy-makers and the SANDF have remained focused on the primary role of the military (defending territorial integrity) accompanied with an unaffordable conventional force design? This question relates to the aim of this paper and is explored by revisiting initial defence policy decisions and compromises that were made in the 1990s. It is argued that the primary role of the SANDF and its conventional force design suited the interests of both the politicians and the military, but that the drawbacks thereof have harshly caught up with the DOD.

The promotion of peace and security in Africa necessitates security cooperation between states and collective security remains a way to pursue it. This paper explores the changed meaning and application of the concept of collective security within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to deal with both interstate and intrastate security concerns within the African Union (AU). Since the AU has made clear commitments to collective security, the aim is to determine to what extent the AU subscribed to collective security and applied it in terms of coercion, which includes interventions. While dealing with genocide, war crimes and extended presidential terms remains problematic, the AU has taken an assertive stand with the use of coercion in cases of unconstitutional changes of government. The article highlights the tension between the theory and practice of collective security in Africa.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) have received significant emphasis over the last decade, as armed forces require highly trained and rapid deployable forces to deal with asymmetric threats. The South African (SA) Army identified the need for an SOF capability in its long-term strategy, and airborne forces form an important component in its envisioned Contingency Brigade. This article examines the utility of contemporary airborne forces despite the decline in major parachute assaults. It also explains the importance of airborne forces for South Africa with reference to its defence policy and defence commitments. The article concludes that an SOF capability will enable the SA Army to operate better across the conflict spectrum, including robust multinational peace operations in Africa, which mostly involve insurgencies. The article also argues that South Africa needs a balanced airborne capability before it can establish an SOF capability. The intended conversion of airborne forces to SOF will require considerable changes in training and doctrine.

Being future-orientated is critical to avoid stagnation and maintain an innovative defence force. The aim of this short paper is to highlight the importance of planning towards the future for the SA Army, as well as to suggest some pointers to achieve this.

The article provides a chronological analysis of the development of non-offensive defence. As a point of departure, it demarcates the roots, the unfolding of, and the application of non-offensive defence in Western Europe. The debate about non-offensive defence in Western Europe serves as the basis for the introduction of the concept in the South African context. Ideas about non-offensive defence came into being in distinct eras and are continuously being connected to new ideas. Initially, non-offensive defence and its various models were mainly utilised in an attempt to prevent nuclear and major war in Europe, as well as to prevent escalation during the Cold War. This was done by emphasising the security dilemma and by criticising the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's nuclear and conventional strategies. Although the Soviet Union briefly accepted non-offensive defence principles, no individual country applied non-offensive defence. The nexus between non-offensive defence and common security ensures that both have some relevance in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, South African defence policy contains principles of non-offensive defence and common security. Non-offensive defence was introduced into the South African defence debate by the African National Congress' Military Research Group to build confidence in Southern Africa. It also served as a catalyst in defence debates to promote an understanding of and consensus regarding South Africa's strategic defensive posture.

The aim of this paper is to highlight emerging trends in African security and to illustrate the challenges with utilising armour in African peace missions. The need to re-introduce multi-role training together with the re-stablishment of a light armour capability is proposed.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the role of South African armour during the South West Africa/Namibia conflict. It commences with a discussion of the role and definition of modern armour. It then explains how armour was employed in the SWA/Namibia and Angola theatres of operations and by dividing the role of different armoured fighting vehicles into eras, starting with the Eland, then the Ratel and lastly the Olifant tank. The role of armour in de-mining operations and the stopping of SWAPO's last wave of cross-border attacks in the last phase of the conflict is then discussed. The last part of the paper is about the pioneers of South African armour doctrine.

Operational strategy and operational theory are two concepts within the levels of war that do not always receive sufficient attention. Russia revived the operational level during the early 20th century while the United States of America came on board during the second half of the same century. The operational level also received insufficient attention in South African military circles until very recently, since it had to compete with a host of military priorities in order to be recognised. In this article it is argued that the South African National Defence Force lacks a clear, coherent operational theory towards a joint operations doctrine for combat operations. One reason for this is the commitment to peacekeeping duties in Africa, which diverts personnel, time and other resources from matters pertaining to operational theory and doctrine. In spite of this, some progress has been made to revive the operational level within the South African National Defence Force, but these initiatives do not sufficiently address the level of operational strategy.

The aim of the paper is to outline the prominence of non-offensive defence (NOD) in South African defence policy and to explain why it is not explicitly used in policy documents. The paper commences with a brief background on
the development of NOD and common security in order to highlight the context and meaning of these ideas. The second part of the paper deals with the development of defensive ideas in South Africa. Lastly, the principles of
NOD that were accepted in South Africa will be highlighted as well as the relevance of these ideas.

This paper aims at an assessment of the Soviet and German operational doctrines in order to determine whether it had any influence on the final outcome of the Battle of Kursk. The first part of the paper is a discussion of the Russian way of war and an analysis of their concept of "Deep Operations". The second part is an analysis of the German Blitzkrieg doctrine whereby specific attention is focused on important concepts that characterised the German way of war. The discussion attempts to highlight particular limitations of the Blitzkrieg doctrine that can be used as doctrinal explanations for the Wehrmacht not being successful at Kursk. The paper concludes with a brief comparison of the most salient aspects of the two operational doctrines.

The aim of this article is to discuss and assess the tension between ideas that underpin the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the changing nature of post-Cold War conflict with specific reference to the nature of low-intensity conflict (LIC). The US view of an RMA is used as a point of departure as it forms part of the mainstream thinking on the debate. It is argued that the conventional and interstate war paradigm in the current RMA-debate seems largely irrelevant to the nature of LIC, which is the most probable type of conflict strong powers will face in future. The terror attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 reinforced this critique of the RMA vision and indicated the rise of asymmetric strategies. Hence, this article discusses the tension between RMA-thinking and the nature of LIC, also considering the impact of September 11. It addresses the preparation for certain scenarios, existing national values, operational thinking, and the use of military instruments.

In Anatomy of post-communist European defense institutions: The mirage of military modernity, Thomas-Durell Young's aim was to determine why Central and Eastern European (CEE) states have failed to apply democratic defence governance concepts, despite 25 years of Western assistance programmes. Young provides an indepth comparative analysis of the impact of Western defence reform programmes on CEE states, from the end of the Cold War to circa 2015, which is of great theoretical importance for South African defence planners.

Recce: Small team missions behind enemy lines is an autobiography by Colonel (retired) Koos Stadler. The book mainly covers his career as a Special Forces officer and reconnaissance soldier during South Africa’s so-called Border War in Namibia (formerly South West Africa) and Angola, and his involvement in operations against the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). It also covers operations against the African National Congress (ANC) and Angolan forces.