Military Doctrine

Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory.

Autor zajmuje się wpływem czwartej wojny izraelsko-arabskiej, która wybuchła w październiku 1973 r., na amerykańską doktrynę wojenną. Armia amerykańska znajdowała się wtedy w procesie transformacji po porażce odniesionej w Wietnamie i przechodzenia na ochotniczy zaciąg do wojska. Wojna Jom Kippur była analizowana z każdego możliwego punktu widzenia przez liczne amerykańskie zespoły badawcze odwiedzające Izrael, których członkami byli również wysokiej rangi generałowie. Wojna izraelsko-arabska nie mogła się zdarzyć w lepszym momencie dla US Army, ponieważ stała się usprawiedliwieniem nie tylko dla radykalnych reform doktrynalnych, ale również dla przeforsowania wielkich funduszy na uzbrojenie. Ponieważ wytworzenie nowych typów uzbrojenia jest procesem niezwykle czasochłonnym, dopiero druga iteracja doktrynalna, tj. bitwa powietrzno-lądowa, w pełni uwzględniała wnioski z analizy wojny Jom Kippur.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: wojna Jom Kippur, wojny izraelsko-arabskie, doktryna wojenna, strategia, aktywna obrona, bitwa powietrzno-lądowa, William E. DePuy, Donn A. Starry.

In this article, the author discusses the impact of the fourth Arab-Israeli war, which took place in October 1973, on American military doctrine. At that time, the US Army was in the transformation period after the defeat in Vietnam as well as in the process of establishing an all-volunteer army. The Yom Kippur War was analyzed from every possible angle by numerous American research teams, including top-tier generals, during their visits in Israel. The Arab-Israel conflict happened in the right time for the US Army, enabling it to proceed with radical doctrinal reform as well as a procurement program. Due to the time-consuming process of creating new military equipment, only second iteration of the US Army doctrine, i.e. AirLand Battle, fully implemented the conclusions stemming from the Yom Kippur War.

KEYWORDS: Yom Kippur War, Arab-Israeli wars, military doctrine, military strategy, active defense, AirLand Battle, William E. DuPuy, Donn A. Starry

This paper attempts to bridge doctrinal and theoretical terms. The use of terms such as 'hybrid,' asymmetric' and 'grey zone,' are often redundant and cause confusion. Furthermore, terms such as irregular and unconventional war are sometimes conflated. These terms have doctrinal or conceptual utility at the appropriate level, but we need to clarify where each belongs. Irregular war and the associated doctrinal activities are placed in a conceptual framework alongside revolution theory. Both the doctrinal and theoretical concepts are shown to fit in the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

This article describes the reasons for, and the process of, establishing the 18th Mechanised Division of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. Its organisational structure, command and role in the Polish Army are also outlined. The author not only focused on the chronological presentation of establishing a new tactical unit but also presented the geostrategic context of Central and Eastern Europe. Reference was made to the Russian military potential of the Kaliningrad Region and the Western Operational Command. The contexts of the Suwałki Corridor, the Smolensk Gate and the Anti-Access Area Denial capacities in the modern art of war were described as well. The research methods employed included analysis, synthesis, comparison and generalisation. Special attention was paid to analysing a range of documents and reports describing Poland’s defence strategies and the significance of eastern areas of the Republic of Poland to the military safety of Central and Eastern Europe, including Securing the Suwałki Corridor; Strategy, Statecraft, Deterrence and Defense, The Suwalki Gap – NATO’S Fragile Hot Spot, The Russia – NATO A2AD Environment, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, and The Strategic Defence Review. In the course of the research, publications and lectures by Jacek Bartosiak – The Republic between the land and the sea. About war and peace also proved useful, and so did articles published on Defence24.
In the author’s opinion, the creation of the 18th Mechanised Division has been one of the most important undertakings recently implemented within the Polish Armed Forces, aimed at strengthening the military potential in the country’s eastern flank. Conducting research in this field also appears justified when taking into consideration the crucial role of the Suwałki Corridor, the Smolensk Gate and Poland’s capacities for conducting multi-area battles.

The article asks the question, Is the Center of Gravity (CoG) concept still relevant in today’s Operational Environment (OE)? It explores the two main schools of thought that argue irrelevancy: unsettled theory and the technological, and philosophical differences between the 18th and 21st centuries. Then the article rebuts the arguments by demonstrating the concept’s utility to planning and its timeless applicability that is independent of shifting philosophical thought.

This article surveys the extent to which service doctrines as well as the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAS) capture and define the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Indian military. The analysis captures the limited view and non-existent view of AI within service and tri-service doctrine. A gap has emerged between the services' doctrinal pronouncements and the actual use of AI in some form in the three branches of the military. AI come in two variants at least-semi-autonomous and autonomous systems. This ensuing assessment is only a partial critique of how service doctrine see or ignore AI, the problem relating to the use of technology and doctrine is not unique to the services, but extends to other areas.

The concepts of military doctrine and military strategy are sometimes wrongly used as if they were the same concept; while the two concepts are related, the student and practitioner of warfare must understand the differences and not confuse them with each other. This article will briefly discuss the two concepts and their relation. The article argues that while doctrine represents the more scientific side of warfare, strategy represents the artistic side. Existing doctrine will almost never meet the requirements for winning the next war; it is through the artistic application of generic peacetime doctrine to the specific strategic and operational context, using doctrine as building blocks for a context specific military strategy, that the military commander outwits and defeats or coerces the adversary and achieves the military objectives.

Interwar Soviet combined-arms doctrine suffered a setback through the purges of the 1930's; proponents of the effective framework resurrected and used it from its prewar debut at Khalkin Gol through the "August Storm" offensive in summer 1945.

Increasingly, contemporary operations take place in a complex environment involving a number of local actors. There have been numerous attempts to make sense of this environment. Influence operations, for example, tend to classify local forces as friendly, neutral, adversary, or enemy. Many field officers prefer a ‘traffic light’ model, according to which local actors are classified green, amber (or yellow), or red based on their place on a spectrum of friendliness to hostility. Still others use a system of green, blue, red, yellow, and white. These characterisations of actors within the human terrain of a given situation can be highly problematic and hinder operational effectiveness. Although they are an improvement on the simple binary of ‘friendly’ or ‘hostile’ that preceded them, they share the same fundamental flaw; a presupposition that actors relate to each other in a binary manner, occupying only one point on the spectrum. While these means of classification allow for complexity of issues and motivations, at a fundamental level, they still assume that there are those who are hostile and those who are friendly. In this way, they neglect the concept of aligned motivation. This paper employs historical cases to demonstrate the problems of this neglect and suggests the basis for a new system.

In the 1990s, Greece  reached a turning point with regard to its national security. The  1996  Imia crisis,  in particular,  manfisted a further escalation of Turkey's claims in the Aegean, which for the first time became direct territorial claims against Greece.  In response, Greece readjusted its  national defense doctrine, encompassing  the necessary political-military “tool” of crisis management.  Readjustments were made to ensure an adequate, determined response , while containing bilateral tensions at the lowest possible level.  These readjustments further clarified the ultimate Greek defence message to Turkey, which is that the threat or use of force  provide no credible alternative to International Law and the international conventions that determine the current Greek-Turkish border status quo. Since then, although bilateral tensions have been indeed  contained at a low level, Ankara has persisted in its unilateral claims against Greek sovereignty rights and territory.

Dans cette étude prosopographique, je me propose de présenter un certain nombre de personnalités françaises ayant contribué au débat sur la motorisation et la mécanisation des armées. Leur action a connu parfois un rayonnement à l'échelle européenne. Dans le sillage des pionniers de la Grande Guerre, une pléiade d'officiers s'efforce de penser l'adaptation de l'outil militaire - personnels et armements - issu de la période de conflagration, dont aucune institution ne sort inchangée. En exploitant les dossiers individuels des officiers conservés au SHD Vincennes, je m'efforcerai de mettre en parallèle articles publiés dans des revues et appréciations de la hiérarchie, croisant littérature ouverte et archives. Dans les parcours de chacun de ces hommes, il sera peut-être possible d'estimer le moment d'entrée en contact avec cet engin alors contesté qu'est le char de combat. L'état-major prend le parti de le considérer comme une arme supplémentaire, subordonnée à l'infanterie, compatible avec les habitudes tactiques éprouvées. L'héritage du vainqueur de Verdun, incarné par le maréchal Pétain, a dans une certaine mesure tendance à freiner les innovations, du fait du vieillissement de cadres inamovibles, et du corsettement réglementaire auquel doit se plier tout officier qui souhaite publier sur les événements de la guerre mondiale. Cependant, des généraux relativement âgés mais clairvoyants, comme Buat et Maitrot, pressentent les nouvelles formes de combat induites par l'utilisation de machines sur le champ de bataille, alors que d'autres plus jeunes demeurent hermétiques aux courants novateurs, souvent associés à l'excentricité insulaire des Britanniques. J'essaierai de restituer la dynamique d'émergence et de diffusion des idées à travers les strates générationnelles. Peu de partisans de la modernisation prennent place parmi les rédacteurs des deux grands textes doctrinaux qui balisent la période étudiée, l'Instruction provisoire sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités de 1921 et l'Instruction sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités de 1936. Si comme l'assure la Revue Militaire française dans l'immédiat après-guerre,  les militaires français sont les plus qualifiés pour assumer la direction intellectuelle des diverses armées du monde, cette volonté se heurte à la réalité du terrain, européen ou colonial (la conflit du Rif, où les Français se trouvent malmenés par des adversaires d'un niveau de développement très inférieur en ce qui concerne l'art de la guerre), et surtout au manque de renouvellement conceptuel  et matériel. Cette étude sera l'occasion d'évoquer les servitudes et grandeurs du métier d'officier à une époque dominée par la rigueur budgétaire et une dévalorisation de l'armée. Ce sera l'occasion de mettre en valeur une galaxie de noms un peu oubliés du grand public qui ne retient que la figure de De Gaulle comme promoteur du char, allant à l'encontre d'une hiérarchie réputée sclérosée. Il s'agit de restituer la situation de l'époque dans toute sa complexité institutionnelle, technique et naturellement humaine.

The political, economic and military rivalry between the United States and the People's Republic of China is one of the most important aspects of the changing global distribution of powers. It prompts investigations into the Chinese war-making practice and the Chinese line of thought about warfare, thus facilitating the understanding of decisions made by Beijing authorities. The objective of this article is to outline the Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare-its origins, characteristics and contemporary use. The principal research issue resulting from the assumed objective was to respond to the following question: What is unrestricted warfare, and how it is currently used by the Chinese People's Liberation Army? The following research methods were employed to solve the research queries: a monographic method, a document examination method, literature analysis and criticism, and methods of analysis and synthesis. Considering their preliminary investigations, the authors formulated the following research hypothesis: the concept of unrestricted warfare is one of the most important Chinese concepts describing its war-making practice and rivalry with the United States. Although it was developed over 20 years ago, it still forms a valid selection of warmaking methods and forms. Non-military forms of warfare, including financial warfare, trade warfare, resources warfare, economic warfare or regulation warfare are particularly important and frequently used by the People's Republic of China.

Organisation and Warfare Organisation has a deep and direct connection with success or failure in battle. It is agreed by all and sundry that a superior generalship, high morale, sophisticated equipment and logistic stamina do play a major role in battle. Likewise, it is felt with an equal conviction that superiority in organisation from the lowest tactical to operational and strategic levels plays a major role in the performance of an army, a formation, a unit or even a sub-unit in war. In fact, at certain times, the organisational superiority or inferiority has played a crucial role in the victory or defeat of an army. Historically, the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion stand out as examples of battle formations that played an important part in the victories of their armies. Nevertheless, both these organisations had their limitations and thus faced extinction. Again, the Mongol tactics of employment of cavalry were at one time invincible before they too became obsolete. In a later history, Frederick the Great’s revolutionary, Oblique Order tactics also met their fate. Napoleon’s divisional and corps system that formed a guarantee for victory could also not stand the test of time. His opponents' imitation of this model and other calculated organisational counter measures rendered it ineffective with the passage of time. Moltke the Elder introduced a concept of controlling the armies organised under various army/corps commanders in a single theatre, by means of a single general staff system. In these the command and co-ordination was done by means of telegraph, whilst movement was radically improved through railways. Still, within the next four decades his system as well was subjected to organisational modifications. The German Experience in Organisation as a Case Study Moltke's success in the Franco-German war of 1870-71 developed a false feeling of superiority in the German Army. While his campaigns were analysed and elevated to the pedestal of the formula for victory, no effort was made to appreciate that the growth in the size of armies necessitated changes to their organisation. The necessity of a general staff for the control and co-ordination of the Eighth and Ninth Armies that advanced into France as part of the famous Schlieffen Plan was dismissed and allusion made to Moltke’s successes of 1866 and 1870. It was assumed that the two general officers whose armies, trained in like manner, would, when advancing abreast, co-ordinate and function effectively and understand an operational situation in a context larger than their own individual progress. The Battle of Marne fought in 1914 proved the contrary and showed that the two army commanders followed their own personal whims. The reason for this failure was the organisational flaw:- The German General Staff Headquarters located many hundred miles in the rear could not co-ordinate the movement of various armies advancing towards Paris right from the D-Day till the Battle of Marne. Absence of an army group headquarters to co-ordinate the actions of two or three armies advancing side by side led to the following setbacks:- Failure to exploit the opportunities to encircle or outflank the French and British formations. Lack of co-ordination created gaps between the armies only to be exploited by the Franco-British Armies who launched successful counter-strokes. The most notable of this was the fateful battle of Marne of 1914. It has been fashionable to attribute the German failure to defeat France in 1914 to non-adherence of the original Schlieffen Plan. While it is true that Moltke the Younger’s cautious personality, by altering the force ratio, robbed the Schlieffen Plan of its inherent boldness and dynamism, the fact that the Germans missed many opportunities to inflict a decisive defeat on the French during their advance towards Paris stands out as a hard historical reality. Failure to do so was largely organisational. Had the Germans possessed an intermediate headquarters to co-ordinate the operations of two or three armies, they may have been able to encircle one of the French Armies on their way to Paris. They would have then created an operational imbalance that may have seriously jeopardised the stability of French dispositions long before they were able to successfully retreat to the Marne and stabilise the operational situation. The following two examples prove that the presence of an army group headquarters to co-ordinate at least two or three German Armies may have produced a decisive German thrust long before reaching Paris or the line of Marne and Oise Rivers. The Lost Opportunity of 20 August 1914 On 20 August 1914, following was the operational situation:- Lanzearac's 5th French Army was holding a defensive position south of Sambre River and west of Meuse River. Bulows German Army was holding the line of Sambre River north of Lanzearac's 5th French Army.

This article shows that the new, post-Arab Spring military role of the border mission in Israel is a significant part of an overall organizational change. The latter, in turn, is the product of doctrinal change in the IDF, introducing a minor defensive doctrine alongside the main offensive doctrine. The author explains this doctrinal change by cultural theory. He argues that, though influenced by the Arab Spring's structural changes, the doctrinal change is the product of an interaction between Israel's socio-political culture, highly sensitive to casualties and hesitant to authorize large-scale ground operations, and its military organization culture, that is deeply-rooted in offensive, ground warfare. The IDF decision to establish the Border Defence Array, and the way it conceptualizes and operates its mission, embody its adaptation. This adaptation seeks to prevent border incidents that could escalate to a wider confrontation which would induce a large-scale ground operation, and back the IDF offensive doctrine by freeing manoeuvring formations from the burden of “current security” mission to focus on manoeuvre training for effective use in time of war.

The first military doctrine in Lithuania during the interwar period was
drafted in 1922. The doctrine is the basic belief on which the state military system is based and where the rules on how to train soldiers and how they must fight are laid down. Having summarised the experience of war and of other operating armed forces and technology innovations, the guidelines for the development, maintenance, armament, planning, education and military training of armed forces in order to ensure national security were provided in the military doctrine. Military doctrine itself can be understood as the theory of warfare and its implementation (compliance) in view of rapid time changes – as practice. The reparation, development and implementation of doctrines require one to think about the future, to consider the time issues and opportunities, and to rely on historical experience.
During the inter-war period, the Lithuanian Army followed and reflected on the theory of warfare of European countries. Within two decades, almost 150 officers were sent to study in Western European military schools; the majority of them studied in France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. In this way, the traditions and experience of the French military school, with consideration to the specifics of Lithuania, were adopted. In 1934, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Kazys Grinius assessed the Blitzkrieg strategy in the Lithuanian military periodicals stating that it was the possibility of industrialised countries, and a small country such as Lithuania was able to respond to it by rapid mobilisation involving paramilitary and sports organisations. Having summarised the experience of the fights for Lithuania’s independence and of European warfare, in 1939, Major of the General Staff Vytautas Bulvičius, who prepared a textbook for university students, comprehensively discussed the theory of Total War by General E.F.W. Ludendorff, the theory of Tank (mechanized) War by Major General J.F.C. Fuller and the theory of Air War by Major General G. Douhet, and the military capabilities of Lithuania.

The article deals with theoretical and practical aspects of training Soviet citizens to military service in the 30’s. The focus is on the organization of defense-mass work during the first Soviet five-year plans. Established network of defense-mass organizations in the country has contributed to the solution of double-base tasks - spread of military knowledge among the population and the formation of a sense of patriotism and willingness to defend the Fatherland in Soviet citizens. Experience of implementation of military educational system of USSR civilian population attests to the fact that this work has had the enduring historical significance in strengthening the country's defense.

В статье рассматриваются теоретические и практические аспекты подготовки советских граждан к военной службе в 1930-е годы. Основное внимание уделено организации оборонно-массовой работы в годы первых советских пятилеток. Созданная в стране сеть оборонно-массовых организаций способствовала решению двухосновных задач распространение среди населения военных знаний и формирование у советских граждан чувства патриотизма и готовности встать на защиту Отечества. Опыт создания системы военной подготовки гражданского населения СССР свидетельствует о том, что эта работа имела непреходящее историческое значение в деле укрепления обороноспособности страны.

מאמר זה סוקר את תהליך ההתפתחות והכתיבה של תורת הלחימה של צה"ל,
משחר הקמתו ועד היום. לאורך המאה הקודמת הבסיס לתורת הלחימה עבור
כוחות היבשה נשאר פחות או יותר סטטי. עם זאת תכיפות השינויים בסביבה
המבצעית וההתפתחות המהירה של הטכנולוגיה בעידן הנוכחי מעלה צורך לבחון
את תורת הלחימה ולעדכנה באופן קבוע. חסרים כיום כלים לתהליכי מחשב
ופיתוח ידע, ודבר זה עלול לפגוע בעוצמת כוחות היבשה ובאפקטיביות המבצעית
שלהם. לכן על זרוע היבשה להקים גוף שיתאים בגודלו, בבכירות העומדים בראשו
ובאופי של המשרתים בו, שיהיה מסוגל לפתח תורת לחימה מותאמת לאתגרי
הלחימה העכשוויים תוך צפיית אתגרי הלחימה העתידיים ומתן מענה גמיש וזריז
לאתגרים מתפתחים.

Abstrakt: Aby określić miejsce Iranu w regionie, należy poddać analizie irańską politykę bezpieczeństwa, która opiera się na zdolnościach asymetrycznych, rekompensujących konwencjonalne niedostatki. Iran niezmiennie stara się osiągnąć status głównego mocarstwa w regionie, przez co władze zmuszone są kreować niezwykle skomplikowaną, wielowymiarową strategię bezpieczeństwa, co odzwierciedla się w irańskiej doktrynie militarnej. Głównym sposobem na osiągnięcie końcowego celu – zbalansowania regionalnej nierównowagi sił oraz stania się bliskowschodnią potęgą, mogącą w realny sposób oddziaływać na sprawy globalne – jest wykorzystywanie działań asymetrycznych. Artykuł ma na celu przybliżenie asymetrycznych założeń irańskiej strategii militarnej, jej ewolucji i adaptacji do zmieniającej się sytuacji międzynarodowej, a także możliwości jej modyfikacji w obliczu konfliktów i kryzysów, na przykładzie zagrożenia generowanego przez Państwo Islamskie.
Abstract: To define the place of Iran in the region, we need to understand the Iranian security policy, which relies on asymmetric capabilities, to compensate the conventional deficiency. Iran invariably seeks to achieve the status of the main powers in the region, so the authorities are forced to create extremely complex, multi-dimensional security strategy, which is reflected in the Iranian military doctrine. The main way to achieve the final goal – the stabilization of the regional imbalance of power and become a Middle East power, capable of affecting global issues – is the use of asymmetrical activities. Article aims to explain the asymmetrical principles of the Iranian military strategy, its evolution and adaptation to changing international situation over the years and the possibility of its modification in the face of conflicts and crises, for example, the threat generated by the Islamic State. Wstęp Różnice w potencjale pomiędzy oponentami istniały zawsze, choć nie koniecznie zawsze odzwierciedlały się w samym wyniku konfliktu. Obecnie asymetria na poziomie strategicznym, jest równie istotna, bowiem odzwierciedla się w takim wykorzystywaniu różnic, które zwiększa przewagę nad przeciwnikiem. Odnosząc asymetrię do działań militarnych, należy stwierdzić, że wiąże się ona z przyjętą strategią.

The article is presented against the background of the need for African military
forces to deal with the complexities that come with leading and participating in
multinational military operations in Africa. The research problem that guided this
research is: What should the doctrine of military forces in Africa be to enable them
to work together as part of the multinational forces while serving African interests?
The aim is to investigate the possibility of a military doctrine that would serve
African interests in the context of the reality of a multinational approach to military
intervention. This aim has been achieved by offering theoretical assumptions on
military doctrine, multinational military intervention and humanistic values in Africa
to form a theoretical framework for deploying the argument. An in-depth discussion
of African military practice prior to colonialism, the multinational and humanistic
nature of military operations since the end of the previous century, as well critical
reflections on the quest for a military doctrine that reflect the humanistic values
of Africa resulted in some important findings. The main finding is that the people
of Africa have accumulated a wealth of military knowledge over many centuries
that is sufficient to develop an endogenous (home grown) military doctrine that
can serve the African people. An endogenous military doctrine would be based on
the principles of people-centredness; flexibility; collectiveness; affordability and
institutionalisation to place African humanistic values and continental policies at the
forefront in strategic decision-making and implementation. Taking into consideration
the above-mentioned principles some practical measures are recommended.

The article shows the activities of state authorities and the military in the  interwar period (1921–1941) was carried out in the interests of strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet Union. To solve this problem in the course of the Civil war were taken, including the military training of youth in the period prior to their conscription service in the red army. The article shows that the process of education and training of youth of premilitary age was carried out in extremely difficult conditions in consequence of the presence of a number of objective factors.
Scientific interest in the topic due to the fact that generation of Soviet youth, held a military training in the system of pre-conscription training in the 1920–1930- ies, fought in armed conflict with the participation of our country in the interwar period, and then it took up arms to protect their homeland from attack by German aggressors, and liberated their Homeland from Nazi invaders, and then managed to defeat the enemy in Western Europe.



В статье показана деятельность государственных органов власти и военного ведомства в межвоенный период (1921–1941 гг.), проводимая в интересах укрепления обороноспособности советской страны. Для решения этой задачи уже в ходе Гражданской войны были приняты соответствующие меры, в том числе обучение военному делу молодежи в период до их призыва на действительную службу в рядах Красной армии. В статье показано, что процесс обучения и воспитания допризывников осуществлялся в невероятно трудных условиях, в следствие наличия целого ряда объективных факторов.
Научный интерес к теме обусловлен ещё и тем, что именно поколение советской молодёжи, проходившее обучение военному делу в системе допризывной подготовки в 1920–1930-е годы, воевало в вооруженных конфликтах с участием нашей страны в межвоенный период, а затем оно взяло в руки оружие для защиты своего Отечества от нападения германских агрессоров, освободило свою Родину от фашистских захватчиков, а затем сумело разгромить врага в Западной Европе.

Berlin Duvarı yıkılıp Sovyet/Varşova Paktı tehdidi ortadan kalktıktan hemen sonra, NATO değişen uluslararası sisteme kendini uyarlamaya başladı. Bu süreç zor ve sorunlu olmasına rağmen, önemli başarılar kaydetti. Ama “Nato yaşayabilecek mi?” sorusu hep gündemde kaldı. Bu inceleme iddialı öngörüler yerine aktörlerin eğilimlerine ve ortamdaki değişmelere işaret ederek bir düşünme ve tartışma zemini hazırlamanın gayreti içinde olmuştur. Uluslararası sistemdeki yapısal değişiklikleri irdeleyip, İttifakın yeni durumlara uyum sağlamak için ne gibi politikalar uyguladığını ve söz konusu dönüşümün önündeki engelleri eleştirel bir yaklaşımla incelemiştir. Ortak siyasi iradenin oluşmasının ve askeri yapı ve stratejinin yeni şartlara uyarlanmasının sınırlarını açıklığa kavuşturmaya çalışmıştır.Bu çerçevede askeri doktrin çalışmaları ve Afganistan tecrübesi arasındaki etkileşim ve dönüşüm süreci üzerindeki etkileri ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca sonuç bölümünde, genişleyen Avrupa-Atlantik Bölgesindeki NATO askeri operasyonlarının meşruiyet sorununa da değinilmiştir.

The article discusses the activities of the highest party leadership of the USSR and the country's military department in the mid-1920s, aimed at the reorganization of local bodies of military administration.

В статье рассматривается деятельность высшего партийного руководства СССР и военного ведомства страны в середине 1920-х годов, направленная на реорганизацию местных органов военного управления.

Those who continue to harbour a late-20th century view of war and the armed forces that fought them would be surprised if they were to visit a brigade-level or higher headquarters of Western armed forces in any of the several fronts in what has recently been described as the ‘continuous war’ currently on-going. There are some strange people to be found there.

In addition to the professional – almost exclusively since the abolition or suspension of conscription in most Western armed forces – military personnel trained in infantry operations, fire-support, PsyOps and the host of other military specialties that one should reasonably expect to find, there are also anthropologists, archaeologists, art experts, the occasional theologian (in addition to the chaplains, who have other concerns), and representatives from disciplines that have apparently nothing to do with what is perceived to be the dirty business at hand: to wit, killing people and blowing things and people up.

This paper explores the role of social scientists in combat operations, with a special emphasis on their role in the protection of tangible and intangible cultural property as called for by various treaties and agreements.

Após a Guerra da Geórgia, em agosto de 2008, a Rússia anunciava um Programa de Rearmamento Estatal, que estabelecia a intenção de transformar o seu Exército. Não era algo novo, já que, desde os tempos da antiga União Soviética, existia tal proposição por parte do Kremlin. A Guerra da Geórgia demonstrou aos oficiais do Exército Russo a necessidade de rever a estrutura de força, a doutrina militar e o material bélico de sua força. Nesse contexto, foram reaproveitados conceitos estratégicos e operacionais provindos do passado, além da revisão das percepções de ameaça que a Rússia tinha no sistema internacional. Na anexação da Crimeia, em 2014, pôde-se verificar os resultados dessa transformação anunciada em 2008. A Rússia utilizou métodos não convencionais de guerra para conseguir a posse desse território, consolidando a sua transformação militar mediante o uso da força. Semelhantemente, em 2008, o Brasil anunciava a sua Estratégia Nacional de Defesa por via do decreto 6703, que serve como orientação para capacitar as Forças Armadas Brasileiras. Esse documento estabelece justamente diretrizes para transformação do Exército Brasileiro e também informa as percepções de ameaça que o Brasil tem. Após a sua publicação, uma série de outros documentos que versam sobre a transformação do Exército Brasileiro é produzida para direcionar um processo de transformação militar no Brasil, o que inclui a criação de capacidades militares diferentes daquelas que existiam anteriormente. Visto desse ângulo, tanto Brasil quanto Rússia começaram, no mesmo período de tempo, um processo de transformação militar, entretanto ambos os países têm uma postura diferente no sistema internacional, no qual a Rússia faz uso da força, e o Brasil não. Tendo isso em vista, este trabalho procura encontrar nexos comparativos entre dois países que se comportam de maneira diferente, possuem recursos financeiros diferentes para seus processos, no entanto encontraram um caminho semelhante para realizar uma transformação em seus Exércitos. Assim, os objetivos dessa dissertação, são os de identificar estímulos que contribuíram para o Brasil e a Rússia realizarem este movimento, seus resultados e quais foram os fatores que influenciaram na mudança das percepções de ameaça dos respectivos países.

Although Public Diplomacy has a diminished share of America's engagement with the world, its goals have become more expansive; this is a recipe for frustration.  Public Diplomacy is too light to effect social change, there's no money to match its dreams; it is no longer the case that Country Public Affairs Officer at an embassy is the Ambassador's "principal public affairs advisor."  Although they were never written down, the U.S. Information Agency had doctrines – focus on foreign policy goals; two-step communication with defined audiences; focus on "policy" rather than "culture"; "field-driven" programs; an annual plan; a three-step concept (policy, audience, program); the collaboration of American and local employees; and truthful and attributed communication.  In a world changed by the social media and a new international environment, it's time for Public Diplomacy to debate "lessons learned, "best practices," and doctrine.

On 26 December 2014, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin finally endorsed the new version of the Military Doctrine, which had been announced months before This brief explains the contents of this edition. Furthermore, it provides an analysis of the new doctrine and a forecast of its possible consequences. Finally, I discuss what the significance of this new Russian security document might be for Central Asia.

Основываясь на материалах французских военных журналов, автор раскрывает характер и итоги влияния опыта "Великой войны" на армию Франции начала 1920-х гг.
Basing on the French military journals, the author reveals how the "Great War" changed the French army in the beginning of the 1920s.

This article comparatively analyzes the origins of the military doctrines in Israel and Iran, which are positioned at the poles of status quo and revisionism in the Middle East. In a conceptual hybridity, both parties stand strategically on the defensive but operationally combine defensive with offensive elements. These combinations are backed by powerful cultural motivations and organizational interests in each country. The implications enrich our understanding of the nature of military doctrine and indicate another contributing factor in regional destabilization.

El modelo conjunto para la operación de las Fuerzas Militares es una tendencia mundial que responde a cambios técnicos y a desarrollos organizacionales impuestos por la complejidad social y el desarrollo de la productividad. Es algo más que la simple coordinación de las Fuerzas e implica una cultura nueva en el mundo militar. Se trata de ver el conjunto de las Fuerzas como un instrumento único e integrado.

Rusya Federasyonu’nun 21.yüzyılda yayınladığı Ulusal Güvenlik Konseptleri, Askeri Doktrinler’in analiz edilmesi
amacıyla yapılan bu çalışma şu temel sorunsal üzerine yoğunlaşmıştır: “Uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinden hangisi,
Rusya Federasyonu’nun güvenlik belgelerini açıklayabilir(?)”. Sorunsal dâhilinde çalışma: “Rusya Federasyonu’nun
güvenlik belgelerinin neo-realist teori tarafından şekillenmektedir” hipotezi üzerinden sınanmıştır. Çalışmada, ulaşılan
bulgular çerçevesinde Rusya Federasyonu’nun; uluslararası sistemi anarşik-istikrarsız gördüğü, ulusal güvenliğine
yönelik temel tehditlerin uluslararası sistemin yapısından kaynaklandığı, güvenlik politikalarının ise “nükleer
caydırıcılık ve askeri kapasite” ve “ittifaklar yolu ile dengeleme” stratejileri çerçevesinde oluşturulduğu saptanmıştır

"Recension en 6500 caractères environ de l'ouvrage récent d'Arlette Estienne Mondet Le général J.B.E Estienne « père des chars » Des chenilles et des ailes. Ce livre bien documenté apporte aux historiens et aux passionnés d'histoire militaire un éclairage moderne sur l'une des figures fondatrices de l'armée française du XXe siècle.
À noter l'article http://0z.fr/kbKht du 19 février 2013 sur le père des tanks britanniques, J.F.C. Fuller, pour complèter cette perspective hexagonale."

Les évolutions comparées dans les armées françaises et allemandes de l'Armistice à 1936, sous l'angle de la doctrine et de son adaptation au progrès technique. Le livre est en vente sur cette page http://lasabretache.fr/produit/larmee-francaise/