Military Strategy

In a world likely to remain hostage to thousands of nuclear warheads over the long term, in which
ancient realism---or as some wrongly refer to it as Cold-War thinking---appears to be an unbreakable
psychological barrier even for those who thoroughly understand the nuclear “threat of pain and
extinction" (Schelling), meeting Article VI (disarmament) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) is quite a challenge. Current concerns relative to proliferation tendencies among non-compliant
regimes as well as the potential implications of the still uncertain nuclear renaissance---which, if realized,
would disseminate sensitive (dual-use) nuclear technology among numerous untrustworthy actors---further the disarmament challenge. As a result, all the states parties to the NPT, not to mention those
beyond the nonproliferation regime, have failed to make sufficient efforts within their different nuclear
roles and responsibilities towards meeting the NPT disarmament clause, with many of them exhausting
themselves in a cacophonic debate on who is required to do what under NPT Articles III (nonproliferation safeguards), IV (peaceful use of the atom) and VI.

: China is strengthening diplomatic ties and building naval bases along the sea lanes from the Middle East. This "String of Pearls" strategy is designed to protect its energy security, negate US influence in the region, and project power overseas. China is rapidly building a blue-water navy, developing advanced missile technology, and stockpiling undersea mines to counter US Navy capabilities, especially in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. To counter China's growing naval power, the United States can exploit a critical vulnerability China's dependence on sea lines of communication. Eighty percent of China's oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca; the Chinese leadership calls this strategic weakness the "Malacca Dilemma." In conjunction with naval forces, land-based airpower offers a promising way to control key maritime checkpoints and trade routes. Land-based airpower proved a decisive maritime force in the war against Japanese shipping d...

JURIST Guest Columnist Kevin Govern of the Ave Maria School of Law says says the US must pursue a full spectrum of "smart power"
capabilities in Africa, to include but not be limited to the use of drones for surveillance or targeted killing strikes...

A military or defence policy is created through the military policy process of making important organisational decisions, including the identification of priorities and different alternatives such as defence personnel and technology programs or budget priorities, and choosing among them on the basis of the impact they will have on the overall national development. Defence policies can be understood as political, management, financial, administrative and executable mechanisms arranged to reach explicit military goals and objectives. Military policy differs from rules of engagement determine when, where, and how military force is to be used by formations and units. Military doctrine is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy. Military reform has been backed by strong political will on the part of the political leadership, as illustrated by the steadily increasing military budgets are all resultant impact of defence policies of any nation backed by national interest that drives military strategy. The role of defence policy on military strategy examples includes (1) Addressing the defence challenges posed by the Internet of things (IoT) seems likely to require more broadly empowered military cyber resources, an expanded effort to set standards and regulate internet-connected products, and a "Whole of Nation" defence policy approach (2) Tools and levers of Russia's Security policy using the Military; and (3) Development of the US Military's Use of Social Media are all examples that epitomize the impacts on defence policy on military strategy. The defence policies of nations have changed as results of modern conflict scenarios of the twenty-first century.


Keywords:  Defence policy, Military strategy, National interest, Defence priorities

Dubai’s Answer to the Challenges of the 21st Century: Organised Crime and Prostitution, in Particular of the Police Forces

István KOVÁCS,  Adrián CSAJKA-VÁNDOR

By now Dubai has not only grown into a futuristic, modern tourist paradise but has also become a major economic power, centralising a certain part of the global capital. This has also been realised by organised crime which tries to make use of accumulated dollar billions by the help of different kinds of crimes often even without using violent means. The present paper analyses, on the one hand, the supply system of Dubai, that is its economy, army, police and social system, on the other hand, the system of international organised crime and trafficking. The method used is critical source analysis, basic historical research, as well as case and judgement/verdict analysis. This is not a classic analysis but a criminal analysis of specific cases. Our strategic aim is to create a database which can show the new profile of the organised crime in the 21st century.


Keywords: oil market, global economy, organised crime, military strategy, Middle East, Gulf States, the “to Dubai” phenomenon

Dubai válasza a 21. század kihívásaira: Szervezett bűnözés és prostitúció, különös tekintettel a rendőri feladatvégzésre.)

Absztrakt

Dubai a millenniumot követően nem csak futurisztikus, modern turisztikai paradicsommá nőtte ki magát, hanem olyan vezető gazdasági nagyhatalommá vált, amely a világtőke egy bizonyos részét centralizálja. Erre a szervezett bűnözés is felfigyelt, a felgyülemlett dollármilliókat különböző bűncselekmények elkövetésével próbálja meg kiszipolyozni, mi több ehhez még gyakorta erőszakos eszközöket sem kell alkalmaznia. A tanulmány tudományos igényességgel egyfelöl Dubai – gazdasági, honvédelmi, rendvédelmi és szociális – ellátórendszerét – vagyis miként emelkedhetett fel az állam -, másfelöl pedig a szervezett bűnözéssel és az emberkereskedelemmel összefüggésben álló nemzetközi „dubajozás” jelenségét vizsgálja. Mindehhez forráskritikai elemzést, történelmi alapkutatást, valamint akta-, és ítéletanalízist alkalmaz. Stratégiai cél egy olyan adatbázis létrehozása, amely a szervezett bűnözés XXI. századi új arculatának megmutatására képes.

kulcsszavak: „dubajozás”, olajpiac, világgazdaság, szervezett bűnözés, katonai stratégia, Közel-Kelet, Öbölállamok

While practitioners and historians have long noted the importance of leadership in war, the scholarship on military effectiveness has generally ignored the role of leadership. This essay uses the scholarship on strategy, leadership, and military performance to develop a strategic leadership theory of military effectiveness. The theory proposes that strategic leadership can have two effects on military performance. First, a strategic leader can increase combat power by creating an advantageous context for battle through the development and implementation of an effective theory of success (strategy). Second, a strategic leader can increase motivation by inculcating an identity and values in the fighting force consistent with the leader’s strategy. A case study of General Matthew Ridgway’s leadership intervention in the Korean War suggests the potential analytical utility of a strategic leadership explanation of military effectiveness.

Existing Enterprise Architecture (EA) models and frameworks appear to be incapable of capturing the dynamic and extended nature of military enterprises. An improved understanding of the evolution of enterprise structures over extended periods of time may help architects in planning military transformations. This paper approaches the Military enterprise architecture from the viewpoint of qualitative research using the fundamentals of systems science and evolutionary theory. The paper merges the results of five related studies that each explore the evolution of a single domain or layer of the military enterprise. The resulting merged model, referred to as the coherent EA model, combines the domains of knowledge, information, and information security management on the layer of ICT Infrastructure. The coherent model defined for this work is composed of layers of knowledge management, information management, information security management and ICT infrastructure. The coherent EA model is tested in experimentation where three separate transformation journeys of different Armed Forces are analysed from starting point to end state. The validity of the model is assessed according to its usability in determining possible positive and negative forces affecting the transformation of a military enterprise and providing advice to manage the change. The EA model focuses on helping architects working in the field of military Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information (C4I), to examine their existing situation, to find realistic paths for transformation and to provide advice in each step of change of military enterprise.

Ukrainekrieg: Moskaus Strategiewechsel. Übersicht über das Kriegsgeschehen bis zum 10. April 2022
Eine der Ursachen für das Scheitern der russischen Offensive vor Kiew scheint Wladimir Putins Tendenz, sich persönlich in die operative Führung seiner Armeen einzumischen. Die Bestellung eines für den gesamten Kriegsschauplatz verantwortlichen Oberbefehlshabers, General Alexander Dwornikow, soll jetzt Abhilfe schaffen.
Nach dem Rückzug aus der Nordukraine hat Russland einen Strategiewechsel vollzogen und will sich nun auf die Eroberung des Donbass konzentieren. Die erforderliche Umgruppierung ist im Gange.
1. Putins operative Führung
2. Die Ursachen der russischen Schwäche
3. Der neue Oberbefehlshaber
4. Der Angriff auf den Bahnhof von Kramatorsk
5. Die russische Umgruppierung
6. Die Kämpfe im Donbass
7. Die Belagerung von Mariupol
8. Die Lage um Maritopol und Cherson

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest przybliżenie głównego dzieła Sir Basila Henry’ego Liddell Harta, Strategia: Działania pośrednie, poprzez dokonanie wyboru kluczowych tez strategicznych. Zestawienie to powinno być wsparciem dla studentów na kierunkach: Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne na przedmiotach: Klasyczna strategia i strategia wojskowa. Każda z tez, uwzględniona w niniejszym zbiorze, podana jest z uwzględnieniem numeru strony z polskiego wydania wydanego nakładem Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej w Warszawie 1959 roku w serii: Biblioteka Wiedzy Wojskowej. Inspiracją dla przygotowania niniejszego opracowania stał się praca prof. Józefa Marczaka, Tezy strategiczne. C. v. Clausewitz „O wojnie”. Wprowadzenie, opracowana w 2011 roku dla Polskiego Stowarzyszenia Carla von Clausewitza.

The aim of this study is to present the main work of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: Indirect Actions, by selecting key strategic theses. This list should support students students of "National Security" in the subjects of Classical Strategy and Military Strategy. Each of the theses included in this collection is given taking into account the page number from the Polish edition issued by the Ministry of National Defense in Warsaw in 1959 in the series: Military Knowledge Library. The work of prof. Józef Marczak, Strategic Theses. C. v. Clausewitz "On War". Introduction, developed in 2011 for the Polish Carl von Clausewitz Association.

: This report is an outgrowth of questions raised in the fall of 1980 and spring of 1981 about the conduct of air operations in the war between Iran and Iraq. Unlike previous Middle Eastern wars, this one had continued over a protracted period while we in the United States and in the US Air Force had been able to observe it only from a distance. As the war haltingly progressed, we began to have a fair picture of what was going on in the air war, through our information was far from complete or detailed. The sketchy picture that emerged, however, seemed to indicate the combatants were using their airpower assets in ways contrary to our expectations. Most notably, it seemed that both sides seemed content not to use their airpower and relied instead on ground forces for most combat operations. This report examines the air war between Iran and Iraq, but rather than attempt simply to lay out what happened in the war it attempts to discern why Iran and Iraq used their airpower as they did...

The present work examines the possibility of a serious undermining of European security architecture in the near future, due to a synthesis a series of factors. One of these factors is the deconstruction of European militaries with a possible parallel drastic reinforcement of Russian armed forces. The reinforcement of Russian military capabilities could come about indirectly because of a sudden increase of China's land forces capabilities, in the event that the USA and its allies succeed in containing the rising Chinese air and naval capabilities within the China Sea. At the same time, the USA are shifting the centre of gravity of their geopolitical strategy, and therefore their military power, towards the Pacific and China, limiting their presence in Europe and further denuding western military capabilities. This work proposes the establishment of a sort of humble RMA on the part of the EU in order to reinforce European deterrent capabilities in fragile geo-systems like those of the Baltic Republics. This European RMA will be based on affordable precise strike weapon systems that will act within the framework of decentralized war fighting models based on a scientific paradigm that will take advantage of the principles of chaos and complexity (ChaoPlexity).

The analysis introduces the Hungarian National Military Strategy (NMS) adopted in 2012, but presents it not only in a conventional manner: it also offers an evaluation of the wider strategic environment in which the strategy was drafted. Thus the au¬thor makes use of the fact that the environment in which strategic documents are born, their nature and contents convey a relatively accurate picture about the state of a nation’s strategic culture and its elements. In this approach it is quite eloquent for example that the first national military strategy was adopted by Hungary in 2009 – twenty years after the change of regime and ten years after joining NATO – and had to be revised as soon as 2012. International experience shows that the state of a community’s strategic culture is indicated by the fact whether such strategies are ‘white books’ that summarize strategic goals, or are more of a ’planning nature’, be¬ing a functional strategic plan that also includes the means and ways of its realization

L'opera indaga i fondamenti della guerra e della pace ed è suddivisa in quattro grandi sezioni: metafisica della guerra, epistemologia della guerra, teoria pura della guerra e la guerra nelle sue relazioni con la cultura e la pace. L’impostazione filosofica non trascura il dialogo con altre discipline che si occupano e si sono occupate di guerra, dando vita a un’opera interdisciplinare di ampio respiro.

The recently-released NATO 2030 report has recommended for the first time the establishment within NATO of a net assessment (NA) capability to deal with an increasingly complex strategic environment. To determine whether or not NATO should adopt NA as one its tools for developing strategy, this Policy Brief provides an overview of the concept; illustrates its connection to strategy; examines its content;
and considers how NA would alter NATO’s strategic decision-making. Such an analysis lends itself to an appreciation of how NA could fine-tune NATO strategy-making and address the problem of “strategic
simultaneity”.

Weary of costly on-the-ground military interventions, Western nations have increasingly turned to "Remote Warfare" to address the continued threat of terrorism. Despite the centrality of drone strikes to the practice of Remote Warfare, we still know relatively little about their effectiveness as instruments of coercion. This article offers a conceptual framework for assessing their coercive efficacy in counterterrorism. We argue that remote control drones are fundamentally different from traditional airpower, owing to changes in persistence, lethality, and relative risk. Critically, these technological characteristics produce weaker coercive effects than often assumed. While persistent surveillance combined with lethal, low-risk strikes renders armed drones highly effective at altering the cost-benefit calculations of terrorists, these same technological attributes cause them to be less effective at clear communication, credibility, and assurance-other key factors in coercion success. Overall, drone strikes are poor instruments of coercion in counterterrorism, underscoring some potential limitations of Remote Warfare.

The concepts of military doctrine and military strategy are sometimes wrongly used as if they were the same concept; while the two concepts are related, the student and practitioner of warfare must understand the differences and not confuse them with each other. This article will briefly discuss the two concepts and their relation. The article argues that while doctrine represents the more scientific side of warfare, strategy represents the artistic side. Existing doctrine will almost never meet the requirements for winning the next war; it is through the artistic application of generic peacetime doctrine to the specific strategic and operational context, using doctrine as building blocks for a context specific military strategy, that the military commander outwits and defeats or coerces the adversary and achieves the military objectives.

In any broad survey of the European landscape over the last thee hundred years, it is evident that nearly all paths go through Germany.  It becomes impossible to study German politics and diplomacy without quickly realizing that all roads in Germany lead to the military.  Militarism and strict obedience shaped every form of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German life and culture.  In the weeks prior the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914, the French journalist Georges Bourdon made an observation that embodies the core of this thesis.  He wrote, “such and such country may possess an army, but Germany is an army that possesses a country.”
This research project focuses on “the cult of the offensive” that developed within German militarism, its crucial role in her rise to prominence in Europe, and the consequences for Germany, and for Europe, when a military culture dictates domestic and foreign policy.
Extensive research examines the German how as a roadmap to understanding and explaining the Germany why.  In analyzing the how, it becomes possible to reroute traditional conversations on the pure mechanics of German militarism by historians such as Gerhard Ritter and Gordon Craig; into a conversation that focuses on how the ideologies of military theorists such as Clausewitz and the Elder Moltke shaped the cultural mindset.  Two of the most influential German thinkers -- Nietzsche and Treitschke – built and expanded on this “cult of the offensive,” and translated it into the egoism of Germany’s pre-determination for “greatness.”
Wilhemine Germany was unique in embracing offensive rather than the defensively minded strategies adopted by the other great Powers of the era: England, France and Russia.  Polices which had kept the European peace for almost one hundred years.  The crowning achievement of the German “cult of the offensive” was the development of the most famous war plan in history – the Schlieffen Plan - named for its creator and architect, Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff between 1891 and 1905.
With her geography at heart of Central Europe, and with no natural defensive barriers such as mountains or waterways, the German states had a long-developed fear of encirclement; and by 1900, her enemies included France in the West, and Russia in the East.  Schlieffen Plan’s was an aggressive first-strike should Imperial Germany be forced to fight a war on two fronts.
The driving force of Schlieffen’s Plan was speed; Germany must quickly and decisively defeat the French, so she could turn the full force of her attention towards Russia, within six weeks.  A key element of the Plan called for the invasion neutral Belgium in order to facilitate an attack on France that would sandwich the French armies between a strong left German flank and even stronger right one.  Schlieffen was a brilliant strategist and meticulously planned and choreographed every detail down to the hour.  The German government and High Command believed that with the Schlieffen Plan in their back pocket, when - not if- war came, German victories would be swift and crushing.  With “cult of the offensive” tactics, Germany could not loose.
Reliance was so heavy on Schlieffen’s war planning that no contingencies were considered.  The Plan was exhaustive but left no flexibility for an enemy who might behave differently than expected; or battles which might take longer than anticipated.  In prizing speed and an aggressive first-strike above all else, any disruptions or delays in the prescribed timetable became deadly.
This research reaffirms that it is inaccurate to say that the Schlieffen Plan lost the Great War for Germany however; it did contribute considerably.  Moreover, it was the unshakable confidence in the infallibility of the Schlieffen Plan that prompted Germany’s aggressive policies in the summer of 1914 and led her down a path of such deadly destruction that the Paris peacemakers found it necessary to include the punitive Article 231 – the German War Guilt Clause – in the Versailles Treaty.  It is the harshness of Article 231 that laid the foundations for the Third Reich and a second world war a mere 21 years later.

The rapid proliferation of a new generation of artificial intelligence (AI)-augmented and AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems (AWS), most notably drones used in swarming tactics, could have a significant impact on deterrence, nuclear security, escalation, and strategic stability in future warfare. James Johnson argues that emerging iterations of AWS fused with AI systems will presage a powerful interplay of increased range, accuracy, mass, coordination, intelligence, and speed in a future conflict. In turn,  the risk of escalation use-them-or-lose-them situations between nuclear-armed military powers and the attendant dangers posed by the use of unreliable, unverified and unsafe AWS will increase, with potentially catastrophic strategic outcomes.

This concise but spiritually rich text the Training of Humanity Against the Traits of Satan was composed in 1827 after Shaykh Abdullahi had retired from active rule of the Gwandu Province of the western Sokoto Caliphate. Shaykh Abdullahi being a master military strategists and statesman composed this entirely spiritual treaties couched in military and political vocabulary. In this amazing work the Professor, as he was called by his colleagues, equates the human being as a government or state, the human heart as its ruler, human reason as the chief minister, the limbs and senses as civil servants and government officials, the corrupt passions as plebian slaves and Satan as the external avowed enemy of the state. This work can be compared to similar works composed in China during the Warring States era and in Japan during the Shogunate era where scholar warriors composed purely esoteric, spiritual and ethical works couched in the language of the Art of War.
Shaykh Abdullahi divided the work into an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion:
Introduction: On the States of the Heart (Ahwaal ‘l-Qalb)
Chapter One: On  the Entrances of Satan Into the Hearts of Humanity
Chapter Two: On the Subtypes of the Heart
Chapter Three: On Disciplining the Soul and Protecting It From Its Illnesses
Conclusion: On the Disciplining of Children

The Clausewitzian Center of Gravity (COG) concept is central in western military strategic thinking and serves as a core concept in military planning.  However, several interpretations of the concept exist, which contributes to theoretical as well as practical confusion.  Moreover, the concept receives critique such as “it is so abstract to be meaningless,” “it fails to provide convincing evidence for its use at the strategic level of war,” “there is a lack of interdisciplinary awareness,” it is an analogy tailored to Prussian military challenges in the early 19th Century, etc.  This article contributes to the discussion by combining the COG concept with strategic theory, hereby addressing many of the raised critique points.  The article presents three COG-Strategy schools, centered on different/competing interpretations of the Clausewitzian Center of Gravity (CoG) concept as well as different approaches to strategy.  Each CoG-strategy school is rooted in the experiences as well as the historical roles of the individual U.S. military services and expresses a distinct, ideal-type way of fighting and winning wars.  The article finishes with a discussion of how the COG concept can connect a grand strategy to the military strategy.  For this purpose, it introduces the Will and Ability COG concept, which belongs to COG-Strategy school three (see below).  The Will and Ability COG concept provides strategists a method for designing war winning strategies that focus on inducing a policy change by the adversary leadership and on defeating the adversary’s strategy, starting at the grand strategic level of war and with the lower levels providing increasingly more details to various elements of the grand strategy.

The submitted article deals with the question whether the Security strategy, the Defense strategy and the Military strategy of the Slovak Republic are capable to influence the activities of the public authorities of the Slovak Republic, as well as the question whether the fact, that these documents are approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic, af-fects their enforceability.

The West has been witnessing a concerning trend of Russian penetration into South Eastern Europe, more palpably since 2008. The beginning of the implementation of the South Stream gas pipeline project seems to have marked a "stealthy" shift in the regional balance. Also, as Russia continues with its global "politicisation" of energy resources and strategic wielding of non-military power other relevant aspects of its Balkan strategy -- most notably its post-1999 defence ties with Serbia as its regional bastion No.1 -- are often overlooked. Russia's Balkan and eastern Mediterranean pattern of resurgence inevitably raises the general question of the western strategic dilemma with the "awakening bear."

In the rush to the Rhine, the US Army stormed into the dense Hurtgen Forest in an attempt to take the strategic towns of Aachen and Schmidt; in doing so, it sacrificed advantages in manpower and materiel, and was left with a Great War-style battle of attrition against a well- prepared and fortified Wehrmacht.  Strategic setbacks may have been avoided had the US Army attempted to contain, and not invest, the Hurtgen Forest.

Military operations by their very nature are complex 1 and require high levels of cooperation, even between members of a single service who are of the same mind-set. Furthermore, the force generated to fulfil a military response is more than likely to be joint and ultimately multinational joint, requiring interoperability between the constituent force elements from land, sea, and air forces. Consequently, when members of different services come together (let alone different nationalities), each with their own environmental mind-set, effective cooperation is even more challenging, underpinning the usual systems and technical interoperability issues. These mind-sets (termed air-mindedness 2 in the air force) are largely influenced by our physical perspective. In the army it might be the next hill, in the navy the horizon of sea and sky, and in the air force, it is virtually boundless. It would seem then, that in addition to these discrete environmental mind-sets, we should strive to instil a joint mind-set as a foundation for joint interoperability at all levels. As a starter, we need to think about what joint interoperability is.

The new challenges of post cold war world have changed military strat-egy of modern great powers including the United States. Author treats mili-tary strategy as a part of American «grand strategy». Main attention he paid to evolution of three elements of military strategy: comprehension of threats, strategic/operational concepts, and military reforms.
The first chapter describes levels of strategic analysis and reveals factors shaping modern military strategy. The last comprise trends of global development, strategic environment, grand strategy, and traditions of strategic thinking.
The second chapter investigates how American military perceived threats to national security before and after 9/11. Obviously, the switch to terrorism and soft security engendered the ambiguity in selecting of criteria for the use of force. The principle of threat estimation has been changed from state-centric approach to challenges from global trends, rouge states, and non-state actors, which are able to use asymmetric methods of warfare and/or terror. Homeland security became the first priority task for American security.
The third chapter depicts evolution of strategic concepts (selective en-gagement, preventive defense, preemptive actions), operational concepts of transformation (forward deterrence, joint operations, information operations, operations other than war), and nuclear strategy. American strategy tends to the use of brigade-type mobile light forces both in regional conflicts and wide range of peace-time military operations. The role of special operation forces and expeditionary abilities of regular forces arose significantly. Modern military strategy makes emphasize on operational rather than overall strategic concepts because the United States still have no comparable challenger.
The forth chapter deals with military reforms: «base force», «the bottom up review», «transformation» (joint force), and «new triad». American strategy implies building-up a global military structure providing global strike in critical regions: Europe, North-East Asia, Middle East, and the littoral of East Asia. Department of Defense intended to win any adversary shortly by the use of relatively small but more mobile and flexible forces. The benefits of American force derives from combination of joint force doctrine, high-tech weapons, global military presence, and integrated combat command system called C4ISR (control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Its main vulnerable points are military infrastructure facilities located abroad and dependency on sophisticated information and communication technologies.
Military doctrines and force structure clear support hegemonic strategy of the United States. Apparently, new President of the United States B. Obama will not change main parameters of military strategy in spite of his liberal rhetoric. The United States will continue penetration in Central Asia and Caucasus to strengthen control over Eurasia. While Russia is still within eyeshot of military, the focus of American strategy is shifting to China as potential regional and further global challenger.

Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books. However, hybrid warfare is a concept as controversial as it is popular. Frequently criticized for being ambiguous and weak as a concept, it carries the risk of misleading the defence community and obscuring the sound strategic thought. Carrying out a content analysis over 66 media items, this study has demonstrated that hybrid warfare is indeed an ambiguous concept. It is revealed that the authors used hybrid warfare term in its true meaning only 20 (30%) media items. Most of the time (70%), the authors imply another concept when they use hybrid warfare. We believe, it is high time that international defence community built consensus over the actual meaning of hybrid warfare.

This article provides an analysis of the problematic of foresight in traditional Chinese thought, articulating it with current developments in the epistemology of futures studies, planning theory, and strategic management. It is argued that in Chinese thought the answer to the question " Can the future be predicted? " depends on the forecasting horizon: whereas the immediate future can be sensed and taken advantage of by immersing oneself in the evolving situation, the remote future is fundamentally unpredictable. These dual answers are entrenched in discussions of what constitutes wisdom, opening up productive spaces of encounter between the problematic of foresight and the problematic of wisdom. https://doi.org/10.6531/JFS.2018.22(3).00A35

Abstract: Future Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) will use the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) for their command and control needs. This study examines this automated decision support system for command and control: the Global Command and Control ...